Beyond Visual Range Air combat is an extremely complex affair with number of variables. I have read through some materials over the internet and I would like to share it in context of JF-17.
Visual range means an object which could be seen through human eye. Generally it is considered “BVR” beyond 37 kilometers but these figures vary w.r.t. weather, light conditions and size of an aircraft. The plane with a size of MIG-21 could be seen in ideal conditions at 9-10km while SU-30 at 15km or so.
@ If a BVR missile has a stated range of 100kms, its effective range against a fighter is ~ 20kms (1/5th)
@ BVR missiles follow ballistic trajectories. The motor burns out in initial 10-12 seconds (10-12kms) after launch. At that point the missile is at its top acceleration with minimum mass (as motor fuel is gone). However, it starts to decelerate with each passing seconds. Missile ranges are max at high altitude. If a fighter plane receives an early warning of missile lock, it could choose to outrun or out maneuver the missile. Simply by diving to low altitude could make the missile lose 25% of its range.
@ g forces in tracking turn are a square of speed. If a fighter plane pulls 9gs at 0.9 mach speeds, while taking sharp turn, a chasing missile with 3 mach speed would need to pull 100 g to match the turn. AIM-120 with a Mach 4 speed could pull 30 g.
@ Active sensors during combat are quickly detected by EW suites of opponent.
@ Out of 41 kills in Desert Storm, 16 involved use of BVR shots, but only five kills were made at BVR. Longest BVR shot was at 29kms
@ 24 radar-guided missile kills out of 88 shots gives Pk of 27%
@ F-15s killed 23 targets in 67 shots with AIM-7 (Pk 0.34). Sidewinder launches from F-15 resulted in 8 kills from 12 shots (Pk 0.67)
@ F-16s launched 36 Sidewinders and scored 0 kills
@ During Kosovo campaign against Serbia in 1999, AIM-120 achieved Pk of 0.46 (6 kills out of 13 shots). It also achieved the longest ranged air-to-air combat kill ever, when a Dutch F-16 shot down a (malfunctioning and no maneuvering) Serb MiG-29 at 34.8 kms
Targets in most of the cases were unaware of being fired at and did not take any evasive action; mostly targets have no electronic countermeasures and support of jammers. When targets got aware and took evasive actions, the results were different.
@ Iraqi pilots also were badly trained, and most Iraqi jets did not have bubble canopy like F-16 thus lack of rearward visibility.
On January 5th 1999, two MiG-25s (equipped with radars illuminated US fighters) and violated southern “no-fly” zone, and succeeded at evading 3 AIM-7, 1 AIM-120 and 2 AIM-54 missiles, all fired by US fighters from beyond visual range.
These results immediately point to AIM-7s operational tests, when it achieved 50% to 60% Pk against non-maneuvering drone targets.
@ As per Air power Australia report, missiles have demonstrated 0.34 – 0.46 Pk against non-maneuvering opponents with no ECM; 0.46 figure is for AIM-120. Thus 54% miss value is attributed to factors that have no connection to ECM or maneuvering. Out of remaining 46%, there is 93% for chance of miss. Thus BVR missile Pk against aware, maneuvering opponent using modern ECM suite is around 3%. Considering that most opponents shot at by BVR missiles during Cold War had no ECM, and some at least did not notice a missile, thus failing to take evasive action, this can be considered to be in line with demonstrated Pk.
State of Serbian Air force prior to NATO operations in 1999:
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_380.shtml
“even if from around 1996 they started suffering from a latent lack of spares, which severely impacted the capability of the service to maintain them.”
MiG-29s were badly maintained.
“Eventually, the cancellation of the development of Novi Avion resulted in MiG-29s remaining in service with the JRViPVO until the late 1990s, and well past their resources. To make matters worse, the corrupt regime of the Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic was more concerned with own survival and to reinforce riot-police and similar services, or finance the aggression war in Bosnia but with the maintenance of MiGs. Consequently, when Serbia found itself confronted with the NATO, in 1998, the condition of the MiGs with the 127.LAE was very poor, and its pilots were flying barely 20 hours annually.”
Pilots were not experienced in flying the aircraft.
“As only few aircraft were considered operational (they were actually merely flyable)”
Aircraft merely flyable, AKA not in condition for combat.
“Maj. Ljubisa Kulacin evaded several missiles fired at him while fighting to bring his malfunctioning systems back in working order”
Kulacin evaded several missiles despite equipment malfunction.
“Kulacin’s experience was not much different to that of his three other colleagues, all of which experienced immense problems with weapons and navigational systems on their aircraft: on the 18112, flown by Maj. Arizanov, both the radio and SPO-15 malfunctioned; on 18104, flown by Maj. Ilic, the radar failed; on 18111, flown by Maj. Nikolic, both the radar and the SN-29 missile guidance systems were inoperative, and apparently the
SPO-15 also did not function properly.”
At least 4 MiG-29s had equipment malfunctions, two cases of radar malfunction and two cases of RWR malfunction.
“The fifth and last MiG-29 to get airborne on that night was 18106, flown by Maj. Predrag Milutinovic. Immediately after take-off his radar failed and even the electrical generator malfunctioned. Shortly after, he was warned by SPO-15 of being acquired, but he evaded the opponent by several evasive manoeuvres. Attempting to evade further encounters and searching for an airfield where a landing was possible, he finally ended over Ribarska Banja, when his RWR warned him of acquisition by a ground-based radar. Seconds afterward the aircraft was hit and Milutinovic forced to eject. ”
Radar failure, electric generator malfunction. Evaded several enemy missiles and was shot down by friendly SAM.
“Once there, the GCI advised them that both were detected by the NATO aircraft, but would not indicate the kind of a threat. This was a tragic mistake: Maj. Peric led his wingman into a climb, and straight into three AIM-120 missiles fired by two USAF F-15Cs that were on a patrol over Tuzla. Two missiles hit home, destroying both MiGs: after evading one AIM-120, Maj. Peric’s aircraft was hit and he ejected safely, but Capt. Radosavljevic was killed.”
Apparently no missile or radar warner.
No quotes indicate existence of countermeasures, and many of MiGs had no radar warners either. At least two MiG-29 kills happened at visual range, too, as photos exist.
Excerpts taken from an article
https://defenseissues.net/2013/04/27/usefulness-of-bvr-combat/
@gambit @Horus @Dazzler @Khafee
@khanasifm @HRK @Bilal Khan (Quwa) @JamD
Your expert views please.