surprisingly, where would u get the exact location from reagarding nuclear installations of iran???. dont tell me it would be ur intelligence
No surprises at all. There are several crucial points of production in any nuclear refinement process that Israel could target. Of course their potential delays in the production line will differ.
On the front end of the production line are the mining and conversion facilities. Ore production is at the Estafahan Nuclear Technology Research Center (ENTC). Another R/D facility that provides continuous support for the miniaturization process important for warhead builds is the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). Another good target is the Natanz centrifuge facility. Centrifuges spinning at 60k+ rpm cannot be disturbed by voltage spikes or seismological activities. Both can be produced by exploding bombs. Industrial scale activities and facilities such as mining cannot be hidden. The world knows their locations, least of all thru google.maps, eh?
At the Estafahan facility, the enrichment processes that turn raw uranium into gaseous uranium, uranium hexaflouride (UF6), is vulnerable. The processes are nominally circular. Raw gas is looped until the final product is about %19 U235 by weight. To produce electricity, %5-19 enrichment level will work and there is an inverse relationship between size and concentration, or enrichment level. The point that attracts global, and potentially hostile, attention is %20 enrichment because that level of U235 concentration is conducive for an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction. Deployable nuclear weapons must be at %90 enrichment in a chunk of uranium in order to be fitted into a modern warhead assembly. Little Boy destroyed Hiroshima with 60kg of total uranium quantity and look up the size of that bomb. For limited space consideration, nuclear reactors at sea uses %90 enrichment level, the same as nuclear missile warheads.
A 'warhead' is not the same as an explosive nuclear device. The Manhattan Project that gave US Fat Man and Little Boy originally had each explosive device the size of a room. What we call 'weaponization' is when we refine the components into a deliverable package. War time necessities demanded that once Little Boy's components were able to be fitted into a package that could be fitted into a B-29's bomb bay, the weaponization process ends for that particular bomb. Higher than %20 uranium enrichment level is a crucial part of the weaponization process and
IF the requirement is to have a missile package, it will take longer to achieve %90 enrichment level for any weight of uranium and longer to refine the components into a missile warhead. Destruction or severe damage to the refinement facility will set Iran back who knows how many years but it will be years to rebuild including the time trying to find anyone who will sell those refinement equipments again.
For the Natanz centrifuge facility, the IAEA's estimate has about 1,200 centrifuges above ground as initial or 'seeder' enrichment line for the unconfirmed tens of thousands centrifuges below ground in hardened containment. Centrifuges spins at the minimum of 60k rpm and at that speed special metals are required to withstand rotational stresses. The special metal for the centrifuges is called 'maraging steel'...
Maraging steel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Large quantity of purchase of maraging steel will attract attention. That is why Saddam Hussein's chief nuclear scientist, Mahdi Obeidi, bought them in the black market through unscrupulous European connections who knew exactly what Iraq wanted to do with the alloy.
USCC - Testimony of Milhollin Page
3. Maraging steel
Maraging steel is a high strength steel used to make solid rocket motor cases, propellant tanks, and interstages for missiles. Like carbon fibers, it is used to make centrifuge rotors for enriching uranium for nuclear weapons. In 1986, a Pakistani-born Canadian businessman tried to smuggle 25 tons of this steel out of the United States to Pakistans nuclear weapon program. He was sentenced to prison as a result. Maraging steel has been controlled for export since January 1981.
This steel is produced by companies in France, Japan, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States and it meets all the criteria for mass market status. Several steel companies list maraging steel on the Internet and can produce maraging steel in multi-ton quantities. Over the telephone, two American companies and one British company explained to my staff how to order 25 ton quantities with delivery in less than a month. Maraging steel is bundled and shipped much like stainless steel, which it closely resembles.
Magnetic bearings are needed for effective centrifuge operations...
Magnetic bearing - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A magnetic bearing is a bearing which supports a load using magnetic levitation. Magnetic bearings support moving machinery without physical contact, for example, they can levitate a rotating shaft and permit relative motion without friction or wear. They are in service in such industrial applications as electric power generation, petroleum refining, machine tool operation and natural gas pipelines. They are also used in the Zippe-type centrifuge [1] used for uranium enrichment. Magnetic bearings are used in turbomolecular pumps where oil-lubricated bearings are a source of contamination. Magnetic bearings support the highest speeds of any kind of bearing; they have no known maximum relative speed.
Any kind of voltage instability will make a centrifuge spin out of control and disrupt the particular 'stage' and the uranium gas for that stage will have to be 're-stage' to another group. That can be time consuming.
So just for the front end of Iran's nuclear weapons program we already have several points of attack that would definitvely have negative consequences for the program. The extent of those negative consequences, time wise for rebuilding, is of course a variable. Severe damages to the mining point will not be difficult, will maximize Iran's setback over time, but does nothing to delay the current uranium flow. Severe damages to the refinement/enrichment point will be more difficult to achieve but would have an immediate stoppage effect on the program. The cost to rebuild will be high with increased damaged or destroyed centrifuges and more resources will be diverted to further hardened the facility.
At the back end of the weapons program will be the plutonium use to make a nuclear warhead. Plutonium is the product of uranium reactors. These nuclear weapons require the services of a heavy water reactor running plutonium-239 and/or -240. Heavy water, like maraging steel, is under IAEA's watch list. The Arak plant is a viable target. The Bushehr plant is not as viable because it is already under heavy IAEA supervision with the Russian's cooperation since it is their responsbility to remove the spent plutonium from Iran. Plus the plutonium produced there is not as high quality since Bushehr is light water.
Bushehr - Iran Nuclear Reactor
In January 1995, Russia and Iran signed a contract under which Russia would provide one VVER-1000 (aka WWER-1000) 950-1,073 MWe (electrical) light water reactor at Bushehr.
That leave Arak...
Arak - Iran Special Weapons Facilities
Heavy water was used to moderate the nuclear chain reaction in one type of nuclear reactor, that could be used either for civilian power production or to produce bomb materials. The nuclear reactor then under construction at Bushehr does not use heavy water, nor did existing Iranian research reactors need it in amounts that would justify construction of such a facility.
This is why no one in the defense and nuclear business really believe Iran is pursuing nuclear technology solely for energy related national issues. Unlike ships at sea, space is not an issue on land and less than %20 uranium enrichment is more than adequate for Iran's energy needs and Iran is an oil export to boot. Plutonium separation from spent fuel is good for either nuclear weapons build or R/D. Iranians can lie to the world with a straight face about what to do with the Arak plutonium all they want. None will believe the mullahs. Who will after seeing all those Photochopped missile launches?
GBU-39/B, GBU-40/42/B Small Diameter Bomb I/II
The cited blast radius is 26 ft (cf 82 ft with 2,000-lb JDAM). Boeing claim the ability to penetrate more than 5 ft of steel reinforced concrete making the SDB competitive against the BLU-109/B for many targets.
The SDB will be most effective in the urban and broader close air support, battlefield interdiction, Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (DEAD) lethal suppression and counter-air strike airfield attack roles. Against soft skinned vehicles and structures, armour, point emplacements, runways, aircraft shelters and SAM/SPAAG systems this weapon will be highly lethal.
Where the SDB will be less than effective is against deep / hardened bunkers, large infrastructure targets, large buildings, industrial plant, bridges, large trench systems, vehicle parks, infantry on the move and other area or large point targets. These remain the domain of larger specialised bunker busting weapons, or large explosive bombs such as the Mk.83/BLU-110 (1,000 lb), Mk.84/BLU-117/BLU-119 (2,000 lb), BLU-109/116/118 (2,000 lb), BLU-113/122 (5,000 lb).
Despite Natanz's centrifuges being deeper underground than the penetrative power of a single SDB, do not forget that with Osirak using 'dumb' bombs, Israeli pilots managed to deliver sequential bombs into a single opening on the dome at Osirak. Explosive force, like water and electricity, always seek the path of least resistance. The delivery of these 'dumb' bombs into a single opening mean for each bomb, there is only one small least resistive path, maximizing the power of each bomb to destroy in a confined area.
One SDB after another can explosively 'drill' thru the hardened concrete. Once inside, any bomb can create sufficient concussive force against the walls to initiate and possibly collapse of the chamber that house these centrifuge stages. The SDBs can also destroy and damage a good deal of these centrifuges. At the same time, another attack force, also using SDBs, can strike the Estafahan mining facility, destroying some and damaging other equipments. The Arak plutonium facility is an option as without uranium fuel, no plutonium can be extracted. However, we cannot not rule out the possibility that some uranium fuel have been processed in secret and the plutonium extract hidden elsewhere. This could constitute a later date threat for Israel.
The F-16s will be the main ground strike aircrafts. Protection escorts will be F-15s and they can also be fitted with SDBs, although in lesser loads. If the Israelis encounter Iranian fighters, the F-15s can discard their SDBs and engage the Iranians. If no Iranian fighters, the F-15s can deliver their SDBs on the planned ground targets for good measure. The Israelis are willing to lose men over this and the attack will be successful.
.....trust me, they are one determined nation with one determined army. Iran is a big country but that is not an obstacle as far as modern warfare is concerned. Also Israel will have the laxury of indirect support from international community if they are attacking Iran's nuclear plants.
It won't stop at conventional warfare.
