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Pakistan is in a fluid, fast-changing position which contains within it a vast array of possibilities. Outer world ought to be paying close attention:
LIKE all else around it, How stable is the Pakistani state? Is there a risk of the state disintegrating in the face of ethnic and religious challenges? How much of a threat are Islamist political formations, as well as their supporters within the military, likely to pose to it in years to come? How likely is Pakistan to be able to negotiate successfully the economic challenges before it? And what prospects are there for the emergence of a durable, democratic political system in the country? The Pakistan movement bequeathed to the country multiple, often conflicting, identities: one that was culturally Indian, even if in opposition to Hindus; as a re-born version of the Mughal states; as an heir to the Raj; as a flag-bearer of the destiny of the wider Muslim ummah. Battered by multiple crises in the first few decades of its existence, notably but not only confined to the secession of Bangladesh, Pakistan never wholly succeeded in arriving at a comfortable sense of its raison d'etre as a nation-state, or in reaching a point where the question itself did not matter.
In Feb. 2005, CIA report predicts that Pakistan may well come apart in the next decade. Corruption and poor government are making Islamic radicalism more popular, especially in the Pushtun (northwest) and Baluchi (southwest) tribal areas. Most of the population is not tribal. In fact, about have the population is in one province, Punjab. When India and Pakistan were formed in 1947, Punjab was split, with about 70 percent of it going to Pakistan. The Indian portion, with better government and less corruption, has done more than twice as well as the Pakistani part (on a per-capita basis). India also has problems with tribal separatists (in the northeast), but in Pakistan the tribes comprise a larger portion of the population (at least ten percent.) It's expensive to fight the tribes, and the Baluchis are eager to take control of the lucrative natural gas fields operating in Baluchistan. The CIA report sees the country coming apart along ethnic lines, much like Yugoslavia did in the 1990s. This would create a Punjabi state, with at least half the population, plus Pushtun and Baluchi states, plus one or two more. The big question is what would happen to Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
The Pakistanis dismiss the report, pointing out that, while they created the mess, they've also learned to deal with it.
The Army, the political parties, political Islam, regional identity and the economy hold the keys to Pakistan's future.
While Pakistan's Army is unlikely to be hijacked by Islamists, it is also improbable that opportunities to harass India will be passed by. Its opportunistic alliances with Islamists, too, are likely to continue. Given the Army's vision of itself as a guardian of Pakistan's ideological frontiers, it is important to ask what might happen if the détente process leads to a point where the Army's central role in the affairs of the state comes under serious question. "Regardless of what may be desirable, "the Army will continue to set the limits on what is possible in Pakistan."
History provides some illuminating insights into President Pervez Musharraf's vision for Pakistan; much of what Musharraf stands for. Musharraf's notions of basic democracy have served to weaken both the political system and the bureaucracy. As Pakistan's Army has demonstrated no greater ability to solve the nation's problems than other institutions, the challenges to its authority are likely to mount. How the Pakistani state negotiates these tensions will be key, will it lurch towards the religious Right? Resort to greater authoritarianism? Or democratize?
Although religious fundamentalists do not command the mass constituency needed to pose a serious threat to the existence of the state, the turbulence in Pakistani society makes it likely that "the recruiting base of its Islamist radicals is likely to expand". At once, the closing of doors in the West, particularly to non-resident Pakistanis, has meant that growing numbers of people find the notion of "a civilization war between Islam and an unholy Christian-Jewish-Hindu alliance" plausible. As with the potential Islamist influence on elements in Pakistan's armed forces, this could have a serious long-term impact.
Pakistan has provoked feelings of both "hope and frustration". Once regarded as a model for emerging states - bureaucrats from East Asia used to visit Pakistan prior to 1971 for lessons in economic development - the country now faces severe economic challenges, notwithstanding the massive flows of Western aid that have pulled it out of its perilous situation of 2001-02. Nonetheless, its educational system is in the midst of a serious crisis, and the government's efforts to improve administration and end corruption have yielded only limited gains.
Ethnicity, sectarianism and economic instability are fundamental variables of internal security threats to Pakistan. Religious extremism has created an unenviable image of Pakistan in the eyes of the rest of the world and has affected the country adversely. At the same time inter-provincial grievances could potentially cause serious damage to the federation. Despite recent economic recovery and sound macro policies, the absence of genuine socio- economic development has provided ethno-sectarian elements and regional forces grounds to exploit and weaken Pakistan internally. Ethno- sectarian problems are major security threats to Pakistan and will remain a huge impediment to the goals of economic prosperity. Interdependence of these multifaceted threats and their overall impact on internal security must be in focus when analyze solutions.
Pakistan needs to address these national security threats and find a viable solution in a reasonable timeframe to find its rightful place in the community of modern nations. The immediate requirement is to restore Constitution, reinstate parted judiciary, enforce rule of law, introduce political, economic and education reforms and lastly introduce fresh incentives for socio-economic development, and take bold initiatives to obviate present and future threats.
LIKE all else around it, How stable is the Pakistani state? Is there a risk of the state disintegrating in the face of ethnic and religious challenges? How much of a threat are Islamist political formations, as well as their supporters within the military, likely to pose to it in years to come? How likely is Pakistan to be able to negotiate successfully the economic challenges before it? And what prospects are there for the emergence of a durable, democratic political system in the country? The Pakistan movement bequeathed to the country multiple, often conflicting, identities: one that was culturally Indian, even if in opposition to Hindus; as a re-born version of the Mughal states; as an heir to the Raj; as a flag-bearer of the destiny of the wider Muslim ummah. Battered by multiple crises in the first few decades of its existence, notably but not only confined to the secession of Bangladesh, Pakistan never wholly succeeded in arriving at a comfortable sense of its raison d'etre as a nation-state, or in reaching a point where the question itself did not matter.
In Feb. 2005, CIA report predicts that Pakistan may well come apart in the next decade. Corruption and poor government are making Islamic radicalism more popular, especially in the Pushtun (northwest) and Baluchi (southwest) tribal areas. Most of the population is not tribal. In fact, about have the population is in one province, Punjab. When India and Pakistan were formed in 1947, Punjab was split, with about 70 percent of it going to Pakistan. The Indian portion, with better government and less corruption, has done more than twice as well as the Pakistani part (on a per-capita basis). India also has problems with tribal separatists (in the northeast), but in Pakistan the tribes comprise a larger portion of the population (at least ten percent.) It's expensive to fight the tribes, and the Baluchis are eager to take control of the lucrative natural gas fields operating in Baluchistan. The CIA report sees the country coming apart along ethnic lines, much like Yugoslavia did in the 1990s. This would create a Punjabi state, with at least half the population, plus Pushtun and Baluchi states, plus one or two more. The big question is what would happen to Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
The Pakistanis dismiss the report, pointing out that, while they created the mess, they've also learned to deal with it.
The Army, the political parties, political Islam, regional identity and the economy hold the keys to Pakistan's future.
While Pakistan's Army is unlikely to be hijacked by Islamists, it is also improbable that opportunities to harass India will be passed by. Its opportunistic alliances with Islamists, too, are likely to continue. Given the Army's vision of itself as a guardian of Pakistan's ideological frontiers, it is important to ask what might happen if the détente process leads to a point where the Army's central role in the affairs of the state comes under serious question. "Regardless of what may be desirable, "the Army will continue to set the limits on what is possible in Pakistan."
History provides some illuminating insights into President Pervez Musharraf's vision for Pakistan; much of what Musharraf stands for. Musharraf's notions of basic democracy have served to weaken both the political system and the bureaucracy. As Pakistan's Army has demonstrated no greater ability to solve the nation's problems than other institutions, the challenges to its authority are likely to mount. How the Pakistani state negotiates these tensions will be key, will it lurch towards the religious Right? Resort to greater authoritarianism? Or democratize?
Although religious fundamentalists do not command the mass constituency needed to pose a serious threat to the existence of the state, the turbulence in Pakistani society makes it likely that "the recruiting base of its Islamist radicals is likely to expand". At once, the closing of doors in the West, particularly to non-resident Pakistanis, has meant that growing numbers of people find the notion of "a civilization war between Islam and an unholy Christian-Jewish-Hindu alliance" plausible. As with the potential Islamist influence on elements in Pakistan's armed forces, this could have a serious long-term impact.
Pakistan has provoked feelings of both "hope and frustration". Once regarded as a model for emerging states - bureaucrats from East Asia used to visit Pakistan prior to 1971 for lessons in economic development - the country now faces severe economic challenges, notwithstanding the massive flows of Western aid that have pulled it out of its perilous situation of 2001-02. Nonetheless, its educational system is in the midst of a serious crisis, and the government's efforts to improve administration and end corruption have yielded only limited gains.
Ethnicity, sectarianism and economic instability are fundamental variables of internal security threats to Pakistan. Religious extremism has created an unenviable image of Pakistan in the eyes of the rest of the world and has affected the country adversely. At the same time inter-provincial grievances could potentially cause serious damage to the federation. Despite recent economic recovery and sound macro policies, the absence of genuine socio- economic development has provided ethno-sectarian elements and regional forces grounds to exploit and weaken Pakistan internally. Ethno- sectarian problems are major security threats to Pakistan and will remain a huge impediment to the goals of economic prosperity. Interdependence of these multifaceted threats and their overall impact on internal security must be in focus when analyze solutions.
Pakistan needs to address these national security threats and find a viable solution in a reasonable timeframe to find its rightful place in the community of modern nations. The immediate requirement is to restore Constitution, reinstate parted judiciary, enforce rule of law, introduce political, economic and education reforms and lastly introduce fresh incentives for socio-economic development, and take bold initiatives to obviate present and future threats.