maybe yes maybe no
US intelligence agencies have assessed that Saudi Arabia is now actively manufacturing its own ballistic missiles with the help of China, CNN has learned, a development that could have significant ripple effects across the Middle East and complicate the Biden administration's efforts to restrain...
edition.cnn.com
Nowhere the article you posted (common knowledge) mentions that KSA is operating/building any other missile than DF-21C that they have long been known to possess via purchase from China. Also nowhere it is mentioned that TEL numbers have increased or even seen being deployed. Its common knowledge for 8-10 years now that KSA has possessed DF-21C with a range of 1700 KM and a CEP of 50-100m which CIA ensured cant carry any CBRN warhead. No single satellite or test firing evidence suggests they even have a TEL for that missile. They possess 12 x TEL of DF-3 that they may have been converted but no evidence exists for that. The same KSA was giving money to Ukraine to make a SRBM for them just recently.
You are going to pit that in a missile exchange against IRGC Aerospace Force? Thats like pitting an MMA champion against a street thug.
as i said how many time they failed and how many time they succeed
Qiam-I/Burkan broke through the shield many times, there are pics and videos of landing warheads ... would it be difficult for KS or Qassem glide vehicles with quasi ballistic or depressed skip glide trajectories to achieve that what Qiam-I has achieved many times? Them deployed with Emad-II TRV/MaRV and a bunch of loitering drones can easily massacre MIM-104 and even THAAD which has a ... few weaknesses (separate topic)
Th four FABs will not stand by the end of the episode. Like I said Iran will take blows too but at the end of the day IADS of Iran will sustain through Ambush HIMADS, SHORADS and track radars while the attack capability will sustain itself through underground infrastructure and mobile TELS. The attack capability of PGCC will be gone as four FABs will be destroyed.
that is an interesting missile , how many day after the attack iran responded ? why you believe this time will be faster.
Terrorist militias are hard to target. In case of ISIS, IRGC waited for the targets to gather at one place. You cant say same about the conventional military of PGCC. Their FABs, military installments, HOH resources, oil fields and terminals are not hiding anywhere, they are there and will stay there during conflict for IRGC to target. The same can't be said about ISIS or PJAK.
their base is gone but also this can be said about Iranian under ground missile bases will be out of question .
PGCC does not have the following to ensure complete destruction of IRGC attack capabilities
1) Not enough accurate BM, CEP of 50-100 with conventional warhead wont hurt IRGC.
2) The attack trajectory is Ballistic, not quasi, not depressed, not glide but conventional ballastic which is not something that S-300 PMU2 or Bavar-373 can't intercept. DF-21C's terminal speed is not high.
2) They never had any proper Missile exercise where use of TEL BM has been seen (they had weird ones with Somalia and Sudan involving helis) while IRGC holds missile exercises like people visit their friends.
3) There is no evidence of them fielding or deploying Missiles forces. Not a single TEL picture or use of missiles on Houthis either.
4) The range of SOWs are short , highest 250 KM with Storm Shadow. To fire SOWs at any useful target inside Iran the 15-25 m2 RCS bearing Tornado or F-15 will have to get very close to the target where IADS can deal with them.
do you believe USA already didn't shared its satellite imagery of these underground bases with ksa , do you think they are not already aware of their entrance .
and what will they use to attack that entrance? You do realise we are talking about a force that has failed to stop Houthis from launching BM from TELs next door in 8 years but somehow you are assuming that the same force (failed to destroy TELs of Houthis) will destroy IRGC's underground bases, mobile TEL, multilaunchers on surface in few minutes?
you think how long it take for ksa to fix its base
If Comm towers, aircraft hangars, fuel depots, armoury is gone then it may take weeks.
, you want fuel , they can send some tanker as stopgap for the refueling capacity of the base ,
According to you few F-15 of KSA will land on a highways somewhere far away from the reach of IRGC missiles/UCAVs with:
-no fuel
-no weapons
-Tired pilots
-no quick mechanical check/fix equipment
-no new mission briefing
And you are saying that magically within few mins or hours all of that can be provided.
HOW?
and the runway can be fixed in 2-3 hours now answer me how many hours it take to clear the entrance of those bases if they get bombed.
According to you KSA
- Can land their jets in dessert on highways
- Magically transport A2A, A2G weapons, Fuel, New pilots, mechanical checkup equipment to them
- Rebuild their control towers, fuel depots, runways
- Can target Iranian bases with some unknown missiles and SOWS that (a) have the CEP of less than 10m to destroy the entrances (b) Have the range and trajectories to get pass Iranian IADs
I think Russia should hire KSA to win them Ukraine and couple of other countries.
no, relying on air defense is not the answer they never will be able to prevent those base from being bombed , its air force that can do that.
here, I am probably the biggest supporter of the survival of IRIAF as a potent interceptor force so your comment should be directed toward those who do not believe in IRIAF's role, people who think purchasing heavy attack aircrafts with large RCS for 85 million USD per unit is the solution.
by our current strategy in case of enemy attack we only can rely on t6he missiles which are on tels outside those bases in case of enemy attack
For attack we can totally rely upon our missile and UCAV arsenal but not for defense. IRIAF should be revived as an interceptor force of atleast 240 light fighters with lowest possible RCS, top-notch radars, ECCM packages, e-warefare suits, longest possible BVR, all aspect WVR missiles. Aircrafts that can TDL with IADs, and need not much maintenance. I am defining a force built on:
F-14AM
MIG-29M/35
Kowsar-I/II
WingmentUCAVs
For attack we have the following:
BM force for Mobile TEL+ Underground Silos
- Ballistic (3000 KM) MaRV
- Quasi Ballistic (1400 KM) MaRV/TRV
- Glide/Skip Glide (1400-1800 KM) MaRV
- AL-Ballistic (150 KM)
CM force
Mobile multitube LA-CM (1450 KM)
Fighter Launched CM (1000 KM)
Submarine launched (future)
UCAV launched CM (200 KM)
Glide PGM (100+ KM)
Loitering UCAV SWARM
2500 KM
did the base destroyed ? did it stop work ?
If it was an Airbase housing fighter jets yes it would have stopped working for quite some time. A disaster in war. 30-40 missiles with submunitions, and thermobaric warheads can ruin an airfield.
communication can be fixed with mobile terminals . logistic can be protected . look at those zolfaqar craters , do you believe they can penetrate underground reinforced craters. how many we used to attack a reinforced structure in iraqi kurdistan
No evidence exists of PGCC using underground infrastructure at their TABs/FABs. All their aircraft are in nonprotected bunkers and use pretty much-fixed infrastructure. Not a single shred of evidence exists for the mobile strategy you are assuming they would suddenly unleash on Iran.
by the way around those bases is desert , they just can disperse the logistic around those bases in desert in small caches
Evidence of them using mobile comm towers and radars?
Here is my claim, even their AD infrastructure is not mobile compared to Ambush SAM strategy of Iran. You are welcome to prove me wrong.