What's new

Iranian Chill Thread


I don’t think Namer can be equipped with Trophy (or has), but the other point remains valid. Why doesn’t Israel have any Bradley IFVs? Namer is just a Merkava chassis without the turret.

Supposedly “Eitan” is there the next gen APC with a protection system in place, but APS will struggle in tight urban spaces where enemy can be shoot from extremely close range. Sending ill equipped APCs alone into hostile land is stupid as hell.

Another point: The death of the elite IDF squad in the Namer APC incident earlier this week was a bad problem for IDF. They switched to this APC and the next gen Eitan, after they were caught using 40+ year old M113’s and one got lit up in 2014 Gaza incursion killing everyone inside. There was outcry why Israel was using such old and lightly armoured APCs for battle.
 
.

PG-7VR warhead for RPG-7/27/29
1699135831703.jpeg


Yassin-105

1699135816693.jpeg



Seem to be pretty similar. If Hamas managed to get the same explosive yield as PG-7VR then that means around ~600mm of penetration power which should be sufficient on nearly all IDF mechanized armour. For M-3/4 that would should be sufficient on any non major reinforced area (front hull/front turret).
 
.
Fascinating how a state that has basically unlimited money and full military partnership with the bests in the world since its creation struggles to mass produce armored vehicles and active protection systems and gets caught by what they call "brainless savages".

I'm glad that Iran will never have to face urban warfare as the attacker and limited ground warfare against a potential agressor.

What i would beg to know is how much Israelis left abroad since the 7th.
 
. . . .
Despite dropping more than 10,000 of very powerful (mostly 2,000lb mk-84) bombs on tiny Gaza in only a few weeks, Hamas/PIJ in Gaza are still able to launch dozens of rockets per day, including long-range rockets to Eilat and Tel Aviv. It's not news, but it's a good example of how survivable even the relatively small, unprotected and primitive tunnels (dug by teenagers for $2 a day) in Gaza are.

Iran needs a modern day Ho Chi Minh trail from Iran to Lebanon. In particular: large fortified tunnel networks in south Iraq, Al Bukamal on the Syria/Iraq border, Aleppo, Homs, the Lebanese Beqaa Valley and south Syria near the occupied Golan Heights.

These tunnel networks can be used to store weapons and assist in the transport of such weapons across the axis of resistance, and help entrench pro-Iranian forces across the region, ensuring their survivability and nullifying Israel's attempts to prevent a permanent (pro-)Iranian presence near the Golan/near their 'borders' generally.

South Iraq is c. 1000km from Eilat/Tel Aviv/Haifa. Al Bukamal is 600km from Tel Aviv. Homs is c. 350km from Tel Aviv. South Syria is the most important (and difficult) location as it is only 150km from Tel Aviv.

Ballistic/cruise missiles and drones (and even small rockets with c. 150km range in the case of south Syria) can be exported and stored in all of these locations in huge numbers in preparation for any potential conflict with Israel.

The Iran-led Axis of Resistance's "Ring of Fire" must be strengthened with a view to ensuring survivability vis-a-vis Israel. Israel can invade south Syria, but it cannot reach Al Bukamal or Aleppo tunnels. Israel can invade south Lebanon but it cannot reach the Beqaa. Israel cannot reach south Iraq or Yemen except for token strikes (which would have no effect on tunnel networks).

The goal isn't to 'defeat' or eliminate Israel in a conventional military offensive, that's not plausible given total US support. But such an enhanced and survivable ring of fire will (1) enhance Iran's deterrence against Israeli airstrikes inside Iran and (2) enhance Iran's ability to strike Israel without entering the war itself.
 
.
Iran needs a modern day Ho Chi Minh trail from Iran to Lebanon. In particular: large fortified tunnel networks in south Iraq, Al Bukamal on the Syria/Iraq border, Aleppo, Homs, the Lebanese Beqaa Valley and south Syria near the occupied Golan Heights.

A couple of hurdles to this idea:

Iraqi government will not allow Iran to build tunnels under their sovereign territory. Let’s say they did, they would be sanctioned by the West severely and the population is already a bit restless in what they see as being caught in a US and Iran proxy war the last 20 years.

The other issue is this is a massive engineering effort with major bottleneck.

It is easier to build a network of small tunnels in a city like Gaza or a suburb of Damascus or the Nazi German tunnel system under Berlin or the Russian tunnel system of Stalin and Cold War era. But to build basically an international subway like network tunnel system that you are alluding to would be a massive endeavor financially and man power wise.

One bunker buster and the tunnel collapses and everything comes to a grinding halt. So you would have to build very deep and very fortified and still there is an unsettling chance of collapse. Whereas the examples I gave above are in a much smaller fixed area allowing the network to be built very densely and multiple interconnected tunnels so even if enemy finds out 25% of the tunnels you have back up options while you attempt to reopen damaged tunnels.

You cannot do that in your example, at least with current technology.
 
.
A couple of hurdles to this idea:

Iraqi government will not allow Iran to build tunnels under their sovereign territory. Let’s say they did, they would be sanctioned by the West severely and the population is already a bit restless in what they see as being caught in a US and Iran proxy war the last 20 years.
PMU/PMF forces would build the tunnels. They already possess Iranian MRAPs, rockets and cruise missiles, I think they can build some tunnels in their areas of control to store them. Iran doesn't need to be directly involved. If Hezbollah and Hamas can build 100km+ of tunnel networks then I think PMU/PMF forces can too
It is easier to build a network of small tunnels in a city like Gaza or a suburb of Damascus or the Nazi German tunnel system under Berlin or the Russian tunnel system of Stalin and Cold War era. But to build basically an international subway like network tunnel system that you are alluding to would be a massive endeavor financially and man power wise.
Indeed, but I don't mean to suggest the tunnels all have to link up. Even a set of independent/separate tunnels located at those key areas would increase the survivability of weapons/forces in those areas and make it easier to transfer weapons across the networks (reducing the amount of time they are exposed to attack from the air).
One bunker buster and the tunnel collapses and everything comes to a grinding halt. So you would have to build very deep and very fortified and still there is an unsettling chance of collapse.
If that was the case I think the Hamas tunnel network would have been destroyed a long time ago. I don't think they are building very deep and I am sure Syrian/Iraqi resistance forces can build at least as fortified tunnels as the tunnels dug by teenagers in Gaza.
Whereas the examples I gave above are in a much smaller fixed area allowing the network to be built very densely and multiple interconnected tunnels so even if enemy finds out 25% of the tunnels you have back up options while you attempt to reopen damaged tunnels.
Why can't this be done in each of the strategic areas I mentioned (as independent networks of tunnels)? South Syria terrain/geography is pretty similar to parts of south Lebanon where Hezbollah has done exactly that.
 
. .
A couple of hurdles to this idea:

Iraqi government will not allow Iran to build tunnels under their sovereign territory. Let’s say they did, they would be sanctioned by the West severely and the population is already a bit restless in what they see as being caught in a US and Iran proxy war the last 20 years.

The other issue is this is a massive engineering effort with major bottleneck.

It is easier to build a network of small tunnels in a city like Gaza or a suburb of Damascus or the Nazi German tunnel system under Berlin or the Russian tunnel system of Stalin and Cold War era. But to build basically an international subway like network tunnel system that you are alluding to would be a massive endeavor financially and man power wise.

One bunker buster and the tunnel collapses and everything comes to a grinding halt. So you would have to build very deep and very fortified and still there is an unsettling chance of collapse. Whereas the examples I gave above are in a much smaller fixed area allowing the network to be built very densely and multiple interconnected tunnels so even if enemy finds out 25% of the tunnels you have back up options while you attempt to reopen damaged tunnels.

You cannot do that in your example, at least with current technology.
Basically instead of a underground highway type system, you'd build a network for separate tunnel systems that can allow safer transport of supplies

A Network south of Damascus & Golan.
A network on the Syria-Iraq border.

You'd have to move supplies by land between the systems, but your logistical footprint would be better hidden, since deeper into Syria, there is less vision. This is achievable if not already done
 
. .

I don’t think Namer can be equipped with Trophy (or has), but the other point remains valid. Why doesn’t Israel have any Bradley IFVs? Namer is just a Merkava chassis without the turret.

Supposedly “Eitan” is there the next gen APC with a protection system in place, but APS will struggle in tight urban spaces where enemy can be shoot from extremely close range. Sending ill equipped APCs alone into hostile land is stupid as hell.

Another point: The death of the elite IDF squad in the Namer APC incident earlier this week was a bad problem for IDF. They switched to this APC and the next gen Eitan, after they were caught using 40+ year old M113’s and one got lit up in 2014 Gaza incursion killing everyone inside. There was outcry why Israel was using such old and lightly armoured APCs for battle.
Remember active protection cannot be used with infantry. Active protection is based on small explosive charges that makes it not compatible with infantry protection.
 
. . .

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Country Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom