Cthulhu
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Long time ago i came to the realization that everybody on twitter is an idiot they are always wrong, we have to stop listening to people on twitter.
Iranian Chill Thread
- Thread starter SOHEIL
- Start date
I don’t listen to them personally but I do spread their word when they do a good job. They are soft power soldiers.
Can we say:
معرکه مارب، ام المعارک؟
Surenas
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Interesting. Israeli newspaper Haaretz reports that Netanyahu's government, during its last term, wanted to establish a direct channel with Iran but that the Iranian side flat out refused.
The article also mentions that former Israeli prime minister and defence minister, Ehud Barak, has written in article this weekend in Yediot Aharanot in which he argues that both Israel and the US lack the capabilities to nullify Iran's nuclear program and should accept that it is becoming a nuclear threshold state.
Iran Becoming a Threshold Nuclear State Challenges Israel's Policy of Ambiguity
Iran is rapidly moving to “threshold state” status, with enough fissile material for one nuclear bomb – and then another one and another one after that. It will take time for Israelis to internalize this, but as former Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak said in an article appearing in Yediot Aharonot this past weekend, this is the strategic reality that Israel must now contend with.
The Iranians don’t have an operational nuclear weapon and, as far as anyone knows, they have put off developing a bomb and the means to deliver it. They are concentrating on amassing enriched uranium and developing the infrastructure to produce it. But the delays are technical ones that Iran can overcome without great or prolonged effort. Iran exploited the Trump administration’s exit from the 2015 nuclear agreement, with the enthusiastic encouragement of Benjamin Netanyahu, to create nuclear facts on the ground that will give them an edge going forward – both in improving the terms of any future agreement with the Biden administration and in strengthening their standing in the region, with or without an agreement.
Netanyahu very much feared rapprochement between the United States and Iran, and invested heavily in diplomacy and military operations to foil it. But he failed both to prevent the possibility of an Iranian-American detente in the future or, alternatively, to create a dialogue between Jerusalem and Tehran to ease tensions and prevent a war that neither side wants.
Before the end of the Netanyahu government, the Iranians rejected Israeli feelers about creating a direct channel between the two countries. Whatever contacts there are, if any at all, are through an arbitrator concerning the division of assets belonging to the Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Co. (today known as the Europe Asia Pipeline Company) and are being conducted in Switzerland. Others are through third countries that both sides trust. More direct contacts, had they come to fruition, would have enabled the two countries to discuss a range of regional issues, and reduce mutual tensions and the risk of regional flare-ups. But if there’s no one to talk with on the Iranian side, what do you do?
Ehud Barak – who should know something about these issues – contends that the Israeli military option of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities in a way that would delay for many years Tehran’s “crossing the nuclear threshold” is no longer viable. He holds that even the Americans, whose army is much more powerful than the Israel Defense Forces, have no operative plan or interest in attacking the Iranians. He concludes that Israel must therefore deepen its ties with the U.S. and seek more diplomatic and military assistance.
Experience has taught us that when Israel is contending with security-related distress, it relies more on America. But it also tends to reexamine its policy of nuclear ambiguity, under which it declines to confirm “foreign media reports” about its capabilities and refrains from conducting nuclear tests or declaring that it has nuclear weapons. Ever since the Yom Kippur War, whenever Israel’s leadership was concerned about the public’s anxiety, one official or another would compromise a little on the ambiguity and hint at Israeli capabilities. Even Barak, in his Yediot article, lauded Israel’s deterrent power and said Israelis need not worry.
The appearance of a new nuclear power in the region, not to mention one hostile to Israel and that publicly calls for the dismantling of the “Zionist regime,” will certainly raise the level of concern in Israel. Can we really expect a “second Holocaust” as Netanyahu has warned? The dilemma has now been handed over to his successor, Naftali Bennett: How to reassure the public, deter the Iranians and win American backing.
The “Daniel Project,” a team of nuclear and strategic experts from Israel and the U.S., made recommendations in 2003 to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon about what to do if a country or an organization hostile to Israel were to achieve nuclear capabilities. Its conclusion was that a “credible and decisive” declaration of Israel’s nuclear capabilities would be essential to its very existence. Therefore, Israel might “have to change its policy of ambiguity to a limited degree by revealing its capabilities.” That idea will no doubt resurface as Israel copes with the recognition that Iran has become a threshold power and will continue making nuclear advances.
The main limitation Israel faces in ending ambiguity is its commitment to the U.S. to display restraint. In exchange, America provides a diplomatic umbrella that shelters Israel’s Dimona facilities and its output from international disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives. When the Americans feel that Israel is compromising that understanding, they leak information about Israeli capabilities. Thus, several months ago satellite imagery was leaked showing extensive expansion underway at Israel’s nuclear research campus.
Bennett won’t want to upset that understanding with Washington, about which he spoke during his White House visit with Joe Biden last month. But pressure is going to be exerted on him to reexamine the understanding as Iran amasses more and more enriched uranium and the left wing of the Democratic Party challenges conventional military aid to Israel. This debate will now be very much on the minds of decision makers in Jerusalem and at defense headquarters in Tel Aviv.
https://www.haaretz.com/amp/middle-...ave-to-reveal-its-own-atomic-power-1.10233347
The article also mentions that former Israeli prime minister and defence minister, Ehud Barak, has written in article this weekend in Yediot Aharanot in which he argues that both Israel and the US lack the capabilities to nullify Iran's nuclear program and should accept that it is becoming a nuclear threshold state.
Iran Becoming a Threshold Nuclear State Challenges Israel's Policy of Ambiguity
Iran is rapidly moving to “threshold state” status, with enough fissile material for one nuclear bomb – and then another one and another one after that. It will take time for Israelis to internalize this, but as former Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak said in an article appearing in Yediot Aharonot this past weekend, this is the strategic reality that Israel must now contend with.
The Iranians don’t have an operational nuclear weapon and, as far as anyone knows, they have put off developing a bomb and the means to deliver it. They are concentrating on amassing enriched uranium and developing the infrastructure to produce it. But the delays are technical ones that Iran can overcome without great or prolonged effort. Iran exploited the Trump administration’s exit from the 2015 nuclear agreement, with the enthusiastic encouragement of Benjamin Netanyahu, to create nuclear facts on the ground that will give them an edge going forward – both in improving the terms of any future agreement with the Biden administration and in strengthening their standing in the region, with or without an agreement.
Netanyahu very much feared rapprochement between the United States and Iran, and invested heavily in diplomacy and military operations to foil it. But he failed both to prevent the possibility of an Iranian-American detente in the future or, alternatively, to create a dialogue between Jerusalem and Tehran to ease tensions and prevent a war that neither side wants.
Before the end of the Netanyahu government, the Iranians rejected Israeli feelers about creating a direct channel between the two countries. Whatever contacts there are, if any at all, are through an arbitrator concerning the division of assets belonging to the Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Co. (today known as the Europe Asia Pipeline Company) and are being conducted in Switzerland. Others are through third countries that both sides trust. More direct contacts, had they come to fruition, would have enabled the two countries to discuss a range of regional issues, and reduce mutual tensions and the risk of regional flare-ups. But if there’s no one to talk with on the Iranian side, what do you do?
Ehud Barak – who should know something about these issues – contends that the Israeli military option of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities in a way that would delay for many years Tehran’s “crossing the nuclear threshold” is no longer viable. He holds that even the Americans, whose army is much more powerful than the Israel Defense Forces, have no operative plan or interest in attacking the Iranians. He concludes that Israel must therefore deepen its ties with the U.S. and seek more diplomatic and military assistance.
Experience has taught us that when Israel is contending with security-related distress, it relies more on America. But it also tends to reexamine its policy of nuclear ambiguity, under which it declines to confirm “foreign media reports” about its capabilities and refrains from conducting nuclear tests or declaring that it has nuclear weapons. Ever since the Yom Kippur War, whenever Israel’s leadership was concerned about the public’s anxiety, one official or another would compromise a little on the ambiguity and hint at Israeli capabilities. Even Barak, in his Yediot article, lauded Israel’s deterrent power and said Israelis need not worry.
The appearance of a new nuclear power in the region, not to mention one hostile to Israel and that publicly calls for the dismantling of the “Zionist regime,” will certainly raise the level of concern in Israel. Can we really expect a “second Holocaust” as Netanyahu has warned? The dilemma has now been handed over to his successor, Naftali Bennett: How to reassure the public, deter the Iranians and win American backing.
The “Daniel Project,” a team of nuclear and strategic experts from Israel and the U.S., made recommendations in 2003 to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon about what to do if a country or an organization hostile to Israel were to achieve nuclear capabilities. Its conclusion was that a “credible and decisive” declaration of Israel’s nuclear capabilities would be essential to its very existence. Therefore, Israel might “have to change its policy of ambiguity to a limited degree by revealing its capabilities.” That idea will no doubt resurface as Israel copes with the recognition that Iran has become a threshold power and will continue making nuclear advances.
The main limitation Israel faces in ending ambiguity is its commitment to the U.S. to display restraint. In exchange, America provides a diplomatic umbrella that shelters Israel’s Dimona facilities and its output from international disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives. When the Americans feel that Israel is compromising that understanding, they leak information about Israeli capabilities. Thus, several months ago satellite imagery was leaked showing extensive expansion underway at Israel’s nuclear research campus.
Bennett won’t want to upset that understanding with Washington, about which he spoke during his White House visit with Joe Biden last month. But pressure is going to be exerted on him to reexamine the understanding as Iran amasses more and more enriched uranium and the left wing of the Democratic Party challenges conventional military aid to Israel. This debate will now be very much on the minds of decision makers in Jerusalem and at defense headquarters in Tel Aviv.
https://www.haaretz.com/amp/middle-...ave-to-reveal-its-own-atomic-power-1.10233347
Ambiguity against ambiguity
EvilWesteners
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Current and even previous U.S. administrations (to whatever degree it could have been done considering the idiot Trump) were convinced by U.S.military command and Pentagon that THERE IS NO LOGICAL WAR GAIN by engaging Iran. Unlike some other adversaries (e.g. China, or Russia), picking a fight with Iran just puts U.S. in a very precarious situation for generations with Iranians and nothing of any substance can be gained from it, (economically or otherwise) while others (Russia and China) will gain huge from this stupidity and will use this in having their own advances in their areas of interest. Pentagon strategists consider Iran - the WAR that must NOT happen, since Iran is not able to go anywhere anyways (e.g. can't repair its economy, can't industrialize its nation effectively, can't build a military to challenge U.S., etc. - so they think).
Unless there is a major assault on U.S. soil, there will NOT be a WW2-like war with Iran other than covert or tit for tat. To Americans (politics or military), WAR IS A FORM OF NEGOTIATION. There is nothing significant to U.S. that needs to be ABSOLUTELY negotiated with Iran. Not economically not geopolitical. "You are just making a county that is insignificant, feel and look significant to its peers that wish to resist our domination. It's like arguing with a teenager or fighting a teenager that will grow up one day and come after you when they are stronger".
U.S. is also very concerned that Iran WILL BE A NUCLEAR STATE SOONER OR LATER. Why create yourself another vehement adversary if you don't have to, MAKING SURE that they feel boxed-in enough and humiliated so they HAVE TO NOW GO AND BUILD NUKES? Makes no sense.
Killing Suleimani was stupid and all top military people in U.S. (in the military not outside getting money from lobbyists), disagreed with that stupid act. Iran showed the world that it CAN ATTACK U.S. - something U.S. did NOT want others to see. But had to accept.
Muhammad Saftain Anjum
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Is there any SSBN in development in Iran as guys are already building submarines ?
Stryker1982
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Nothing that is known for the near future.
SSBN would be good for Iran's future doctrine, the largest class submarine being built is the "Besat" class (1200 tons), but it is unknown whether or not it can house a few ballistic missiles like the South Korean 3000 ton SSBN (Probably not). So an entirely new design would need to be done for a SSBN and such a plan has not even been announced yet let alone in development so It would take quite some time to reach that level.
Although, sea launched missiles are available by the name "Jask-2".
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SalarHaqq
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925boy
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Herr Hezbollah': The German Spy Who Mediated Between Israel and Terror Groups Speaks for First Time
Gerhard Conrad tells Haaretz about his dealings with Mideast terror organizations over the years, and his advice for Israel’s current negotiators with Hamas
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Gerhard Conrad. 'Such deals only happen when the stars are aligned.'Credit: SOEREN STACHE / DPA / dpa Pictures
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Yossi Melman
Sep. 23, 2021 4:41 PM
In Germany, he was known as “Herr Hezbollah,” but he could also have been given the title “Herr Hamas.” For 30 years, Gerhard Conrad was a top foreign intelligence officer in Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (the BND), a loyal counterpart of the Mossad.
In the course of his various roles in the organization, he frequently lived or spent time in Damascus, Beirut, Gaza, Cairo and Jerusalem (among other places in the Middle East). But he is best known for his involvement in Israel’s prisoner exchanges with Hezbollah and Hamas.
These included the Gilad Shalit deal (next month will mark the 10th anniversary of the Israeli soldier’s release from Gaza); the deal for the release of drug dealer Col. Elhanan Tannenbaum from Lebanon; the deal for the return of the bodies of Israel Defense Forces soldiers Benny Avraham, Adi Avitan and Omar Sawaid, and also later Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser.
He also negotiated the deal that saw the release of terrorist Samir Kuntar, who murdered the Haran family in Nahariya, and the release of another 1,500 or so Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists, and other foreign terrorists.
“I always acted after being authorized by the federal government of Germany and with the guidelines and instructions of my organization as requested by Israeli governments,” he says in an exclusive interview with Haaretz – the first interview Conrad has given to any media outlet, after operating in the shadows for many years. His name and face were kept out of the press until a Berlin newspaper leaked his details in 2009.
He retired a few years ago but continues to follow events in Israel and the Middle East, and is extremely knowledgeable about what is going on.
“Such deals only happen when the stars are aligned,” he says, when asked about the odds of a deal between Hamas and Israel.
Then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak greeting Gilad Shalit in October 2011, with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu alongside the just-released Israeli soldier. Credit: Ariel Hermony / Defense Ministry
“The deals are always considered as bad on both sides, and will be contested by those who feel that too much has been conceded to the ‘enemy’ for too little in return,” he adds. “Many will be disappointed for not being ‘on the list,’ others will be deeply frustrated to see the killers of their beloved ones free and triumphant. Responsibility weighs heavily on the respective decision-makers’ shoulders; political accountability can be demanding or even be dangerous.”
What advice can you give Israel’s current negotiators with Hamas?
“Be patient and try to prepare a solid framework with terms of reference that are agreed as much as possible between the two sides, and a list of possibly already-agreed action/exchange items. Don’t try to force it unless you have really good cards, in terms of an offer and powerful friends with a real, positive – and negative – influence on your counterpart, and a sincere, credible political interest in getting it done – ultimately for their own sake and standing toward your country, your counterpart, and in the region in general as power broker.”
Terrorist Samir Kuntar after his release from Israeli prison after an exchange for the bodies of two fallen Israeli soldiers, in 2008.Credit: AP
Although he clearly identifies with Israel and its values, it was Conrad’s basic qualities that also enabled him to earn the trust of terror organizations.
“He is very thorough, reliable, precise. A man of details who leaves no loose ends,” says former Shin Bet deputy chief Ofer Dekel, who from 2006-2009 was the prime minister’s coordinator for Israeli prisoners of war and those missing in action.
Through Conrad, Dekel advanced the indirect contacts with Hezbollah, in meetings in Europe and Israel, and also prepared the groundwork for the 2011 Shalit deal – though that deal was ultimately concluded by his successor, Mossad official David Meidan.
Germany’s man in Damascus
Gerhard Conrad was born in Germany in 1954. In the 1970s and ’80s, he studied Arabic at university and specialized in Islamic law, reading and researching the writings of Islamic sages. He went on to study German and international law. While earning his doctorate from the University of Bonn, he worked as a reserve air force officer in the Defense Ministry.
Gerhard Conrad. 'He is very thorough, reliable, precise. A man of details who leaves no loose ends,' says former Shin Bet deputy chief Ofer Dekel.
With such a background, it was no surprise that Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service was eager to recruit him. In 1990, after completing a training course, he joined the organization, initially as a researcher and Middle East expert, and later in operational roles. His wife also worked for the agency.
One of his most important missions was in 1998, when he was assigned as the agency’s representative in Damascus, and then Beirut. He worked under diplomatic cover at the German embassies in both capitals, using the title of “cultural attaché.” But almost everyone who came into contact with him understood he was in intelligence. He calls that kind of work “diplomatic intelligence.”
One of his most interesting encounters was with top Hezbollah figure Mustafa Badreddine, the cousin and brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyeh. Both are no longer with us. Mughniyeh, who was considered Hezbollah’s “defense minister,” was assassinated in Damascus in 2008, in a joint operation attributed to the CIA and Mossad. Badreddine, who was the commander of Hezbollah’s external operations branch in Syria, was assassinated at Damascus airport in May 2016, on the orders of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, then-commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ Al Quds Force.
Badreddine had a reputation for being particularly savage, wild and capricious. Conrad chooses his words carefully in describing him.
“His temper was, let’s say, volatile, ranging from ‘Prince Charming’ with a buoyant, broad smile, to being aggressive – though still predominantly controlled by etiquette – caused, by the way, by physical and neurological pain [from] his diverse wounds, including an amputated lower leg and wooden prosthesis.”
Negotiations timetable
2003
Gerhard Conrad is sent, with Israel’s approval, to conduct negotiations with Hezbollah
2004
Elhanan Tannenbaum deal struck and bodies of three fallen soldiers from Har Dov returned in exchange for about 450 terrorists, most of them Palestinian and Lebanese. At the last minute, Israel removes Samir Kuntar from the list
2005-2006
Hezbollah protests to Conrad that Israel violated its promise to release Kuntar and increases its efforts to abduct soldiers. At the same time, Conrad acts to obtain information on the fate of navigator Ron Arad, including with the help of forensic evidence
2006
Abduction of Gilad Shalit in the Gaza Strip, and Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser on Lebanese border
July - Second Lebanon War breaks out
August - Conrad renews efforts for a prisoner exchange deal
2008
The Regev and Goldwasser deal. Israel releases Samir Kuntar
2009-2011
Conrad involved in negotiations with Hamas and completes the Shalit deal
In 2002, Conrad finished his term in Beirut, from where he had closely monitored Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon and seen the centrality of international terrorism following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States. He was posted to the research division at his agency’s headquarters in Pullach, south of Munich, where he worked on research assignments as well as operational ones. But not for long. Agency chief Ernst Urlau soon dispatched him to oversee the efforts to secure the release of Austrian and German hostages who were seized in the Sahara Desert, in southern Algeria and Mali.
“That engagement vividly showed me firsthand quite a number of limitations and constraints for decision makers in managing – not to speak of solving – such crises with all their multiple moral and operational dilemmas,” he says.
“By the end of the Algerian hostage crisis, I was taken away again by the Lebanese file, when interest on all sides to go for a deal reemerged: ‘Delete Bamako, set Beirut’ was my sigh when I entered, together with my superior, an MEA flight from Paris to Beirut instead of accompanying a German secretary of state to the final mission to Mali, where he was able to welcome the released hostages and show his appreciation to the Malian government of the time.”
He continues: “Until 2004, I was heavily engaged as ‘No.2’ in a negotiation team [Urlau also came to several mediation meetings], in a multitude of different secret missions in the region, in order to promote a hostage deal that was of course not only ‘owned’ by Israel and Hezbollah, but as well by other actors – among them, unsurprisingly, as it was well known, Iran and to a certain extent also Syria.”
But, Conrad adds, “the exchange of 2004,” when the bodies of Avraham, Avitan and Sawaid were returned to Israel, “did not solve all issues on both sides.”
Col. Elhanan Tannenbaum, whose release from Lebanon was secured by Conrad.Credit: Dan Keinan
He says Hezbollah was furious that, at the last minute, Israel refused to include Kuntar among the prisoners being released. He believes that this was one of the pretexts that indirectly led to the Second Lebanon War two years later. Hezbollah intensified its efforts to abduct Israeli soldiers until, in July 2006, it captured Regev and Goldwasser – a move that prompted then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to go to war. Kuntar was released two years later, in the deal that saw the return of Regev and Goldwasser’s remains.
The second matter that stymied Conrad’s mediation efforts was the case of missing Israel Air Force navigator Ron Arad; Hezbollah had pledged to provide information about his fate.
“In 2004 and 2005, quite impressive efforts had been undertaken by all sides – also by a special task force in Germany on ‘historical forensics’ – led by me, in order to narrow down and of course ultimately solve the tragic case – as you know, in vain,” he says. “These were again times of major engagement, thorough security of intelligence findings, circumstantial historical evidence and documents, and, ultimately, deep frustration for all sides concerned.”
The contacts were run on behalf of Hezbollah by Hajj Wafiq Safa, who was in charge of the organization’s coordination and liaison unit, and also the brother-in-law of the secretary-general. Conrad recreates the first meeting between them after the Second Lebanon War, which took place at a modest café in a Beirut mall – not exactly an ideal place for such negotiations.
“After a kind exchange of greetings, congratulations, ultimately for having survived, and words of appreciation for being ready to support my efforts as UN facilitator, the question arose of where to meet for our business in the future – whereupon Safa answered in his perfectly sober, laconic and apt way while smiling and shrugging his shoulders: ‘My friend, no houses left.’
“We agreed that a way would be found in the difficult weeks ahead, and, of course, Hezbollah managed as usual to carry on and to arrange. But in a way, it was one of the quintessential moments when all of us understood what had happened and where we had been put by the events” of the war.
In 2009, after three years of failed efforts to advance a deal for the release of Shalit, who was abducted near the Kerem Shalom crossing in June 2006, Conrad was once again called upon to work on a prisoner-exchange deal.
He explains that the big problem was the deep mistrust that existed between Israel and Hamas – a mistrust expressed by the fact that each side seriously questioned the other’s intentions and willingness to fulfill its obligations. Furthermore, the two sides believed the other was treacherous. So how did Conrad manage to overcome these considerable obstacles?
“With all modesty, my credentials as ‘Mr. Hezbollah’ had not gone unnoticed by Hamas – not least due to their connections in Lebanon and Syria,” he says. “Hence, it was not too difficult for them to agree, of course with due caution, to the new format.”
Senior Hamas figures he met had been reassured by Hezbollah’s testimony that Conrad was a man who could be trusted.
The plan with Shalit was “to use the proof of life exercise as a kind of dry run for an exchange operation, showing to both sides that it was possible and rewarding to honor one’s own pledges and to trust to those of the sworn enemy. I will never forget the sense of pride, relief and satisfaction on both sides,” he recalls.
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news...ps-talks-1.10235907?__twitter_impression=true
this article says Soleimani ordered the death of Hezbollah's Badreddine? wow.
I have a prediction - So many Pakistanis on PDF will refuse to read this post!
Gerhard Conrad tells Haaretz about his dealings with Mideast terror organizations over the years, and his advice for Israel’s current negotiators with Hamas
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Gerhard Conrad. 'Such deals only happen when the stars are aligned.'Credit: SOEREN STACHE / DPA / dpa Pictures
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Yossi Melman
Sep. 23, 2021 4:41 PM
In Germany, he was known as “Herr Hezbollah,” but he could also have been given the title “Herr Hamas.” For 30 years, Gerhard Conrad was a top foreign intelligence officer in Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (the BND), a loyal counterpart of the Mossad.
In the course of his various roles in the organization, he frequently lived or spent time in Damascus, Beirut, Gaza, Cairo and Jerusalem (among other places in the Middle East). But he is best known for his involvement in Israel’s prisoner exchanges with Hezbollah and Hamas.
These included the Gilad Shalit deal (next month will mark the 10th anniversary of the Israeli soldier’s release from Gaza); the deal for the release of drug dealer Col. Elhanan Tannenbaum from Lebanon; the deal for the return of the bodies of Israel Defense Forces soldiers Benny Avraham, Adi Avitan and Omar Sawaid, and also later Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser.
He also negotiated the deal that saw the release of terrorist Samir Kuntar, who murdered the Haran family in Nahariya, and the release of another 1,500 or so Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists, and other foreign terrorists.
“I always acted after being authorized by the federal government of Germany and with the guidelines and instructions of my organization as requested by Israeli governments,” he says in an exclusive interview with Haaretz – the first interview Conrad has given to any media outlet, after operating in the shadows for many years. His name and face were kept out of the press until a Berlin newspaper leaked his details in 2009.
He retired a few years ago but continues to follow events in Israel and the Middle East, and is extremely knowledgeable about what is going on.
“Such deals only happen when the stars are aligned,” he says, when asked about the odds of a deal between Hamas and Israel.
Then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak greeting Gilad Shalit in October 2011, with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu alongside the just-released Israeli soldier. Credit: Ariel Hermony / Defense Ministry
- Gilad Shalit thanks France, Germany for assistance in release
- Nasrallah: I did everything I could to solve Arad mystery
- From abduction to release
“The deals are always considered as bad on both sides, and will be contested by those who feel that too much has been conceded to the ‘enemy’ for too little in return,” he adds. “Many will be disappointed for not being ‘on the list,’ others will be deeply frustrated to see the killers of their beloved ones free and triumphant. Responsibility weighs heavily on the respective decision-makers’ shoulders; political accountability can be demanding or even be dangerous.”
What advice can you give Israel’s current negotiators with Hamas?
“Be patient and try to prepare a solid framework with terms of reference that are agreed as much as possible between the two sides, and a list of possibly already-agreed action/exchange items. Don’t try to force it unless you have really good cards, in terms of an offer and powerful friends with a real, positive – and negative – influence on your counterpart, and a sincere, credible political interest in getting it done – ultimately for their own sake and standing toward your country, your counterpart, and in the region in general as power broker.”
Terrorist Samir Kuntar after his release from Israeli prison after an exchange for the bodies of two fallen Israeli soldiers, in 2008.Credit: AP
Although he clearly identifies with Israel and its values, it was Conrad’s basic qualities that also enabled him to earn the trust of terror organizations.
“He is very thorough, reliable, precise. A man of details who leaves no loose ends,” says former Shin Bet deputy chief Ofer Dekel, who from 2006-2009 was the prime minister’s coordinator for Israeli prisoners of war and those missing in action.
Through Conrad, Dekel advanced the indirect contacts with Hezbollah, in meetings in Europe and Israel, and also prepared the groundwork for the 2011 Shalit deal – though that deal was ultimately concluded by his successor, Mossad official David Meidan.
Germany’s man in Damascus
Gerhard Conrad was born in Germany in 1954. In the 1970s and ’80s, he studied Arabic at university and specialized in Islamic law, reading and researching the writings of Islamic sages. He went on to study German and international law. While earning his doctorate from the University of Bonn, he worked as a reserve air force officer in the Defense Ministry.
Gerhard Conrad. 'He is very thorough, reliable, precise. A man of details who leaves no loose ends,' says former Shin Bet deputy chief Ofer Dekel.
With such a background, it was no surprise that Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service was eager to recruit him. In 1990, after completing a training course, he joined the organization, initially as a researcher and Middle East expert, and later in operational roles. His wife also worked for the agency.
One of his most important missions was in 1998, when he was assigned as the agency’s representative in Damascus, and then Beirut. He worked under diplomatic cover at the German embassies in both capitals, using the title of “cultural attaché.” But almost everyone who came into contact with him understood he was in intelligence. He calls that kind of work “diplomatic intelligence.”
One of his most interesting encounters was with top Hezbollah figure Mustafa Badreddine, the cousin and brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyeh. Both are no longer with us. Mughniyeh, who was considered Hezbollah’s “defense minister,” was assassinated in Damascus in 2008, in a joint operation attributed to the CIA and Mossad. Badreddine, who was the commander of Hezbollah’s external operations branch in Syria, was assassinated at Damascus airport in May 2016, on the orders of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, then-commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ Al Quds Force.
Badreddine had a reputation for being particularly savage, wild and capricious. Conrad chooses his words carefully in describing him.
“His temper was, let’s say, volatile, ranging from ‘Prince Charming’ with a buoyant, broad smile, to being aggressive – though still predominantly controlled by etiquette – caused, by the way, by physical and neurological pain [from] his diverse wounds, including an amputated lower leg and wooden prosthesis.”
Negotiations timetable
2003
Gerhard Conrad is sent, with Israel’s approval, to conduct negotiations with Hezbollah
2004
Elhanan Tannenbaum deal struck and bodies of three fallen soldiers from Har Dov returned in exchange for about 450 terrorists, most of them Palestinian and Lebanese. At the last minute, Israel removes Samir Kuntar from the list
2005-2006
Hezbollah protests to Conrad that Israel violated its promise to release Kuntar and increases its efforts to abduct soldiers. At the same time, Conrad acts to obtain information on the fate of navigator Ron Arad, including with the help of forensic evidence
2006
Abduction of Gilad Shalit in the Gaza Strip, and Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser on Lebanese border
July - Second Lebanon War breaks out
August - Conrad renews efforts for a prisoner exchange deal
2008
The Regev and Goldwasser deal. Israel releases Samir Kuntar
2009-2011
Conrad involved in negotiations with Hamas and completes the Shalit deal
In 2002, Conrad finished his term in Beirut, from where he had closely monitored Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon and seen the centrality of international terrorism following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States. He was posted to the research division at his agency’s headquarters in Pullach, south of Munich, where he worked on research assignments as well as operational ones. But not for long. Agency chief Ernst Urlau soon dispatched him to oversee the efforts to secure the release of Austrian and German hostages who were seized in the Sahara Desert, in southern Algeria and Mali.
“That engagement vividly showed me firsthand quite a number of limitations and constraints for decision makers in managing – not to speak of solving – such crises with all their multiple moral and operational dilemmas,” he says.
“By the end of the Algerian hostage crisis, I was taken away again by the Lebanese file, when interest on all sides to go for a deal reemerged: ‘Delete Bamako, set Beirut’ was my sigh when I entered, together with my superior, an MEA flight from Paris to Beirut instead of accompanying a German secretary of state to the final mission to Mali, where he was able to welcome the released hostages and show his appreciation to the Malian government of the time.”
He continues: “Until 2004, I was heavily engaged as ‘No.2’ in a negotiation team [Urlau also came to several mediation meetings], in a multitude of different secret missions in the region, in order to promote a hostage deal that was of course not only ‘owned’ by Israel and Hezbollah, but as well by other actors – among them, unsurprisingly, as it was well known, Iran and to a certain extent also Syria.”
But, Conrad adds, “the exchange of 2004,” when the bodies of Avraham, Avitan and Sawaid were returned to Israel, “did not solve all issues on both sides.”
Col. Elhanan Tannenbaum, whose release from Lebanon was secured by Conrad.Credit: Dan Keinan
He says Hezbollah was furious that, at the last minute, Israel refused to include Kuntar among the prisoners being released. He believes that this was one of the pretexts that indirectly led to the Second Lebanon War two years later. Hezbollah intensified its efforts to abduct Israeli soldiers until, in July 2006, it captured Regev and Goldwasser – a move that prompted then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to go to war. Kuntar was released two years later, in the deal that saw the return of Regev and Goldwasser’s remains.
The second matter that stymied Conrad’s mediation efforts was the case of missing Israel Air Force navigator Ron Arad; Hezbollah had pledged to provide information about his fate.
“In 2004 and 2005, quite impressive efforts had been undertaken by all sides – also by a special task force in Germany on ‘historical forensics’ – led by me, in order to narrow down and of course ultimately solve the tragic case – as you know, in vain,” he says. “These were again times of major engagement, thorough security of intelligence findings, circumstantial historical evidence and documents, and, ultimately, deep frustration for all sides concerned.”
The contacts were run on behalf of Hezbollah by Hajj Wafiq Safa, who was in charge of the organization’s coordination and liaison unit, and also the brother-in-law of the secretary-general. Conrad recreates the first meeting between them after the Second Lebanon War, which took place at a modest café in a Beirut mall – not exactly an ideal place for such negotiations.
“After a kind exchange of greetings, congratulations, ultimately for having survived, and words of appreciation for being ready to support my efforts as UN facilitator, the question arose of where to meet for our business in the future – whereupon Safa answered in his perfectly sober, laconic and apt way while smiling and shrugging his shoulders: ‘My friend, no houses left.’
“We agreed that a way would be found in the difficult weeks ahead, and, of course, Hezbollah managed as usual to carry on and to arrange. But in a way, it was one of the quintessential moments when all of us understood what had happened and where we had been put by the events” of the war.
In 2009, after three years of failed efforts to advance a deal for the release of Shalit, who was abducted near the Kerem Shalom crossing in June 2006, Conrad was once again called upon to work on a prisoner-exchange deal.
He explains that the big problem was the deep mistrust that existed between Israel and Hamas – a mistrust expressed by the fact that each side seriously questioned the other’s intentions and willingness to fulfill its obligations. Furthermore, the two sides believed the other was treacherous. So how did Conrad manage to overcome these considerable obstacles?
“With all modesty, my credentials as ‘Mr. Hezbollah’ had not gone unnoticed by Hamas – not least due to their connections in Lebanon and Syria,” he says. “Hence, it was not too difficult for them to agree, of course with due caution, to the new format.”
Senior Hamas figures he met had been reassured by Hezbollah’s testimony that Conrad was a man who could be trusted.
The plan with Shalit was “to use the proof of life exercise as a kind of dry run for an exchange operation, showing to both sides that it was possible and rewarding to honor one’s own pledges and to trust to those of the sworn enemy. I will never forget the sense of pride, relief and satisfaction on both sides,” he recalls.
this article says Soleimani ordered the death of Hezbollah's Badreddine? wow.
Great thread, thanks.
I have a prediction - So many Pakistanis on PDF will refuse to read this post!
We have to admit that Biden foreign policy is very passive/apologetic and submissive to any harsh hawkish voice.
Ashamed of his own deal with Iran
Overreacting on China
Backstabbing to France
Still weak and zilch in view of any hawk.
Stryker1982
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His general fear, will make him reluctant to harsh hawkish voices in my view.
Obama was aggressive and charismatic both inside and outside US. Interestingly, Biden is scared of Republican senators more than democrats.
TheImmortal
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Hack-Hook
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don't get it AH-1j belong to army , maybe those are Shahed-285 or Toofan
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