Hehe an analysis of the structure of the IRIADF after they will start to receive the Bavar-373 in two weeks.
Today the SAM system force looks like this:
HAWK --> Mersad-1 level --> Mersad 2 Shalamcheh level --> "Mersad 3" (Kamin?) level.
Transforming it to a fully mobile, multi-target capable, ECM hardned, low-RCS capable SAM system with the last "Mersad 3" level.
This is the backbone, highest number of systems
S-200 --> Talash-1 Sayyad-2 level --> Talash 2 level --> Talash 3 Sayyad-3 level
Transforming it to a multi target, mobile-radar, with two added missile layers, ECM hardened, low-RCS capable SAM system.
Only the well known 5 systems received back in the 90's
S-300PMU-2, 4 known systems
If the Bavar-373 enters service, it can replace HAWKs used for protection of the nuclear sites. It can start to be deployed close to borders and contested regions like the straight of Hormuz.
If numbers increase, it can start to form a chain around sensitive and ultimately all border regions.
So as Bavar-373 enters service, redundant multi-layer HAWK sites become free, HAWK protected regions get covered by the Bavar-373.
If tasks are efficiently shared with the IRGC-ASF, the IRIADF can cease its massive presence in Tehran and Esfahan. The numbers of HAWK/Mersad-3 sites freed by such a structural reform could be used to create protection for smaller cities currently unprotected or just by the far envelope of Talash-3/S-300PMU-2.
Major missile bases near larger cities could also be protected by the IRGC Sayyad-2.
Slowly the somewhat desperate tactic to use multi-layerd HAWK sites to protect critical sites, can be changed and assets freed. At Mersad-3 level each of those sites will become much more survivable + effective against LO targets + multi-target capable.
In that way currently less important larger cities such as Ardebil, Yazd, Kerman, Zahedan would get a Mersad-3 site, freed by the reforms (initiated by the Bavar-373) from its current duty.
Similarly Bushehr and Bandar Abbas S-200/Talash-3 sites could be moved to less protected eastern parts of Iran when replaced by highly survivable Bavar-373 batteries.
Added to all of this is a complete other dimension: The IRGC-ASF: It needs to protect Tehran, its offensive missile bases and its offensive ground forces.
The key issue with such defensive fortification concepts is that the enemy will concentrate its offensive forces to one point in order to break the wall at one of its weak points. Here is where assets such as interceptors would come to counter the enemy's concentrated attack. If there is really a long range Sayyad-5 missile in the Bavar-373 structure, such a 300km+ missile could also be used to cover and support a sector that is exposed to a massive concentrated attack.
So a key goal is to have strong enough defenses to defend until some sort of support arrives. Alternatively another goal is to defend sufficiently long until all offensive missile assets are spent on the enemy.
The 10x10 Zoljanah hints to a very large and heavy missile, the container seems to be 9 meters long and able to support a 600-700mm diameter missile. Such a Fateh sized SAM would offer sufficient kinematic performance for future exo-atmospheric ABM tasks and a would also be sufficient for an ARH seeker equipped LR-SAM. This capability comes at a higher cost per SAM, to be used in "emergency" or "confirmed-high-value" situations.
