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Iran Military and Deterrence strategy

My dear brother Arminkh what will foreigners' opinion do good for us ? the best thing we can do to please them is to get naked and dance in front of their officials during their visit ...then theyll love us .... them liking us wont warm our houses or raise our standard of living at all ! yet again your point is interesting too
Dear Kiarash,
I agree that them liking us won't raise our standard of living and we really don't need to make them like us. We just need to make them understand that while we object many of their policies, we are not that aggressive nation that their media is trying show. The very least it can do is that it will disarm any warmonger that tries to present Iran as an enemy.
 
Iran nuclear deal: Iran's power rises, with or without deal - CNN.com


Iran's power rises, with or without deal

By Stephen Collinson, CNN



Updated 12:51 PM ET, Tue March 31, 2015






Washington (CNN)Deal or no deal in the Iranian nuclear talks, Tehran is already behaving like it's made a killing.

Sure, U.S. and international sanctions inflicted staggering damage on Iran's economy, convincing the longtime American foe to join talks aimed at limiting its nuclear program. Those talks face an important Tuesday night deadline.

But it's not just Iran's nuclear aspirations that have everyone's attention -- though just the fact that Iranian officials are at the table with the world's most powerful countries has elevated Iran's international status.

Getting the bomb would greatly magnify its regional -- even global -- role, but Tehran is also making big moves in a tumultuous Great Game of Middle East geopolitics that is challenging U.S influence and prestige and chilling Washington's allies.

READ: Iran nuclear talks: 'Tricky issues' remain, Kerry says

As it engages on its nuclear program, Tehran has exploited the divisions of the Arab Spring and the power vacuum of America's downgraded involvement in the region. It has also taken advantage of the leeway the United States offered in prioritizing a nuclear deal over attempts to restrain Tehran's proxies that could risk breaking up the negotiations.

The result is that Iran -- often through militant groups it sponsors -- has become a key player in conflicts in neighboring states all the way to the edge of the Mediterranean.

Its drive for regional pre-eminence is becoming an increasing problem for the Obama administration as it contemplates selling a nuclear deal -- which is already drawing considerable skepticism -- to opponents in Congress and to anxious allies like Saudi Arabia and Israel, who are watching Iran's maneuvering up close.

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Critics are accusing President Barack Obama of turning a blind eye toward Iran's nefarious motives and proxy wars in the Middle East to safeguard a legacy-enhancing push for a deal that could lift his presidency's historic potential after decades of hostility between Washington and Tehran.

They fear Iran is not only about to walk away with a deal that leaves its nuclear infrastructure intact, but that it is also playing the United States for a fool by using the talks to shield its hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East.

"They have completely schooled the American and European diplomats," said Michael Rubin, an Iran analyst and critic of the administration at the American Enterprise Institute.

"The Iranians used to brag that they play chess and we play checkers. It turns out that they play chess, while we play solitaire."




Iranian proxies


Iran has used its Revolutionary Guard Corps and a host of proxies to fill the power gap left by the U.S. departure from Iraq and the political tumult stirred by the collapse of authoritarian governments felled by now-defunct popular reform movements.

"Iran was destined to expand its influence one way or the other, and the U.S. was not going to prevent that, especially because of the cost involved in trying to pacify Iraq," said Reva Bhalla, vice president of global analysis at Stratfor, a global intelligence and advisory firm.

"Iran benefited from the Arab Spring as well."

Iran has also seen an opportunity in the U.S.'s shifting policies and interests in the region. The George W. Bush administration pushed out the regional strongman in Iraq, Saddam Hussein, who kept Iran in check through a hostile balance-of-power arrangement. The subsequent collapse of the Iraqi state left a festering sectarian stew that Tehran was quick to use to forge links in Shiite areas.

And Obama, in addition to withdrawing American forces from Iraq, has sought a lighter touch in hot spots like Syria, Yemen and Libya, where chaos has created an opening for outside fighters and radical domestic groups to swoop in.

The regional meltdown that has seen governance collapse and national borders redrawn on sectarian lines has provided a potent breeding ground for radical, stateless Islamic groups — like ISIS -- to grow and threaten both U.S. and Iranian national interests.

So the Obama administration also sees a common interest with Iran in fighting ISIS. But some critics say its desire to do so has blinded it to Iran's activities elsewhere.



White House assessments


This has left the White House in the uncomfortable position of having to explain why the United States appears to be tacitly cooperating with Iran, with which it has waged a de facto ideological war for 30 years.

Senior U.S. officials deny they are going soft on Iran to keep Tehran sweet on nuclear talks. They say the negotiations are walled off from concerns about Iran's aggressive moves elsewhere. And they point out that Tehran would be much more dangerous to its neighbors if it were able to build a bomb.

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READ: Centrifuges and secret sites: Get up to speed on the Iran nuclear talks

"Even if a nuclear deal is reached, our concerns about Iran's behavior in the region and around the world will endure," White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough told the J Street policy conference last week, slamming Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, a proliferator and a gross violator of human rights that seeks to destabilize its neighbors.

Several U.S. allies in the region, watching Iran's growing influence, worry that whatever berth the United States is giving Iran, it goes well beyond the nuclear talks and the fight against ISIS.

Instead, they fear the beginning of a wider détente with Iran that some are calling a "Persian pivot."



Saudi concerns


Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel al-Jubeir told CNN that Riyadh was "concerned about the interference by Iran in the affairs of other countries in the region, whether it is in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen."

Obama's domestic foes are less diplomatic.

"I heard repeatedly from leaders in the region that they believe we are forming some kind of Faustian bargain with the Iranians which would then lead to great danger to those countries," Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona said last week.

"They believe that we are siding with Iran."

The former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, warned on Fox News on Sunday that Iran was "on the march" across the Middle East and that the administration response was one of "willful ignorance."

But a senior Obama administration official on Monday denied that Washington wanted the wider accommodation with Iran that its allies fear.

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"The critics look at this as some part of a grand détente or reconciliation -- that by getting this deal we will turn another cheek or grant them carte blanche," said the official, who was not authorized to talk publicly about the nuclear talks.

"We have been and we remain just as concerned."

And at the same time that it holds marathon talks with Iran, Washington is backing its ally Saudi Arabia and a Sunni coalition that is bombarding Iranian-backed Shiite Houthi militias in Yemen.

In Syria, the United States wants close Iranian ally President Bashar al-Assad gone after his murderous rampage against his own people.

But many Washington observers believe the United States has stepped back from the region and interpret the increasingly assertive military actions of Sunni states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt as a sign that they feel Iran already has the upper hand. They see the Saudi coalition's assault on the Houthis as a signal, not just to Iran, but to Washington.

"Our traditional Arab allies are apoplectic. We are involved against ISIS in Syria but essentially did nothing in the past three years as the Houthis took over Yemen," said David Schenker, a former Bush administration official now with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

READ: If a deal is done, would Iran cheat?

The Saudis are using Yemen to send messages "to Iran and to a lesser extent to us about their lack of confidence in the American security blanket being able to protect them from Iran's machinations in the region," said Stephen Seche, a former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen.

The White House said it has no illusions on Iran's motives, but argued that the painful lessons of the last decade show a huge U.S. military operation in the Middle East is unlikely to reshape its politics.

"It's definitely a regional power struggle," said the senior administration official, stressing that Iran's strategy dates from well before either the Arab Spring or the Iraq war, all the way back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution itself.

"It's a geostrategic play to use these groups as pressure points, in some cases playing on Shiite grievances but also just to increase pressure on the Saudi border," said the official.

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Iran: Key players in the nuclear talks 9 photos

The administration insists that a large-scale reintroduction of U.S. forces to the Middle East is not the correct policy response.

"It is going to be dictated by individual countries and the particular circumstances and what is the U.S. interest there," the official said.

And the administration is not alone in believing the United States has a limited ability to influence what happens in the region.

"We can do things at the margins to help this side, reinforce that side, train another, arm another. So the U.S. position is likely to be quite modest," said Richard Haass, chairman of the Council of Foreign Relations.

And Justin Logan, a specialist in geopolitics at the Cato Institute, warned that the United States must not get involved in the "pathological politics" of the region.

The idea that a proxy struggle between the Gulf Arabs and the Iranians can be effectively managed by the United States defies both logic and history," he said.
 
Iran and the Middle East: Who’s Afraid of Russia’s S-300 Air Defense System?

The executive order issued by Russian President Vladimir Putin, which lifts the ban on the export of weapons systems to Iran, has been met with sharp condemnation by Israel, and admonishment from the United States. While Moscow has yet to make a final decision on if/when it will begin supplying the S-300 air defense missiles to Iran – Tehran purchased the system under a 2007 contract left unfulfilled by Russia as a result of the UN-imposed arms embargo – it is clear that the possibility alone signals a significant shift in the geopolitics of the region.

On the one hand, Iranian air defenses would be significantly upgraded with an advanced weapons system such as S-300 which, though not exactly new, is still very much capable of defending the country’s airspace from any potential attack, be it Israeli or US. On the other hand, the possible delivery of the S-300s is a symbolic step towards integrating Iran into a broader non-NATO security architecture taking shape under the leadership of Russia and China.

While BRICS has come to be the watchword of multi-polarity, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has emerged as a military-security-intelligence alliance, on top of being an economic and political forum for Sino-Russian relations. The possibility of Iran joining this alliance both through participation in SCO summits, and in practice through military and non-military contracts as well as other forms of cooperation, signals a watershed both for Iran, and the non-western world. Where, just a few years ago, the US and its allies could dictate the terms of relations between Iran and other states, today it simply cannot, nuclear deal or no nuclear deal. The S-300s are only the tip of the iceberg.

What This Means for Iran and the Region

First and foremost, Iran is going to have the opportunity to exist, at least to some extent, on an equal footing on the international stage. Though it is still unclear the specifics of the finalized agreement, including the odious sanctions regime and the extent to which it will actually be lifted, what is certain is that Iran will have much more leeway to pursue economic cooperation with potential partners internationally.

Naturally, various propagandists from Washington to Tel Aviv have taken the opportunity to use Russia’s move to lift the ban as a signal of the “disastrous” policy of “appeasement” by the Obama administration. Commenting on Russia’s decision, Israeli intelligence and international relations minister Yuval Steinitz said that it was:

A direct result of the legitimacy that Iran is receiving from the nuclear deal that is being prepared, and proof that the Iranian economic growth which follows the lifting of sanctions will be exploited for arming itself and not for the welfare of the Iranian people… Instead of demanding that Iran desist from the terrorist activity that it is carrying out in the Middle East and throughout the world, it is being allowed to arm itself with advanced weapons that will only increase its aggression.

Such comments are perhaps far more revealing than Mr. Steinitz might realize. The overt admission in his statement is that Israel sees Iranian economic growth as the true threat to Israel (read Israeli hegemony). In direct contradiction to the droning propaganda about Iran wanting to “wipe Israel from the map,” Steinitz here quite correctly, though perhaps inadvertently, admits that Iran’s economic potential is what makes it a regional threat. While he includes the obligatory references to Iranian “terrorist activity” and “aggression,” Steinitz provides a window into the thinking of Israeli strategic planners who see in Iran a potential economic powerhouse that would lure western and non-western investment alike, not the least of which coming from western energy companies.

As Bloomberg noted in late March on the eve of the framework agreement, “[Iran] is emerging again as a potential prize for Western oil companies such as BP, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Eni SpA and Total SA. The Chinese can also be expected to enter the race, while U.S. companies, more burdened by sanctions and legacy, will be further down the pack...‘Iran is the big prize…The resource size is very attractive.’” Seen from this perspective, both the US and Israel stand to be major losers from the nuclear deal as Iran is allowed to pursue critical investment from international partners.

But the issue is not merely about investment, for if it were, Israel and the US would likely be able to control the debate. Instead, Russia’s potential delivery of the S-300s changes the strategic calculus for Washington and Tel Aviv, as their principal leverage – the threat of the use of force ranging from limited air strikes to all out war – will be considerably weakened, if not totally nullified. For, while Steinitz and others may talk of “advanced weapons that will only increase [Iran’s] aggression,” they know perfectly well that S-300s are defensive weapons whose function is to protect the integrity of a given country’s airspace from either missiles or aircraft. In this way, Israel and the US are far more concerned about losing their strategic advantage than they are of any aggressive posture from Iran.

There is still more for the US and Israel to be concerned about, namely what Iran might be able to do with increased military and technological cooperation with Russia. It could provide Iran the opportunity to up their material and technical support for Syria and Hezbollah in the continued fight against ISIS and Al Qaeda throughout the region. This of course would be disastrous to the regime change agenda of the US-NATO-GCC-Israel in Syria which, despite more than four years of an internationally orchestrated and supported terrorist war, shows no signs of capitulating. Taken in total, the S-300s would both symbolically and concretely alter the balance of power in the region.

The Geopolitical Significance

One should be careful not to understate the importance of this move by Russia. Aside from the obvious strategic importance such a defensive weapons system holds for a besieged country like Iran, there is the symbolic importance internationally. From all indications Russia and Iran are moving considerably closer, as evidenced by the recent military cooperation agreement signed by the defense ministers of the two countries.

Russia and Iran have a number of issues of mutual interest, from questions regarding the conflict in Syria, to Caspian region resources and security, to energy exports and world markets. Such complex international issues require not only close cooperation, but a mutually beneficial understanding in a variety of spheres; that is precisely what worries the US and Israel above all. But, unfortunately for Washington and Tel Aviv, the integration of Iran into a non-western, multi-polar order goes far deeper.

The emerging potential for Iran’s entry to the Russia-China led SCO would fundamentally alter the balance of power in Asia, especially in light of the growing consensus that both Pakistan and India will also join the SCO. Such a development would see a new power bloc in Asia, one that includes the economic and military power of China and Russia, with the emerging economy of India and, to a lesser degree, Pakistan: both military powers in their own right.

It is self-evident the degree to which such an alliance represents a threat, let alone a counterweight, to the decades-long hegemony of NATO and its proxies. Coupled with the emergence of the economic institutions associated with the BRICS – the BRICS Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – which could provide a much needed alternative to the US-EU dominated IMF and World Bank, the contours of a new economic and military order become more apparent.

While of course all of these important developments are far beyond the simple lifting of the ban on S-300s to Iran, they are connected. For, as Iran becomes a viable military and trading partner for Russia, it becomes more integrated into the global political and economic system. Today, it may simply be a defensive missile system, but the potential tomorrow is boundless. Planners in Moscow and Tehran understand this, as do those in Tel Aviv and Washington. For this reason, S-300s are far more than missiles: they are the symbol of a multi-polar future.

Eric Draitser is an independent geopolitical analyst based in New York City, he is the founder of StopImperialism.org and OP-ed columnist for RT, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Iran and the Middle East: Who’s Afraid of Russia’s S-300 Air Defense System? | Global Research - Centre for Research on Globalization
 
The Pentagon’s ‘Long War’ Pits NATO Against China, Russia and Iran
By Pepe Escobar
Global Research, May 02, 2015
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Whatever happens with the nuclear negotiations this summer, and as much as Tehran wants cooperation and not confrontation, Iran is bound to remain — alongside Russia — a key US geostrategic target.

As much as US President Barack Obama tried to dismiss it, the Russian sale of the S-300 missile system to Iran is a monumental game-changer. Even with the added gambit of the Iranian military assuring the made in Iran Bavar 373 may be even more efficient than the S-300. This explains why Jane’s Defense Weekly was already saying years ago that Israel could not penetrate Iranian airspace even if it managed to get there. And after the S-300s Iran inevitably will be offered the even more sophisticated S-400s, which are to be delivered to China as well.

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Who is America’s Worst Enemy?
The unspoken secret behind these game-changing proceedings actually terrifies Washington warmongers; it spells out a further frontline of Eurasian integration, in the form of an evolving Eurasian missile shield deployed against Pentagon/NATO ballistic plans. A precious glimpse of what’s ahead was offered at the Moscow Conference on International Security (MICS) in mid-April. Here we had the Iranian Defense Minister, Brigadier-General Hussein Dehghan, openly stating that Iran wanted BRICS members China, India, and Russia to jointly oppose NATO’s uncontrolled eastward expansion, and characterizing NATO’s for all practical purposes offensive missile shield as a threat to their collective security. We also had Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan emphasizing their military ties are an “overriding priority”; plus Tehran and Moscow stressing they’re strategically in synch in their push towards a new multipolar order. Tearing up the New Iron Curtain Washington’s Maidan adventure has yielded not only a crystallization of a new Iron Curtain deployed from the Baltics to the Black Sea. This is NATO’s visible game. What’s not so visible is that the target is not only Russia, but also Iran and China. The battlefield is now clearly drawn between NATO and Russia/China/Iran. So no wonder they are getting closer. Iran is an observer at the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and is bound to become a member of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) by 2016.

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Iran Ready to Receive S-300 Missiles From Russia – Defense Minister
Russia providing S-300 systems to Iran; S-400 systems to China (with new, longer-range guided missiles); and developing the S-500 systems, which are capable of intercepting supersonic targets, for itself, all point to an ultra high-tech counterpunch. And NATO knows it. This budding military Eurasia integration is a key subplot of the New Great Game that runs parallel to the Chinese-led New Silk Road(s) project. As a counterpunch to encroachment, it was bound to happen; after all Beijing is confronted by US encroachment via the Asia-Pacific; Russia by encroachment via Eastern Europe; and Iran by encroachment via Southwest Asia. Washington would also go for encroachment via Central Asia if it had the means (it doesn’t, and especially now with the New Silk Roads bound to crisscross Central Asia). Eurasian geopolitics hinges on what happens next with Iran. Some selected Washington factions entertain the myth that Tehran may “sell out” to the US — thus ditching its complex Russia/China strategic relationships to the benefit of an expanded US reach in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The Supreme Leader as well as President Rouhani have already made it clear that won’t happen. They know Washington trying to seduce Iran away from Russia and turn it into a client state does not mean Washington ever accepting Iran’s expanded sphere of influence in Southwest Asia and beyond. So the multi-vector Russia-China-Iran strategic alliance is a go. Because whatever happens with the nuclear negotiations this summer, and as much as Tehran wants cooperation and not confrontation, Iran is bound to remain — alongside Russia — a key US geostrategic target. That long and winding road And that brings us — inevitably — to GWOT (Global War on Terror). The Pentagon and assorted US neo-cons remain deeply embedded in their strategy of actively promoting Sunni-Shi’ite Divide and Rule with the key objective of demonizing Iran. Yemen is just yet another graphic example. Only fools would believe that the Houthis in Yemen could get away with mounting a power play right in front of a CIA drone-infested US military base in Djibouti.

Once again, this is all proceeding according to the Divide and Rule playbook. Washington did absolutely nothing to “protect” its Yemeni puppet regime from a Houthi offensive, while immediately afterwards providing all the necessary “leading from behind” for the House of Saud to go bonkers, killing loads of civilians — all in the name of fighting “Iranian expansion”. US corporate media, predictably, has gone completely nuts about it. Nothing new under the sun. This was already foreseen way back in 2008 by the RAND Corporation report Unfolding the Future of the Long War. Yes, this is the good ol’ Pentagon Long War as prosecuted against enemies, fabricated or otherwise, all across the “Muslim world”. What RAND prescribed has become the new normal. Washington supports the petrodollar GCC racket whatever happens, always in the interest of containing “Iranian power and influence”; diverts Salafi-jihadi resources toward “targeting Iranian interests throughout the Middle East,” especially in Iraq and Lebanon, hence “cutting back… anti-Western operations”; props up al-Qaeda — and ISIS/ISIL/Daesh — GCC sponsors and “empowers” viciously anti-Shi’ite Islamists everywhere to maintain “Western dominance”.

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Inside Track on the Iranian Framework Agreement
The Long War was first formulated in the “axis of evil” era by the Highlands Forum, a relatively obscure, neo-con infested Pentagon think tank. Not accidentally the RAND Corporation is a major “partner”.It gets even juicier when we know that notorious Long War practitioners such as current Pentagon supremo “Ash” Carter, his deputy Robert Work, and Pentagon intelligence chief Mike Vickers are now in charge of the self-described “Don’t Do Stupid Stuff” Obama administration’s military strategy. What the Pentagon — with customary hubris — does not see is Moscow and Tehran easily identifying the power play; the US government’s hidden agenda of manipulating a “rehabilitated” Iran to sell plenty of oil and gas to the EU, thus undermining Gazprom. Technically, this would take years to happen — if ever. Geopolitically, it’s nothing but a pipe dream. Call it, in fact, a double pipe dream. As much as Washington will never “secure” the Middle East with Iran as a vassal state, thus enabling it to transfer key US military assets to NATO with the purpose of facing the Russian “threat”, forget about going back to 1990s Russia under disaster capitalism, when the military industrial complex had collapsed and the West was looting Russia’s natural resources at will. The bottom line: the Pentagon barks, and the Russia/China/Iran strategic caravan goes on.

The Pentagon’s ‘Long War’ Pits NATO Against China, Russia and Iran | Global Research - Centre for Research on Globalization
 
Iran's only strategy is to use its missile arsenal on Israel , in case of a serious war , iran can also use the nukes they have from soviet republics on Jerusalem , the other thing iran will do for sure is to mass murder 40,000+ jews that are hostage in iran. other than that iran doesn't have too many options , whether you like it or not iran can't stand against a full fledged US invasion , not only iran will lose but the regime will lose legitimacy too and people will topple it some time later.

Very good analysis ... go & buy some chitooz for yourself !
 
i got a warning for that post , that's great , i didn't know this forum was pro-israeli too , and i'm sure an iranian member reported me for that , not even an israeli .... that's just great
 
i got a warning for that post , that's great , i didn't know this forum was pro-israeli too , and i'm sure an iranian member reported me for that , not even an israeli .... that's just great

mahmod ... khodeti ?
 
mahmod ... khodeti ?

Yeah, I guess he is AhmadiNejad.

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IMO, this type of delusions(like this thread) are coming from Iranian reformists who think that western powers are so dumb that they would leave their Arab allies(with 700 billion barrels of oil reserves), Israel, and their NATO allies, just because they may sign a deal with Iran. No, world powers are not dumbs, and this BS propaganda cannot even influence smart Iranians.

But, what is the deterrence strategy of Iran?

As long as US is concerned:
No matter of how many unveilings is done, not only Iran, but even countries ten times stronger than Iran cannot stand against US. Iran wants to cause more costs in such a scenario for US?!!! does not matter, since Arabs have already announced that they will voluntarily and willingly pay the whole costs.

As long as Israel is concerned:
Israel does have a strong air defense; hence the chance that Iranian missiles kills Palestinians living next doors, is much higher than these missiles killing any jew. Don't be delusional, iran does not have nukes either, and even if she does, she would not dare to use it against Israel, because the first one that is fired, then Iran will be nuked by US, Israel, ... That super moron jammersat is talking about killing 40k jews. First of all, there are currently less than 6K jews living in Iran who are mostly some 70 years old men and women whom touching them would cause serious reactions against Iran from international society. There would be no more holocausts, be sure of that Mr. nutjob.

But, are US and Israel the real issues? No, the rival regional countries are the real threats to Iran, that they may someday attack Iran, like how they are now attacking allies of Iran.
-Now, the real question should be, what is going to be the strategy of Iran to counter regional threats?
 
Also a little old and exaggerating Iran's role on some regional events like US's Iraq invasion, this article reasonably answers the question that is usually asked: Why is Iran pursuing its nuclear program:

Iran's Strategy | Stratfor

Iran's Strategy
Geopolitical Weekly
APRIL 10, 2012 | 09:04 GMT
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Stratfor
By George Friedman

For centuries, the dilemma facing Iran (and before it, Persia) has been guaranteeing national survival and autonomy in the face of stronger regional powers like Ottoman Turkey and the Russian Empire. Though always weaker than these larger empires, Iran survived for three reasons: geography, resources and diplomacy. Iran's size and mountainous terrain made military forays into the country difficult and dangerous. Iran also was able to field sufficient force to deter attacks while permitting occasional assertions of power. At the same time, Tehran engaged in clever diplomatic efforts, playing threatening powers off each other.

The intrusion of European imperial powers into the region compounded Iran's difficulties in the 19th century, along with the lodging of British power to Iran's west in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula following the end of World War I. This coincided with a transformation of the global economy to an oil-based system. Then as now, the region was a major source of global oil. Where the British once had interests in the region, the emergence of oil as the foundation of industrial and military power made these interests urgent. Following World War II, the Americans and the Soviets became the outside powers with the ability and desire to influence the region, but Tehran's basic strategic reality persisted. Iran faced both regional and global threats that it had to deflect or align with. And because of oil, the global power could not lose interest while the regional powers did not have the option of losing interest.

Whether ruled by shah or ayatollah, Iran's strategy remained the same: deter by geography, protect with defensive forces, and engage in complex diplomatic maneuvers. But underneath this reality, another vision of Iran's role always lurked.

Iran as Regional Power
A vision of Iran — a country with an essentially defensive posture — as a regional power remained. The shah competed with Saudi Arabia over Oman and dreamed of nuclear weapons. Ahmadinejad duels with Saudi Arabia over Bahrain, and also dreams of nuclear weapons. When we look beyond the rhetoric — something we always should do when studying foreign policy, since the rhetoric is intended to intimidate, seduce and confuse foreign powers and the public — we see substantial continuity in Iran's strategy since World War II. Iran dreams of achieving regional dominance by breaking free from its constraints and the threats posed by nearby powers.

Since World War II, Iran has had to deal with regional dangers like Iraq, with which it fought a brutal war lasting nearly a decade and costing Iran about 1 million casualties. It also has had to deal with the United States, whose power ultimately defined patterns in the region. So long as the United States had an overriding interest in the region, Iran had no choice but to define its policies in terms of the United States. For the shah, that meant submitting to the United States while subtly trying to control American actions. For the Islamic republic, it meant opposing the United States while trying to manipulate it into taking actions in the interests of Iran. Both acted within the traditions of Iranian strategic subtlety.

The Islamic republic proved more successful than the shah. It conducted a sophisticated disinformation campaign prior to the 2003 Iraq war to convince the United States that invading Iraq would be militarily easy and that Iraqis would welcome the Americans with open arms. This fed the existing U.S. desire to invade Iraq, becoming one factor among many that made the invasion seem doable. In a second phase, the Iranians helped many factions in Iraq resist the Americans, turning the occupation — and plans for reconstructing Iraq according to American blueprints — into a nightmare. In a third and final phase, Iran used its influence in Iraq to divide and paralyze the country after the Americans withdrew.

As a result of this maneuvering, Iran achieved two goals. First, the Americans disposed of Iran's archenemy, Saddam Hussein, turning Iraq into a strategic cripple. Second, Iran helped force the United States out of Iraq, creating a vacuum in Iraq and undermining U.S. credibility in the region — and sapping any U.S. appetite for further military adventures in the Middle East. I want to emphasize that all of this was not an Iranian plot: Many other factors contributed to this sequence of events. At the same time, Iranian maneuvering was no minor factor in the process; Iran skillfully exploited events that it helped shape.

There was a defensive point to this. Iran had seen the United States invade the countries surrounding it, Iraq to its west and Afghanistan to its east. It viewed the United States as extremely powerful and unpredictable to the point of irrationality, though also able to be manipulated. Tehran therefore could not dismiss the possibility that the United States would choose war with Iran. Expelling the United States from Iraq, however, limited American military options in the region.

This strategy also had an offensive dimension. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq positioned Iran to fill the vacuum. Critically, the geopolitics of the region had created an opening for Iran probably for the first time in centuries. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union released pressure from the north. Coming on top of the Ottoman collapse after World War I, Iran now no longer faced a regional power that could challenge it. Second, with the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, the global power had limited military options and even more limited political options for acting against Iran.

Iran's Opportunity
Iran now had the opportunity to consider emerging as a regional power rather than solely pursuing complex maneuvers to protect Iranian autonomy and the regime. The Iranians understood that the moods of global powers shifted unpredictably, the United States more than most. Therefore it knew that the more aggressive it became, the more the United States may militarily commit itself to containing Iran. At the same time, the United States might do so even without Iranian action. Accordingly, Iran searched for a strategy that might solidify its regional influence while not triggering U.S. retaliation.

Anyone studying the United States understands its concern with nuclear weapons. Throughout the Cold War it lived in the shadow of a Soviet first strike. The Bush administration used the possibility of an Iraqi nuclear program to rally domestic support for the invasion. When the Soviets and the Chinese attained nuclear weapons, the American response bordered on panic. The United States simultaneously became more cautious in its approach to those countries.

In looking at North Korea, the Iranians recognized a pattern they could use to their advantage. Regime survival in North Korea, a country of little consequence, was uncertain in the 1990s. When it undertook a nuclear program, however, the United States focused heavily on North Korea, simultaneously becoming more cautious in its approach to the North. Tremendous diplomatic activity and periodic aid was brought to bear to limit North Korea's program. From the North Korean point of view, actually acquiring deliverable nuclear weapons was not the point; North Korea was not a major power like China and Russia, and a miscalculation on Pyongyang's part could lead to more U.S. aggression. Rather, the process of developing nuclear weapons itself inflated North Korea's importance while inducing the United States to offer incentives or impose relatively ineffective economic sanctions (and thereby avoiding more dangerous military action). North Korea became a centerpiece of U.S. concern while the United States avoided actions that might destabilize North Korea and shake loose the weapons the North might have.

The North Koreans knew that having a deliverable weapon would prove dangerous, but that having a weapons program gave them leverage — a lesson the Iranians learned well. From the Iranians' point of view, a nuclear program causes the United States simultaneously to take them more seriously and to increase its caution while dealing with them. At present, the United States leads a group of countries with varying degrees of enthusiasm for imposing sanctions that might cause some economic pain to Iran, but give the United States a pretext not to undertake the military action Iran really fears and that the United States does not want to take.

Israel, however, must take a different view of Iran's weapons program. While not a threat to the United States, the program may threaten Israel. The Israelis' problem is that they must trust their intelligence on the level of development of Iran's weapons. The United States can afford a miscalculation; Israel might not be able to afford it. This lack of certainty makes Israel unpredictable. From the Iranian point of view, however, an Israeli attack might be welcome.

Iran does not have nuclear weapons and may be following the North Korean strategy of never developing deliverable weapons. If they did, however, and the Israelis attacked and destroyed them, the Iranians would be as they were before acquiring nuclear weapons. But if the Israelis attacked and failed to destroy them, the Iranians would emerge stronger. The Iranians could retaliate by taking action in the Strait of Hormuz. The United States, which ultimately is the guarantor of the global maritime flow of oil, might engage Iran militarily. Or it might enter into negotiations with Iran to guarantee the flow. An Israeli attack, whether successful or unsuccessful, would set the stage for Iranian actions that would threaten the global economy, paint Israel as the villain, and result in the United States being forced by European and Asian powers to guarantee the flow of oil with diplomatic concessions rather than military action. An attack by Israel, successful or unsuccessful, would cost Iran little and create substantial opportunities. In my view, the Iranians want a program, not a weapon, but having the Israelis attack the program would suit Iran's interests quite nicely.

The nuclear option falls into the category of Iranian manipulation of regional and global powers, long a historical necessity for the Iranians. But another, and more significant event is under way in Syria.

Syria's Importance to Iran
As we have written, if the Syrian regime survives, this in part would be due to Iranian support. Isolated from the rest of the world, Syria would become dependent on Iran. If that were to happen, an Iranian sphere of influence would stretch from western Afghanistan to Beirut. This in turn would fundamentally shift the balance of power in the Middle East, fulfilling Iran's dream of becoming a dominant regional power in the Persian Gulf and beyond. This was the shah's and the ayatollah's dream. And this is why the United States is currently obsessing over Syria.

What would such a sphere of influence give the Iranians? Three things. First, it would force the global power, the United States, to abandon ideas of destroying Iran, as the breadth of its influence would produce dangerously unpredictable results. Second, it would legitimize the regime inside Iran and in the region beyond any legitimacy it currently has. Third, with proxies along Saudi Arabia's northern border in Iraq and Shia along the western coast of the Persian Gulf, Iran could force shifts in the financial distribution of revenues from oil. Faced with regime preservation, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states would have to be flexible on Iranian demands, to say the least. Diverting that money to Iran would strengthen it greatly.

Iran has applied its strategy under regimes of various ideologies. The shah, whom many considered psychologically unstable and megalomaniacal, pursued this strategy with restraint and care. The current regime, also considered ideologically and psychologically unstable, has been equally restrained in its actions. Rhetoric and ideology can mislead, and usually are intended to do just that.

This long-term strategy, pursued since the 16th century with the resurgence of Persian nationalism in the form of the Safavid Empire, now sees a window of opportunity opening, engineered in some measure by Iran itself. Tehran's goal is to extend the American paralysis while it exploits the opportunities that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq has created. Simultaneously, it wants to create a coherent sphere of influence that the United States will have to accommodate itself to in order to satisfy the demand of its coalition for a stable supply of oil and limited conflict in the region.

Iran is pursuing a two-pronged strategy toward this end. The first is to avoid any sudden moves, to allow processes to run their course. The second is to create a diversion through its nuclear program, causing the United States to replicate its North Korea policy in Iran. If its program causes an Israeli airstrike, Iran can turn that to its advantage as well. The Iranians understand that having nuclear weapons is dangerous but that having a weapons program is advantageous. But the key is not the nuclear program. That is merely a tool to divert attention from what is actually happening — a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East.
 
Iran's defensive strategy should be to boost it's economy very rapidly. A strong inside is a strong outside. Even though the West won't allow Iran to have the best new equipment, some sorts of newer equipment will come in within the next few years. The US wants a balance between the Iran-led group and the GCC-led group for the foreseeable future. No open conflicts any more, just a cold war like thing. The US has given up on 'destroying' Iran for the foreseeable future. They have their hands full trying to contain China now, and their hand is getting weaker and weaker. So they want out of the Middle East ASAP, and to achieve that, some balance must be created. So we'll see a Iran-Shia Iraq camp, with some influence left in the Alawite parts of Syria, Southern Lebanon and parts of Yemen on the one side, the GCC, large parts of Syria and Turkey (50-50 split between trade with Iran and wanting to have Sunni power) on the other side. That's going to be the status quo for the coming 15-20 years (if I'm reading this correctly). No overt military action against Iran will be taken, and after ISIS probably no Covert actions either, unless and until Iran would become TOO influential or powerful (if it can fulfill it's full potential). The rest is bs to keep the sheep reading.
 
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