Is there such foreign NGO active inside Iran ?
1) NGO's can't be classified strictly into domestic and foreign ones insofar as they are non-governmental organizations, as their name indicates. At best can one operate a distinction based on the country they're registered in, and the nationality of their personnel and representatives.
2) Yes, NGO's registered abroad are active in Iran and think tanks counseling the USA regime are considering them as a weapon to instrumentalize. This is illustrated by the following document:
Baquer Namazi, Senior Advisor Population Council and Director, Iran NGO Initiative
www.wilsoncenter.org
3) That being said, the enemy does not need to rely on NGO's registered outside Iran: the liberal fifth column (reformists, moderates) is doing its dirty work already. Including in the NGO department, where hundreds of such organizations staffed by liberals are busy undermining the Leadership's guidelines, working against the Islamic Revolution and advancing the zio-American agenda in Iran.
One example would be a certain NGO claiming to offer free education to orphaned children, which was caught brainwashing youngsters with the very same sexualized material imposed onto nations by the UNESCO's Agenda 2030, against which Supreme Leader Khamenei (h.A.) had to intervene personally in order to prevent it from being integrated into school curriculum by the liberal-majority Majles. There are tons of similar examples. When the enemy has a treasonous fifth column up and running, it no longer considers direct presence of its own institutions as a top priority.
please point it to me and I myself start a Jihad against it.
Kind of doubt it, unless you waged jihad on Doctors Without Borders when they set up shop and began operating an inflatable clinic in Iran at the onset of the coronavirus crisis. The principlist government of seyyed Ra'isi chased them away, rightly so.
https://www.doctorswithoutborders.o...oke-approval-msf-coronavirus-treatment-center
those more traditional area were the area that come to street more and had far more protest
There were very little protests, and most took place in middle class neighborhoods.
These were quickly followed by violent riots. Rioters in turn represent a minority among their social class.
Iran Islamic education I believe is more hard core and has more time being taught in their school rather than countries such as Indonesia. I think the approach that should be improved.
These are the daughter of Indonesian famous Ulama, Quraish Shihab. He doesnt force his daughter to wear hijab, wearing hijab should comes from the heart
Until you familiarize yourself a little more with modern Iranian history, in particular with authors and politicians such as Iraj Mirza, Kasravi, Taqizade, Hedayat, Dashti, Ansari, Fuladvand to name just a few, you'll be deprived of the knowledge enabling adequate commentary on this question.
In Iran there's a minority political current marked by islamophobic thought, and it's unrelated to the present day education system of the Islamic Republic: historically, this islamophobic current was not spawned by the Islamic Republic, nor did it appear as a reaction to the latter's policies.
Indeed it all began 150 years ago, when Naser ed-Din shah of the Qajar dynasty made two fateful and jinxed visits to Europe in 1873 and 1878. During these, the shah fell victim to what patriotic and revolutionary thinkers like Ahmad Fardid would later term as westoxification - a form of neo-colonial inferiority complex vis à vis the zionist-dominated west, whereby national culture and civilization, including and especially in its religious Islamic dimension, would be regarded as a factor of backwardness and under-development whereas aping the west even superficially would be seen as a guarantee of progress and prosperity.
This is clearly distinctly from say, the Meiji's conviction that advanced western technology ought to be combined with local values and spirit: the political inferiority complex we're talking about takes aim at and generates shame towards anything rooted in domestic social reality.
Thence, this ideology developed along two iterations: one, downright admiration for the west and its secular liberalism; and two, a romanticized reinvention of a distant, pre-Islamic past promoted as the cornerstone of Iranian identity, which, in an oftentimes unavowed manner, adopts the same liberalism and secularism that characterize the former ideology (as a matter of fact, most Iranian ultra-nationalists happen to be liberals on the societal-cultural level, as well as secularists on the political level, even though some of them will denounce the west, its decadence and its imperialism; likewise, they by and large have little to no problem with zionism, in contrast to the great majority of Islamically-oriented Iranians, even if some nationalists might occasionally express Judeophobic ideas).
The toxic western-submissive mindset first spread to elements within Qajar court nobility. Then, western imperialists as well as western-based freemasonry began cultivating it on the Iranian political scene during the so-called Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1910, when the monarchy was compelled to accept the creation of the first Iranian parliament. However this revolutionary movement, which was initially marked by strong anti-imperialist and patriotic sentiments and was largely led by traditional clerics and local Resistance commanders, ended up being hijacked by freemasonry and its agents in Iran. The latter elements were responsible for the dastardly execution of an Islamic and national hero, sheykh Fazlollah Nuri, who had recognized and opposed the hijacking of the revolution by secularist liberal freemasons linked to western imperial interests.
From that point on, the two above mentioned political families which had emerged during late 19th century / early 20th century modernity, i.e. the liberal and the ultra-nationalist ones, both of which are of secularist essence, gave rise to varying degrees of islamophobia with full backing from western imperialists, zionists, freemasons and influential Haifan Bahai activists. The ultra-nationalist current came to be favored by Reza Khan, founder of the Pahlavi dynasty after he took power with the help of the British in the early 1920's and initiated a radically secularist and anti-clericalist regime similar to the Turkish Republic of Kemal Atatürk.
Traditionally Iranian national or cultural identity on the one hand, and the dominant religion of the land (i.e. Islam) on the other hand were not being seen as antinomic by anyone. As long as this was the norm across the entirety of Iranian society, Iran was experiencing unparalleled social stability and appeasement. Namely under the Safavid, Afsharid and Zand dynasties, as well as the initial eight decades of the Qajar period. But as soon as western-seeded ideological currents allergic to Islam set out to challenge the consensus, episodes of tumult followed.
The Iranian context differs starkly from the Indonesian. Any attempt at comparative sociology will have to take into account this background information.
However, there are global tendencies at play as well, brought about by the zio-American imperial monster and its far-reaching tentacles of cultural alienation. Said tendencies undermine religiosity including Islamic religiosity, and no Islamic nation is spared.
Nope, I believe Muslim society will keep being more conservative than Western countries. Islam as religion is quite strong as long as Dakwah is still free. After oppressing Islam quite long under Ataturk, current Turkey is getting more conservative, even Islamist party like AKP can will the election since 2000, and if AKP lost the election this year it will be Erdogan that needs to be blamed.
If and when the AKP is replaced by secularists, it will be squarely on the electoral system of democracy. For the latter is supposed to feature political alternation as a key aspect of institutional life. A democracy where one and the same party is elected over and over again with no end in sight, is considered a dysfunctional one, not a true democracy so to say.
Moreover, the perception that Turkish society has become more religious and more conservative compared to the 1960's-1970's is not really an accurate one. Many Iranian secularists who're having issues with sharia law happen to hold this very belief. Truth however is that Turkey under the anti-clerical Atatürk and subsequent decades used to be an overall more conservative place than it is today. Never have nudity, homosexualism, adultery, alcoholism and the like been more prevalent than they are now.
This was confirmed by a senior user from Turkey, who set the record straight for Iranian forumers sharing the mistaken supposition:
The Islamic ruling party in Turkey, and in Indonesia's case the military deep state, are projecting an outwardly image of societal re-Islamization because it's a practical tool of governance and legitimation in periods of political and social transition. Also because it can help contain backlash from the traditional segments of society against the nefarious impact of globalist post-modernity. Under the surface however, the cultural institutions that allow a society to function in the traditional way are unabatedly and gradually being struck as a consequence of these countries' integration into the dominant global order.
IMO the government of Iran are real fucking idiots. They are sticking to their guns with this ideological nonsense that causes unnecessary irritation among normal citizens, when they can just listen to what people want, somewhat liberalize their laws to take the boot off peoples' necks and that would immediately let off a lot of steam in terms of public discontent.
This is really tragic because the Islamist government of Iran is really doing a huge disservice to the Iranian nation, which has always been one of the great intellectual centers of the Islamic world. If Iran had a secular government that followed a more realist and non-ideological path, it could easily become the Germany of the Middle East. Instead the Iranian people's great talents are being smothered by a bunch of idiotic medieval Mullahs who are sacrificing their national interests to their ideological obsessions.
Interestingly enough, in terms of development the supposedly "medieval, ideological" government of Iran has trumped the secularist, "non-ideological" (a fallacious notion anyway) regime of the ousted Pahlavi monarchs. Be it in the field of industries, agriculture, infrastructures, science and technology, public education (including of women), public health, no matter what aspect one will look at the Islamic Republic's record literally dwarfs that of the secularist former regime of the shah.
In another thread, I composed a comprehensive overview proving the point. I'd advise studying it prior to formulating a counter-factual claim:
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/iran-player-refuse-to-sing-national-anthem.755139/post-14089084
Since I wrote the above by the way, Iran climbed to rank ten in worldwide automobile production, as well as to rank seven in worldwide production of steel.
Generally speaking, why should this be so much of a concern to you? I don't see many Iranians caring about what Chinese authorities do at home.
yes but as it does by modern communication channels....
I wouldn't bother with the user, brother. They'll argue endlessly for the sake of pushing a secularist, liberal and western-exonerating ideology. To this end, they'll go as far as blatantly contradicting themself, so long as it serves their talking point at that precise moment depending on the topic at hand.
For instance, when I highlighted how Iran could seek inspiration from China's Great Firewall to improve the filtering of subversive material the internet is literally being flooded with by Iran's existential enemies and their oppositionist footmen, the same user kept suggesting that internet censorship is a useless endeavour doomed to failure because people will circumvent it with VPN's anyway. Now suddenly they're striking the exact opposite tone, lamenting the effects of filtering because this way, they can try to depict the Islamic Republic as a government that limits free speech in contrast to supposedly tolerant western regimes.
More evidence that even in more traditional neighbourhoods of Tehran Women no longer feel obligated to wear "hijab"..
The second video is from Sohrevardi avenue - not a working class district, it's rather home to upper middle class people.
The first, which claims to be recorded in southern Tehran, has scenes spliced in from shopping malls located in upscale neighborhoods. And interestingly, features numerous very short sequences of a second or less - presumably because its makers cherry picked hejab-less females but were wary of showcasing their minority status.
The third video is from central Tehran, again more of a lower middle class than a pure working class district. But even there we can see how the majority of females are in fact observing hejab.
In actual working class areas, hejabis are more dominant even.
At any rate and as user AuZ observed, what can be seen in these clips isn't a new phenomenon in the sense that it predates recent riots by a couple of years. It was thus not induced by the latter.
