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‘Internal security doctrine has changed’

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‘Internal security doctrine has changed’
By Hassan Belal Zaidi

Have we really learned anything from over a decade of war?

Things have changed ever since we entered the war on terror; in particular, our policy towards Afghanistan has changed. Since 1947, we had genuine security concerns with our western neighbour — Pakhtunistan being the major bone of contention. There were incidents such as the Chaman border post attack and the Bajaur attack, which sounded alarm bells in Pakistan.

Back then, the tribal areas were only 30 per cent ‘open’. This means that government buildings and the military controlled only 30 percent of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata). The rest of the area was dark, it was closed to outsiders. This was true for the entire border region with Afghanistan, except for the border post at Torkham.

After 1973, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made industrial units everywhere. This helped open up maybe 60 percent of the tribal areas. The Afghans, on their end, worked vigorously towards their goal; they set up two educational centres in Kabul to preach their doctrine of Pakhtunistan, they recruited people from this side of the border to go to these centres and be indoctrinated. They sought to divide the Pakhtuns in Pakistan.

Now though, Pakistan’s Pakhtun population has become very integrated. So much so that Karachi, not Peshawar or Kandahar, is the largest Pakhtun city in the world. Hence, the fervour for Pakhtunistan has died down too.

What about the doctrine of ‘strategic depth’? Have we moved on from our traditional myopic view of Afghanistan?

The realisation that the US is leaving but we will be left to pick up the pieces has begun to set in. But the doctrine of strategic depth has been exaggerated. It was never as in vogue as it is thought. It was primarily Aslam Beg and before him, a brigadier in the 1960s, who used to espouse this doctrine. But on the ground, this doctrine didn’t hold much sway.

All the military wanted was a government that accepted the Durand Line. They saw that even when the Taliban, who were their ‘own people’, were asked to recognise the Durand Line as an international border, they simply turned around and said, “Islam has no concept of borders or boundaries”. So they are wary now. Moreover, the Taliban threat has domestically awakened the realisation that a Taliban government in Kabul will be harmful for Pakistan as well.

The contention that the British leased the Frontier province from the Afghans and now it must go back to them is not true. Under the UN convention, the agreement between the British and the Afghans has now been transferred to Pakistan, and this is governed by international law. I cannot comment on what seem to be political statements by Abdullah Abdullah, but overall, this issue has died down now. What is most significant is that the US has given statements to the effect that the Durand Line is the recognised international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This has laid the border question to rest.

What about our internal security doctrine? In terms of victimisation and silencing of dissent, particularly when questioning state institutions such as the military. Are they still as unquestionable as they were in the past?

The internal security doctrine has changed as well. Gone are the days when you could brand someone a traitor simply because they didn’t agree with your policies. Among political leaders, victimisation has all but faded away. But this has more to do with the mindset of the people than anything else. Geo TV, for example, were declared traitors for speaking against the army, so there are still red lines. We’ve come a long way, but there is still more to be done. I believe the situation can improve further if democratic governments continue.

The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) still looks to be an unrealised dream. Do you think having a centralised intelligence infrastructure will help us with this war?

In any country where there are several agencies charged with collecting intelligence, you can never have perfect inter-agency cooperation. Look at the US: they have the CIA, FBI, NSA, and they are all quite competitive. This is the bottom line; if the government tries to rein in the agencies through NACTA or any other centralised body, which is answerable to the Interior Ministry, they will face resistance.

In my opinion, sectarian organisations such as the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi must also be tackled in the wake of the action on North Waziristan. One could have a small cell supported by highly-trained operatives, who can swoop in and conduct surgical operations against militant hideouts in Bahawalpur, for example. Timing is key in all such operations, so it must be a small cell with a highly-trained and well-equipped force at their disposal. Now if you ask the Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, and the Special Branch to share intelligence on sectarian organisations, they will be far more willing than if you were to simply ask them to share information with each other.

Following the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) split and Maulana Fazlullah’s flight to Afghanistan, how do you see things shaping up?

The Afghan government does not control the area where Fazlullah is in hiding. But you can be sure that when a player such as Fazlullah is out in the open, all major intelligence agencies in the region will get involved. Be it the Afghan NDS, Russian intelligence, the Iranian, Indians or even our own Inter-Services Intelligence.

The TTP is primarily a Mehsud-led group. Baitullah Mehsud wanted Waliur Rehman to succeed him, but after his death, Hakeemullah took charge. Then both Wali and Hakeemullah were killed in drone attacks, leading to a deadlock. Fazlullah was the consensus candidate; a temporary solution. Now, with the split in the TTP, I see that the Mehsud-led faction will hold sway in Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai and the Frontier Regions (FRs), Darra Adam Khel and Lakki Marwat. The Fazlullah camp will be strong in Mohmand, Bajaur and Malakand, areas where the Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) is present, and will include hardliners like Umar Khalid Khorasani.

With regards to the operation specifically, what does it really mean when the army says that such and such area has been ‘cleared’?

When an agency is ‘cleared’, it means that the military has ‘dominated that space’ and disrupted the status quo, i.e. taken away the power base from militants and sent them packing. But even after an agency or any area is cleared, continued army presence is necessary to maintain stability.

As in the case of Swat, even today, military presence there is necessary because there is a chance that if Swat is left to its own devices, militancy might resurge in the area. The Swat valley and even the Mohmand Agency aren’t 100 per cent clear, but the writ of the state does prevail there now. Things are definitely better than before, at least Fazlullah is not in charge anymore.

So how do we deal with the remnants of these militants, those who blend back into society once their masters are killed or imprisoned?

Those who used to sympathise with militants must be rehabilitated. Those who surrender should be allowed safe passage and must be screened. Former combatants who reform must also be vetted to analyse why they were swayed by the extremist message in the first place. Above all, the children who have been either brainwashed by the terrorists or are simply traumatised by their experiences, must be rehabilitated. There should be aam maafi (general amnesty), like we’ve seen before in Balochistan in the 1970s. Ataullah Mengal, Bizenjo, they were all part of the Hyderabad tribunal, but now they are in the political mainstream.

Does the action stop with the operation in North Waziristan or do you think that there is more to this fight?

The momentum from this operation must be carried forward. After North Waziristan, if the military wants to proceed against terrorist hideouts in, for instance, Bhara Kahu or Jhang or Balochistan, they should go in and act swiftly.

Why has the operation taken so long? If the military wanted to move into NWA since 2011, what was stopping them?

It is always the concerns of the political leadership that hold up or delay any action on the ground. Even now, the biggest impediment to a final decision on the matter was the narrative built up in Punjab, that this action is being taken at the behest of the US. The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) mantra about talks was hurting the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) in Punjab and they had to counter that perception, which is why things took this long to materialise.

Not that they didn’t give peace a chance. But the committee formed to negotiate with the Taliban was a non-starter in the first place. It was obvious that apart from Rahimullah Yousafzai, no one else knew what they were talking about. The Talibs themselves were the architects of the breakdown of talks.

The army needs the sanction of the civilian government before entering any area for an operation. The governor of the province must explicitly request army action and they can only proceed with his orders. But in Fata, interestingly, the orders issued by the governor of the area in 1909, before partition, remains in force. Action was ordered in both Pata and Fata and technically, that order was never rescinded.

What do you think the fallout will be like in the rest of the country?

Look, it’s not possible to stop the terrorists from all their activities. There will be a backlash and it must be tolerated through a national consensus. Only that will ensure the operation’s success. The terrorists will try their best to fragment society’s opinions, but we must remain committed to this action.

There are currently two narratives on the drone issue; that they are a violation of our sovereignty, or that they are the best and most efficient way of taking out high-value targets. Where do you stand on this?

I believe the number of civilian casualties in drone attacks is exaggerated. The Taliban are masters of propaganda. I put it to you that if civilians were dying in drone attacks in as great numbers, as people are claiming, the Taliban would be all over the story. They have massive communications and public relations machinery at their disposal and in the immediate aftermath of a drone strike, they cordon off the area and clear it. So if we had instances of widespread civilian deaths, the Taliban’s media offensive would have been unstoppable. But they are reduced to sharing forged images, taken usually from the Middle East.

They don’t have anything, so they resort to faking ‘proof’.

Discuss the complexities of war on Twitter with Asad Munir @asadmunir38 and with Hassan Belal Zaidi @mightyobvious_

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 22nd, 2014
 
Good read, thank you. It seems some attitudes in Pakistan towards using offense on domestic extremists have shifted, at least from my perspective.

The "US lackey" propaganda appears to be losing at least some of its luster (correct me if I am wrong). Eliminating radicals on your own soil, who promote and commit violence against your countrymen, is the furthest thing from it.

Obviously using violence can only be a part of the equation, since localized poverty and perceived disenfranchisement are what these terror groups exploit in order to recruit. I support continued US aid to Pakistan's development long after we pull out of Afghanistan in order to help in that regard.
 
Insurgents have greatly benefited from the mutual distrust between Pakistan and the US.

The mistake US has made is to take things into its own hands rather than bolstering Pakistans ability to take on the insurgents by itself.

Pakistan has great experiance in such type of warfare, what we needed were the assets we need to impliment our COIN doctrine. Assets like the drones, Apaches, ELINT equipment, NVG capable gear for night ops, MRAPs and air lift helos.

The reason behind this is Obama govt's flawed and failed policy to contain China and prop up India as a regional hegemon. So, whatever gear Pakistan needed the most was seen as a threat by India as their type of Pakistan is the one with sticks and stones.

They lobbied hard to Bush and Obama to refrain from giving such gear to Pakistan or they wont service their anti China agenda which Obama administration agreed to thus hampered our ability to smash the terrorists.

Now Obama finds itself at a dead end. India simply cannot become the regional cop till Pakistan and China are in existence and Obama has a Pakistan with reduced fighting ability therefore increasing the risk factor for Pakistani Forces and the risk of off shore terrorist attacks.

Obama has not even visited Pakistan and has failed our mutual fight. He cannot expect us to fight with him while he visits India and not us who have sacrificed so much.

Obama has a choice to make. NACTA will become a reality and would service our long war against terror with whatever resources we can muster, while Obama can appease India in a falsehood that they'll stand against China.

@OCguy
 
Insurgents have greatly benefited from the mutual distrust between Pakistan and the US.
The mistake US has made is to take things into its own hands rather than bolstering Pakistans ability to take on the insurgents by itself.
Pakistan has great experiance in such type of warfare, what we needed were the assets we need to impliment our COIN doctrine. Assets like the drones, Apaches, ELINT equipment, NVG capable gear for night ops, MRAPs and air lift helos.
The reason behind this is Obama govt's flawed and failed policy to contain China and prop up India as a regional hegemon. So, whatever gear Pakistan needed the most was seen as a threat by India as their type of Pakistan is the one with sticks and stones.

The fact that Pakistan lost the trust of the US due to its policies went a long way in denying Pakistan more hardware.
 
@Aeronaut

I know that last year's military aid was specifically supposed to include NVGs. Armed drones are not sold to anyone as of this time, though I don't see that being the case for very long. I do know that Pakistan's recent increased resolve to take the action to the extremists can only improve the packages offered.

What someone from Pakistan sees as propping up India, America sees as being a supplier in a very large Indian military retrofit of old soviet weapons. Then on the Indian side, other weapons salesman use the fact that the Pakistan/US military partnership is so strong, as a way to stigmatize US bids. In a leaked diplomatic cable, an Indian source was quoted as saying that India does not put any US equipment in formations meant to defend against Pakistan, for fear that the US would no longer supply arms should another war occur. So basically everyone thinks we favor the other side.

I agree, the public distrust between US/Pak is easy for extremists to exploit. But I believe that has to start from the top, with the US government being open with its people about just how much Pakistan does to combat terrorism, and with the Pakistani government being open with its people about the US partnership. I've said before that I believe that telling the domestic audience that the US acts unilaterally within Pakistan, is extremely harmful to improving the trust between common citizens of our countries.

Edit: I also agree that Obama should make it a point to visit Pakistan to show solidarity to the US people, as well as the their people.
 
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Insurgents have greatly benefited from the mutual distrust between Pakistan and the US.

The mistake US has made is to take things into its own hands rather than bolstering Pakistans ability to take on the insurgents by itself.

Pakistan has great experiance in such type of warfare, what we needed were the assets we need to impliment our COIN doctrine. Assets like the drones, Apaches, ELINT equipment, NVG capable gear for night ops, MRAPs and air lift helos.

The reason behind this is Obama govt's flawed and failed policy to contain China and prop up India as a regional hegemon. So, whatever gear Pakistan needed the most was seen as a threat by India as their type of Pakistan is the one with sticks and stones.

They lobbied hard to Bush and Obama to refrain from giving such gear to Pakistan or they wont service their anti China agenda which Obama administration agreed to thus hampered our ability to smash the terrorists.

Now Obama finds itself at a dead end. India simply cannot become the regional cop till Pakistan and China are in existence and Obama has a Pakistan with reduced fighting ability therefore increasing the risk factor for Pakistani Forces and the risk of off shore terrorist attacks.

Obama has not even visited Pakistan and has failed our mutual fight. He cannot expect us to fight with him while he visits India and not us who have sacrificed so much.

Obama has a choice to make. NACTA will become a reality and would service our long war against terror with whatever resources we can muster, while Obama can appease India in a falsehood that they'll stand against China.

@OCguy

why to blame US for everything, they still give you a hell of money. As far as India is concerned we have our own independent policy. Gears you are talking about , you can take it from china also, so don't crib about that. This is basically failure of your policies.
 
The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) mantra about talks was hurting the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) in Punjab and they had to counter that perception, which is why things took this long to materialise.


Singling out PTI is not fair, every political party voted for peace talks in APC and peace talks were agenda of N-League also. So saying only PTI was responsible for this delay is utter nonsense.
 
@VCheng @OCguy

In a fact we started off on the wrong footing due to the republican warmongering without any planning in regards to Afghanistan.

Pakistan was under US sanctions which had created distrust in 2001. The dialouge between the two nations is evident of this distrust which only benefits the insurgents. I'm not blaming a single side as Pakistan too has made mistakes.

As for the equipment, we do need armed drones either sold or leased/jointly operated. US stationed U-2s in Pakistan which produced intel needed for both countries and a highly advanced recon version of B-57 was also sold to Pakistan at a time when we needed it badly.

Is predator technology more important than the fight itself? -If it is then there is an unarmed variant called Predator XP which though unarmed will still offer us extended recon and ELINT capability for up to 35 hours straight which at the moment is just 12 hours through our Shahpar UAV system.

Shahpar and Burraq (armed uav) are not net centric, cannot datalink with our prime surgical, time sensitive attack asset the F-16 Block52s. Predator XP can provide recon for extended periods and MOST importantly is able to lase targets for F-16s in real time.

US's weapons sales to India may not be Pakistan centric, but surely are China centric which China sees as a threat, even though they don't talk about it.

Obama needs to visit Pakistan and make a long term commitment to Afghan security and formation of a national unity govt and ethnically balanced military services.

An ISIS 'The Afghan episode' will destroy all gains made. I hope that Obama is learning lessons from Iraq to be applied on Afghanistan.
 
@VCheng @OCguy

In a fact we started off on the wrong footing due to the republican warmongering without any planning in regards to Afghanistan.

Pakistan was under US sanctions which had created distrust in 2001. The dialouge between the two nations is evident of this distrust which only benefits the insurgents. I'm not blaming a single side as Pakistan too has made mistakes.

As for the equipment, we do need armed drones either sold or leased/jointly operated. US stationed U-2s in Pakistan which produced intel needed for both countries and a highly advanced recon version of B-57 was also sold to Pakistan at a time when we needed it badly.

Is predator technology more important than the fight itself? -If it is then there is an unarmed variant called Predator XP which though unarmed will still offer us extended recon and ELINT capability for up to 35 hours straight which at the moment is just 12 hours through our Shahpar UAV system.

Shahpar and Burraq (armed uav) are not net centric, cannot datalink with our prime surgical, time sensitive attack asset the F-16 Block52s. Predator XP can provide recon for extended periods and MOST importantly is able to lase targets for F-16s in real time.

US's weapons sales to India may not be Pakistan centric, but surely are China centric which China sees as a threat, even though they don't talk about it.

Obama needs to visit Pakistan and make a long term commitment to Afghan security and formation of a national unity govt and ethnically balanced military services.

An ISIS 'The Afghan episode' will destroy all gains made. I hope that Obama is learning lessons from Iraq to be applied on Afghanistan.

I can agree with this post of yours, pretty much.

The last line is the most ominous. A regional crisis after the majority of US forces leave Afghanistan will not be good for anybody sane.
 
I
The last line is the most ominous. A regional crisis after the majority of US forces leave Afghanistan will not be good for anybody sane.

No it absolutely would not be good, mostly for the Afghan people who have suffered tremendously in the last 40+ years.

But Afghanistan is not Iraq or Syria. There will be a power vacuum when the US no longer has a large force to protect the central government, which will have multiple players trying to fill it.

Iraq was not a power vacuum but more a power shift, which left the Sunni minority who once made up the majority of the disbanded Army, subject to institutional discrimination. That is obviously an extreme simplification of the details, but each country faces its unique challenges.
 
ISI is going to facilitate the US force presence agreement by hook or by crook. ISIS repeat in Afghanistan will be a disaster. US presence can stabilize it.
 
No it absolutely would not be good, mostly for the Afghan people who have suffered tremendously in the last 40+ years.

But Afghanistan is not Iraq or Syria. There will be a power vacuum when the US no longer has a large force to protect the central government, which will have multiple players trying to fill it.

Iraq was not a power vacuum but more a power shift, which left the Sunni minority who once made up the majority of the disbanded Army, subject to institutional discrimination. That is obviously an extreme simplification of the details, but each country faces its unique challenges.

Call it a power vacuum or shift, the lack of an effective government in a country traumatized by war and rife with sectarian violence will always be prone to civil war, be it Iraq or Afghanistan.

Both India and Pakistan will be vying to establish their own tilt in Afghansitan, as soon as USA winds down, with predictably messy results.
 
Call it a power vacuum or shift, the lack of an effective government in a country traumatized by war and rife with sectarian violence will always be prone to civil war, be it Iraq or Afghanistan.

Both India and Pakistan will be vying to establish their own tilt in Afghansitan, as soon as USA winds down, with predictably messy results.

As will Russia and China. The United States discovered an estimated $1 Trillion treasure chest of Rare Earth Minerals in Afghanistan a few years ago, which China currently has a lock on 97% of the world supply.

Contrary to the "US invades to steal resources" talking point that gets thrown around, those minerals belong to the Afghan people, and there will be a lot of international chess played to gain influence post-US.
 
As will Russia and China. The United States discovered an estimated $1 Trillion treasure chest of Rare Earth Minerals in Afghanistan a few years ago, which China currently has a lock on 97% of the world supply.

Contrary to the "US invades to steal resources" talking point that gets thrown around, those minerals belong to the Afghan people, and there will be a lot of international chess played to gain influence post-US.

Russia is embroiled in its own troubles in the CAS and on its western side, and China would have no interest in those minerals, if they do exist, since it has its own. I see Iran as being more important than either of those two, and likely in co-operation with India. Pakistan will struggle to maintain its existing policies in Afghanistan.
 
Russia is embroiled in its own troubles in the CAS and on its western side, and China would have no interest in those minerals, if they do exist, since it has its own. I see Iran as being more important than either of those two, and likely in co-operation with India. Pakistan will struggle to maintain its existing policies in Afghanistan.

Maybe, but maybe you are thinking of the China and Russia of yesteryear. Both have renewed national aspirations of true Superpower status. This leads to expanded foreign engagement, in an attempt to expand foreign influence. Ultimately that requires economic and military power projection, particularly regionally.

China doesn't currently need more REMs, but they enjoy the power that comes with their current monopoly. They also don't need the oil out of a couple rigs in the SCS currently, but they are learned in tactics and are starting out locally with their power assertion.

I'm not saying anyone will be putting boots on the ground officially, but increased Intelligence operations are destined.
 
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