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katarabhumi
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I/ITSEC 2014: Rheinmetall to Supply the Indonesia Army with LEOPARD 2 Simulators
Indonesia has awarded Rheinmetall an order for state-of-the-art simulation technology for training tank crews. By 2015, Rheinmetall will have produced a driving- and a gunnery simulator for training Indonesian LEOPARD 2 personnel. The order is worth several million euros.
The LEOPARD Gunnery Skills Trainer (LGST) and Driver Training Simulator (DTS) are specifically designed for training LEOPARD 2A4 tank crews, and will primarily be used for sharpening the gunnery and combat skills of commanders, gunners and drivers.
Rheinmetall’s ultramodern TacSi technology features prominently in these simulators. Furthermore, as a leading supplier of defence technology systems, the Group is able to draw on its unsurpassed knowledge of the Leopard 2 and longstanding competence in the field of simulation, now coupled with the advantages offered by serious gaming technologies. As a result, Rheinmetall simulation products combine the virtues of the game engine in regard to visualization with the high-quality training outcomes its simulators assure.
A further advantage of the Rheinmetall system: Several simulators can be networked to enable tactical training at platoon and company level.
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY: I/ITSEC 2014: Rheinmetall to Supply the Indonesia Army with LEOPARD 2 Simulators
Indonesia has awarded Rheinmetall an order for state-of-the-art simulation technology for training tank crews. By 2015, Rheinmetall will have produced a driving- and a gunnery simulator for training Indonesian LEOPARD 2 personnel. The order is worth several million euros.
The LEOPARD Gunnery Skills Trainer (LGST) and Driver Training Simulator (DTS) are specifically designed for training LEOPARD 2A4 tank crews, and will primarily be used for sharpening the gunnery and combat skills of commanders, gunners and drivers.
Rheinmetall’s ultramodern TacSi technology features prominently in these simulators. Furthermore, as a leading supplier of defence technology systems, the Group is able to draw on its unsurpassed knowledge of the Leopard 2 and longstanding competence in the field of simulation, now coupled with the advantages offered by serious gaming technologies. As a result, Rheinmetall simulation products combine the virtues of the game engine in regard to visualization with the high-quality training outcomes its simulators assure.
A further advantage of the Rheinmetall system: Several simulators can be networked to enable tactical training at platoon and company level.
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY: I/ITSEC 2014: Rheinmetall to Supply the Indonesia Army with LEOPARD 2 Simulators
Reashot Xigwin
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Limited fuel supply hampers national maritime security: Military chief
Senin, 1 Desember 2014 17:17 WIB | 1.182 Views
Jakarta (ANTARA News) - Limited fuel supplies for Indonesian Navy ships has hampered the conduct of surveillance and security measure in Indonesian waters, a top military official said here Monday.
"The limited supply of fuel has been reported to President Joko Widodo. Currently, the Government only provided 27 percent of the total fuel needed by the Indonesian Navy," Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander General Moeldoko said here Monday, after leading the ceremony of the Korpris (Indonesian Civil Servants Corps) 43rd Anniversary at Navy Headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta.
Despite the limited supply, Moeldoko said he expected in the future that the Government will support the Navys requirements to help secure the nation�s waters.
Meanwhile, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Marsetio confirmed that the fuel allocation was far from optimal to maintain maritime security.
"If the fuel supply meets our requirements, we can go anywhere. Once there is a report from the KKP (Maritime and Fishery Ministry), or of illegal activity, we can immediately go to the site," Marsetio said.
Marsetio said the Indonesian Navy has three major roles.
First, the Navy has its military role, as the enforcement force in protecting the nations sovereignty. Second, it performs law enforcement and lastly, it carries out a diplomatic role for the nation.
"There is no particular navy ship to tackle illegal fishing. The ships do all the three inherent roles," Marsetio said.(*)
Limited fuel supply hampers national maritime security: Military chief - ANTARA News
Indonesia’s Seaward Shift: A Break from the Past
December 4, 2014 Lino Miani Leave a comment
In his inaugural speech as the President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo communicated a vision of prosperity for his country based on a tradition of maritime trade. Indonesia, he said, is to become a sea-going trading power once again. With a new Ministry of Maritime Affairs and a US $6 billion investment in maritime infrastructure, he’s putting his proverbial money where his mouth is. While this seems like an obvious path for archipelagic Indonesia to take, there are very important reasons why this signals a profound shift in the strategic thinking of the country from an internal threat perception to an external one. Although some analysts believe Jokowi’s pronouncement is code for abandonment of Indonesia’s non-alignment policy, it is likely his words had nothing to do with external actors and everything to do with growing confidence in Indonesia’s democracy to effectively address its historically troubled internal security.
Understanding this requires a look at the history and culture of Indonesia’s security services. Like many of its counterparts in neighboring states, the Indonesian security apparatus was formed, tested, blooded, and solidified in an environment of internal insurgency. For hundreds of years, Southeast Asian nations (with the exception of Thailand) were caught up in the ebb and flow of colonial domination. In a very short time following the Japanese invasion of the region in December 1941, these nations underwent a rapid decoupling from the colonial system. By 1959 all were newly independent and all except Thailand were on a fairly shaky basis due to the newness of their institutions. Worse, they all suffered from vicious Communist insurgencies formed, trained, and supported by the Allies to counter the Japanese. In some cases, returning colonial powers (French, Dutch, and British) found themselves fighting the very the agents they had trained just a few years earlier. The chickens had come home to roost in a very real and violent way.
The Communists had two weakness: they were not a single, monolithic insurgency but a collection of disconnected national movements (Malayan, Thai, Indonesian, Filipino) vulnerable to defeat in detail, and their core membership was composed primarily of culturally distinct ethnic Chinese minorities. Their ability to blend into the local populations was limited, forcing the Communists to operate in remote, politically marginal areas. Despite this, they posed a very real threat to the stability of the young governments in the five nations that would eventually form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). By 1967, these nations had had enough and decided they needed a political construct that would enable them to address the problem. The solution was the principle of non-interference enshrined in the founding declaration of ASEAN. This principle allowed member states to define their insurgencies as purely internal problems and to deal with them without fear of interference by other ASEAN member states. In its implementation over the last forty-seven years, the principle of non-interference has been used at times as a cover for the suppression of internal populations through imposition of emergency security measures such as restrictions on freedoms of the press and assembly; common factors in many ASEAN countries. Of course, the best tool for implementing these restrictions is the police. As a result, in many ASEAN countries the police, not the Army, have primacy for both internal and external security. But Indonesia went a different direction, relying more on its military special operations forces (Kopassus and others) than on its police.
Created by the Japanese to fight Dutch-trained Indonesian paramilitary formations (and ultimately the Dutch themselves), the predecessors of the Indonesian Army (TNI) and national intelligence service (BIN) adopted a heavy counter-insurgency focus during their early operations in the Second World War. With the accession of their leaders, Sukarno and Zulkifli Lubis, to political and bureaucratic power, TNI and BIN’s perception of threat from within dominated Indonesia’s strategic landscape until the end of the 20th Century. As TNI’s monopoly on political power quickly eroded after the fall of Suharto in 1998, the emphasis began to shift toward the police. A U.S. legislative prohibition on direct military engagement with individuals accused of human rights violations accelerated the situation. The prohibition disproportionately affected Kopassus after accusations that many of its leaders committed war crimes during the invasion of East Timor in 1975. Decades later, the U.S. failure to engage Kopassus remained problematic for the United States because TNI continued to block access to other Indonesian units, insisting that Jakarta, not the U.S. Congress, would decide which Indonesian formations received priority for mil-mil cooperation. The impasse left the door open for the U.S. State Department to become the lead U.S. agency for security assistance to Indonesia. Through its Anti-Terrorism Agency (ATA), the State Department drove the formation and training of the now famous police counterterrorism unit, Densus 88,[1] known for its spectacular successes against a number of the country’s most wanted international terrorists. By 2007, with hotspots in Timor and Irian Jaya temporarily quiet, Indonesia’s police seemed to be firmly in control of internal security, allowing the country’s military and political leadership to begin thinking outwardly.
It is in this context that Jokowi’s pronouncement makes sense. Navies do not have great utility against insurgencies and it would not be feasible or advisable to emphasize naval power while under threat from within. While some happily interpret this shift to be aimed squarely at China, whose territorial claims in the South China Sea affect Indonesia’s energy rich Natuna Island, this is probably wishful thinking. China’s brushes with Natuna are a very recent development in what is a much older strategic context. Therefore we should not view such a shift as a bold break from strategic concepts of the past, rather we should take it as a reflection of Indonesia’s changing security situation going all the way back to the Japanese invasion in 1941. While it’s probably inaccurate to portray this as evidence of Jokowi’s greatness and vision, we can take heart that a shift to the sea is evidence that a mature, stable Indonesia has indeed arrived and is here to stay.
Lino Miani is a US Army Special Forces officer, author of The Sulu Arms Market, and CEO of Navisio Global LLC. Views expressed in this article are definitely not the views of the US Government, the U.S. Army, or the Special Forces Regiment.
[1] The name Detacmen Khusus 88, or Densus 88 for short, is reportedly the result of a misinterpretation of the English acronym for Antiterrorism Agency (ATA) by a senior Indonesian police official.
Indonesia’s Seaward Shift: A Break from the Past
Senin, 1 Desember 2014 17:17 WIB | 1.182 Views
Jakarta (ANTARA News) - Limited fuel supplies for Indonesian Navy ships has hampered the conduct of surveillance and security measure in Indonesian waters, a top military official said here Monday.
"The limited supply of fuel has been reported to President Joko Widodo. Currently, the Government only provided 27 percent of the total fuel needed by the Indonesian Navy," Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander General Moeldoko said here Monday, after leading the ceremony of the Korpris (Indonesian Civil Servants Corps) 43rd Anniversary at Navy Headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta.
Despite the limited supply, Moeldoko said he expected in the future that the Government will support the Navys requirements to help secure the nation�s waters.
Meanwhile, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Marsetio confirmed that the fuel allocation was far from optimal to maintain maritime security.
"If the fuel supply meets our requirements, we can go anywhere. Once there is a report from the KKP (Maritime and Fishery Ministry), or of illegal activity, we can immediately go to the site," Marsetio said.
Marsetio said the Indonesian Navy has three major roles.
First, the Navy has its military role, as the enforcement force in protecting the nations sovereignty. Second, it performs law enforcement and lastly, it carries out a diplomatic role for the nation.
"There is no particular navy ship to tackle illegal fishing. The ships do all the three inherent roles," Marsetio said.(*)
Limited fuel supply hampers national maritime security: Military chief - ANTARA News
Indonesia’s Seaward Shift: A Break from the Past
December 4, 2014 Lino Miani Leave a comment
In his inaugural speech as the President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo communicated a vision of prosperity for his country based on a tradition of maritime trade. Indonesia, he said, is to become a sea-going trading power once again. With a new Ministry of Maritime Affairs and a US $6 billion investment in maritime infrastructure, he’s putting his proverbial money where his mouth is. While this seems like an obvious path for archipelagic Indonesia to take, there are very important reasons why this signals a profound shift in the strategic thinking of the country from an internal threat perception to an external one. Although some analysts believe Jokowi’s pronouncement is code for abandonment of Indonesia’s non-alignment policy, it is likely his words had nothing to do with external actors and everything to do with growing confidence in Indonesia’s democracy to effectively address its historically troubled internal security.
Understanding this requires a look at the history and culture of Indonesia’s security services. Like many of its counterparts in neighboring states, the Indonesian security apparatus was formed, tested, blooded, and solidified in an environment of internal insurgency. For hundreds of years, Southeast Asian nations (with the exception of Thailand) were caught up in the ebb and flow of colonial domination. In a very short time following the Japanese invasion of the region in December 1941, these nations underwent a rapid decoupling from the colonial system. By 1959 all were newly independent and all except Thailand were on a fairly shaky basis due to the newness of their institutions. Worse, they all suffered from vicious Communist insurgencies formed, trained, and supported by the Allies to counter the Japanese. In some cases, returning colonial powers (French, Dutch, and British) found themselves fighting the very the agents they had trained just a few years earlier. The chickens had come home to roost in a very real and violent way.
The Communists had two weakness: they were not a single, monolithic insurgency but a collection of disconnected national movements (Malayan, Thai, Indonesian, Filipino) vulnerable to defeat in detail, and their core membership was composed primarily of culturally distinct ethnic Chinese minorities. Their ability to blend into the local populations was limited, forcing the Communists to operate in remote, politically marginal areas. Despite this, they posed a very real threat to the stability of the young governments in the five nations that would eventually form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). By 1967, these nations had had enough and decided they needed a political construct that would enable them to address the problem. The solution was the principle of non-interference enshrined in the founding declaration of ASEAN. This principle allowed member states to define their insurgencies as purely internal problems and to deal with them without fear of interference by other ASEAN member states. In its implementation over the last forty-seven years, the principle of non-interference has been used at times as a cover for the suppression of internal populations through imposition of emergency security measures such as restrictions on freedoms of the press and assembly; common factors in many ASEAN countries. Of course, the best tool for implementing these restrictions is the police. As a result, in many ASEAN countries the police, not the Army, have primacy for both internal and external security. But Indonesia went a different direction, relying more on its military special operations forces (Kopassus and others) than on its police.
Created by the Japanese to fight Dutch-trained Indonesian paramilitary formations (and ultimately the Dutch themselves), the predecessors of the Indonesian Army (TNI) and national intelligence service (BIN) adopted a heavy counter-insurgency focus during their early operations in the Second World War. With the accession of their leaders, Sukarno and Zulkifli Lubis, to political and bureaucratic power, TNI and BIN’s perception of threat from within dominated Indonesia’s strategic landscape until the end of the 20th Century. As TNI’s monopoly on political power quickly eroded after the fall of Suharto in 1998, the emphasis began to shift toward the police. A U.S. legislative prohibition on direct military engagement with individuals accused of human rights violations accelerated the situation. The prohibition disproportionately affected Kopassus after accusations that many of its leaders committed war crimes during the invasion of East Timor in 1975. Decades later, the U.S. failure to engage Kopassus remained problematic for the United States because TNI continued to block access to other Indonesian units, insisting that Jakarta, not the U.S. Congress, would decide which Indonesian formations received priority for mil-mil cooperation. The impasse left the door open for the U.S. State Department to become the lead U.S. agency for security assistance to Indonesia. Through its Anti-Terrorism Agency (ATA), the State Department drove the formation and training of the now famous police counterterrorism unit, Densus 88,[1] known for its spectacular successes against a number of the country’s most wanted international terrorists. By 2007, with hotspots in Timor and Irian Jaya temporarily quiet, Indonesia’s police seemed to be firmly in control of internal security, allowing the country’s military and political leadership to begin thinking outwardly.
It is in this context that Jokowi’s pronouncement makes sense. Navies do not have great utility against insurgencies and it would not be feasible or advisable to emphasize naval power while under threat from within. While some happily interpret this shift to be aimed squarely at China, whose territorial claims in the South China Sea affect Indonesia’s energy rich Natuna Island, this is probably wishful thinking. China’s brushes with Natuna are a very recent development in what is a much older strategic context. Therefore we should not view such a shift as a bold break from strategic concepts of the past, rather we should take it as a reflection of Indonesia’s changing security situation going all the way back to the Japanese invasion in 1941. While it’s probably inaccurate to portray this as evidence of Jokowi’s greatness and vision, we can take heart that a shift to the sea is evidence that a mature, stable Indonesia has indeed arrived and is here to stay.
Lino Miani is a US Army Special Forces officer, author of The Sulu Arms Market, and CEO of Navisio Global LLC. Views expressed in this article are definitely not the views of the US Government, the U.S. Army, or the Special Forces Regiment.
[1] The name Detacmen Khusus 88, or Densus 88 for short, is reportedly the result of a misinterpretation of the English acronym for Antiterrorism Agency (ATA) by a senior Indonesian police official.
Indonesia’s Seaward Shift: A Break from the Past
pr1v4t33r
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I'll add some more...
The boats looks small, but they're actually more than 80GT, way more bigger than many of indonesian fisherman boat.
The illegal boat, close-up and personal...
illegal boats, awaiting execution
Hands up, stand up... vietnamese boat's crew...deported
illegal boats drowning after bombed
Thailand illegal fishing boats captured, waiting similar fate
December 14th, the execution day. 5 thailand illegal fishing boat in waiting mode...
The boats looks small, but they're actually more than 80GT, way more bigger than many of indonesian fisherman boat.
The illegal boat, close-up and personal...
illegal boats, awaiting execution
Hands up, stand up... vietnamese boat's crew...deported
illegal boats drowning after bombed
Thailand illegal fishing boats captured, waiting similar fate
December 14th, the execution day. 5 thailand illegal fishing boat in waiting mode...
Last edited:
onebyone
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Good work
pr1v4t33r
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Indeed a good wook. Job well done. illegal fishing can be the entering door for human trafficking, illegal drugs trading, etc.
Reashot Xigwin
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This story of how the Son of China Becoming an Admiral in the Indonesian Navy.
Dani Hardiat Satria - December 4, 2014 22:08 pm
First Laksama Harmin Facility - MTVN / Hardiat Dani Satria
Metrotvnews.com, Jakarta: First Admiral Harmin is a Chinese with a successful career in the military. The man who entered the military in 1978. He judges that the public often mistakenly see ethnic Chinese relations with the Military.
TNI, said Harmin, knows no discrimination. He was never discriminated in the selection process, training, until he held the rank of Star.
"If we did not complain and fear the task, willing to take the most heaviest of duty and if no one else wants to help, people will appreciate and will not see the color of our skin," he said when the launch of his book "History of the Chinese in the military Since Nusantara to Indonesia "in Joang Building 45, Jalan Menteng Raya No. 31, Central Jakarta, Thursday (12/04/2014).
When serving in the Marines, Harmin feel strong brotherhood with his friends. People actually amazed at the figure of Harmin wearing the Marine uniform and gun in hand.
"I came to Glodok, people there glared and looking at me, I become something so rare," said Harmin.
In addition, Harmin also ensure that there is no discrimination in the selection process of the military. Pasalnyam, Harmin had become the center of the reception team at the academy. "The words 'What Ethnicity you belong to?' is not used, "said Harmin.
Harmin also claimed never favored fellow Chinese citizens. He even once refused a another Chinese youth. "I myself decided he was not accepted. Because in terms of health is not worth it in my opinion, not because of race, "said Harmin.
To that end, Harmin urge people eliminate the negative stigma of ethnic Chinese in the military sphere. "So I told Gema Inti, Chinese youths, to not have a sense of inferiority. We are Indonesian, we are part of the community. Prove We deserved to be active in military activities, "pleaded Harmin.
OGI
Ini Kisah Putra Tiongkok sampai Jadi Laksamana TNI | News |…
Dani Hardiat Satria - December 4, 2014 22:08 pm
First Laksama Harmin Facility - MTVN / Hardiat Dani Satria
Metrotvnews.com, Jakarta: First Admiral Harmin is a Chinese with a successful career in the military. The man who entered the military in 1978. He judges that the public often mistakenly see ethnic Chinese relations with the Military.
TNI, said Harmin, knows no discrimination. He was never discriminated in the selection process, training, until he held the rank of Star.
"If we did not complain and fear the task, willing to take the most heaviest of duty and if no one else wants to help, people will appreciate and will not see the color of our skin," he said when the launch of his book "History of the Chinese in the military Since Nusantara to Indonesia "in Joang Building 45, Jalan Menteng Raya No. 31, Central Jakarta, Thursday (12/04/2014).
When serving in the Marines, Harmin feel strong brotherhood with his friends. People actually amazed at the figure of Harmin wearing the Marine uniform and gun in hand.
"I came to Glodok, people there glared and looking at me, I become something so rare," said Harmin.
In addition, Harmin also ensure that there is no discrimination in the selection process of the military. Pasalnyam, Harmin had become the center of the reception team at the academy. "The words 'What Ethnicity you belong to?' is not used, "said Harmin.
Harmin also claimed never favored fellow Chinese citizens. He even once refused a another Chinese youth. "I myself decided he was not accepted. Because in terms of health is not worth it in my opinion, not because of race, "said Harmin.
To that end, Harmin urge people eliminate the negative stigma of ethnic Chinese in the military sphere. "So I told Gema Inti, Chinese youths, to not have a sense of inferiority. We are Indonesian, we are part of the community. Prove We deserved to be active in military activities, "pleaded Harmin.
OGI
Ini Kisah Putra Tiongkok sampai Jadi Laksamana TNI | News |…
DESERT FIGHTER
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That pic is from Pak.. and AZ isnt a few tank... its a complete upgrade for older tanks......
Nike
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for all of Indonesian member here, no need to use chauvinistic tone. Our military still struggling to fulfill their basic needs, our military still small when compared to India, Chinese, and other countries who possesses large structure armed forces and quite well armed like South Korean, Turkiye armed forces, Pakistan and others. We still growing and we are not reach our destination yet
Indonesian Brigade Mobil (Brimob), paramilitary forces under jurisdiction of Police Department, they are well equipped along with standard small arms and gears, they also own their infantry support equipment like Armored vehicle, helicopter units, combat boat, patrol boats and Mortars.
credit to original uploader and that's not me surely
Indonesian Brigade Mobil (Brimob), paramilitary forces under jurisdiction of Police Department, they are well equipped along with standard small arms and gears, they also own their infantry support equipment like Armored vehicle, helicopter units, combat boat, patrol boats and Mortars.
credit to original uploader and that's not me surely
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