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Indonesia Defence Forum

Congratulation (^_^)d @Indos

Thanks bro, I hope our contribution to our nation is more than this.......... :partay:

Hoping to see PDF Indo brigade infiltrate Indonesia future politics though, damn so many childish politician at our nation now, need to crush them all :sniper:
 
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Indonesian Raider Infantry unit conduct exercise
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Helicopter Bell 412EP supporting the Raider to conduct their mission
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Indonesian Raider ground vehicle armed with CIS 50 Heavy Machine Gun

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Jokowi’s waves of opportunity
26Nov 2014
By Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto

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Today ASPI has released Waves of opportunity: Enhancing Australia–Indonesia maritime security cooperation. The full report can be found here [PDF].

At the recent East Asia Summit (EAS), Indonesia’s President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo spoke about Indonesia’s new maritime doctrine, the ‘World Maritime Axis’ concept. But what does that mean? Some criticise the term for its negative connotations, as in ‘axis powers’, or ‘axis of evil’. Perhaps it’s more apt to describe it as a ‘pivot’, as the US ‘rebalance’ used to be termed.

The World Maritime Axis highlights that ‘the sea is becoming more important for our future’, wroteJokowi. Indonesia is increasingly aware of its central location along the sea lanes that connect two strategic oceans, the Indian and Pacific. Hence, Jakarta has warmly embraced the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ not only as diplomatic jargon [PDF], but as strategic comprehension.

But the important shift isn’t just maritime. Rather, it’s how Indonesia views its surrounding geography. Indonesia has traditionally looked north and east toward the Pacific, for economic, diplomatic and strategic reasons in its engagements with ASEAN and the major powers, including the US. The World Maritime Axis aims to give greater attention to the less-understood, but no less important, Indian Ocean in Jakarta’s mental map [PDF].

That brings Australia (and India) into the equation. The Indian Ocean, including the Timor Sea, has been known as a sea of troubles due to challenges ranging from people smuggling and illegal fishing, to more strategic Chinese submarine forays and the security of its maritime choke-points—including the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits. No countries are better poised to address challenges to those vital waterways than Australia and Indonesia [PDF].

Maritime security cooperation can therefore support some, if not all, of the five pillars of the World Maritime Axis concept: rebuilding the maritime culture; enhancing the maritime economy (especially the fishing industry); improving maritime infrastructure and connectivity (through the‘sea highway’ proposal); engaging in maritime diplomacy (such as the chairmanship of IORA); and strengthening maritime defence.

First, trust must be built between policymakers. Cooperation can be both a way to build and maintain trust and an end in itself. Trust-building can start from personal ties between policymakers at both strategic and operational/tactical levels to underpin the formal consultative and dialogue processes, such as the Indonesia-Australia Defence Strategic Dialogue, annual leaders’ meeting, and the 2+2 foreign and defence ministers’ meeting. Institutionalising personal ties, such as those facilitated by the Ikatan Alumni Pertahanan Indonesia-Australia (IKAHAN), is useful but could be more so if expanded to include civilian counterparts, such as law-enforcement officials. With trust anything is possible. Both countries could discuss their individual—and potentially their collective—plans to prevent or counter the threat of force in territorial disputes, such as in the South China Sea.

Second, there’s an apparent need to streamline institutional stove-piping and bureaucracies responsible for cooperation. Cooperation currently takes a siloed form: each agency responsible does its own thing. The problem partly lies in Indonesia’s multiple, but poorly coordinated, maritime-security agencies. The Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut (Maritime Security Coordinating Agency, BAKORKAMLA) is supposedly responsible for coordinating 12 agencies. But competition among some of them has stymied operations and precipitated turf battles. As such, BAKORKAMLA will soon become the Badan Keamanan Laut (Maritime Security Agency, BAKAMLA) as Indonesia’s new Coastguard so that it can gain a command authority. Even then, overlaps and duplication of roles will still exist. Under National Law No. 32/2014 on Marine Affairs, BAKAMLA would be responsible for patrols, search and rescue, and law enforcement, similar to other agencies such as Marine Police and Transport Ministry’s Sea and Coast Guard Unit (KPLP). That necessitates major legal and institutional reforms. The formation of the Australian Border Force (ABF) [PDF] next year could give Indonesia useful insights on the Australian experience in streamlining multiple agencies responsible for maritime security.

Third, while Indonesia still lacks the capacity to secure its waters effectively, Australian assistance needs to be recalibrated. Rather than giving hardware assets, assistance should be aimed toward improving Indonesia’s maritime security policymaking and assisting Indonesia to contribute more in regional maritime security. Australia can offer education and training opportunities for BAKAMLA’s officials, while simultaneously planning for future BAKAMLA-ABF exercises. Such training could be jointly conducted in other countries, such as Timor-Leste [PDF].

Fourth, the ultimate achievement of security cooperation should be maritime domain awareness (MDA) along the maritime boundary. MDA is essentially a comprehensive understanding about what’s happening over, on, and under the sea and along the littoral. Australia has voiced support for Indonesia’s National Maritime Security Information Center. That Center could support surveillance and information-sharing cooperation between Australia and Indonesia.

Finally, Indonesia can engage in joint tri-service military exercises with Australia, both to increase interoperability and to make our two armed forces more comfortable about working together in a joint environment. Submarine search and rescue might be another opportunity to add weight to bilateral cooperation.

Notwithstanding those opportunities, old problems remain and new ones can arise. For Indonesia, it remains to be seen whether the President can promote his ideas beyond the circle of advisers and ministers. He must convince the skeptics in the parliament, the bureaucracy, and the public that the World Maritime Axis concept is indeed what Indonesia needs to navigate the Indo-Pacific century.

Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is an associate research fellow in the RSIS Maritime Security Programme and author of Waves of opportunity: Enhancing Australia–Indonesia maritime security cooperation. Image courtesy of Department of Defence.

http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/
 
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Indonesia: Widodo government heralds more muscular strategic posture

21Nov 2014 By Greta Nabbs-Keller


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Prior to President Joko Widodo’s inauguration, one of his principal advisers lamented Indonesia’s weak state mentality. In a critique of Indonesia’s defence posture, which he characterised as ‘too passive’, he quipped to seminar participants that Indonesia’s South-China-Sea-located ‘Natuna [Islands] would be snatched and Indonesia forced to snatch them back again!’

Not so, if the more robust defence of Indonesia’s airspace is anything to go by. In the last few weeks, the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) has scrambled its Russian-made Sukhoi fighters on three separate occasions to intercept civil aircraft traversing Indonesia’s airspace without necessary flight clearances.

Although Indonesia has scrambled its fighters previously in response to perceived incursions, three incidents in as many weeks is unprecedented. The incidents have undoubtedly provided the Sukhoi pilots from Makassar’s Sultan Hasanuddin Air Base with some useful combat training experience, but they also indicate a more muscular strategic posture by the Widodo government.

Indonesia’s military brass, it seems, is getting more serious about defending the country’s territorial integrity. The nation’s diplomats, meanwhile, are pursuing a foreign policy predicated on a more hard-nosed calculus of national interests.

Widodo’s global maritime axis doctrine (poros maritim dunia), the centrepiece of his foreign policy platform, can best be understood as the geopolitical component of a broader maritime development agenda. Its defence aspects include (PDF) a boost to Indonesia’s naval capabilities, enhanced Indian Ocean defence diplomacy, and a strong emphasis on the protection of Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty and the security and welfare of its outer islands.

Widodo’s projected increase in Indonesia’s defence spending from 0.8 to 1.5%of GDP within five years is to be concentrated on building naval capabilities. It remains highly contingent upon global economic growth rates and the success of further macroeconomic reform within Indonesia. But if achieved, it would see a doubling in Indonesia’s defence spending from around $7.83 billion (IDR 83 trillion) to $15 billion.

There is, of course, considerable policy continuity with the previous government. The Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) administration oversaw both a relatively rapid increase in defence expenditure and the procurement and/or indigenous production of more modern military air and naval platforms. Those include new Changbogo-class diesel electric submarines; Sigma corvettes; KCR-60/KCR-40 missile attack craft; stealth trimaran patrol craft and AS565 Panther helicopters with anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

However, Widodo has given prioritisation of the seas greater institutional substance. This is evident in his appointment of former chief of naval staff Admiral (retd) Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno as the powerful Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs and in his decision to establish a new Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs led by distinguished scientist and marine resources expert, Indroyono Soesilo.

Whilst the Indonesian Armed Forces has indicated a greater willingness to respond to territorial incursions with displays of hard power, diplomats are recalibrating foreign policy settings to reflect redefined national interests. Such interests are predicated upon a maritime-led model of economic growth and the robust defence of both the country’s political and territorial sovereignty.

Under the new government, SBY’s ‘one thousand friends, zero enemies’ mantra has been consigned to the historical dustbin by Widodo’s advisers. The country’s diplomatic motto can now more accurately be characterised as ‘pro-people’ and ‘pro-growth’. Implicit in this is a rejection of a previous foreign policy approach perceived as over-conciliatory and lacking in substance.

Indonesia’s new foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, is now ‘expected to put more attention on bilateral relations, which would directly benefit Indonesia rather than multilateral processes’. Coming from influential Widodo adviser, Rizal Sukma, who has previously expounded the need for a ‘post-ASEAN foreign policy’, this is code for a more pragmatic appraisal of ASEAN’s utility to Indonesia’s foreign policy interests.

In short, Indonesia looks set to test ASEAN’s consensus norms, and won’t retreat from offending its neighbours. ‘To uphold our political sovereignty, what we must do is preserve the sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. We’ll do this firmly and clearly’, stated new foreign minister Retno Marsudi.

It seems demands that Indonesia discard its weak-state mentality are finally beginning to have real military and diplomatic consequences.

Greta Nabbs-Keller is the director of Dragonminster Consulting, a Brisbane-based company providing Indonesia expertise to government, university and private sector clients.
 
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Indonesian military improves quality and role of education and training command
Jumat, 28 November 2014 18:34 WIB |
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General TNI Moeldoko. (ANTARA/Andika Wahyu)

Jakarta (ANTARA News) - The Indonesian Military (TNI) has improved the quality and role of the Education and Training Command (Kodiklat) in a bid to boost the quality of human resources in the institution.

"The military policy involves the improvement of human resources, taking into consideration the arrival of sophisticated weapons system," Indonesian Military (TNI) Chief General Moeldoko stated here on Friday.

Moreover, he remarked that upgrading the capabilities of the soldiers with the latest technology was also incorporated in the primary weaponry defense system (Alutsista).

"It is pointless without interoperability. The power of the military (navy, air force, and army) will be designated properly, both in terms of software and hardware. So, it will be in control," Moeldoko affirmed.

Besides improving the ability to operate main weapons systems, Moeldoko noted that the TNI has also improved its quality and intelligence capabilities.

"We are taking effective and efficient efforts. We want to create intelligent humans who have the mastery of intelligence by educating them for a period of over six months at the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS)," he reported.

General Moeldoko also emphasized that the ranks of the military leadership have also formulated policies to improve the strength of the military by eliminating sectoral ego.

"All of our policies run properly," he added.
(Uu.A063/INE/KR-BSR/F001)

Indonesian military improves quality and role of education and training command - ANTARA News

Indonesia’s Maritime Role Hinges on ‘Pillars’
By Bantarto Bandoro on 08:41 pm Nov 27, 2014
Category Commentary, Opinion
Tags: Joko Widodo, maritime policy, National Police, Navy

An officer from the Indonesian Navy surveying the Singapore Straits amid naval signal flags on a Naval Command Center in Batam, Indonesia, during an Indonesia and Singapore navy joint demonstration in the Singapore Straits in this file photo on May 27, 2005. (EPA Photo/How Hwee Young)

President Joko Widodo is serious in making Indonesia a more active and capable maritime player in the region. But this requires not only a stronger and more modernized navy, as well as a better equipped marine security police, but also effective inter agency coordination dealing with a wide spectrum of maritime affairs.

The national police for maritime security and the navy, however, have already complained about the prospect of their role in supporting the government’s maritime nexus — unless they are given a much larger budget to buy fuel in order to operate their patrol boats.

Joko’s message about Indonesia’s rightful aspirations as a seagoing Indo-Pacific power — that is, an archipelagic country connecting two oceans — is at the outset full of rhetoric until he, in the East Asia Summit (EAS) held in Naypyidaw, Myanmar, outlined the five underlying pillars of the policy: A revival of Indonesia’s maritime culture, recognizing the link between the country’s archipelagic geography, identity and livelihood; improved management of Indonesia’s oceans and fisheries through the development of the country’s fishing industry and building maritime food sovereignty and security; boosting Indonesia’s maritime economy by improving the country’s port infrastructure, shipping industry, and maritime tourism; maritime diplomacy that encourages Indonesia’s partners to work together to eliminate conflict arising over illegal fishing, breaches of sovereignty, territorial disputes, piracy and environmental concerns like marine pollution; and bolstering Indonesia’s maritime defenses, both to support the country’s maritime sovereignty and wealth, and to fulfill its role in maintaining security.

Those five pillars are integrated and one cannot be seen in isolation from the other if the Indonesia’s maritime nexus is to be proven strategically beneficial for the country’s well being.

In his East Asian Summit speech, the president said Indonesia is “obliged” as a “fulcrum between two oceans” to bolster its maritime defenses, both to protect its own sovereignty and to maintain regional navigational safety.

The fourth and fifth pillar of Indonesia’s maritime policy looks well enough to provide the country’s maritime defense as well as the safety of navigation and maritime security.

The world “pillar,” to some evoke the sense of Samson standing between two huge pillars of a great building, with a hand on each pillar. He pushes the pillars with all his might until it causes them to collapse, killing him.

The world pillar brings to mind visions great strength that stand upright and hold an important structure in place.

The president vowed to restore Indonesia’s maritime status and profile by adhering to the strategic importance of the sea in dealing with comprehensive maritime issues.

The Asia Pacific will definitely be central to Indonesia’s maritime nexus. It not only the world’s most politicized maritime region, but it is also full of instances of maritime diplomacy going back centuries involving not only traditional maritime powers like the United States and the United Kingdom, but also less traditional maritime powers.

The president hopes the pillars of the country’s maritime policy will serve to anchor Indonesia’s role as a force for security as well as regional stability.

Joko stated in his inaugural speech that Indonesia will continue to adhere to and execute a free and active foreign policy, regardless of the impact of the changing strategic environment Indonesia faced.

With maritime nexus as one of the main components of Indonesia’s external relations, Jokowi wanted to strike a balance between economic development and the enhancement of its maritime infrastructures (pillar two and three). Not only that, the policy also aims at making Indonesia a leader in tackling fresh regional maritime security issues as envisioned in the fourth pillar of the policy.

Indonesia’s quest for a strong and sustainable maritime status does require constant strategic policy steps to further prove the importance of those five pillars as they imply that Indonesia has to enhance and strengthen, if not regain, its international standing by taking fresh maritime security initiatives. But that would mean countries in the region also need to step up cooperation and support in Indonesia’s attempt to eliminate conflict over illegal fishing, territorial disputes, piracy, and environmental concerns like marine pollution.

For Indonesia’s trading and security partners, President Joko’s maritime policy presents ample and interesting opportunities for collaboration. This is the essence of the fourth pillar of the country’s maritime nexus.

It is appropriate, if not timely, that the pillars of Indonesia’s maritime nexus is introduced as the country and the region are now facing and will continue to face the reality that issues related to maritime security have extended beyond the classical geostrategic issues.

The fourth pillar of the maritime policy indicates that maritime security issues have now become more complex and diffused due to the very quick changes in the economy and technology, which heavily impact on the security of the state and stability of the region. A sense of a diffused and global maritime security threat has prevailed.

With the introduction of the pillars of Indonesia’s maritime policy, the country is politically and strategically committed to developing some kind of long-term insurance for regional maritime security and stability of the Asia Pacific.

The logical and strategic consequence is that Indonesia would have to mobilize whatever national resources it has at its disposal to make sure that the pillars stand upright and hold up the nation’s maritime infrastructure.

Not only that: the government must make sure that the funding for the maritime policy pillars is available to secure the maintenance of such a maritime nexus.

In short, Indonesia’s approach to global and regional maritime security issues is already unfolding, knitting states together in collaborative partnerships to promote a better and safer environment of maritime security.

Bantarto Bandoro is a senior lecturer at the School of Defense Strategy at the Indonesian Defense University (IDU) in Jakarta.

Indonesia's Maritime Role Hinges on ‘Pillars’ - The Jakarta Globe
 
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Latest LAPAN UAV development LSU-05, LSU-03, LSU-02

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LSU 05 cruising range of 240 miles, flying endurance 8 hours and is capable of carrying a load of 30 km.

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LSU 03

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LSU 02

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LAPAN 51th Anniversary : LAPAN Submit LSU 02 Drone to the Army
pertahananbangsa.blogspot.com/2014/11/hut-lapan-ke-51-lapan-serahkan-drone.html
 
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we want to get stample Halal for made in Is**** products.....
What kind of product madokafc?I'm not aware on any defense products that jointly being develop by Israeli and Azerbeijan
other than UAV and artillery system
 
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What kind of product madokafc?I'm not aware on any defense products that jointly being develop by Israeli and Azerbeijan
other than UAV and artillery system

they will joint developt some Electronic warfare system, radar artillery system, armor, and etc....
 
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From Wiki,it said Indonesia has ordered TD-2000B and QW-3, but I have searched the database from SIPIR's database, it showed that Indonesia get only 15 QW-3 launcher, so there are something confusing:
1. Had Indonesia ordered QW-3 MANPADS separately except the ones mounted on trucks?
2. One suite of TD-2000B includes 64 launcher of QW Vanguard MANPADS, so didn't this number of launcher is too small?
Can any member here from Indonesia answer my question? Thanks in advance.
 
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