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Indonesia eyes Eurofighters to check China’s threat

I am still waiting. Nobody has the balls yet. But we spank India, spank Indonesia and spank everybody who tries to get in our way.

Spank Indonesia? I see no tanks rolling in Jakarta, nor DF xxx missiles flying above and our CG still catching and sinking Chinese fishing ships caught in the water like it is Sunday. C'mon, you have talked the talk, when will you be walking the walk? The burden of proof is on you, not the world baby.
 
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Last time I check, we still catching your countrymen. So you cant control „your“ waters? How can you talk about tanks rolling in Jakarta when you cannot even assert your claim fully in SCS? Even against smaller countries like Vietnam? Like I said, walk the walk. :rofl:
LOL the last time you tried to stop us from fishing our coast guard rammed your navy ship :lol:
 
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:rolleyes::lol:

So easy yet you still cant stand your claim. So easy yet it is China that is begging for diplomatic talks over SCS and got turned down https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesia-china-south-china-sea-united-nations-12847188

That wasnt a spank, that was a tickle:lol:

All right imma head to sleep. Wake me up when the tanks are rolling and df bla bla are flying over Jakarta would ya :partay:
 
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2000+ SRBMs with precision guidance and an equal number of cruise missiles launched from both the ground and from PLAN ships,...
Here is another fact that the lot of you are ignorant about...

Let us say you have 1000 missiles. Are you going to use them all in a war? No, you will not. There are two points that you are ignorant about: Strategic Reserve and Tactical Reserve.

Of that 1000 missiles, let us be generous and say you will keep 500 for strategic reserve. Prudence demands it. You need to keep some as deterrence just in case. That leave 500 to use in that one war. Of that 500, you will keep 200 as tactical reserve. The tactical reserve is for when unplanned situations and/or unexpected opportunities arise.

From that perspective, China do not have enough missiles and bombs to destroy Taiwan's defense OVER WEEKS. China shares borders with 14 countries, correct? How many of them are hostiles? Are the hostiles capable enough for China to keep strategic reserves?

http://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=46

With the current situation with India, how much strategic reserves do you think China will need for that 'just in case' situation? I doubt that any of you would know. But you better believe it that it will be more than %50 given China is hostile to at least India and Russia.

Further, despite the fact that we used precision weapons in Desert Storm, US pilots still faced dangers like anti-aircraft guns and short range battlefield level missiles. Did you missed all those CNN videos of night shooting by the Iraqis? I guess you must have. So what make you think that PLAAF fighters will escape the air battles unscathed?

It is well known that Taiwan have erratic tides. One part of Taiwan have semi-diurnal and another part have diurnal. I will leave this as homework assignment for you to find out which part of Taiwan have which type. But for what we are talking about -- amphibious landing -- the ideal landing tide is high tide. A high tide means lesser beach expanse to cross which mean lower time under fire. For an amphibious launch, a high tide is also desirable, simply put, you can launch more vessels at the same time.

https://slate.com/technology/2014/0...army-navy-compromise-on-tides-and-timing.html
The Army wanted a high tide, the Navy wanted a low.

Why did the Army wanted high tide? Because of troop vulnerabilities.
The Army favored high tides, decreasing the amount of time soldiers would be targets as they crossed the exposed beaches.

Why did the Navy wanted low? Because of ship vulnerabilities.
The Navy wanted a low tide, exposing the extensive obstacles identified by aerial surveillance...

Get it? This is what the PLA must deal with on ALL CANDIDATE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SITES.

As if that is not bad enough, the Taiwan strait is famous for a phenomenon call 'geostrophic transport reversal'.

Here...

https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2003JC001836
A strong northerly wind may reverse the sea surface slope across the Taiwan Strait and induce a geostrophic transport reversal.

Simply put, the strait weather may change unexpectedly. We are not talking about single tanker loaded with toys, household appliances, and cars and that the ship can take its time getting to destination. We are looking at a fleet of ships of various sizes carrying who knows how many human beings and that the ships have deadlines to multiple locations and at the same time.

How does all this factored in with those weapons reserves I mentioned earlier?

Because China do not have the resources to continuously bombard Taiwan WHILE WAITING for the ideal day for the amphibious launch.

You want to use Desert Storm? I will indulge you. Back in Desert Storm, the US Army had a planned date and that meant by that date, US airpower must remove as much as possible of Iraq resistance on land and in the air. We did not removed all Iraqi defenses on land and in the air. The land forces still met considerable resistance on their way to Baghdad. You must have missed all the news about the many land battles, right?

An invasion of Taiwan have only one path: amphibious. China must make a firm date and commit. Remember that narrow %20 or more likely %15 window between Mar and Nov? When the PLAAF begins its operations, everyone around the world will have very precise estimate as to when that amphibious fleet will launch. All Taiwan have to do is to execute that force preservation doctrine and hit the fleet once it leave Chinese ports. The US will provide Taiwan with real time strait update. How precise do you think Taiwanese volleys of artillery and surface to surface missiles will be? By US estimate, a loss of %15 will render the amphibious invasion a disaster. Given Taiwan is qualitatively better than Iraq, try looking at around %30 or more for that loss.

Planning and troubleshooting are opposites. Planning is for the future. Troubleshooting is historical. But what is common to both is the ability to think of factors that may not be apparent to casual observers that may or even will affect the project. None of you have exercised that ability when it come to Taiwan. You guys have been seduced by the 'shiny new toys' effects. If the toy is the latest, make the loudest noise, create the bigger explosion, then it will defeat others -- by default.
 
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I do think that people often mistook the word China for Chinese and vice versa.


Some not. Some are racist (like to play generalization) and support some racial events to justify their deep rooted racism.
 
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Here is another fact that the lot of you are ignorant about...

Let us say you have 1000 missiles. Are you going to use them all in a war? No, you will not. There are two points that you are ignorant about: Strategic Reserve and Tactical Reserve.

Of that 1000 missiles, let us be generous and say you will keep 500 for strategic reserve. Prudence demands it. You need to keep some as deterrence just in case. That leave 500 to use in that one war. Of that 500, you will keep 200 as tactical reserve. The tactical reserve is for when unplanned situations and/or unexpected opportunities arise.

From that perspective, China do not have enough missiles and bombs to destroy Taiwan's defense OVER WEEKS. China shares borders with 14 countries, correct? How many of them are hostiles? Are the hostiles capable enough for China to keep strategic reserves?

http://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=46

With the current situation with India, how much strategic reserves do you think China will need for that 'just in case' situation? I doubt that any of you would know. But you better believe it that it will be more than %50 given China is hostile to at least India and Russia.

Further, despite the fact that we used precision weapons in Desert Storm, US pilots still faced dangers like anti-aircraft guns and short range battlefield level missiles. Did you missed all those CNN videos of night shooting by the Iraqis? I guess you must have. So what make you think that PLAAF fighters will escape the air battles unscathed?

It is well known that Taiwan have erratic tides. One part of Taiwan have semi-diurnal and another part have diurnal. I will leave this as homework assignment for you to find out which part of Taiwan have which type. But for what we are talking about -- amphibious landing -- the ideal landing tide is high tide. A high tide means lesser beach expanse to cross which mean lower time under fire. For an amphibious launch, a high tide is also desirable, simply put, you can launch more vessels at the same time.

https://slate.com/technology/2014/0...army-navy-compromise-on-tides-and-timing.html
The Army wanted a high tide, the Navy wanted a low.

Why did the Army wanted high tide? Because of troop vulnerabilities.
The Army favored high tides, decreasing the amount of time soldiers would be targets as they crossed the exposed beaches.

Why did the Navy wanted low? Because of ship vulnerabilities.
The Navy wanted a low tide, exposing the extensive obstacles identified by aerial surveillance...

Get it? This is what the PLA must deal with on ALL CANDIDATE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SITES.

As if that is not bad enough, the Taiwan strait is famous for a phenomenon call 'geostrophic transport reversal'.

Here...

https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2003JC001836
A strong northerly wind may reverse the sea surface slope across the Taiwan Strait and induce a geostrophic transport reversal.

Simply put, the strait weather may change unexpectedly. We are not talking about single tanker loaded with toys, household appliances, and cars and that the ship can take its time getting to destination. We are looking at a fleet of ships of various sizes carrying who knows how many human beings and that the ships have deadlines to multiple locations and at the same time.

How does all this factored in with those weapons reserves I mentioned earlier?

Because China do not have the resources to continuously bombard Taiwan WHILE WAITING for the ideal day for the amphibious launch.

You want to use Desert Storm? I will indulge you. Back in Desert Storm, the US Army had a planned date and that meant by that date, US airpower must remove as much as possible of Iraq resistance on land and in the air. We did not removed all Iraqi defenses on land and in the air. The land forces still met considerable resistance on their way to Baghdad. You must have missed all the news about the many land battles, right?

An invasion of Taiwan have only one path: amphibious. China must make a firm date and commit. Remember that narrow %20 or more likely %15 window between Mar and Nov? When the PLAAF begins its operations, everyone around the world will have very precise estimate as to when that amphibious fleet will launch. All Taiwan have to do is to execute that force preservation doctrine and hit the fleet once it leave Chinese ports. The US will provide Taiwan with real time strait update. How precise do you think Taiwanese volleys of artillery and surface to surface missiles will be? By US estimate, a loss of %15 will render the amphibious invasion a disaster. Given Taiwan is qualitatively better than Iraq, try looking at around %30 or more for that loss.

Planning and troubleshooting are opposites. Planning is for the future. Troubleshooting is historical. But what is common to both is the ability to think of factors that may not be apparent to casual observers that may or even will affect the project. None of you have exercised that ability when it come to Taiwan. You guys have been seduced by the 'shiny new toys' effects. If the toy is the latest, make the loudest noise, create the bigger explosion, then it will defeat others -- by default.

I'll just address the requirement of a reserve, since the weather pattern in the Taiwan strait is something that I am not familiar with. As you noticed, I narrowly talked on the air and naval side, simply because I don't know enough to comment on the amphibious invasion side.

China has no problems with Russia. The permanent border demarcation treaty was signed in 1991 and $100+ billion currency swaps, energy trade, and 71% of Russians view China favorably. China is Russia's largest import partner and second largest export market. In addition, Russia has no claim on Chinese land nor does China have to Russian land. Both side are nuclear powers and can catastrophically damage the other. No strategic reserve of SRBMs need exist for Russia.

India doesn't even have a road from the Indian border to the Chinese one. The sole path from India to China is on the G318 highway... which terminates in Nepal. India would have to invade Nepal to invade China. If they attempt to do so, Chinese strategic recon satellites would pick this up before they could even move into Nepal and the PLAGF will mine the road. There is also nothing within 100 km of the border of Nepal and China. Everywhere else, they'd make little progress since they can't move their armor.

Secondly, the Taiwanese claim is for SRBMs positioned in Fujian and Guangdong. It is not the PLARF's entire inventory. Of the 2000, a portion will be kept as tactical reserve, but will still be usable in the Taiwan theater. The rest can be used in initial strikes, since no SRBM strategic reserve needs to be kept.
 
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All the more reason for the Chinese to develop the PL-21 to handle highly maneuverable fighter sized targets and not just nodal aircraft like AWACS and Tankers as with the less maneuverable PL-15 (unless the PL-15 plans to use “puffers” thrusters on the sides as planned for the Aim-260 Peregine)

The Indonesians could base these Eurofighters at Natuna Airport (on Riau Island) and with Meteors be a serious challenge to the Chinese assets on the Spratlys.
 
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I'll just address the requirement of a reserve, since the weather pattern in the Taiwan strait is something that I am not familiar with.
Let us not beat around the bush here. You NEVER even considered it and you never thought about it because you never served. Anyone who ever done time in uniform inevitably get at least once rudely informed by the weather. I am not a meteorology expert yet my USAF yrs showed me the importance of weather in everything we do. That was enough for me to draw on my experience and do PROPER research.

China has no problems with Russia.
The only relationship that do not warrant wariness is that of the US and Canada. China and Russia are not that. So yes, China will always keep an eye and a few troops on that border.

India doesn't even have a road from the Indian border to the Chinese one.
That is not the point and you know it. If anything, I doubt you ever thought of something like a strategic reserve of weapons for neighbors that you do not have warm fuzzy feelings for.

So far, your argument for a China superiority over Taiwan have been at best 50/50, and we have not even touch what could and would happen once the invasion fleet launched.
 
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Let us not beat around the bush here. You NEVER even considered it and you never thought about it because you never served. Anyone who ever done time in uniform inevitably get at least once rudely informed by the weather. I am not a meteorology expert yet my USAF yrs showed me the importance of weather in everything we do. That was enough for me to draw on my experience and do PROPER research.


The only relationship that do not warrant wariness is that of the US and Canada. China and Russia are not that. So yes, China will always keep an eye and a few troops on that border.


That is not the point and you know it. If anything, I doubt you ever thought of something like a strategic reserve of weapons for neighbors that you do not have warm fuzzy feelings for.

So far, your argument for a China superiority over Taiwan have been at best 50/50, and we have not even touch what could and would happen once the invasion fleet launched.

With all these so called advantages, do you think Taiwan can conquer PRC?

After all, if PLAAF cannot obtain air superiority over Taiwan, it means that ROCAF would be able to defeat the PLAAF, right?

If PLAN cannot obtain naval superiority over Taiwan, it means that ROCN can defeat the PLAN right?

If that is not true, then the only difference between ROCN/ROCAF invading PRC, and PLAN/PLAAF invading Taiwan, would be SAMs and ground based missiles.

That is the simplest way to put it.
 
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All the more reason for the Chinese to develop the PL-21 to handle highly maneuverable fighter sized targets and not just nodal aircraft like AWACS and Tankers as with the less maneuverable PL-15 (unless the PL-15 plans to use “puffers” thrusters on the sides as planned for the Aim-260 Peregine)

The Indonesians could base these Eurofighters at Natuna Airport (on Riau Island) and with Meteors be a serious challenge to the Chinese assets on the Spratlys.

PL-15 is the same like other AAM that can handle highly maneuverable fighter sized target, the difference is on range up to 300km + AESA radar.

Because it is very long range, it is expected to be effective to handle AWACS, Tankers that is usually positioned farther behind the frontline.
 
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