Indonesia Defence Forum

[striver44]

What do you expect from a country that even have just a two months of independence, bro?? Sure we're still so weak at that time. Not only in terms of weaponry and logistics, also in manpower and well trained soldiers which are so limited.
But even so, our youths militia are still able to provide a fierce resistance in combating the allied forces despite just relying on a fighting spirit and limited weapons. Which in turn, their heroic effort is gained the international sympathy and support for our independence.. So that's the real victory are!

He's refering the battle of surabaya as a model of indonesian urban warfare tactics......and we all know we failed after less than 3 weeks (despite numerical superiority)......what do I expect? Well grozny held the russian army for 2 months in the 1st chechen war, mosul held the iraqi army for almost a year,aleppo is a stalemate for over 3 years.......and the defender hold these cities with significant disadvantage in men and weapons

 

[nufix]

He's refering the battle of surabaya as a model of indonesian urban warfare tactics......and we all know we failed after less than 3 weeks (despite numerical superiority)......what do I expect? Well grozny held the russian army for 2 months in the 1st chechen war, mosul held the iraqi army for almost a year,aleppo is a stalemate for over 3 years.......and the defender hold these cities with significant disadvantage in men and weapons

I try to see this from both point of view, but I dont think we can use Battle of Surabaya as point of referrence nor can it be compared to Grozny and Mosul. Fighters in the Battle of Surabaya were mostly youths armed with anything they could get their hands on, only a handful of them received any proper training. Most of the skilled rebels were fighting somewhere else like West and Central Java. There were no "urban warfare" tactic to speak of since the fighting it self was sporadic and less coordinated; You got the pemuda, the santris, and several other citizen groups that organized themselves for the defence of the city. On the other hand, you cant compare the battle of Surabaya and the battle of Mosul and Grozny for the same exact reason: Fighters both in Grozny and Mosul were not "citizen groups" occasionally formed in response to a call-to-arms, they were skillful militias and armed groups, trained to defend their de facto territory and have good coordination with other organized groups. They have developed their urban warfare tactic just in case their nemesis decide to make move on them.

 

[mengkom]

come on!
you are comparing modern professional armed forces today,
to a newly formed "army" 70 years ago (back then, TNI is just less than 1 month old)

it's not even comparable, just like comparing apple to a potato

 

[Var Dracon]

Example of how rifle parts is produced

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Pindad doesn't share this type of video often (or they never did). I would love to compare the machining process between the two firearms maker.

 

[nufix]

come on!
you are comparing modern professional armed forces today,
to a newly formed "army" 70 years ago (back then, TNI is just less than 1 month old)

it's not even comparable, just like comparing apple to a potato

That is what I am trying to say, it cant be used as point of referrence nor a benchmark for any comparison.

 

[SIM.Inc]

I try to see this from both point of view, but I dont think we can use Battle of Surabaya as point of referrence nor can it be compared to Grozny and Mosul. Fighters in the Battle of Surabaya were mostly youths armed with anything they could get their hands on, only a handful of them received any proper training. Most of the skilled rebels were fighting somewhere else like West and Central Java. There were no "urban warfare" tactic to speak of since the fighting it self was sporadic and less coordinated; You got the pemuda, the santris, and several other citizen groups that organized themselves for the defence of the city. On the other hand, you cant compare the battle of Surabaya and the battle of Mosul and Grozny for the same exact reason: Fighters both in Grozny and Mosul were not "citizen groups" occasionally formed in response to a call-to-arms, they were skillful militias and armed groups, trained to defend their de facto territory and have good coordination with other organized groups. They have developed their urban warfare tactic just in case their nemesis decide to make move on them.

Mungkin ada yang salah persepsi tentang kalimat
Bahkan tanpa mereka belajarpun mereka sudah memahaminya dengan konsep mereka sendiri sih.

Saya ambil contoh perang Surabaya, karena pertempurannya berfokus di pertempuran kota/daerah urban.
Kenapa saya bilang Tanpa belajarpun TNI sudah memahaminya dengan konsep mereka sendiri
karena begini. Menurut saya, pertempuran urban warfare sebenenarnya dari dulu sampe sekarang masih sama seperti pertempuran manapun setelah konsep blitzkrieg di terapkan. pertempuran yang Menitik beratkan Peran Armed, Peran kavaleri dan Peran Infantri.

Tanpa belajarpun berkaca dari sejarah TNI sudah memahami apa itu urban warfare. Karena ini pernah di rasakan mereka dari pertempuran surabaya.

Urban warfare versi US dan tidak jauh beda dengan versi Inggris. kutipan dari wikipedia ini bisa menjelaskan apakah inggris sudah menerapkan urban warfare atau tidak saat itu.
British troops began a methodical advance through the city under the cover of naval and air bombardment. Fighting was heavy, with British troops clearing buildings room by room and consolidating their gains.

Selanjutnya silahkan nilai sendiri.

Hari Hari pertama AS menyerang irak, AS bergantung sepenuhnya kepada Tomahawk (artileri medan). Untuk menghancurkan pertahanan yang tidak dapat di tembus oleh aset-aset udara US (dengan maksud selanjutnya adalah pemanfaatan bantuan tembakan udara guna mendukung perab kaveleri,unit mekanis dan infantri dalam menguasai medan di dukung unit-unit pasukan khusus seperti ranger dll dengan mengamankan bangunan demi bangunan memastikan tidak ada lagi sisa-sia perlawanan.

Jadi klo di bilang TNI cuma hebat di jungle warfare yah enggaklah. Karena sewaktu menerapkan Guerrilla warfare di surabaya para veteran pasti sudah melihat dan belajar banyak tentang bagaimana pola urban warfare di jalankan.

Kalau saya salah tolong di koreksi

 

[Bhayangkara]

He's refering the battle of surabaya as a model of indonesian urban warfare tactics......and we all know we failed after less than 3 weeks (despite numerical superiority).....

Yah I know, and I'm just trying to give an excuse why we are so "poorly" in the battle of Surabaya.

what do I expect? Well grozny held the russian army for 2 months in the 1st chechen war, mosul held the iraqi army for almost a year,aleppo is a stalemate for over 3 years.......and the defender hold these cities with significant disadvantage in men and weapons

Well, before we comparing something to another, first of all we should try to learn and analyse it about the history of those conflicts. Then we'll find what point of the difference, which all of it has been explained clearly by nufix and mengkom.

 

[SIM.Inc]

come on!
you are comparing modern professional armed forces today,
to a newly formed "army" 70 years ago (back then, TNI is just less than 1 month old)

it's not even comparable, just like comparing apple to a potato

Take your time. It is misunderstanding.

 

[SIM.Inc]

More anoa for peacekeeper
Info: 24 unit

7 nov 2017

 

[striver44]

come on!
you are comparing modern professional armed forces today,
to a newly formed "army" 70 years ago (back then, TNI is just less than 1 month old)

it's not even comparable, just like comparing apple to a potato

Im not comparing......what Im actually trying to say is..we need to address the upcoming challenge of modern warfare particularly urban warfare.....the philippine army in marawi is an example of why armies trained mostly for jungle warfare fare poorly in urban warfare.....

Btw

.

 

[SIM.Inc]

Im not comparing......what Im actually trying to say is..we need to address the upcoming challenge of modern warfare particularly urban warfare.....the philippine army in marawi is an example of why armies trained mostly for jungle warfare fare poorly in urban warfare.....

Btw

.

why armies trained mostly for jungle warfare fare poorly in urban warfare.....

Asumsi yang salah jika mengartikan bahwa setiap tentara yang mahir pertempuran hutan tidak akan bisa menangani perang kota.
Klo kita lihat dari kutipan media tempo pada tanggal 28 oktober 2003
Dengan judul
Idi Rayeuk Dikuasai GAM Selama 14 Jam
Oleh:
Tempo.co
28 Oktober 2003 13:30 WIB

00001
TEMPO Interaktif, Jakarta:Gerilyawan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) menduduki sebuah kota kecil, Idi Rayeuk, di Aceh Timur selama 14 jam sejak Kamis (1/3) hingga Jumat (2/3) pagi. Anggota GAM yang bersenjata lengkap itu baru mundur ke arah perkampungan penduduk, sekitar pukul 08.00 WIB pada Jumat pagi setelah digempur oleh pasukan gabungan TNI/Polri dalamjumlah yang besar. Berikutnya, untuk mempertahankan kota tersebut dari serangan gerilyawan balik dari GAM, aparat mengerahkan dua unit panser dan satu helikopter.

Ini contah kemampuan urban warfare apa bukan? Karena syaratnya lengkap tuh menurut wikipedia tentang urban warfare

Fighting in urban areas negates the advantages that one side may have over the other in armour, heavy artillery, or air support. Ambushes laid down by small groups of soldiers with handheld anti-tank weapons can effectively destroy entire columns of modern armour (as in the First Battle of Grozny), while artillery and air support can be severely reduced if the 'superior' party wants to limit civilian casualties as much as possible, but the defending party does not (or even uses civilians as human shields).

Some civilians may be difficult to distinguish from combatants such as armed militias and gangs, and particularly individuals who are simply trying to protect their homes from attackers. Tactics are complicated by a three-dimensional environment, limited fields of view and fire because of buildings, enhanced concealment and cover for defenders, below-ground infrastructure, and the ease of placement of booby traps and snipers.[citation needed]

 

[nufix]

Im not comparing......what Im actually trying to say is..we need to address the upcoming challenge of modern warfare particularly urban warfare.....the philippine army in marawi is an example of why armies trained mostly for jungle warfare fare poorly in urban warfare.....

Btw

.

We actually have had an urban warfare experience, but we are not the one defending the town. Take Dili for example.

 

[barjo]

We actually have had an urban warfare experience, but we are not the one defending the town. Take Dili for example.

Serangan OEMOEM 1 Maret 1949, and much more

 

[SIM.Inc]

To answer any doubts, this information maybe can explain whether TNI has urban warfare capability or not.

From what we see above they are trained by the best of the best units which is dedicated for urban warfare.

 

[Nike]

Hadi officially begins tenure as TNI commander

• 
  News Desk
  The Jakarta Post
  

Jakarta | Sat, December 9, 2017 | 04:29 pm

New leader: Air Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto (left) has officially replaced Gen. Gatot Nurmantyo as the Indonesian Military Commander after a handover ceremony on Saturday at the military headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta. (Antara/Puspa Perwitasari)

• 
  

Air Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto has officially begun his tenure as the Indonesian Military (TNI) commander, replacing Gen. Gatot Nurmantyo, after a handover ceremony at the military headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta, on Saturday.

At the ceremony, Gatot thanked all military personnel who had supported him during his term as commander. He also expressed his support that his successor could meet the nations expectations in leading the TNI.

“Good luck on carrying out a not-so-easy mandate,” Gatot said as quoted by Antara news agency.

Hadi reasserted his determination to develop the military’s professional capabilities to win the publics trust, as well as working under the designated minimum essential force (MEF) corridor.

“The TNI will continue the programs initiated by Pak Gatot,” Hadi said, referring to his predecessor.

The handover ceremony took place only a day after Hadi was sworn in as TNI commander on Friday at the Presidential Palace. The former Air Force chief of staff replaced Gatot, who was dismissed with honor by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo earlier this week.

Hadi will lead the TNI until his retirement in 2020. (kuk)

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/12/09/hadi-officially-begins-tenure-as-tni-commander.html