Illustration: Jayachandran/Mint
In hindsight, the proposed talks between the National Security Advisers (NSAs) of India and Pakistan were doomed even before the ink had dried on the declaration signed between the two countries at Ufa on 10 July. The talks, scheduled to be held on Monday in New Delhi, were called off on Saturday after a barrage of acrimonious words were exchanged between Pakistani NSA Sartaj Aziz and minister for external affairs Sushma Swaraj.
Technically, it was Pakistan’s “expansion” of the agenda for the talks—well beyond what had been agreed upon at Ufa—that killed the talks. Islamabad wanted its NSA to meet leaders of the secessionist All-Parties Hurriyat Conference before meeting NSA Ajit Doval. In addition, it wanted to discuss Jammu and Kashmir at the meeting. Both were unacceptable to India and in spite of repeated entreaties not to do so, Pakistan persisted and that spelled the end of the talks.
The Ufa declaration was a breakthrough in an important way. A reading of the declaration shows that India agreed to resume the so-called composite dialogue that was started in the late 1990s, which includes a discussion of Jammu and Kashmir. But as in any structured diplomatic engagement, the process was sequenced. First in line were talks between the NSAs, which were to be followed by those between paramilitary officials and then discussions between the two directors general of military operations. Pakistan wanted to telescope the entire process and insisted on discussing Jammu and Kashmir along with terrorism at the NSAs’ meet. In the process, it got nothing and short-circuited the composite dialogue that it has wanted to revive for many years now.
Much has been made of India’s “petulance” in not letting Pakistan’s representative talk to the Hurriyat. It is also claimed that by giving so much prominence to the Hurriyat, the government has almost pulled it out of its grave, politically that is. Both assertions are incorrect and misread the political situation in India and particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.
The Hurriyat today is a pale shadow of what it was in the days of Robin Raphael, the American diplomat who did so much to encourage its formation in the early 1990s. India found itself on a politically difficult wicket in those years. Under immense pressure at home and abroad, the P.V. Narasimha Rao government had to tolerate much against its wishes.
The Hurriyat—a disparate gathering of 26 political parties—remained a cohesive political outfit as long as external support—American and Pakistani—was available. The moment that began to dry up, its contradictions began to emerge. This was always the case, but the differences became clearly visible since 2000, roughly the time India began the process of political normalization in the state.
Today, 15 years later, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is a coalition partner in the government of Jammu and Kashmir. The Congress was a partner of the previous government, which was led by the National Conference (NC). On an earlier occasion, the NC was aligned with the BJP as well. For all its problems, normal politics is well entrenched in the valley. The Hurriyat—for all its capabilities to call strikes—is a mere husk of what it was once.
India’s so-called red line to Pakistan—not letting the Hurriyat have any role in discussions with Pakistan—is only a reflection of this political reality. This is something very hard for Pakistan to accept. The usual course for Pakistan when it comes to dealing with anything uncomfortable with India—from terrorists to the Hurriyat—is denial. That was obvious on Saturday in Aziz’s bitter words.
What should India do now? It is clear that the road to peace with Pakistan has to involve talks. Swaraj said that clearly on Saturday when she used the metaphor of a potholed road on which the two countries have to travel.
That, however, does not mean a rush to restart talks again. That will be pointless and will further embolden Pakistan’s unrealistic expectations. The path to sustainable talks and a positive end-goal—peace—requires immense patience on India’s part. One part of patience has to be ignoring Pakistan, as long as it does not see sense.
India’s tough line with Pakistan - Livemint
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