A touch of enduring Von Schlieffen, characterized through an impetuous oriental pretense of bowing to boorish populist wish, flavored with antagonistic mortals, always wishing:
Aah ko chahiye ik umr asar honay tak
kon jeeta hey teri zulf ke sar honay tak
My longing for you requires a lifetime of realization
Who may live that long to see it realized?
The above naivety notwithstanding, it is indeed a viable and enduring solution. Though some aspects need a feeble bit of clarification.
I appear to have given offence in some way not clearly understood, so it seems better to leave these preliminary remarks aside until greater comprehension is achieved.
The development of communication infrastructure up to the rail/road head is indeed very important for re-locating large bodies of troops and logistic support. In mountains however, the real problem emanates from these rail/road heads through often torturous shingle roads and tracks up to the reaches where troops are fighting. Fortunately for Von Schlieffen and subsequently Moltke, the Himalayas did not pose any problem, by not being there. And this is where the logistical nightmare come to-fore and forces a stark reality on to the defender as well as the attacker.
It is a failing of any brief note or comment that much valuable detail gets lost.
The PLA can afford to run rail lines right up until the border, since it has a high plateau to deal with, and sufficient ground between mountain ranges to build roads and railways. The IA cannot. It had entirely different terrain.
The intention was to convey the need to strengthen and expand existing lines, and allow more traffic to pass. The intention was also to enable strategic reserves from the left bank of the Brahmaputra to move forward fast and at lower cost than by lorry.
If the communication infrastructure along the border in NE India, beyond the rail or road-head, was not built earlier, was it due to the dissuasive strategy in order to effect a delay by presenting the nature in its barest form and letting the enemy cut through inhospitable mountains in order to logistically support the ingresses. OR was it due to unavailability of resources or both. And I am not referring to the approach infrastructure being developed or suggested for rear areas in depth.
Both, as far as I can make out.
If the BRO would construct the infrastructure up to the border, this probably is also suggestive of a change in strategy; lets say from dissuasive to deterring. This may also fall in line with the proposed raising of new strike corps and other formations. Though may need much more over a period of time to become operational.
This will also address the popular demand for better roads in the hill country.
As for time frames, the background preparation, infrastructure building, re-orientation of troops, all such things considered, fitness to meet the needs of the northern border may take five years to bring about.
For the overall infrastructural development needs, India was seeking to raise 1 Trillion US Dollars, which according to the recent admission by an Indian government official, has not been achieved. This, not to say that it would never be achieved, but may incur a delay.
Delays taken into account, around five years is the estimate.
This is in any case necessary in order to try and put in place a permanent and lasting peace both on the west as well as on the north.
In case it was due to the needs of dissuasive strategy, the suggested changes along the border areas may also have to be based on either a change in strategy or it is coupled with a planned scorched earth policy (e.g road-routing/cratering/slides etc etc) in the face of an advancing enemy.
It is difficult to see dissuasive Strategy and deterrent strategy as working at cross purposes.
A purely dissuading strategy is not possible, because this region is well-populated, not thickly so, but enough to count in a democracy. Development has to come to the hills, along with infrastructure, so maintaining a wilderness as a defence is not much more than an accidental option, one which will disappear very shortly.
On the other hand, it is possible to postulate a fortress defence at known locations of geographic or strategic importance, coupled with a plan for swift and sufficient reinforcement on the direction of thrust and the dimensions of thrust of the enemy becoming clear, and with clear ideas about the critical tip-over point between defence and structured withdrawal.
Counter-attacks are seen as completely independent of this. But counter-attacks will also have to cope with the PLA's own tactics of flanking enemy positions, enfilading them and rolling them up from one end in a concentrated, asymmetric attack, while mounting ambushes on probable lines of retreat. Catching an enemy in flank who is himself moving fast to inflict flanking attacks on one's garrison troops, in mountain terrain, in the fog of war, with uncertain communications links in the mountains, is a hazardous task at best. It requires very high standards of physical effort, and of battlefield command abilities by field officers. Only a dedicated force, trained to the inch, can even think of pulling this off.
If the strategy remains being dissuasive, and no border approach roads are being planned, the 150 + 100 helicopters may meet a portion of the air supplied logistics needs (7200 MT) for a large body of troops ahead of the rail/road head, the rest may still have to be met through existing roads/tracks. This could be accomplished by achieving air parity and air superiority may not be needed.
It has already been discussed that such a strategy may not be available for very long. However, to examine the potential of this partial capability scenario, we note that 1000 MT may be transported at a time. That defines the size of force that might intervene at a time. Of course, admittedly, this effort can be repeated after a gap, once enemy intentions become clearer, but it all depends on the size of the enemy effort, and it does not seem wise to keep such a partial capability in place.
Very interesting environment indeed.
