'We had no food. We had only ammunition'
On December 7, a helicopter with the brigade commander
went in for a recee, and they came back saying that there
was no opposition, no firing. They thought that the corps
commander was right, nobody was there.
The officers were told to 'get ready.' We had no time for
plans, no time for strategy. The orders were just 'Capture
the area, go on the ground and keep expanding.'
When the first sorties left for Sylhet, we discovered there
was tremendous opposition. We did not know it till later,
but 202 Brigade was still there; they had not gone to
Dhaka.
Though we saw a lot of artillery fire, we thought it must be
a battalion; we did not realise it was a brigade.
I went in the last sortie. My company 'johnnies' (soldiers)
could not say my name 'Cardozo.' They called me
'Cartoos sahib' (in Hindi, 'cartridge').
When the helicopters landed, they went from helicopter to
helicopter till they found me, and fired in the air with
satisfaction.
The boys were not worried (about the enemy fire). They
put me on their shoulders and shouted: 'Cartoos sahib
has come, he is now with us, we can go.' I went to meet
the CO who was also happy that I had reached.
We started fighting and after some time, we managed to
get an area of 1000 metres by 1500 metres. The CO had
told us there would be a link-up in 48 hours. For para-
commandos, a link-up must be done within 48 hours or
they are finished.
We had no food. We had only ammunition, grenades, one
handful of shakarparas (sweet wheat balls), one bandage,
one bottle of water and a barsatti to sleep on the ground.
No blanket, no clothes, no shoes, nothing else.
At that time, the war was covered by the BBC, Akashvani
(All India Radio) and Pakistan Radio. Nobody believed
Pakistani Radio. All India Radio was always giving news
two days late, because they had to get the clearance from
army headquarters. But the BBC gave news on the spot.
They had very committed war correspondents and had got
the permission to cover the operations.
We all listened to the BBC. That day we heard: 'A brigade
of Gorkhas has landed at Sylhet.'
I told my CO: 'Sir, the Pakistanis are listening to the BBC,
we are listening to the BBC, they have more than a
battalion, so let us keep pretending that we are a brigade
and let us deploy as a brigade.'
There was a risk: They could have taken us apart bit by
bit. We took the risk and put LMG nests to fill up the gaps
between the companies.
One day, we intercepted a Pakistani vehicle coming in; we
picked up the officers and used the khukri. This put more
pressure on us. The Pakistanis must have thought: 'We
should get these guys.' The operations continued during
the following days.
During the day time, we were supported by the air force
(Hunters and MIGs) who were breaking the attacks. But at
night we were on our own.
One day, a Pakistani patrol went between the companies.
We came to the conclusion that they had realised that we
were not a brigade. We had hardly any ammunition left.
We decided to regroup as a battalion and fight till the
bitter end.
The companies had to withdraw just after dusk, so that
the enemy could not see us move.
One company came back intact, but the other company
came a bit too early and was seen by the enemy while on
the move. The CO and I were watching them come back
as it became dark. We suddenly heard 'Allah ho Akbar,
charge.'
But trust the Gurkhas, they took out their khukris, turned
around and shouted 'Ayo Gurkhali.' They fought like in a
theatre. After shouts and sounds of battle, silence fell. The
company reached us, five, six boys were missing and we
could hear the groans of the wounded.
There was an unspoken agreement between us and the
Pakistanis: We brought our chaps back and they did the
same with their boys.
The next day the fight continued, but (Then General, later
Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw served Pakistan an
ultimatum: 'You surrender or we wipe you out.'
On December 15 morning, 1,500 of them came out (we
were 480) with white flags. The company commanders
asked the CO: 'There is a huge number of them, what do
we do?'
The CO told them, let their emissaries come. But if they
come to know that we are only 480, they may change
their minds.'
The CO told the emissaries: 'We have no orders to take
your surrender. Come back tomorrow.' They said: 'We
want to surrender.' 'No,' said the CO: 'Come back
tomorrow.'
We spoke on the radio with the brigade commander (in
Tamil) and told him: 'For God sake, come and take the
surrender.'
The next morning, the Pakistanis came again. The brigade
commander had meantime come by helicopter. The
Pakistanis asked him: 'Where are you coming from?' He
said: 'From such and such place'. The Pakistanis asked,
'But what is here, a brigade?' He told them that it was
only a battalion.
A battalion only! They could not believe it. They had never
realised that we were not a brigade. This was a big
surprise for them.
Our surprise was that we thought that they were one
brigade, but there were two brigades (the 202 and 313
Infantry Brigade)! We took the surrender of three
brigadiers, a full colonel, 107 officers, 219 JCO, and
7,000 troops.
(Lieutenant General A A K] Niazi (commanding the
Pakistani army in East Pakistan) had ordered Sylhet to be
held for the defence of Dhaka. The second brigade had
landed the same day as us. We were fighting two
brigades at the same time.
Anyway, we were very cold, so I told this Pakistani JCO,
'Saab, aap ke pas kambal hain store mein?' ('Do you have
blankets in your stores?')
'Haan Sahib('Yes, Sir').'
So I said, 'Main aap ko receipt de doonga (I will give you
a receipt), can you give kambals to my men?'
'Kambal nahin laye, saab? ('Sir, you have not brought
blankets?')'
'Hum sone ke liye nahin aaye, aap ko barbaad karne ke
liye aaye. (We did not come to sleep, but to destroy you.)'
He digested that. Then I said, 'Agar kuch kambal rahe
jaate hain, hamare affsar sahiba ko de sakte hain? ('If
some blankets remain, can you give them to our
officers?)'
'Kya baat karte hain saab, affsar sahiba bhi kambal nahin
laye? ('What are you saying sir, even the officers do not
have blankets?')'
So I said, 'Saab, agar jawano ke paas kambal nahin hain,
to afsar sahiba ke liye kambal kaise ho sakta hai? ('When
the jawans do not have blankets, then how can the
officers have them?).'
He stood to attention, saluted me, and said, 'Janaab,
agar hamari fauj mein Bharat jaise afsar hote, ye din
humne dekhna tha ('Sir, if in our army we had officers like
those in India, we would not have seen this day).'