indian army chief says pakistan must be secular if they want to stay together with india

[El Sidd]

Or..... it may be the reactionary evolution to the effects that affect the Indian security, consequent to the Zia Educational Reforms coming of age?

That remains to be seen.
None of the reforms brought upon by Zia meant to politicize the Indian army i believe however.

 

[Hellfire]

That remains to be seen.
None of the reforms brought upon by Zia meant to politicize the Indian army i believe however.

Sir.

I shall request you to indulge me when I quote Clausewitz on what is war (for the newbies, to get a perspective):

War, therefore, is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.

Having said that, the intricacies of the conduct of war are also well covered by him in his work On War. The fact that the conduct of war is, to paraphrase, an extension of the political objectives of a nation, leads one to a situation wherein, the armed forces, conduct a political activity in an 'apolitical' mannerism.

But can one truly delineate the fine distinctions that separate the two apparently distinct entities from one another in any intellectual/theoretical discourse, in real life?

As Clausewitz has explained in his work, war 'is controlled by its political object' which 'will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and makes its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail' . He has discussed distinctly, the rational chains of action that establish a purpose to be achieved, a military aim that serves the stated purpose, and the selection of means appropriate to attain the aim that is, at the end of the day, subservient to the overall Political Objective that must be met.

Modern day states, as can be seen today, struggle to employ their militaries as effective instruments of policy, primarily due to the existence of complexities in the political conditions rather than any significant military shortcomings (although, one can argue about the same in context of the Indian sub-continent). The pre-eminence of asymmetric means of warfare, in the form of terrorism or insurgency, the politics of the day, remain central to the overall policy of employment of the level and quantum of force, that needs to be employed and additional measures, if any, to be initiated.

I shall refrain from a further diatribe but merely post what I had written elsewhere, with respect to the primary current security challenges - terrorism & insurgency, that India faces:

Effective political action on the population must be preceded by military and police operations against the guerrilla units and the insurgent political organisations. Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population, hence, a need for a military intervention to create conducive atmosphere for a political action.


The counter-insurgent needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win. The counter-insurgent cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a position of strength, or his potential supporters will flock to the insurgent


In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In counterinsurgency, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organisation at the grass roots. The counter-insurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embodied in a political organisation issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population.


My apologies for the rather long answer, but it was for the benefit of those who may want to intercede without understanding my intent comprehensively.

What, in my opinion, we see, is merely the political prosecution of the military operations that have to be undertaken. No Chief in Indian Armed Forces, makes a political statement with potential ramifications on International relations, without clearance from the Government of India.

So, I shall hardly look at this as anything akin to politicizing of the Indian Armed Forces.


I shall of course, invite comments of @MilSpec, @Joe Shearer @Nilgiri to perhaps add to or correct any aspect as understood by Indians of the prevailing situation nowadays.

 

[El Sidd]

Sir.

I shall request you to indulge me when I quote Clausewitz on what is war (for the newbies, to get a perspective):

War, therefore, is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.

Having said that, the intricacies of the conduct of war are also well covered by him in his work On War. The fact that the conduct of war is, to paraphrase, an extension of the political objectives of a nation, leads one to a situation wherein, the armed forces, conduct a political activity in an 'apolitical' mannerism.

But can one truly delineate the fine distinctions that separate the two apparently distinct entities from one another in any intellectual/theoretical discourse, in real life?

As Clausewitz has explained in his work, war 'is controlled by its political object' which 'will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and makes its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail' . He has discussed distinctly, the rational chains of action that establish a purpose to be achieved, a military aim that serves the stated purpose, and the selection of means appropriate to attain the aim that is, at the end of the day, subservient to the overall Political Objective that must be met.

Modern day states, as can be seen today, struggle to employ their militaries as effective instruments of policy, primarily due to the existence of complexities in the political conditions rather than any significant military shortcomings (although, one can argue about the same in context of the Indian sub-continent). The pre-eminence of asymmetric means of warfare, in the form of terrorism or insurgency, the politics of the day, remain central to the overall policy of employment of the level and quantum of force, that needs to be employed and additional measures, if any, to be initiated.

I shall refrain from a further diatribe but merely post what I had written elsewhere, with respect to the primary current security challenges - terrorism & insurgency, that India faces:

Effective political action on the population must be preceded by military and police operations against the guerrilla units and the insurgent political organisations. Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population, hence, a need for a military intervention to create conducive atmosphere for a political action.


The counter-insurgent needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win. The counter-insurgent cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a position of strength, or his potential supporters will flock to the insurgent


In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In counterinsurgency, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organisation at the grass roots. The counter-insurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embodied in a political organisation issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population.


My apologies for the rather long answer, but it was for the benefit of those who may want to intercede without understanding my intent comprehensively.

What, in my opinion, we see, is merely the political prosecution of the military operations that have to be undertaken. No Chief in Indian Armed Forces, makes a political statement with potential ramifications on International relations, without clearance from the Government of India.

So, I shall hardly look at this as anything akin to politicizing of the Indian Armed Forces.


I shall of course, invite comments of @MilSpec, @Joe Shearer @Nilgiri to perhaps add to or correct any aspect as understood by Indians of the prevailing situation nowadays.

Lets get perspectives from our other guests before continuing i would say. No point in discussing rhetoric.

 

[Pan-Islamic-Pakistan]

during old days prior to partition we used to have people who had names like Muhammed Ram

Muslims and Hindus were so mixed they were confused, half muslim half hindu bit like these misguided muslim actors of Bollywood

then some great believers decided enough was enough, believers can't be together with idol worshippers

then came the idea of a separate homeland for muslims by muslims

they then made Pakistan, a clean pure nation free from hindus

where muslims would practice their religion free from idol influences

at the start our forefather did well, they created a Pakistan and we up and till 1970s we were doing great

somewhere after that we got lost and messed up

but principles is there, muslim and hindu CANNOT live together

look how Israel treats the Palestinians thats how we would live under Hindus why go far look at Kashmir

so be grateful we have a home and be grateful we are muslim and never ever let go of your religion and sacrifices of our forefathers

India is historical arch enemy of Muslims and Pakistan their opinion is always wrong

Hindu-Zionist is alliance that is our greatest threat and I hope one day I see Pakistan smash this alliance back into the Stone Age, then history will one day say there used to be a country called India and Israel

In sha Allah, my brother. Haqq will always crush Batil, no matter how long it takes.

We have no problems with Hindus following their own path, as we let them live unharmed for centuries, but we can’t tolerate Hindutva bigots telling us how to practice our faith, what to eat, inventing false history about our heroes, and wanton murder/rape of our co-religionists.

This is the difference. Quaid e Azam saw this trend in the 1930s.

 

[Hellfire]

Lets get perspectives from our other guests before continuing i would say. No point in discussing rhetoric.

Fair enough.

 

[Hellfire]

@Arsalan

Refer our PM conversations back in 2016. Further, refer the Ahl-e-Hadith angle and the anticipated thrust of the change in narrative of the situation in Kashmir Valley. If you recall the same (or you can refer back in conversation in backend), read this statement in conjunction with those discussions.

The narrative is effectively being changed and the acts of the terror groups in Kashmir, that of ISIS style beheading and viral videos of same, plays right into it.

Correlate with our discussion on upstroke in violence.

This is not a 'loose shot' by far.

Cheers

 

[tarrar]

F**K yourself with a cactus first then will see if we need to think about it.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Lets get perspectives from our other guests before continuing i would say. No point in discussing rhetoric.

I agree with @hellfire in broad terms, but want to point out that this government in particular is the one that is using the COAS as a source of information dissemination on policy, dissemination essentially to the outside world, Pakistan in particular, and that had not happened before.

Clearly, from one point of view, this is NOT political; from another, perhaps more jaundiced point of view, this is precisely political in the forbidden degree. Practices differ; a Colin Powell in the US would be quite plausibly a spokesperson of larger, national policy; it has never before been done in India. What would we call that? Before calling it anything, how would we asses it?

I agree with his observations on the rest. One author rewarding to study in this context was my father's favourite, when the old man was faced with an identical situation, that was then at the time managed successfully, but has recurred with troubling intensity, and that author is Sir Robert Thompson. He, and Gerard Templer, really wrote the book on counter-insurgency operations. Here is an extract, not from his original books, which are still languishing bewitched by the Bad Witch of the North, but from Wikipedia (@hellfire, every time the discussion turns to Kashmir, from the Indian perspective, Thompson seems to be an unseen participant, unseen but with his views resounding through the discussion like an oracle in the sky):

1. The people are the key base to be secured and defended rather than territory won or enemy bodies counted. Contrary to the focus of conventional warfare, territory gained or casualty counts are not of overriding importance in counter-guerrilla warfare. The support of the population is the key variable. Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter, financing, and other materials, the counter-insurgent force must focus its efforts on providing physical and economic security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and propaganda.
2. There must be a clear political counter-vision that can overshadow, match or neutralize the guerrilla vision. This can range from granting political autonomy to economic development measures in the affected region. The vision must be an integrated approach, involving political, social and economic and media influence measures. A nationalist narrative, for example, might be used in one situation, an ethnic autonomy approach in another. An aggressive media campaign must also be mounted in support of the competing vision or the counter-insurgent regime will appear weak or incompetent.
3. Practical action must be taken at the lower levels to match the competitive political vision. It may be tempting for the counter-insurgent side simply to declare guerrillas "terrorists" and pursue a harsh liquidation strategy. Brute force, however, may not be successful in the long run. Action does not mean capitulation, but sincere steps such as removing corrupt or arbitrary officials, cleaning up fraud, building more infrastructure, collecting taxes honestly, or addressing other legitimate grievances can do much to undermine the guerrillas' appeal.
4. Economy of force. The counter-insurgent regime must not overreact to guerrilla provocations, since this may indeed be what they seek in order to create a crisis in civilian morale. Indiscriminate use of firepower may only serve to alienate the key focus of counter-insurgency - the base of the people. Police level actions should guide the effort and take place in a clear framework of legality, even if under a State of Emergency. Civil liberties and other customs of peacetime may have to be suspended, but again, the counter-insurgent regime must exercise restraint, and cleave to orderly procedures. In the counter-insurgency context, "boots on the ground" are even more important than technological prowess and massive firepower, although anti-guerrilla forces should take full advantage of modern air, artillery and electronic warfare assets.[7]
5. Big unit action may sometimes be necessary. If police action is not sufficient to stop the guerrilla fighters, military sweeps may be necessary. Such "big battalion" operations may be needed to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups where combined civic-police action can control them.
6. Aggressive mobility. Mobility and aggressive small unit action is extremely important for the counter-insurgent regime. Heavy formations must be lightened aggressively to locate, pursue and neutralise insurgent units. Huddling in static strongpoints simply concedes the field to the insurgents. They must be kept on the run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches, etc.
7. Ground level embedding and integration. In tandem with mobility is the embedding of hardcore counter-insurgent units or troops with local security forces and civilian elements. The US Marines in Vietnam also saw some success with this method, under its CAP (Combined Action Program) where Marines were teamed as both trainers and "stiffeners" of local elements on the ground. US Special Forces in Vietnam, like the Green Berets, also caused significant local problems for their opponents by their leadership and integration with mobile tribal and irregular forces.[8] The CIA's Special Activities Division created successful guerrilla forces from the Hmong tribe during the war in Vietnam in the 1960s,[9] from the Northern Alliance against the Taliban during the war in Afghanistan in 2001,[10] and from the Kurdish Peshmerga against Ansar al-Islam and the forces of Saddam Hussein during the war in Iraq in 2003.[11][12] In Iraq, the 2007 US "surge" strategy saw the embedding of regular and special forces troops among Iraqi army units. These hardcore groups were also incorporated into local neighborhood outposts in a bid to facilitate intelligence gathering, and to strengthen ground level support among the masses.[7]
8. Cultural sensitivity. Counter-insurgent forces require familiarity with the local culture, mores and language or they will experience numerous difficulties. Americans experienced this in Vietnam and during the US invasion of Iraqi and occupation, where shortages of Arabic speaking interpreters and translators hindered both civil and military operations.[13]
9. Systematic intelligence effort. Every effort must be made to gather and organize useful intelligence. A systematic process must be set up to do so, from casual questioning of civilians to structured interrogations of prisoners. Creative measures must also be used, including the use of double agents, or even bogus "liberation" or sympathizer groups that help reveal insurgent personnel or operations.
10. Methodical clear and hold. An "ink spot" clear and hold strategy must be used by the counter-insurgent regime, dividing the conflict area into sectors, and assigning priorities between them. Control must expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.
11. Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units. Mass forces include village self-defense groups and citizen militias organized for community defense and can be useful in providing civic mobilization and local security. Specialist units can be used profitably, including commando squads, long range reconnaissance and "hunter-killer" patrols, defectors who can track or persuade their former colleagues like the Kit Carson units in Vietnam, and paramilitary style groups.
12. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully used. Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper "taking over" the local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the toll of dead foreigners mounts. Such a scenario occurred with the US in Vietnam, with the American effort creating dependence in South Vietnam, and war-weariness and protests back home. Heavy-handed foreign interference may also fail to operate effectively within the local cultural context, setting up conditions for failure.
13. Time. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict that wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces. Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time. The counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done. Impatient demands for victory centered around short-term electoral cycles play into the hands of the guerrillas, though it is equally important to recognize when a cause is lost and the guerrillas have won.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On a personal note, these principles were very, very successfully adapted to a counter-insurgency campaign that Lt. Gen. Jacob appropriated as his own, but was emphatically a civilian effort with only marginal Army participation. So it can be done. Is it being done?

 

[Hellfire]

I agree with @hellfire in broad terms, but want to point out that this government in particular is the one that is using the COAS as a source of information dissemination on policy, dissemination essentially to the outside world, Pakistan in particular, and that had not happened before.

Clearly, from one point of view, this is NOT political; from another, perhaps more jaundiced point of view, this is precisely political in the forbidden degree. Practices differ; a Colin Powell in the US would be quite plausibly a spokesperson of larger, national policy; it has never before been done in India. What would we call that? Before calling it anything, how would we asses it?

I agree with his observations on the rest. One author rewarding to study in this context was my father's favourite, when the old man was faced with an identical situation, that was then at the time managed successfully, but has recurred with troubling intensity, and that author is Sir Robert Thompson. He, and Gerard Templer, really wrote the book on counter-insurgency operations. Here is an extract, not from his original books, which are still languishing bewitched by the Bad Witch of the North, but from Wikipedia (@hellfire, every time the discussion turns to Kashmir, from the Indian perspective, Thompson seems to be an unseen participant, unseen but with his views resounding through the discussion like an oracle in the sky):

1. The people are the key base to be secured and defended rather than territory won or enemy bodies counted. Contrary to the focus of conventional warfare, territory gained or casualty counts are not of overriding importance in counter-guerrilla warfare. The support of the population is the key variable. Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter, financing, and other materials, the counter-insurgent force must focus its efforts on providing physical and economic security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and propaganda.
2. There must be a clear political counter-vision that can overshadow, match or neutralize the guerrilla vision. This can range from granting political autonomy to economic development measures in the affected region. The vision must be an integrated approach, involving political, social and economic and media influence measures. A nationalist narrative, for example, might be used in one situation, an ethnic autonomy approach in another. An aggressive media campaign must also be mounted in support of the competing vision or the counter-insurgent regime will appear weak or incompetent.
3. Practical action must be taken at the lower levels to match the competitive political vision. It may be tempting for the counter-insurgent side simply to declare guerrillas "terrorists" and pursue a harsh liquidation strategy. Brute force, however, may not be successful in the long run. Action does not mean capitulation, but sincere steps such as removing corrupt or arbitrary officials, cleaning up fraud, building more infrastructure, collecting taxes honestly, or addressing other legitimate grievances can do much to undermine the guerrillas' appeal.
4. Economy of force. The counter-insurgent regime must not overreact to guerrilla provocations, since this may indeed be what they seek in order to create a crisis in civilian morale. Indiscriminate use of firepower may only serve to alienate the key focus of counter-insurgency - the base of the people. Police level actions should guide the effort and take place in a clear framework of legality, even if under a State of Emergency. Civil liberties and other customs of peacetime may have to be suspended, but again, the counter-insurgent regime must exercise restraint, and cleave to orderly procedures. In the counter-insurgency context, "boots on the ground" are even more important than technological prowess and massive firepower, although anti-guerrilla forces should take full advantage of modern air, artillery and electronic warfare assets.[7]
5. Big unit action may sometimes be necessary. If police action is not sufficient to stop the guerrilla fighters, military sweeps may be necessary. Such "big battalion" operations may be needed to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups where combined civic-police action can control them.
6. Aggressive mobility. Mobility and aggressive small unit action is extremely important for the counter-insurgent regime. Heavy formations must be lightened aggressively to locate, pursue and neutralise insurgent units. Huddling in static strongpoints simply concedes the field to the insurgents. They must be kept on the run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches, etc.
7. Ground level embedding and integration. In tandem with mobility is the embedding of hardcore counter-insurgent units or troops with local security forces and civilian elements. The US Marines in Vietnam also saw some success with this method, under its CAP (Combined Action Program) where Marines were teamed as both trainers and "stiffeners" of local elements on the ground. US Special Forces in Vietnam, like the Green Berets, also caused significant local problems for their opponents by their leadership and integration with mobile tribal and irregular forces.[8] The CIA's Special Activities Division created successful guerrilla forces from the Hmong tribe during the war in Vietnam in the 1960s,[9] from the Northern Alliance against the Taliban during the war in Afghanistan in 2001,[10] and from the Kurdish Peshmerga against Ansar al-Islam and the forces of Saddam Hussein during the war in Iraq in 2003.[11][12] In Iraq, the 2007 US "surge" strategy saw the embedding of regular and special forces troops among Iraqi army units. These hardcore groups were also incorporated into local neighborhood outposts in a bid to facilitate intelligence gathering, and to strengthen ground level support among the masses.[7]
8. Cultural sensitivity. Counter-insurgent forces require familiarity with the local culture, mores and language or they will experience numerous difficulties. Americans experienced this in Vietnam and during the US invasion of Iraqi and occupation, where shortages of Arabic speaking interpreters and translators hindered both civil and military operations.[13]
9. Systematic intelligence effort. Every effort must be made to gather and organize useful intelligence. A systematic process must be set up to do so, from casual questioning of civilians to structured interrogations of prisoners. Creative measures must also be used, including the use of double agents, or even bogus "liberation" or sympathizer groups that help reveal insurgent personnel or operations.
10. Methodical clear and hold. An "ink spot" clear and hold strategy must be used by the counter-insurgent regime, dividing the conflict area into sectors, and assigning priorities between them. Control must expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.
11. Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units. Mass forces include village self-defense groups and citizen militias organized for community defense and can be useful in providing civic mobilization and local security. Specialist units can be used profitably, including commando squads, long range reconnaissance and "hunter-killer" patrols, defectors who can track or persuade their former colleagues like the Kit Carson units in Vietnam, and paramilitary style groups.
12. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully used. Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper "taking over" the local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the toll of dead foreigners mounts. Such a scenario occurred with the US in Vietnam, with the American effort creating dependence in South Vietnam, and war-weariness and protests back home. Heavy-handed foreign interference may also fail to operate effectively within the local cultural context, setting up conditions for failure.
13. Time. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict that wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces. Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time. The counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done. Impatient demands for victory centered around short-term electoral cycles play into the hands of the guerrillas, though it is equally important to recognize when a cause is lost and the guerrillas have won.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On a personal note, these principles were very, very successfully adapted to a counter-insurgency campaign that Lt. Gen. Jacob appropriated as his own, but was emphatically a civilian effort with only marginal Army participation. So it can be done. Is it being done?

I avoided going in depth describing the three groups of any insurgency - insurgent & counter insurgent who form a minuscule group and the overwhelmingly large indifferent

My contention was, the context has to be in the overall view that I have been trying to drive in earlier too (till as late as Oct 2016 when I left here) when I had mentioned the Ahl-e-Hadith and permissiveness of the authorities towards flow of money and Wahabi ideology into the valley, an ideology which is inherently antagonistic to the Kashmiriyat that remains the unique attribute of the valley. The metamorphosis of the narrative, from an essentially political-insurgency issue to countering radical Islamic terror, did not take long. This is essential in the present world view of radicalized groups acting in name of religion and committing acts of barbarity. Essentially, from the low of 90s when India remained under tremendous pressure internationally over the spiralling violence in Kashmir valley, we see a change in the situation today, as those who were chiding the Indian leadership at the time, are today themselves at the receiving end.

 

[Imran Khan]

secularism is sin in india itself . all the narritive of BJP is that secular s are bad guys . bupin first check his home where people calling secular s sickuler suclulers etc

 

[War Thunder]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1068417757107052544

https://twitter.com/x/status/1068361799999868928

https://twitter.com/x/status/1068430397732605952

https://twitter.com/x/status/1068385386181918720

Pakistan should turn secular to be with india? Well here's the shit, india can go screw herself with the juice of secularism.
He is making demands as if he gets to chose what another people want to be. no wonder they dont care if people in Kashmir dont like them or if they go around raping women.

How about india becomes civilized first and start respecting women if they want to exist as a state, and not get labeled the rapist country at some point.

 

[El Sidd]

I agree with @hellfire in broad terms, but want to point out that this government in particular is the one that is using the COAS as a source of information dissemination on policy, dissemination essentially to the outside world, Pakistan in particular, and that had not happened before.

Clearly, from one point of view, this is NOT political; from another, perhaps more jaundiced point of view, this is precisely political in the forbidden degree. Practices differ; a Colin Powell in the US would be quite plausibly a spokesperson of larger, national policy; it has never before been done in India. What would we call that? Before calling it anything, how would we asses it?

I agree with his observations on the rest. One author rewarding to study in this context was my father's favourite, when the old man was faced with an identical situation, that was then at the time managed successfully, but has recurred with troubling intensity, and that author is Sir Robert Thompson. He, and Gerard Templer, really wrote the book on counter-insurgency operations. Here is an extract, not from his original books, which are still languishing bewitched by the Bad Witch of the North, but from Wikipedia (@hellfire, every time the discussion turns to Kashmir, from the Indian perspective, Thompson seems to be an unseen participant, unseen but with his views resounding through the discussion like an oracle in the sky):

1. The people are the key base to be secured and defended rather than territory won or enemy bodies counted. Contrary to the focus of conventional warfare, territory gained or casualty counts are not of overriding importance in counter-guerrilla warfare. The support of the population is the key variable. Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter, financing, and other materials, the counter-insurgent force must focus its efforts on providing physical and economic security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and propaganda.
2. There must be a clear political counter-vision that can overshadow, match or neutralize the guerrilla vision. This can range from granting political autonomy to economic development measures in the affected region. The vision must be an integrated approach, involving political, social and economic and media influence measures. A nationalist narrative, for example, might be used in one situation, an ethnic autonomy approach in another. An aggressive media campaign must also be mounted in support of the competing vision or the counter-insurgent regime will appear weak or incompetent.
3. Practical action must be taken at the lower levels to match the competitive political vision. It may be tempting for the counter-insurgent side simply to declare guerrillas "terrorists" and pursue a harsh liquidation strategy. Brute force, however, may not be successful in the long run. Action does not mean capitulation, but sincere steps such as removing corrupt or arbitrary officials, cleaning up fraud, building more infrastructure, collecting taxes honestly, or addressing other legitimate grievances can do much to undermine the guerrillas' appeal.
4. Economy of force. The counter-insurgent regime must not overreact to guerrilla provocations, since this may indeed be what they seek in order to create a crisis in civilian morale. Indiscriminate use of firepower may only serve to alienate the key focus of counter-insurgency - the base of the people. Police level actions should guide the effort and take place in a clear framework of legality, even if under a State of Emergency. Civil liberties and other customs of peacetime may have to be suspended, but again, the counter-insurgent regime must exercise restraint, and cleave to orderly procedures. In the counter-insurgency context, "boots on the ground" are even more important than technological prowess and massive firepower, although anti-guerrilla forces should take full advantage of modern air, artillery and electronic warfare assets.[7]
5. Big unit action may sometimes be necessary. If police action is not sufficient to stop the guerrilla fighters, military sweeps may be necessary. Such "big battalion" operations may be needed to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups where combined civic-police action can control them.
6. Aggressive mobility. Mobility and aggressive small unit action is extremely important for the counter-insurgent regime. Heavy formations must be lightened aggressively to locate, pursue and neutralise insurgent units. Huddling in static strongpoints simply concedes the field to the insurgents. They must be kept on the run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches, etc.
7. Ground level embedding and integration. In tandem with mobility is the embedding of hardcore counter-insurgent units or troops with local security forces and civilian elements. The US Marines in Vietnam also saw some success with this method, under its CAP (Combined Action Program) where Marines were teamed as both trainers and "stiffeners" of local elements on the ground. US Special Forces in Vietnam, like the Green Berets, also caused significant local problems for their opponents by their leadership and integration with mobile tribal and irregular forces.[8] The CIA's Special Activities Division created successful guerrilla forces from the Hmong tribe during the war in Vietnam in the 1960s,[9] from the Northern Alliance against the Taliban during the war in Afghanistan in 2001,[10] and from the Kurdish Peshmerga against Ansar al-Islam and the forces of Saddam Hussein during the war in Iraq in 2003.[11][12] In Iraq, the 2007 US "surge" strategy saw the embedding of regular and special forces troops among Iraqi army units. These hardcore groups were also incorporated into local neighborhood outposts in a bid to facilitate intelligence gathering, and to strengthen ground level support among the masses.[7]
8. Cultural sensitivity. Counter-insurgent forces require familiarity with the local culture, mores and language or they will experience numerous difficulties. Americans experienced this in Vietnam and during the US invasion of Iraqi and occupation, where shortages of Arabic speaking interpreters and translators hindered both civil and military operations.[13]
9. Systematic intelligence effort. Every effort must be made to gather and organize useful intelligence. A systematic process must be set up to do so, from casual questioning of civilians to structured interrogations of prisoners. Creative measures must also be used, including the use of double agents, or even bogus "liberation" or sympathizer groups that help reveal insurgent personnel or operations.
10. Methodical clear and hold. An "ink spot" clear and hold strategy must be used by the counter-insurgent regime, dividing the conflict area into sectors, and assigning priorities between them. Control must expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.
11. Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units. Mass forces include village self-defense groups and citizen militias organized for community defense and can be useful in providing civic mobilization and local security. Specialist units can be used profitably, including commando squads, long range reconnaissance and "hunter-killer" patrols, defectors who can track or persuade their former colleagues like the Kit Carson units in Vietnam, and paramilitary style groups.
12. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully used. Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper "taking over" the local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the toll of dead foreigners mounts. Such a scenario occurred with the US in Vietnam, with the American effort creating dependence in South Vietnam, and war-weariness and protests back home. Heavy-handed foreign interference may also fail to operate effectively within the local cultural context, setting up conditions for failure.
13. Time. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict that wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces. Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time. The counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done. Impatient demands for victory centered around short-term electoral cycles play into the hands of the guerrillas, though it is equally important to recognize when a cause is lost and the guerrillas have won.

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On a personal note, these principles were very, very successfully adapted to a counter-insurgency campaign that Lt. Gen. Jacob appropriated as his own, but was emphatically a civilian effort with only marginal Army participation. So it can be done. Is it being done?

and you expect this to be implemented on a disputed territory?

 

[Joe Shearer]

and you expect this to be implemented on a disputed territory?

Yes. If that is what you got out of it.

 

[Kakaspai]

Why dont you ask your brethren iran to turn secular.

 

[El Sidd]

Yes. If that is what you got out of it.

I was only asking a question.