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India tells China: Kashmir is to us what Tibet, Taiwan are to you

If India doesn't let this go then it will be 1962 all over again.

I really wish there could be peaceful development between India and China but if India keeps fanning the flames then they will get burned, again, and this time they will not recover.
 
Re: India tells China: Kashmir is to us what Tibet, Taiwan are to you???

What
In Pakistan we do not understand such complicated and long statements we only know one thing.

WE SUPPORT ONE CHINA POLICY.:pakistan::china::pakistan:
 
If India doesn't let this go then it will be 1962 all over again.

I really wish there could be peaceful development between India and China but if India keeps fanning the flames then they will get burned, again, and this time they will not recover.

This isn't the situation today. You would do well to read up on what happened in 1962. Here's a well written account of what happened.




Dear Sir,

It is regrettable that the vast majority of us Indians have been kept in the dark, and ill-served both by our government and by our intellectuals with regard to the differences with China. Perhaps a good way to address these issues would be to start with your enclosed article, and to comment it suitably.

Indian public opinion has been almost entirely molded for decades by apologists for Nehru and his many failings. The most pervasive myth of all, which will have to be debunked if India and China are to move towards long term good-neighborly relations, is that of Chinese perfidy. For no reason at all, out of sheer greed of Indian territory, the Chinese betrayed a peace-loving brotherly country that had even antagonized the mighty United States by pleading Beijing's cause for a place on the United Nations Security Council
This only is the beginning of the deception. The facts are that for decades, more than a century, the nearby imperial powers, Czarist Russia and Imperial Britain, had acknowledged China's suzerainty over Tibet. The facts are that China had not been consulted either during the establishment of the line in the west, nor during the establishment of the line in the east. Of the two, the demarcation in the east was the worse of the two, and consisted of an arbitrary line drawn by Mr. MacMahon on the map, representing the watershed of the Himalayan ridges. He did this against the instructions of the British government in India. But let us go on.
Noted analyst Brahma Chellaney articulates this traditional view in a recent article: "In fact, Nehru, the architect of the Hindi-Chini bhai bhai [Indians and Chinese are brothers] festivity, had gone out of his way to propitiate communist China, accepting even the Chinese annexation of Tibet in a 1954 agreement without settling the Indo-Tibetan border. So betrayed was Nehru by Mao's war that he had this to say on the day the Chinese invaded: 'Perhaps there are not many instances in history where one country has gone out of her way to be friendly and cooperative with the government and people of another country and to plead their cause in the councils of the world, and then that country returns evil for good'."

Noorani, though, disagrees with the view that Nehru was duped. He says, "Nehru was distrustful of China from the very outset; he substituted old Indian maps with a new one in 1954 and ruled out any compromise. He was a hardliner, but his opponents were chauvinistic."

Brahm Chellaney's account reads like bad propaganda, and is bad propaganda. Nehru accepted Chinese occupation of Tibet; he did not confirm the boundary with China, not because China offered no opportunity, but because he sought more than China was offering.

On the other hand, Noorani assessed the situation correctly and described Nehru's activities in greater frankness.

Noorani describes the course of events prior to the war, "China did not protest when on February 12, 1951, Major R Khating took over Tawang, evicting Tibetan administrators. The entire area south of the McMahon Line was now in Indian control. The famed Nehru-Patel [Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, independent India's first home minister] correspondence in November 1950 centered on the McMahon Line. Neither was interested in Aksai Chin and for good reason.

"Patel's ministry of states had published White Papers on the states in July 1948 and February 1950. Official maps were attached to both. The 1948 map did not even extend the yellow color wash to the entire state of J&K [Jammu and Kashmir]. In 1948 and 1950, Kashmir's northern and eastern boundaries - as also that stretching from Kashmir to Nepal - were explicitly shown as 'undefined', in contrast to the clear depiction of the McMahon Line in the east. This was the true position in law and in fact. Changes in maps by either side cannot alter the position.

Both these facts are correct and well-established.

The position on the west had not been established clearly. The position on the east, the McMahon Line, was drawn arbitrarily by McMahon, with the hapless Tibetans consenting, but without the consent of the Chinese representative in Lhasa.

The McMahon Line sought to establish the line south of the watershed, but very largely deviated from this principle; it actually was in places NORTH of the watershed.

Nehru must have been aware of both the unknown situation in the West as well as the cartographic aggression by the British Empire in the East. It is impossible that he should have done what he did without knowledge of the situation on the ground.
"Nehru's cable to N Raghavan, India's ambassador to China, on December 10, 1952, provides a glimpse of his policy: 'Our attitude towards the Chinese government should always be a combination of friendliness and firmness. If we show weakness, advantage will be taken of this immediately. In regard to this entire frontier we have to maintain an attitude of firmness. Indeed, there is nothing to discuss there and we have made that previously clear to the Chinese government'. He could not have been unaware of his own maps.

The underlying belligerence that was a part of Nehru's posiion is clear from the extract above.
"On April 29, 1954, India and China signed the famous Panchsheel [five-point] agreement on trade with Tibet. On June 18, 1954, Nehru sent a note on Tibet and China to the secretary-general of the MEA [Ministry of External Affairs], the foreign secretary and joint secretary. 'No country can ultimately rely upon the permanent goodwill or bona fides of another country. It is conceivable that our relations with China might worsen'. That very month a new official map was published claiming a firm line in the western sector as well.

This (the publication of the official map with a firm boundary in the west, in unilateral supersession of the previous correct position) is factual, and was a falsehood by Nehru and the External Affairs Ministry.
"On July 1, 1954, Nehru issued a directive: 'All our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our northern and north-eastern frontier without any reference to any line. These new maps should also not state there is any undemarcated territory. This frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion with anybody'. India was thus set on a collision course with China.

"Nehru's demarche to Zhou Enlai on December 14, 1958, centered on the McMahon Line and on China's maps. He did not mention Aksai Chin or China's road through it. It was Zhou who raised that in his reply of January 23, 1959, while promising 'to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line'. Nehru's rejoinder of March 22, 1959, cited a treaty of 1842 on Ladakh and claimed 'the area now claimed by China has always been depicted as part of India on official maps'. This foreclosed compromise.


Here, for those who have not caught the allusion, it is necessary to recall that in 1841, General Zorawar Singh, the outstanding general of the Dogra Maharaja of Kashmir, had swept through Ladakh, conquered it (it was then a dependent principality of Tibet, itself a dependent on suzerain China) and mounted a sharp attack on Tibet. This attack failed; he was killed, his troops repelled and in a precursor of 62, they were thrust pell-mell back into Ladakh. There they made a stand and were able to beat off the Tibetan forces. The resultant peace treaty of 1842 was between the Dogra forces and the Tibetan general.


This is from memory and may need minor correction.
"Zhou proposed a meeting 'so as to reach some agreement of principles as a guidance to concrete discussions and a settlement of the boundary question. Without such a guidance there is a danger that concrete discussions of the boundary question by the two sides may bog down in endless and fruitless debates'. Nehru replied: 'How can we, Mr Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts?'



This, after he had cooked up the facts, both in the west and in the east.
"In Delhi in April, 1960, Zhou offered an 'overall settlement' based on two 'principles' - recognition of the McMahon Line in the east and the Karakoram watershed in the west. Nehru was politically too weak to accept it. He set up a joint group of officials to examine the 'evidence'."
It is not clear what political weakness this reference is about. Otherwise the rest of the facts are correct.
It is a sign of the times that a major Indian website rediff.com carries a special three-part report on the genesis of the 1962 war by former Times of London correspondent Neville Maxwell, the only journalist to have had access to a secret Indian army report on the debacle. The Indian army had commissioned Lieutenant-General Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P S Bhagat to study the debacle. With the well-known Indian obsession with secrecy, their report has not yet been made public. Maxwell has made an in-depth study of the subject and is the author of India's China War (1970), widely available on the Internet.

Introducing his article, he says, "Indians will be shocked to discover that, when China crushed India in 1962, the fault lay at India, or more specifically, at Jawaharlal Nehru and his clique's doorsteps. It was a hopelessly ill-prepared Indian army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi, and paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation."

On the origins of war, its summary is indeed shocking to Indians nourished on the Nehruvian myths. It needs to be quoted in some detail: "In the Indian political perspective, war with China was deemed unthinkable and, through the 1950s, New Delhi's defense planning and expenditure expressed that confidence. By the early 1950s, however, the Indian government, which is to say Nehru and his acolyte officials, had shaped and adopted a policy whose implementation would make armed conflict with China not only 'thinkable' but inevitable.

"From the first days of India's independence, it was appreciated that the Sino-Indian borders had been left undefined by the departing British and that territorial disputes with China were part of India's inheritance. China's other neighbors faced similar problems and, over the succeeding decades of the century, almost all of those were to settle their borders satisfactorily through the normal process of diplomatic negotiation with Beijing.

"The Nehru government decided upon the opposite approach. India would, through its own research, determine the appropriate alignments of the Sino-Indian borders, extend its administration to make those good on the ground and then refuse to negotiate the result. Barring the inconceivable - that Beijing would allow India to impose China's borders unilaterally and annex territory at will - Nehru's policy thus willed conflict without foreseeing it.

"Through the 1950s, that policy generated friction along the borders and so bred and steadily increased distrust, growing into hostility, between the neighbors. By 1958, Beijing was urgently calling for a standstill agreement to prevent patrol clashes and negotiations to agree on boundary alignments. India refused any standstill agreement, since it would be an impediment to intended advances and insisted that there was nothing to negotiate, the Sino-Indian borders being already settled on the alignments claimed by India, through blind historical process. Then it began accusing China of committing 'aggression' by refusing to surrender to Indian claims.

"From 1961, the Indian attempt to establish an armed presence in all the territory it claimed and then extrude the Chinese was being exerted by the army, and Beijing was warning that if India did not desist from its expansionist thrust, the Chinese forces would have to hit back. On October 12, 1962, Nehru proclaimed India's intention to drive the Chinese out of areas India claimed. That bravado had by then been forced upon him by public expectations which his charges of 'Chinese aggression' had aroused, but Beijing took it as in effect a declaration of war. The unfortunate Indian troops on the frontline, under orders to sweep superior Chinese forces out of their impregnable, dominating positions, instantly appreciated the implications: 'If Nehru had declared his intention to attack, then the Chinese were not going to wait to be attacked'.

"On October 20, the Chinese launched a preemptive offensive all along the borders, overwhelming the feeble - but, in this first instance, determined - resistance of the Indian troops and advancing some distance in the eastern sector. On October 24, Beijing offered a ceasefire and Chinese withdrawal on the condition that India agree to open negotiations: Nehru refused the offer even before the text was officially received. Both sides built up over the next three weeks, and the Indians launched a local counterattack on November 15, arousing in India fresh expectations of total victory.

"The Chinese then renewed their offensive. Now many units of the once-crack Indian 4th Division dissolved into rout without giving battle and, by November 20, there was no organized Indian resistance anywhere in the disputed territories. On that day, Beijing announced a unilateral ceasefire and intention to withdraw its forces: Nehru, this time, tacitly accepted."

The Henderson-Brooks Report was not written by two amateurs; it was written by a very senior general, a veteran of WWII, and by the darling of the Army, the VC winner, the bravest of the brave, Prem Bhagat.

It was a damning indictment.

Reading it, even today, is for a patriotic Indian with a fierce pride in the Indian Army, and the Navy and Air Force, like undergoing a public whipping.
A Lieutenant Commander of the US Navy, James Barnard Calvin, summarizes the war in his 1984 study "The China-India Border War (1962)": "In the war that began with skirmishes in the summer of 1962, the significant fighting occurred in October and November, 1962, along three widely separated fronts. In virtually every battle the Chinese forces either outmaneuvered or overpowered the unprepared Indians. In less than six weeks of bloody fighting, the Chinese completely drove Indian forces back behind Chinese claim lines. After achieving their limited strategic objectives, the Chinese dramatically declared ceasefire on November 21, 1962. Following the ceasefire, China kept most of their claim in Aksai Chin but gave India virtually all of India's claim in the North East Frontier Agency [NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh] - about 70 percent of the disputed land."



They actually withdrew to the McMahon Line, even when it was north of the watershed.
China returned to India occupied and still "disputed" Indian territory in the northeast even after Nehru had bid goodbye to the people of Assam in an afternoon radio broadcast. Clearly this war was not about territory, though India did lose territory it had come to consider as its own.


As a student of military history, i have gone through the accounts on the Chinese side and the Indian side carefully. Contrary to the accounts of brute force Chinese massed attacks on small groups of isolated Indians who fought to the last with unmatched valour, the picture that emerges is that of the last of the Mao-led wars in history. It showed all the hallmarks of the military style prescribed by Mao in his textbook on Military Warfare, "On Guerrilla Warfare".

There was no frontal massed attack.

Typically, the Chinese drove regiments, even brigades through defiles and ravines, and outflanked or attacked from the rear totally unprepared Indian positions. They attacked at night, and captured bunkers in a linear sequence* that ensured that they always had a local superiority, although overall the numbers were nowhere so disparate as to dictate a military disaster. They used noisy and alarming tactics, bugles, loud-hailers and concerted shouts, to alarm and upset a rattled, befuddled enemy fighting without good leadership, in exposed positions.

* This reminded me so much of the enfilading tactics of Frederick the Great that I read and re-read the comparative passages several times. It was true; this was classic concentration of force on a thin section of the line, its overwhelming, and then on to the next thin section.

Put very bluntly, NEFA 62 was not Thermopylae; it was Cannae.

The Indians did not move; the Chinese moved, moved, moved all the time.

What exactly did India lose? During the 30-day border conflict, in two phases over October and November, 1,383 Indian soldiers were killed, 1,696 went missing and 3,968 were captured. There are no figures of Chinese casualties. Six months later, by May 25, all the captured Indians had been released. In the icy heights of Ladakh - called the western sector - where, even Nehru acknowledged in parliament later, "not a blade of grass grew", India had to give up some 38,000 square kilometers of territory. In the eastern sector in Arunachal Pradesh, China continues to claim some 90,000 square kilometers of territory, at the heart of which lies the disputed Tawang swathe of land.


It is time to deal with another myth.

We are told that our troops were badly-clothed, badly-armed and badly-positioned. True, but the Chinese were not better clothed. These attacks were made, in wet weather, in October and November. There are authentic reports of serious and significant Chinese deaths due to exposure to the weather. They struggled against local conditions as much as the Indians.

Coming across these facts of history, most Indians reject them outright as biased accounts. Some do think, however, that it is important to find out the truth. If India and China have to normalize their relations, they must solve their border disputes. This is only possible if Indians leaders are backed by a democratic consensus. In order for this consensus to evolve, Indians must know the truth of the war. No better beginning can be made than the official publication of the Indian army's own account in the Henderson-Brooks report.

Another important input could be the publication of the official history of the war, written by a high-powered editorial team at the behest of then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, a quarter century after the war. This remains classified, although another committee was appointed to see if it could be released to the public.

India must understand that the absence of objective and authentic accounts is doing the country no good; it is merely reinforcing the trauma of defeat and failure that Indians have undergone for 40 long years, apart from making normal relations with an important neighbor difficult to achieve.
Why, oh why, does a Chinese analyst have to post this?

I would like to console myself with one thought.

This was a classic Maoist campaign. Mao is acknowledged as an outstanding military genius, quite apart from his outstanding grip over politics. The old master was up against a nouveau-riche barrister who had never practised, was brought up in the lap of luxury, and had appointed the grotesque Krishna Menon as the Defence Minister. Menon, with his penchant for doing the wrong thing at the wrong time, encouraged the ambitious B. M. Kaul to weaken the authority of the then COAS, General Thapar (Karan Thapar's father, if I'm not mistaken) and to arrogate power.

Kaul, in turn, lined up a stellar constellation: the bluff, blunt Lionel Pratap (Bogey) Sen, his COS, the sinister Monty Palit, and some hapless field officers to serve as his official cover.

Was this a contest?

[THIS SECTION OFF TOPIC: ONLY INDIANS TO READ THIS SECTION PLEASE]

Look at what happened twenty years later. A sharp contrast.

In 1982 and before and after, during the Chinese conflicts with Vietnam, when Deng was Chief, and everybody took their cue from him, we saw a different story. The invincible PLA had its nose bloodied by a hard-fighting Vietnamese Army which put up its traditional rugged, indefatigable resistance to their old foes, their historical enemy. It was a lesson to the PLA, even more of a lesson to the Indian Army.

I am frankly writing this to take away some of the pain and humiliation of the sacrifice of IV Indian Div and its gallant soldiers, who died as political pawns of Nehru, Krishna Menon and Kaul, and because their own professional leadership did not turn around and kick these people in the seats of their churidars.

[END OF SECTION OFF-TOPIC]

Sadly,


Written by Joe Shearer.

http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-defence/65762-all-indian-members-here-question-2.html#post1000089
 
Personally, I have noticed that Indians are becoming more openly jingoistic and confrontational. Not just online, but also in real life. People I have known for decades have become more fiercely nationalistic. And this happened before 26/11. It has more to do with India's growing economic/diplomatic/military power. In a democracy dancing to the tune of a sensationalist media, this is a dangerous trend.

I don't discuss politics with my Chinese friends in real life, so I can't speak if a similar change is happening in the Chinese psyche.
 
Re: India tells China: Kashmir is to us what Tibet, Taiwan are to you???

What
In Pakistan we do not understand such complicated and long statements we only know one thing.

WE SUPPORT ONE CHINA POLICY.:pakistan::china::pakistan:



You mean "one child Policy?? :undecided::undecided:


Actually, i too support that! :smitten:
 
Personally, I have noticed that Indians are becoming more openly jingoistic and confrontational. Not just online, but also in real life. People I have known for decades have become more fiercely nationalistic. And this happened before 26/11. It has more to do with India's growing economic/diplomatic/military power. In a democracy dancing to the tune of a sensationalist media, this is a dangerous trend.

I don't discuss politics with my Chinese friends in real life, so I can't speak if a similar change is happening in the Chinese psyche.

I agree with most of what you have said. Though irritating and some times offensive to people from other nations, I am not sure if it is necessarily a dangerous trend. This sense of nationhood has actually helped keep a country as diverse as India intact. Though ideally, I would like my people to be more modest , respectful and above all realistic!
 
Sir,
Somehow i feel that having a more democratic voice in China is a plus for India. While you may be true, politically minded middle class may not like to give away the lands under the control of China, they wouldn't worry about something that is not under their control right now. At least it has happened in India. Unless people in China are so attached to AP like Taiwan.
People won't like a government going on war mode too. Bad thing would be to have a bad dictator at the helm of offers. Chinese people have a lot at stake for the world remaining peaceful and so are indians

Thanks.

I disagree actually.

I think a democratic China would be MORE nationalist than it is now.

The CPC often attempts to reduce nationalist sentiment, which it sees as something that could cause political instability.

At best, the Chinese position regarding India would be exactly the same as it is now. What do you think the average Chinese person would say about the fact that India has been hosting our largest separatist group (the Tibetan government "in exile") for over 50 years?

I agree to a point but you may have a distorted picture of a democratic China would look like. I would venture to say a democratic China in the future would be just as nationalistic and I'm sure many other Chinese here would agree. The PRC more or less tries to sit on nationalism and play down events that might cause a runaway nationalistic tendency. A democratic China full of demagogues and fire-breathers will attempt no such thing. Rather than modulating nationalism they like hack politicians everywhere will likely exploit it.

No people are immune to this, this includes the Chinese.

Yours is an interest view because it really reflects something many westerners especially Americans hold dear. ie Democracy is what makes us great, so everyone else must want what we have. and the corollary if people adopted democracy they would think more like us and hold the same values. This I don't think is really true.

To give you an example, much of the US planning in the Iraq war hinged on Americans being welcomes as liberators and that if Americans installed a democracy, Iraqis would abandon their values to embrace Americans one. Most would probably agree this was a mistaken approach.

This is truly an interesting angle that Gubbi has opened up for consideration: will a liberal democratic China, as opposed to a people's democratic China, be more or less nationalistic, hence more or less attached to its specific national interests arising out of the heightened nationalistic feeling?

Indian commentators here - Gubbi (by inference) and K S Gokul directly - have commenced from a position that democracy is a good thing, and therefore democracy in China is a good thing, and a good thing cannot at the same time be a bad thing, so every aspect of a country that is a democracy must therefore be interpreted and extrapolated into a good thing. In other words, a liberal democratic China's foreign policy also will be a good thing, and border relations will improve. Regrettably, this depends on two logical fallacies, maybe even three.

First, it is not entirely clear that a liberal democracy is entirely a good thing, as we tend to assume during arguments with those who themselves do not belong to liberal democracies (in this context, please note that PRC is being considered as a people's democracy, where the will and the interests of the people are interpreted and guided by a dictatorship, the dictatorship of the proletariat). If we see the example of the US, liberal democracy, with its significant concentration on human rights and on the rights of minorities, tends to overlook the influence of economics on the system. Rather sadly, it is necessary to acknowledge that liberal democracies do not understand materialism and have never understood materialism; although this sounds like an abstruse philosophical point, it is probably at the base of every major difference in policy and in attitude between a people's democracy and a liberal democracy. To revert, in the US, for instance, the preference of the political system to either ignore the inequities of the wholly uncontrolled free market system, the Anglo-Saxon version, not the European version, of course, leads to unbridled excesses and to frequent and recurring scandals. As a result, the pressures and the compulsions of the capitalist factor have an inevitable influence on the decision-making of the state - a conclusion that had been reached by two bearded German philosophers in the middle of the 19th century itself.

Second, assuming for a moment that liberal democracy leads to good things in general, leaving the economic argument and materialism aside for the moment, we find that one of the good things that arise is the distortion in the structure of superficial emotions and values, such as nationalist feeling, which is not based on the class structure, but on ideologies made possible only by the domination of a class structure that favours nationalism as a method of expressing itself and representing its interests, nationally and internationally. While certain aspects of pre-socialist state structures are international in character, the influence of international capital and of internationalist capitalists, for instance, other aspects are in the grip of the nationalist bourgeoisie. These aspects include superficialities like the pomp and panoply of pre-socialist states (although the distorted conditions of 'socialism in one state' introduced equivalent pomp and panoply in an ugly manner into socialist or people's democratic states), such as an anthem, a flag, deliberately exaggerated devotion and patriotic excesses, jingoism in short, and various aspects of the state that serve to keep citizens from thinking about why other countries have to be dominated or subjugated, other people of different ethnic composition have to be dominated or subjugated, wars have to be fought, concessions have to be acquired and defended, by force if necessary, citizens rewarded for showing patriotic feeling and sacrificing themselves and their families for the interests of the state at war, and the like.

So nationalist feeling, including exaggerated nationalist feeling, is part of the reversion to liberal democracy that many Indians and many Europeans and North Americans also apparently hope to see in China.

Third, if this nationalist feeling comes in, and it already has, with the weakening of the socialist impulses in the original People's Republic and after the easing of socialist rigour under Deng Xiaoping, there may be unforeseen consequences for India, for instance, also, in even more brutal and undiluted form, for Japan and perhaps Vietnam, in less brutal but still vigorously assertive form for most of east and south-east asia. Instead of welcoming the orderly nature and eminently predictable nature of people's democracy, these neighbours have been aping the US line without even a slight thought towards the inevitable consequences.

India has little to gain and much to lose by the gradual assimilation of the original people's democracy that was China by the one-state socialism that is emerging, no doubt with a pluralism to be allowed very gradually and with as much regulation and care as the government of Singapore has taken towards its pluralist democratic elements.

This, in essence, without the political analysis that the present comment contains, is what Chinese-Dragon and CardSharp are trying to explain to people:
  1. A liberal democracy in China is not necessarily good for its neighbours;
  2. Nationalist feeling due to liberal democracy will be sharper and more focussed than today;
  3. This nationalist feeling will lead to pressure on the political leadership to take an increasingly aggressive stand on all matters relating to the nation-state, and in fact, to expand the nation-state to the maximum. None of which is good for India.

If possible, other aspects may be taken up, depending on what demand there is for such discussions, after a necessary break to visit the hospital and to perform mundane domestic chores.
 
Huzihaido....I didnt quite grasp what you meant to say here.

Did you mean that China was defending Indo-China and Chinese mainland simultaneously? And had China not done this, Japan would have had access to the resources it needed to keep the Americans at bay? This would have made things hard for Americans?

I want to say, if there is no Chinese Theater, the United States and its allies can not win. China has not the United States, it is still able to get the victory, but will be more difficult, but the KMT and the CCP will have a stronger unity.

Let PASS, here focused on the original theme.
 
I disagree actually.

I think a democratic China would be MORE nationalist than it is now.

The CPC often attempts to reduce nationalist sentiment, which it sees as something that could cause political instability.

At best, the Chinese position regarding India would be exactly the same as it is now. What do you think the average Chinese person would say about the fact that India has been hosting our largest separatist group (the Tibetan government "in exile") for over 50 years?

I agree to a point but you may have a distorted picture of a democratic China would look like. I would venture to say a democratic China in the future would be just as nationalistic and I'm sure many other Chinese here would agree. The PRC more or less tries to sit on nationalism and play down events that might cause a runaway nationalistic tendency. A democratic China full of demagogues and fire-breathers will attempt no such thing. Rather than modulating nationalism they like hack politicians everywhere will likely exploit it.

No people are immune to this, this includes the Chinese.

Yours is an interest view because it really reflects something many westerners especially Americans hold dear. ie Democracy is what makes us great, so everyone else must want what we have. and the corollary if people adopted democracy they would think more like us and hold the same values. This I don't think is really true.

To give you an example, much of the US planning in the Iraq war hinged on Americans being welcomes as liberators and that if Americans installed a democracy, Iraqis would abandon their values to embrace Americans one. Most would probably agree this was a mistaken approach.

Sir,
Thanks for the insight. But i would just add how i think about the scenario.
a) By Democracy, i mean a democracy for Tibetians too. I just want to be extra careful to mention that they have a representation in your democracy( not by any means a separate country ). So that representation will definitely not be having so much of negative energy towards India. The majority chinese would like to work with the minorities to solve issues and not dominate and suppress them.
b) When you form a democracy, i would say that one of the first actions would be to bring back the Tibetian refugees. They would like to go back, as that is their homeland and they have a representation inside it. India would love to solve the problem once and for all. For China, that would solve all the criticisms.
May be i am missing the point somewhere. Since my history knowledge is not as extensive as yours are, may be i am seeing the design patterns in a different way. So please tolerate any ignorance. Since i am working in a tight project, i am not able to spend much time in this forum. :cry:

Thanks.
 
Sir,
Please find my replies.

Indian commentators here - Gubbi (by inference) and K S Gokul directly - have commenced from a position that democracy is a good thing, and therefore democracy in China is a good thing, and a good thing cannot at the same time be a bad thing, so every aspect of a country that is a democracy must therefore be interpreted and extrapolated into a good thing. In other words, a liberal democratic China's foreign policy also will be a good thing, and border relations will improve. Regrettably, this depends on two logical fallacies, maybe even three.

I think one of the main problems, i believe for the rest of the world is the non-transparency that exists in China. That creates the fear. Even most of the people in the Chinese side are getting offended by the press articles on our side( thinking that it is the government that's actually publishing these articles ) and indian members are thinking that whatever published in china are being done by the government.

Third, if this nationalist feeling comes in, and it already has, with the weakening of the socialist impulses in the original People's Republic and after the easing of socialist rigour under Deng Xiaoping, there may be unforeseen consequences for India, for instance, also, in even more brutal and undiluted form, for Japan and perhaps Vietnam, in less brutal but still vigorously assertive form for most of east and south-east asia. Instead of welcoming the orderly nature and eminently predictable nature of people's democracy, these neighbours have been aping the US line without even a slight thought towards the inevitable consequences..

Here i am slightly not able to understand. There are so many democracies which have originated in the past. Do they have that kind of pattern in history? Sir, By no means i am trying to be assertive. I am just trying to be inquisitive. Ottaman empire broke into a democracy. Imperialist Japan became a democracy. But there were no problems for the neighbors.

I believe, we are preferring the US now, because China has grown more assertive with the transparency index remaining low(particularly on its defence doctrine). I don't think people had trouble accepting US as super power( when the transition happened after second world war ).

Thanks...
 
Sir,
Thanks for the insight. But i would just add how i think about the scenario.
a) By Democracy, i mean a democracy for Tibetians too. I just want to be extra careful to mention that they have a representation in your democracy( not by any means a separate country ). So that representation will definitely not be having so much of negative energy towards India. The majority chinese would like to work with the minorities to solve issues and not dominate and suppress them.
b) When you form a democracy, i would say that one of the first actions would be to bring back the Tibetian refugees. They would like to go back, as that is their homeland and they have a representation inside it. India would love to solve the problem once and for all. For China, that would solve all the criticisms.
May be i am missing the point somewhere. Since my history knowledge is not as extensive as yours are, may be i am seeing the design patterns in a different way. So please tolerate any ignorance. Since i am working in a tight project, i am not able to spend much time in this forum. :cry:

Thanks.

There are 3 million Tibetans, there are 1200 million Han Chinese, if when it comes to a representative democracy, Tibetan opinion would count exactly for naught. Banish from your mind the idea Tibetan opinion would affect Sino-Indian relations whatever their inclinations.

Might be harsh but tis the truth.
 
I dont recall the chinese leader asking the UN to intervene in tibet or taiwan and promising a vote to the people like the indian leader did in kashmir.
 
Atleast v can trust pakistani's than chinese.....chinese started there game in pakistan...slowly militarizing pakistan with their stuff....one day they will say taiwan, arunachal pradesh n pakistan too belong to china n they will show some map before india-pakistan partition.....

I always see pakistan members pulling china always into the forum when v discuss about india and pakistan military stuff comparing india and china-pakistan military strength but i dnt see an indian member comparing india-russia with pakistan-china in military

Last but nt least if china was your close ally thy could have invested in pakistan billions of dollar...helped you guys to develop the economy...starting new industries.....but many chinese companies are rolling around india to start new industries.....thy need a market to sell their military stuff so thy need you.

My dear pakistan friends start thinking...no offence....

I always trust India-Pakistan friendship now and ever.....
 
Here i am slightly not able to understand. There are so many democracies which have originated in the past. Do they have that kind of pattern in history? Sir, By no means i am trying to be assertive. I am just trying to be inquisitive. Ottaman empire broke into a democracy. Imperialist Japan became a democracy. But there were no problems for the neighbors.

I believe, we are preferring the US now, because China has grown more assertive with the transparency index remaining low(particularly on its defence doctrine). I don't think people had trouble accepting US as super power( when the transition happened after second world war ).

Thanks...


Socialism in China and the CCP was founded as a reaction (amongst other things) towards foreign incursion and what the Chinese saw as aggressive tendencies from colonial and imperial powers. As such, one of the tenets of the PRC, was a promise to resist imperialist power and never become one ourselves. This was the reason trotted out during the Korean war (the war of resisting American imperialism), the Vietnam war, and was still often mentioned even later.

As communist ideals weaken and China undergoes a transformation from a "people's democracy" as Joe put it to a "liberal democracy", the aversion to imperialism and expansionist aggression might be left by the road side. As such there will only be left the public's resistances to war based on whatever other grounds.


This I think is the irony that Joe touched upon when he said

Instead of welcoming the orderly nature and eminently predictable nature of people's democracy, these neighbours have been aping the US line without even a slight thought towards the inevitable consequences

It is well for some people to decry communism and cheer democracy but to do so without understanding and a bit of careful reflection is foolhardy. Nevertheless I expect the Chinese people to act rationally and calmly whatever comes in the future. (we know first hand the dangers of unbridled righteousness and ideological fervour, read the great proletarians cultural revolution)
 
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