India-Pakistan Military CBMs project
Phase 1
Final Report
I. Introduction
The India-Pakistan military CBMs project held meetings in Dubai from 20-21 November 2011;
Bangkok from 23-25 February 2012; and Lahore from 23-25 September 2012. Additionally,
smaller, working group meetings took place in Chiang Mai on 21 April 2012, and Palo Alto from
30-31 July 2012. This report will summarise the main conclusions of the discussions. Appended
to it is a proposal on the Siachen issue.
II. General Political Situation
The project held several discussions of the general situation, both in the region and bilaterally,
and how this affects the prospects for progress on the CBM file. It was reported that the
relationship between the two countries is going through a relatively positive phase. Diplomatic
and business contacts are improving across a range of issues. At the same time, suspicions
remain concerning each sides view of the others objectives and alleged actions in Afghanistan,
and in the area of military doctrines and deployments.
There has been another round of Track 1 discussions on both conventional and nuclear CBMs,
but both sides found it disappointing. The 2007 accord Reducing Risk Relating to Nuclear
Weapons has been renewed for another five years. However, there was no progress on other
proposals to develop new CBMs. In contrast, some participants pointed to lower profile
examples of confidence-building measures at work between the two countries. For example,
when there was an inadvertent helicopter crossing of the LOC into Pakistan, the matter was
managed quickly and effectively.
Some participants expressed fear that political, technical and doctrinal changes on both sides are
compressing the time available for decision-making in a future crisis with potentially serious
consequences. It was felt that crisis mitigation mechanisms beyond the current CBMs are
needed. This led to a discussion of the growing interplay between sub-conventional,
conventional, and nuclear issues, with many expressing the concern that they were being linked
in dangerous ways which will foster escalation in a crisis. The growing pressure of the media
and other societal changes could make it difficult to resist pressures to escalate in a crisis. This
led to a discussion over the need to prevent rapid escalation of future crises, and over possible
CBMs to this effect, which will be reflected later in this report.
Participants then noted that current political trends in each country do not favour the negotiation
of far-reaching CBMs and agreements. Each government is preoccupied and is likely to remain
so for some time. It was noted that the propensity on both sides to "wait and see" dissuades
either from considering far-reaching changes to its doctrines or policies. Against these points,
some participants indicated that sweeping changes are underway on both sides, which undermine 2
the "wait and see" view. It was generally agreed that there is a need to find ways out of the
present situation whereby each side wants to discuss different things and feels it can wait if the
other is not prepared to come to the table.
In this context, it was agreed that the role of Track 2 is not to track Track 1 but to push ahead
of it and explore ideas that cannot yet be discussed officially and develop proposals for
consideration by the official level.
III. Status of Existing CBMs
The project reviewed the status of existing CBMs between the two countries. Based on
presentations from the two sides, it was agreed that the main existing military CBMs are:
DGMO Hotline
Non-attack on nuclear facilities (1988)
Advance notice of military exercises and maneuvers (1991)
Prevention of Airspace Violations (1991)
Link between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (2005)
Informal ceasefire along LOC/AGPL (2003)
Joint patrolling along the international border and periodic flag meetings. Non
development of new posts
Biannual meeting between Indian border security forces and Pakistani Rangers (2004)
Advance notice of Ballistic Missile tests (2005)
In discussions, the following was agreed with respect to each of these CBMs:
On the DGMO Hotline, it was agreed that this is working well, though thought should be given
to making sure the interactions through this channel are both more frequent and substantive.
There was discussion of how the idea of this agreement could be extended to other areas, which
will be reflected in the following section of this report.
On the agreement on Non-attacks on Nuclear Facilities, it was agreed that this CBM is working
well. It was noted that the CBM was agreed before the two sides became declared nuclear
powers and some wondered if the agreement could be extended to cover military nuclear sites,
thereby making it into a form of reassurance vis a vis counterforce agreement. The majority
took the view that this is not possible in the present environment and any effort to do so now
might jeopardise a useful agreement.
On the Advance Notification of Military exercises and manoeuvres agreement it was noted
that this CBM works well, but could be improved in its implementation in several ways. There
was, for example, discussion over whether the levels of notification of exercises (Division level
exercises) are appropriate in light of military developments since the agreement was signed in
1991. There was no consensus, but it was suggested that the two sides could review this. Some
participants questioned whether all relevant commands and officers on both sides were
sufficiently aware of this agreement, particularly in the Navies and the Air Forces. It was 3
suggested that the two governments take steps to make sure that the requirements and
circumstances for such notifications are broadly circulated and written into SOP.
On the Prevention of airspace violations agreement, there was a lengthy discussion of how this
CBM might be improved in light of developments since it was signed in 1991. In particular, the
increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles by both sides was noted, as was the fact that both
sides will soon likely be using armed UAVs. While most were reluctant to open up this existing
CBM to further negotiation for fear it might be compromised in the process, there was consensus
that the two countries could explore whether a separate CBM is necessary to prevent potential
airspace incidents involving UAVs, drawing upon the form and content of the existing document
as appropriate.
On the agreement to establish electronic communications Links between the Pakistan
Maritime Security Agency and the Indian Coast Guard, it was noted that the electronic links
had worked well between 2005 and 2010 and been useful. Despite an agreement being signed to
continue these links until 2016, they had fallen into disuse. It was noted with approval that this
situation was corrected recently. In pursuance of the MOU signed between the two countries in
2005, the DG Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and DG Indian Coastguard have been meeting
annually. The last meeting was held in July 2012 during which discussions were held on
maritime issues, particularly working out mechanisms on inadvertent line crossers at sea
(fishermen).
On the Informal ceasefire along the LOC/AGPL it was agreed especially among participants
with past command experience in the region that this CBM works quite well. There was
discussion of the value of formalising the CBM, but many felt that doing so would be difficult
politically right now and any attempt to do so could risk the CBM itself.
On Joint patrolling along the international border and the non-development of new border
posts it was agreed that this CBM works well. There was agreement that the re-negotiation of a
broader CBM which sets some ground rules for activities along the international border which
are not covered by this CBM should be explored.
On the Biannual meeting between the Heads of the Indian Border Security Force and the
Pakistan Rangers, it was agreed that this CBM works well and should not be changed.
Finally, on the CBM on Advance notification of Ballistic missile tests it was agreed that this
CBM should be modified to include cruise missiles (as also recommended by the Ottawa
Dialogue on nuclear issues).
IV. Proposed, but not yet implemented CBMs
Several CBMs which have been proposed between the two sides, but not yet agreed, were
identified. These are:
A Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement;4
The development of a Pakistan Air Force-Indian Air Force Communications link and of a
Communications link between the two navies;
Exchange of military delegations and also participation of senior military officers in
seminars;
Mil-to-mil exchanges and cultural activities (such as: exchanges of guest speakers;
visits by military bands; sports teams and adventure activities);
Quarterly flag meetings between sector commanders along the LOC; and
Speedy return of inadvertent line crossers.
On the Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement it was noted that this CBM was called for in
the Memorandum to the Lahore Declaration of 1999. It was further noted that a separate Track
Two between retired senior naval officers has worked on this for many years and developed a
proposed text. This was shared with the two governments some time ago and became the basis
for an official exchange between them. Our information is that the two sides had certain
observations on the text, but currently the process of developing an agreement for signature
seems to be stalled. There was unanimous agreement that the two Governments should revisit
this issue, to find out why the process seems to have stalled and to agree and sign an agreement
as quickly as possible.
On The development of a Pakistan Air Force-Indian Air Force Communications link and of
a Communications link between the two navies it was agreed that this is necessary and that
CBMs should be put in place to facilitate such contacts. It was agreed that these new
communications links should not be seen primarily as hotlines and that the existing DGMO
hotline should continue to be the primary channel to serve that purpose in the event of crisis. But
these new links would facilitate the sharing of information between the Air Forces and Navies
which is specific to their interests.
On the Exchange of military delegations and also participation of senior military officers in
seminars it was agreed that this should go forward as quickly as possible. An agreement to this
effect should be signed. Exchanges could start at the institutional level with Staff Colleges and
National Defence University/Colleges, and then be expanded to include specific positions, such
as Vice-Chiefs. Also, regular face-to-face meetings of the DGMOs could take place, to
supplement their regular phone calls.
On Mil-to-mil exchanges and cultural activities (such as: exchanges of guest speakers;
visits by military bands; sports team and adventure activities), there was an in-depth
discussion. It was noted that this CBM would tend to extend contacts between officers and
enlisted personnel on both sides. Some wondered if this should be done at this stage at the
military level before civilian cultural exchanges are on a better footing, while others felt it should
be. The majority felt that such contacts should go ahead though this CBM requires further study.
On the quarterly flag meetings between sector commanders along the LOC, such a CBM is
under consideration and has been discussed at the official level. This group believes that such a
CBM will further enhance trust and provide an opportunity to address tactical issues at local
levels.5
Finally, on the speedy return of inadvertent line crossers, once again this CBM is
consideration and has been discussed at the official level. This group believes that such an
agreement will contribute to the building of trust, to stability, and will help alleviate the hardship
experienced by those who inadvertently cross the line.
V. Siachen and Sir Creek
The project had significant discussions, and developed a proposal on the Siachen issue. The
proposal is attached.
On Sir Creek, it was reported that progress has been made in recent years in the form of a joint
hydrographic survey in 2007 which has established an agreed ground truth on the present
geographical disposition of the area.
However, there continues to be significant disagreement over where the boundary should be
located. India argues for a "mid-channel" approach, while Pakistan cites the "green line". It was
agreed that the difference between the two will have a significant impact on progress of the
delimitation of the maritime boundary. It is encouraging to note that talks have been going on
between the two countries on a more or less annual basis. During the 11th round of talks in May
2011, both sides agreed to exchanged non-papers on Sir Creek. In the 12th round of talks of the
joint Working Group in New Delhi in June 2012, certain suggestions were made by both parties
but there was no consensus. Finding a solution to the Sir Creek issue is of paramount importance
as it has a direct bearing on resolving the maritime boundary.
It was agreed that the ultimate solution of this issue will be a political question.
The group will conduct further studies on this issue.
VI. Crisis stability
Discussion over this issue revealed a consensus view that crisis stability is a key issue and that
technologies, doctrines and political/media forces are evolving in ways which compress the time
available during a crisis for diplomacy to defuse tensions and prevent conflict.
There was agreement that a useful area for CBMs in the short to medium term is the elaboration
of a framework for crisis management to provide the two sides with some agreed steps that can
be taken to prevent a crisis from spinning out of control; referred to by one participant as
providing a longer fuse in a crisis situation. To that end there was consensus that an
interlocking network of CBMs should be developed which, in the event of a crisis, would:
Require a political commitment that diplomats and officials from each side come
together at the outset of the crisis for discussions on how to resolve it;
Require that, in times of crisis, both sides should take no military actions and adhere to
existing CBMs; and
Discussions should begin as soon as possible on new CBMs relevant in these
circumstances.6
It was agreed by consensus that discussions should also commence at an early date to review
existing CBMs, such as the Agreement on Advance Notification of Military Exercises and
Manoeuvres, with a view to updating them in light of technical and political developments since
they were first signed.
Further, it was agreed by consensus that a CBM should be agreed whereby both sides, including
their respective military establishments, should regularly meet to discuss their respective
concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures to build confidence in the nuclear
and conventional fields.
Some participants argued that the only way to finally overcome these problems is through
changed mind-sets on both sides as to the possible use of military force, including sub-state
actors. All participants felt that CBMs should be designed which would seek to constrain the
possibility that force could be used to resolve disputes. Some felt that one way to resolve such
issues would be through the creation of a "No War Pact." Others, while not necessarily
disagreeing with this analysis, believed that changed mind-sets are too far away and that
managing the existing situation so that conflict does not happen by accident is a more realistic
goal.
Participants in this project agreed that this issue requires further study and agreed that the project
will consider ways to develop mechanisms for crisis prevention and management.
VII. Terrorism
Indian and Pakistani participants shared their respective perspectives on terrorism. All
participants agreed that it was a major issue which needed to be effectively addressed.
In terms of military-to-military CBMs in this area, there was consensus that one possible
measure would be real time sharing of information on cross-border movement.
Beyond military CBMs, it was recognised that intelligence-sharing is a key issue. It should be
noted that information is being shared on lists of terror groups which both sides wish to see
stopped but cooperation on investigations regarding these groups should be more intensive and
transparent.
Other suggestions included:
The creation of a hotline between the interior ministries on terror issues;
An effort to revive the SAARC mandated Integrated Regional Data-base on terror;
Discussions between respective officials on national experiences on such matters as legal
frameworks to deal with terror;
Greater maritime cooperation on terror; and
Exchanges of views between the immigration, border services and customs authorities on
both sides.7
It was agreed by project participants that this issue is an important area for future work. Thus,
they have agreed to carry out a series of intensive studies on various aspects of the question,
including:
Study on the Joint Anti-terrorism Mechanism (what was the experience of negotiating it,
why did it not succeed at the time and could it be revived and improved today?)
Bring together legal and law enforcement experts from both sides to study the legal
frameworks for dealing with terror and make suggestions.
Study on models of regional, bilateral and international cooperation in dealing with
terror.
Study on how to prevent future attacks and what to do to prevent escalation through
effective crisis management mechanisms should such attacks occur.
VIII. Conclusion and Way Ahead
At the meeting in Lahore, the group discussed and adopted this report and further discussed the
way ahead for its work. It was agreed that this report will be made public in the hopes that it will
stimulate further discussion of these issues.
The co-chairs of the process, General Karamat and ACM Tyagi, will provide this report to their
respective governments.
The Lahore meeting constitutes the final meeting of Phase 1 of this project. However, the
participants are of the view that there remains useful work for them to do on issues such as
terror; Sir Creek; bridging the trust deficit; and crisis stability. They therefore agreed that a
Phase 2 will be launched and asked the University of Ottawa and the South Asia Center of the
Atlantic Council to undertake to do so.
The participants expressed their thanks to the sponsors of this process: the Near East and South
Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defence University; and the US Institute of
Peace. They also expressed their thanks to the University of Ottawa and the South Asia Center
of the Atlantic Council for their work in organising the meetings.
List of participants:
Co-chairs:
General Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan Army Retd)
Air Chief Marshal Shashi Tyagi (Indian Air Force Retd)
Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal (Pakistan Army, Retd)
Rana Banerji (former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, India)
Air Vice Marshal Shahzad Chaudhry (Pakistan Air Force, Retd)
Lieutenant General (Retd) Tariq Ghazi (former Defense Secretary of Pakistan)
Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi (Pakistan Foreign Service, Retd)
Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Indian Army, Retd)8
Ambassador Vivek Katju (Indian Foreign Service, Retd)
Ambassador Aziz Khan (Pakistan Foreign Service, Retd)
Admiral Tariq Khan (Pakistan Navy, Retd)
Ambassador Riaz Khan (former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan)
General Tariq Majid (Pakistan Army, Retd)
Ambassador Lalit Mansingh (former Foreign Secretary of India)
Lieutenant General BS Pawar (Indian Army, Retd)
Major General Qasim Qureshi (Pakistan Army, Retd)
Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Indian Army, Retd)
Ajai Shukla (Journalist)
Vice Admiral A.K. Singh (Indian Navy, Retd)
Lieutenant General Aditya Singh (Indian Army, Retd)
Lieutenant General Arvinder Singh Lamba (Indian Army, Retd)
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Above two posts are track-2 negotiations reports...
