India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[PanzerKiel]

A word about AD as well....

Fighting an air war with hot AD assets on ground requires precise coordination, good C2, complete picture of battlefield, hard training... And what not..

Very few countries have the requisite practical experience of this.... In my opinion Soviets and Russians have to their intense cold War experience, and North Vietnam which faced the US Air might.... And maybe Yugoslavia in the late 90s during the NATO bombing.... Egyptians and Syrians as well....

Rest all countries, Pakistan and India included.... Despite having potent AD weapons, do not have the requisite experience and knowhow of operating in a dense air environment..... And then, obviously, fearing fratricide, they normally allow one of them, either air force or AD elements, to engage.

 

[Nilgiri]

You qualified your observation by referring to the situation as a one-off, but it is still objectionable. Does that mean that there is NO defence possible? That horse won't run.

I'll come to this a bit later maybe. I have veered off into entirely different thoughts now that I will need to let settle down and I need some sleep too soon.

You are correct, its still very inexcusable showing....given whats been arrayed and developed these days especially. It must be looked into in the strongest way possible. It should serve as a big wake up call and kick up the rear, especially if you engaged the first action.

 

[rockstarIN]

I have been waiting for @jbgt90 to fill in the details,and hope that he is back in station. His details are likely to be accurate and current. @Hellfire might also have helped, but I cannot trace him any longer.

@notorious_eagle

Hellfire confirmed that AWACS were on station.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@notorious_eagle

Hellfire confirmed that AWACS were on station.

Is that a fact?

Really disappointed.

@PanzerKiel @Nilgiri @jbgt90

I'll come to this a bit later maybe. I have veered off into entirely different thoughts now that I will need to let settle down and I need some sleep too soon.

You are correct, its still very inexcusable showing....given whats been arrayed and developed these days especially. It must be looked into in the strongest way possible. It should serve as a big wake up call and kick up the rear, especially if you engaged the first action.

You go off to sleep, we'll talk later. Trust @PanzerKiel to put his finger on the sore spots, one after the other, with metronomic regularity.

PS: @jbgt90 has a very detailed and clear overview of equipment available for the beefing up of the IN, but he should say his say. I feel the IN needs to review its doctrine first, and decide its priorities before writing another cheque. The bottoms can come later.

 

[rockstarIN]

s that a fact?

Really disappointed.

@PanzerKiel @Nilgiri @jbgt90

It was flying over Punjab and started moving to near the theatre once the action started. The battlefield was controlled from the ground as the first detection and further handling were from Ground and no hand over in-between to AWACS. Further reinforcements (Mig-29s & MKIs) were vectored by AWACS but PAF were long gone deep inside by the time they reached there.[/QUOTE]

 

[Joe Shearer]

With the indulgence of other contributors, the analysis of the lessons learnt from 1947-48 is being concluded here. First, with regard to the original actions, what were the take-aways? Second, what are the logistics and infrastructural failings shown by these actions? Third, in what ways might the Indian Army re-think the way it fights wars, after looking at solely the actions of 1947-48?

The mutiny of the Gilgit Scouts, led by the British citizen, Major Alexander Brown, in August 1947 (?), and their seizing control of Gilgit, ambushing and neutralising State Forces, and attacking down the roadways into Baltistan and onwards into Ladakh (Leh); they were supported by lashkars deputed to their support, but quickly dispensed with; they were opposed by the State Forces that held out in Skardu for a year without relief and reinforcement, and by the regular Indian Army, that opened up Zoji La, relieved Leh and re-captured Kargil.

So far we looked at the account narrated by @PanzerKiel in terms of the uprising of the Sudans, their capture of Muzaffarabad and Rajauri, their siege of Poonch, their declaration of independence, their feting of the tribal lashkars passing through to Baramula, and the armed insurgency that they waged against the Kashmir State Forces, later, against the Indian Army.

The third pulse was the Gilgit Scouts actions, that took them, on foot, all the way to Leh.

What emerges from this third 'pulse' is that a cutting edge formation that outruns its logistics has in reality achieved nothing; all of its glorious gains must be given up before too long. The Scouts and their associated troops marched uphill to Skardu, a march of nearly 200 kms on foot, and uphill 700 metres, from 1500 metres above sea level to 2230 metres above sea level. After this march, completed in 10 days' time, they besieged Skardu.

Skardu had been reinforced at the last moment by a Major in the State Forces service from his original location at Leh, and around 200 others. They travelled from Leh to Skardu, around 300 kms, in the dead of winter, over roads that were tracks and were not considered motorable. This garrison held out for six months; during this entire period, there were attempts to relieve the garrison, but it is difficult to believe that any effort was made that could have overcome the fairly modest resources of the besiegers. At the end, the garrison surrendered; the Major (promoted Lt. Col.) was kept alive due to his personal sporting relationship with General Gracey, and the others were executed.

The point is that there was no attempt at reinforcing this besieging group during the siege, and after the siege, opposing forces reached only as far as Kargil, so there was never anything to shake the hold of the Scouts on Skardu.

The Scouts had divided themselves into three columns, Ibex, Tiger and Eskimo. I am confused about the role of Major Jarral who has been mentioned on PDF; my information says that he was posted to command Tiger Force to capture Gurez, but that on Gurez falling to the Indian Army, this column retreated to Minimarg. If he was involved so heavily in the capture of Zoji La and its defence, he must have been in charge of Eskimo Force.

To get back to the narrative, the Indian Army managed to air transport Stuart tanks up to Srinagar in dismantled condition,assemble them, and then make their precarious way along the very difficult track from Sonamarg to Zoji La. (to be cont.)

 

[PanzerKiel]

With the indulgence of other contributors, the analysis of the lessons learnt from 1947-48 is being concluded here. First, with regard to the original actions, what were the take-aways? Second, what are the logistics and infrastructural failings shown by these actions? Third, in what ways might the Indian Army re-think the way it fights wars, after looking at solely the actions of 1947-48?







What emerges from this third 'pulse' is that a cutting edge formation that outruns its logistics has in reality achieved nothing; all of its glorious gains must be given up before too long. The Scouts and their associated troops marched uphill to Skardu, a march of nearly 200 kms on foot, and uphill 700 metres, from 1500 metres above sea level to 2230 metres above sea level. After this march, completed in 10 days' time, they besieged Skardu.

Skardu had been reinforced at the last moment by a Major in the State Forces service from his original location at Leh, and around 200 others. They travelled from Leh to Skardu, around 300 kms, in the dead of winter, over roads that were tracks and were not considered motorable. This garrison held out for six months; during this entire period, there were attempts to relieve the garrison, but it is difficult to believe that any effort was made that could have overcome the fairly modest resources of the besiegers. At the end, the garrison surrendered; the Major (promoted Lt. Col.) was kept alive due to his personal sporting relationship with General Gracey, and the others were executed.

The point is that there was no attempt at reinforcing this besieging group during the siege, and after the siege, opposing forces reached only as far as Kargil, so there was never anything to shake the hold of the Scouts on Skardu.

The Scouts had divided themselves into three columns, Ibex, Tiger and Eskimo. I am confused about the role of Major Jarral who has been mentioned on PDF; my information says that he was posted to command Tiger Force to capture Gurez, but that on Gurez falling to the Indian Army, this column retreated to Minimarg. If he was involved so heavily in the capture of Zoji La and its defence, he must have been in charge of Eskimo Force.

To get back to the narrative, the Indian Army managed to air transport Stuart tanks up to Srinagar in dismantled condition,assemble them, and then make their precarious way along the very difficult track from Sonamarg to Zoji La. (to be cont.)

Excellent....
Logistics..... Operations can't continue on captured food and ammo...
Follow up forces to consolidate your success and secure the ground already captured....
Mules required to enable troops to carry mortars, MGs, and light artillery...
Winter clothing...
Dumping on your posts, because once they are attacked, no reinforcements or supplies will reach you for days or even weeks...

 

[notorious_eagle]

@notorious_eagle

Hellfire confirmed that AWACS were on station.

That's deeply disappointing on part of IAF if they only had one AWAC Airborne. On a side note, i think IAF is in desperate need of additional AWACS. For India's geographic size, it needs AWACS in the double digits to cover China, Pakistan and the Mighty Sea.

Pakistan despite its size now has 11 AWACS online.

It was flying over Punjab and started moving to near the theatre once the action started. The battlefield was controlled from the ground as the first detection and further handling were from Ground and no hand over in-between to AWACS. Further reinforcements (Mig-29s & MKIs) were vectored by AWACS but PAF were long gone deep inside by the time they reached there.

[/QUOTE]

One AWAC airborne . Why was the other AWAC not airborne if the third was being kept as a reserve?

I would love to learn more about India's C4I capabilities. I haven't found any good source so please feel free to share any source that you might come across.

A fantastic piece on Pakistan's C4I capabilities @rockstarIN @Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @Nilgiri

https://quwa.org/2016/03/08/pakistans-c4isr-introduction-overview-part-1/
https://quwa.org/2016/03/15/pakistans-c4isr-part-2-land-airborne-surveillance-systems/
https://quwa.org/2016/03/17/pakistans-c4isr-part-3-intelligence-reconnaissance/
https://quwa.org/2016/03/27/pakistans-c4isr-part-4-communications-data-links/

 

[rockstarIN]

That's deeply disappointing on part of IAF if they only had one AWAC Airborne. On a side note, i think IAF is in desperate need of additional AWACS. For India's geographic size, it needs AWACS in the double digits to cover China, Pakistan and the Mighty Sea.

Pakistan despite its size now has 11 AWACS online.

Not really, It was said to be around Jalandhar.

Check Falcon's tracking range with 450 km. It is covering well areas including Part of Rajastan, entire punjab & J&K.

 

[Cuirassier]

The Scouts had divided themselves into three columns, Ibex, Tiger and Eskimo. I am confused about the role of Major Jarral who has been mentioned on PDF; my information says that he was posted to command Tiger Force to capture Gurez, but that on Gurez falling to the Indian Army, this column retreated to Minimarg. If he was involved so heavily in the capture of Zoji La and its defence, he must have been in charge of Eskimo Force.

The conqueror of Zoji La, Major(R) Mohammed Khan Jarral(Deceased) got commission on 28th March 1942 from Indian Military academy (IMA), Dehra Doon. During 2nd World War, he served with the 2nd Jammu & Kashmir Rifles and went to Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Lebonan and Palestine. On partition he was appointed Adjutant Gilgit Scouts, on 8th August 1947 at Gilgit.
Zoji La was captured by Major Mohammed Khan Jarral on July 7, 1948. When the Liberation War of the Northern Areas started in 1947-48, he joined hands with the Muslim feedom fighters against Maharaja Hari Singh's rule.He was given the command of a combined force consisting of "A" and "B" wings of the Gilgit Scouts with the task of capturing Zoji La and then if possible to advance towards Sonamarg and Srinagar. Major Jarral during the early outset of the Kashmir Liberation War captured Bunji in the last week of October, 1947 and liberated Astore area down to Gurez by the middle of November, 1947. He attacked the Sakardu Fort during the night of 11/12 Feburary, 1948. He ambushed and defeated the first Indian Relief Column lead by Brigadier Faqir Singh at Thorgopari, 15 miles south of Sakardu- Srinagar Road, on 17th March, 1948. The action of Thorgopari paved the way for Captain Jarral's subsequent successes in Baltistan area. He again ambushed and dislodged and humiliated the 2nd Indian Relief Column known as Indian Z-Brigade lead by Brigader Sanporan Singh at Parkuta.
The enemy now knew that he was up against the determined men of Major Jarral's Force. Two Indian Generals, Thimayya and Srinagesh, were personally present with Brigader Atal during planning and mounting of an attack at Zoji La. It shows the great importance the Indians gave to it. Captain Jarral had built up the defences well and the credit goes to his ingenuity in organising his positions in such a manner that the enemy could not capture even the outlying bunkers and trenches. On June 12,1948 Major Jarral lead an attack on the two forward Indian companies at Khoru and Gumri. On June 22, Jarral's men made a surprise dawn attack on the pickets. The enemy called in aircrafts to bomb and strafe the area. A hand-to hand fight started. The enemy was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy casualties. A few other pickets were similarly attacked and captured. Simultaneously, Major Jarral was working his way up along the main axis and when the Patiala's realized that their rear was threatened, they withdrew in a disorder. The battle lasted for twenty days and Zoji La was captured on July 7,1948 by Captain Mohammed Khan Jarral. The enemy lost about 400 men and large quantities of ammunition and other stores fell into the hands of Jarral's Force.
It is also very interesting to put on record that Major Jarral defeated General Srinagesh who was his former company commander at IMA Dehra Doon from where he got King's Commission. Major Jarral's courage and bravery against all the odds completely changed the whole scenario of the Liberation War of Northern Areas in 1947-48.
Major(R) Mohammed Khan Jarral passed away in October 2008 in Mirpur (AK) at the age of 90 and is buriied at Chitar Pari, Mirpur

 

[Joe Shearer]

Excellent....
Logistics..... Operations can't continue on captured food and ammo...
Follow up forces to consolidate your success and secure the ground already captured....
Mules required to enable troops to carry mortars, MGs, and light artillery...
Winter clothing...
Dumping on your posts, because once they are attacked, no reinforcements or supplies will reach you for days or even weeks...

LOL.

You have this annoying habit of summarising things into tight precis formats that leave no space for any long-winded Poona Colonel stories of the sort that I like to weave (I am saying this with the greatest admiration, and, if it is not misunderstood, with the greatest affection for one of the sharpest minds I have had the pleasure to encounter).

Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.

 

[PanzerKiel]

LOL.

You have this annoying habit of summarising things into tight precis formats that leave no space for any long-winded Poona Colonel stories of the sort that I like to weave (I am saying this with the greatest admiration, and, if it is not misunderstood, with the greatest affection for one of the sharpest minds I have had the pleasure to encounter).

Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.

Actually, I just summarized conclusions from your first part only ..... Was waiting for your next part....

Brevity, somehow, remains the hallmark of our profession.

 

[PanzerKiel]

LOL.

You have this annoying habit of summarising things into tight precis formats that leave no space for any long-winded Poona Colonel stories of the sort that I like to weave (I am saying this with the greatest admiration, and, if it is not misunderstood, with the greatest affection for one of the sharpest minds I have had the pleasure to encounter).

Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.

Or shall we take on 1965 now...what do you think?

With the indulgence of other contributors, the analysis of the lessons learnt from 1947-48 is being concluded here. First, with regard to the original actions, what were the take-aways? Second, what are the logistics and infrastructural failings shown by these actions? Third, in what ways might the Indian Army re-think the way it fights wars, after looking at solely the actions of 1947-48?







What emerges from this third 'pulse' is that a cutting edge formation that outruns its logistics has in reality achieved nothing; all of its glorious gains must be given up before too long. The Scouts and their associated troops marched uphill to Skardu, a march of nearly 200 kms on foot, and uphill 700 metres, from 1500 metres above sea level to 2230 metres above sea level. After this march, completed in 10 days' time, they besieged Skardu.

Skardu had been reinforced at the last moment by a Major in the State Forces service from his original location at Leh, and around 200 others. They travelled from Leh to Skardu, around 300 kms, in the dead of winter, over roads that were tracks and were not considered motorable. This garrison held out for six months; during this entire period, there were attempts to relieve the garrison, but it is difficult to believe that any effort was made that could have overcome the fairly modest resources of the besiegers. At the end, the garrison surrendered; the Major (promoted Lt. Col.) was kept alive due to his personal sporting relationship with General Gracey, and the others were executed.

The point is that there was no attempt at reinforcing this besieging group during the siege, and after the siege, opposing forces reached only as far as Kargil, so there was never anything to shake the hold of the Scouts on Skardu.

The Scouts had divided themselves into three columns, Ibex, Tiger and Eskimo. I am confused about the role of Major Jarral who has been mentioned on PDF; my information says that he was posted to command Tiger Force to capture Gurez, but that on Gurez falling to the Indian Army, this column retreated to Minimarg. If he was involved so heavily in the capture of Zoji La and its defence, he must have been in charge of Eskimo Force.

To get back to the narrative, the Indian Army managed to air transport Stuart tanks up to Srinagar in dismantled condition,assemble them, and then make their precarious way along the very difficult track from Sonamarg to Zoji La. (to be cont.)

Maj Jarral was there at Zoji La during the first phase of INdian attacks, he was then rotated.

That's deeply disappointing on part of IAF if they only had one AWAC Airborne. On a side note, i think IAF is in desperate need of additional AWACS. For India's geographic size, it needs AWACS in the double digits to cover China, Pakistan and the Mighty Sea.

Pakistan despite its size now has 11 AWACS online.
/

To sum up, IAF may be regarded at highly unbalanced......I mean they may have lot many fighters to show off, but then they do not have the corresponding number of EW / support aircraft to synergize the effects of all these assets and bring the strength of IAF on the battlefield.

Regarding the Air Rescue, we performed like the Keystone Cops. Believe me, no civilian project would have gone into action with such unpreparedness.

Pulwama incident happened on 14 Feb, IAF went in on 26.....i mean IAF had fully 11 days to prepare the response, and prepare for PAF response as well....one wonders what they were doing for all these 11 days.

 

[Joe Shearer]

LOL.

You have this annoying habit of summarising things into tight precis formats that leave no space for any long-winded Poona Colonel stories of the sort that I like to weave (I am saying this with the greatest admiration, and, if it is not misunderstood, with the greatest affection for one of the sharpest minds I have had the pleasure to encounter).

Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.

Actually, I just summarized conclusions from your first part only ..... Was waiting for your next part....

Brevity, somehow, remains the hallmark of our profession.

What has emerged from the close look at operations in Kashmir in 1947-48 are these three very broad-brush conclusions, that are so broad as to offer few or no operational guidelines specific to the sector; however, for whatever they are worth, they seem to be

1. What the Indian Army has been doing in the eastern sector is as applicable, if not more, in the equally mountainous and equally thickly forested slopes of the Vale of Kashmir and its outer slopes. It needs to hone its small-unit jungle- and mountain-warfare skills. In addition, it must allow the border guards to shoulder their share of the burden, and withdraw a few kilometres. This will allow them to reduce their numbers, once released from the mechanical coverage of the entire frontage, but will demand the equipment for very quick, very strong reactions.
2. It need not worry about irregulars; it should continue to worry about regulars dressed and deployed as irregulars. That is now part of the DNA of the force that they oppose, and they need to address this issue firmly.
3. It needs to drastically improve its logistics, and ensure that all roads are 'redundant'; there must always be two, preferably even three ways to get from A to B, throughout the sector.

That touches upon, but does not focus upon the very serious role that logistics plays in this sector, where troops are at the end of a very long line of communications, and even the slightest dislocation can give rise to sleepless nights for the commanders.

In general, a useful approach to logistics will be to build circular roads around the Vale at contour lines at increasing heights. This will reduce a substantial amount of friction between civilians and the military convoys that seek to share the existing roads; these run right through thickly populated areas, and the security measures taken during convoy passage do not find friends anywhere in the Vale.

That is within the Vale. Outside it, there need to be more of the road-building that is mentioned so frequently nowadays: the Durbok-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road, for instance, but many more like it. There is automatically a need to build in two other features - one is a close vigilance over these roads, to stop Lawrence of Arabia theatrics, and the second is very careful joint planning with ecological experts. Even a cursory look at the map will reveal that there are serious economies to be achieved.

• Manali to Dras via Keylong is 564 kms; Dalhousie to Dras, as the crow flies, is 210 kms.;
• Kishtwar to Dras is hardly 120 kms.
• Manali to Kargil is 500 kms.; as the crow flies, it is 275 kms.

One can go on and on, but this will offer a quick heads-up into the role of communications in the supply chain.

With that, it is time to look afresh at the Indian Army and its role in future, specifically in the boundaries of the old state of Jammu and Kashmir. (to be cont.)

Or shall we take on 1965 now...what do you think?

I will finish in two small posts, of which one is already up.

Maj Jarral was there at Zoji La during the first phase of INdian attacks, he was then rotated.

I see. That makes sense of the whole thing.

To sum up, IAF may be regarded at highly unbalanced......I mean they may have lot many fighters to show off, but then they do not have the corresponding number of EW / support aircraft to synergize the effects of all these assets and bring the strength of IAF on the battlefield.

My take is that they haven't put their toys together into an integrated battle management system. All these gadgets and facilities have to be used. Now. Instead, people have procured these, and are now sitting in talk shows on television explaining what these weapons do.

What we had was more than enough to cover the ground of the entire episode.

[/quote]Pulwama incident happened on 14 Feb, IAF went in on 26.....i mean IAF had fully 11 days to prepare the response, and prepare for PAF response as well....one wonders what they were doing for all these 11 days.[/QUOTE]

Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.

Coming to the last point relating to 47-48, what should the Indian Army be looking at, given these memories and war histories?

1. The present division of responsibility between XIV, XV and XVI Corps is all right, BUT your #77 made a very fundamental point: we cannot switch formations from one end to the other. So XIV Corps has to be detached from Northern Command, and attached to a different Theatre, running from
   1. Daulat Beg Oldie to Bareilly in UP, from
   2. Bareilly to Kishanganj in Bihar, from
   3. Kishanganj to Tezpore in Assam, and from
   4. Tezpore to Walong (not really; the correct point of assembly and coordination should be Dibrugarh or Jorhat)
2. XV and XVI Corps need to take stock, and use their paramilitary front rank effectively, to release regular troops from duty on the borders guarding lines and boundaries. There is no space to dwell on this in this summary.
3. Northern Command, with these two Corps, needs to identify missions that it will seek to execute at appropriate times, both in war-time and in the conditions of low-level conflict that prevail during peace-time.
   1. These might include the expansion of the footprint forward of Turtuk;
   2. The constant vigilance over Haji Pir Pass, whose recapture can make a significant difference in reducing vulnerability of the sector;
   3. The sealing off of the Akhnoor salient;
   4. The dog that barked at night.
4. These objectives cannot be met by putting together an ad-hoc force at short notice, but must be a thoroughly well-planned exercise, with ample options for the event that for each mission, the PA will throw a spanner in the works as soon as it possibly can.

With that, I put myself at the disposal of the contributors to move on to the 1965 conflict.

 

[notorious_eagle]

Not really, It was said to be around Jalandhar.

Check Falcon's tracking range with 450 km. It is covering well areas including Part of Rajastan, entire punjab & J&K.

View attachment 635964

Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored. Another point i just thought of now, the SU30MKI's were in the sector as per PAF and they have very potent radars. I am curious to see why didn't the BARS pick up PAF's strike package?

As i said, a lot depends on IAF's C4I coverage. I have been trying to research online but haven't found much on this topic. In addition, if the Western front requires 3 Phalcons for IAF, who's going to be covering the North sector against China?