India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[Joe Shearer]

Reminds me of Sentry Challenging procedure....

I was pulling his leg about that! The challenge is usually rendered, "HoogoDya!" it is not clear if the sentry knows what he is saying. I don't know the current Hindi version, if there is one.

PS: May I start on the 1965 conflict? As you have seen, it takes me time, and I am unable to function between 11 in the morning and around 4 or 5 in the evening.

 

[PanzerKiel]

I was pulling his leg about that! The challenge is usually rendered, "HoogoDya!" it is not clear if the sentry knows what he is saying. I don't know the current Hindi version, if there is one.

I think the correct wording which goes which what you have highlighted is ...."Who goes there"......transformed into HoogoDya

 

[VCheng]

After some thought, I feel we can talk about this subject once the existing one is over.

As someone reduced to mere spectating on PDF, I do look forward to a good discussion even in read-only mode. Military history is important, no doubt, but it must also be analyzed with an eye on the present and towards the foreseeable future as well. Please do carry on!

 

[Joe Shearer]

I think the correct wording which goes which what you have highlighted is ...."Who goes there"......transformed into HoogoDya

Yes, it is, indeed.

As someone reduced to mere spectating on PDF, I do look forward to a good discussion even in read-only mode. Military history is important, no doubt, but it must also be analyzed with an eye on the present and towards the foreseeable future as well. Please do carry on!

Why reduced to mere spectating? As you can see, on this thread, even outlying misfits find their voice. Jump in, the water's fine. But do let this finish; do hold on - if we were to go at @PanzerKiel 's speed, we would have finished by now, but accommodating my rambling, verbose posts is slowing us down by a factor of 3.

 

[Joe Shearer]

As we look at the conflicts in 1965 (there were several), what emerges most clearly is that Pakistan had a clearly defined plan of action, consisting of three phases:

1. Diversionary attack far away from the proposed main objective, both to send the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force to the wrong places, and to test the gleaming new toys acquired from their gleaming new friends, the Americans;
2. Covert attack seemingly by native Kashmiris in the Vale, to rouse up the citizenry against the supposedly hated occupying power;
3. If #2 did not succeed in toppling the entire Indian tower of cards, a formal attack by regular forces.

It seems to make sense to combine @PanzerKiel 's excellent summary, presented much earlier, with the same break-down of the situation into discrete phases, in order to draw lessons for the Indian Army from the analysis.

With the indulgence of the other participants, that is what I shall proceed to do.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I would like to spend two posts on some associated issues relating to the 1965 conflict.

First, in this post, the conflict in the Rann of Kutch, and its implications. In the next, Operation Gibraltar and its implications. As always, as suggested, the main focus of the analysis will be what lessons may be drawn from the events described by the Indian Army.

The Rann of Kutch
According to the records of the British administration, the 23,000 odd sq. kms. of the Rann of Kutch belonged to Kutch; in pre-independence days, there was no dispute. In 1956, Pakistan tried to set up a post at Chhad Bet, but was dissuaded and withdrew. The Indians put in a company of policemen; the Gujarat policemen are not renowned for taking on heavy duties, and they treated the assignment as a necessary evil, to be suffered and to be left behind once the transfer to the next group was done.

Now that a test run was desired, it was felt that this would be ideal, for two reasons:

1. It was as far away from Kashmir as could be imagined, being itself a dry arm of the sea that was inundated during the monsoons.
2. It was close to Pakistani resources in Sind, and far from Indian resources in Gujarat.

In those halcyon days, there was in fact no patrolling of this border, none at all.

Events moved quickly. The policemen on the Indian side were lethargic; so the Indus Rangers, their counterparts, built a road 2.5 kms inside the claimed Indian boundary line. This was discovered in January 1965 (what would have happened if it was not discovered is a matter for very amusing speculation). The opposite numbers met; far from withdrawing from patrolling the road, the Pakistani representative protested against Indian policemen coming up to the ruins of Kanjarkot on their patrols. The two sides disagreed; the Rangers occupied Kanjarkot. The Government of Gujarat got involved and protested, but to no avail; the Rangers cleaned up and fortified Kanjarkot. As a measure of prudence, the Indians put in a contingent of CRPF armed policemen, strengthened Chhad Bet, and sought to establish more posts on the boundary. Also, 31 Brigade was moved up, from Dhrangadhra to Bhuj.

On the 9th of April, the one of the new Indian police posts was shot up. The balloon was up. Event followed event in quick succession, and as is usual for Indo-Pakistani conflict, everything was over in three weeks, from 9th April to 1st May.

On the 10th, talks were proposed, but without vacation of occupied territories; on the 19th, the Indian Army took out the sector from the Area Command, HQ Maharashtra and Gujarat, and put Maj. Gen. P. O. Dunn in charge of 31 Brigade and 50 (Ind.) Para Brigade. These two brigades were supposed to cover 230 kms of boundary!

General Dunn was informed about Pakistani Army troop movements on the night of the 20th/21st April; this was the 8th Infantry Division reinforced by two regiments of armour. When Dunn asked for reinforcements, Southern Command agreed, but the GoI, advised in that direction by the COAS, refused to escalate or to be diverted. The Pakistani attack, led by Eftekhar Janjua, did well, and pushed out a number of police outposts, and came up to the defensive line of the Indian regulars. At this stage, a ceasefire was agreed upon.

The lessons learnt:

1. All parts of the border, including the international border, are negotiable, according to Pakistan;
2. The PA will fight behind irregulars or paramilitary until positions have been firmed up, and then intervene decisively with its regular troops;
3. It is unsafe to assume that a particular limited conflict will remain a limited conflict; at the very moment that FM Ayub Khan was speaking of living '...as good neighbours...' and of the need for the two countries to '... direct their resources and develop their economies in peace...', plans were being finalised for the follow-on campaigns.
4. As early as April 1965, India had clearly indicated her intention to open up the entire border if attacked very hard at any one point. Taking Shastri's statement as mere bluffing obscured the expansion of Operation Grand Slam by the Indian side when the pressure grew too high, and the thrusts launched towards Sialkot and Lahore respectively.
5. There is insufficient defensive resource in the Southern Rajasthan-Gujarat areas, against a serious Pakistani push.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Operation Gibraltar
This might be considered the second phase of a two-, possibly three-phase campaign launched by Pakistan. While the attack in Kutch might be considered the first, the trial run, this was the second, and it should have gained victory, if the assumptions of the planners had been correct. They were not.

The matter was extremely simple; a mix of regulars and irregulars would be injected into Indian administered J&K, and would mix with the people and create violent protests against the Indian Army, and that Army, facing a mass uprising, would vacate Kashmir, allowing for its reversion to its proper administration. As we all know, this did not work. There were a variety of reasons; the Kashmiri populace was not interested, and was not as disaffected as they should have been, the Indian Army was far more vigorous in its counter-insurgency role (as it was initially thought to be) than had been anticipated, and 33,000 over 7,000 commandoes (in the Boer War sense) were not enough to take on an Army Corps. The lessons learnt are simple, and repetitive; many of these were learnt in the earlier 47-48 conflict. For what they are worth, here they are:

1. The Pakistan Army has an irresistible urge to use irregulars. This is in its DNA, rather, in the national DNA. The very birth of Pakistan was marked with tremendous violence, and the new nation-state had been born in a welter of blood, suffering according to some authorities twice as many casualties as they inflicted.
2. Again, during the battle for Kashmir in 47-48, irregulars were used because the regulars had not been released for deployment.
3. The Indian Army, within Kashmir, was too strong then to be defeated in open battle.
4. [ed.] However, it suffered a number of casualties from ambushes and surprise attacks and had to divert resources to deal with the menace.
5. [ed.] XV Corps did not have sufficient reserves to absorb these urgent needs.
6. [ed.] As XVI Corps did not exist, the diversion of resources to the Valley substantially weakened the strength available at Akhnoor to ward off any major thrust, such as Grand Slam.
7. The Indian Army inflicted a couple of major blows in its counter-insurgency sweep, most particularly the recapture of the Haji Pir Pass.
8. Logistics continued to be the Achilles Heel of the Indian forces in the Valley and in Ladakh.

With the failure of Operation Gibraltar, General Akhtar Hussain Malik's 'Plan B' came into play; that was code-named Operation Grand Slam. This event, and its consequences, are what constitute the bulk of the conflict of 1965, to which the Rann of Kutch incident and Operation Gibraltar were preliminaries.

 

[Cuirassier]

Note - Operation Gibraltar involved 5,000 - 7,000 AKRF, Mujahid Force and SSG troops. You can say it was 12 Division in disguise. While it failed at an overall strategic level due to the obvious faulty assessment & analysis by the planners, the tactical nuisance value was fairly good. And Ghaznavi Force's success in holding ground at Darhal - Budhal etc. showed how crucial local support was to achieve the Op's strategic goals.

According to the Indian Defence Minister, by August 23, an estimated 150+ 'infiltrators' including 2 officers were killed(only 1 officer casualty was confirmed in actual), 84 were claimed captured(which maybe truer than fatality claims), and in process 21 policemen & 46 Army troops were killed (including 5 officers).

By August 23, the peak of Gibraltar had faded - IA started crossing LC at Tithwal and then in the Haveli Sector as August became September. These figures challenge the hype created over this operation and exaggerated losses depicted. Remember, for Pakistan most of the losses were incurred by Mujahids, who made up about 70% of the force. Most of the forces had to extricate in perilous conditions - but the human losses weren't as colossal as depicted. 2 officers died in the whole Op - in the Kutch affair we lost 3.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Note - Operation Gibraltar involved 5,000 - 7,000 AKRF, Mujahid Force and SSG troops. You can say it was 12 Division in disguise. While it failed at an overall strategic level due to the obvious faulty assessment & analysis by the planners, the tactical nuisance value was fairly good. And Ghaznavi Force's success in holding ground at Darhal - Budhal etc. showed how crucial local support was to achieve the Op's strategic goals.

According to the Indian Defence Minister, by August 23, an estimated 150+ 'infiltrators' including 2 officers were killed(only 1 officer casualty was confirmed in actual), 84 were claimed captured(which maybe truer than fatality claims), and in process 21 policemen & 46 Army troops were killed (including 5 officers).

By August 23, the peak of Gibraltar had faded - IA started crossing LC at Tithwal and then in the Haveli Sector as August became September. These figures challenge the hype created over this operation and exaggerated losses depicted. Remember, for Pakistan most of the losses were incurred by Mujahids, who made up about 70% of the force. Most of the forces had to extricate in perilous conditions - but the human losses weren't as colossal as depicted. 2 officers died in the whole Op - in the Kutch affair we lost 3.

Corrections made.

I am not sure how to deal with your assessment of the tactical nuisance value. Other than kill 21 policemen and 46 jawans and officers, what was the result? Did it slow down any IA operation? Did it inhibit any IA operation? Haji Pir Pass still was attacked and re-captured; except Ghaznavi Force, every other detachment suffered, although I note with some considerable interest that this is mitigated in your view by the losses being mostly Mujahids, who made up about 70% of the force.

So nothing much happened; a few policemen and soldiers were killed, but the casualties on the Pakistani side were marginal. As far as failure of the objectives is concerned, I note that it was not a particularly deterrent development.

In any case, if I have read your views correctly, having planned for Operation Grand Slam, it might have been demoralising not to be able to launch it merely because of some success by the guerrillas + special services troopers, so it didn't matter what happened to Gibraltar; the main plan went ahead.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Corrections made.

I am not sure how to deal with your assessment of the tactical nuisance value. Other than kill 21 policemen and 46 jawans and officers, what was the result? Did it slow down any IA operation? Did it inhibit any IA operation? Haji Pir Pass still was attacked and re-captured; except Ghaznavi Force, every other detachment suffered, although I note with some considerable interest that this is mitigated in your view by the losses being mostly Mujahids, who made up about 70% of the force.

So nothing much happened; a few policemen and soldiers were killed, but the casualties on the Pakistani side were marginal. As far as failure of the objectives is concerned, I note that it was not a particularly deterrent development.

In any case, if I have read your views correctly, having planned for Operation Grand Slam, it might have been demoralising not to be able to launch it merely because of some success by the guerrillas + special services troopers, so it didn't matter what happened to Gibraltar; the main plan went ahead.

There were serious effects of Gibraltar, I'll present them shortly....

 

[Joe Shearer]

There were serious effects of Gibraltar, I'll present them shortly....

Looking forward to it.

Incidentally, I went through a thread on the Skardu Air Base modernisation, and nearly did myself an injury laughing. Finally I deleted my response as it only have enraged the chipmunks, but a thought that lingers is that the Pakistan Army (and Air Force, and Navy) are in serious danger of being confined to barracks by these young lions and tigers.

PS: I would deem it a personal favour if you were to do a head-count of XV Corps, and explain to the young heroes that it does not add up to 700,000, not even by including the RR and the Central Armed Police (BSF, CRPF and CISF).

No hurry, any time you are bored and have the inclination.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Operation Grand Slam and its ramifications
While there is already a brilliant summation available, in this and succeeding linked posts, an account of events subsequent to Operation Gibraltar will be presented. This account will consist of the following:

1. Operation Grand Slam - the attack on Akhnoor-Chhamb-Jaurian;
2. NORTHERN COMMAND
   1. Operations of Indian XI Corps
      1. 15th Inf. Div.
      2. 7th Inf. Div.
      3. 4th Mtn. Div.
   2. Operations of Indian I Corps
      1. 6th Mtn. Div.
      2. 14th Inf. Div.
      3. 26th Inf. Div.
3. SOUTHERN COMMAND
   1. Operations south of I Corps
4. Naval Operations: The PN at Dwarka

As usual, this will try to eschew an hour-by-hour narrative, and focus on the lessons learnt by the Indian Army during the conflict, thereafter, at the level of the entire set of events, an analysis of logistics requirements and an assessment of Indian Army needs in future, in the light of these events.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Looking forward to it.


PS: I would deem it a personal favour if you were to do a head-count of XV Corps, and explain to the young heroes that it does not add up to 700,000, not even by including the RR and the Central Armed Police (BSF, CRPF and CISF)..

For Indian 15 Corps only,
Its a MINIMUM of
38 infantry battalions
4 PARA SF units
20 artillery regiments
4 AD regiments
5 Engineer units

Apart from these, Corps troops include
The Corps Sub Area
RRF V force
RRF K force

 

[Joe Shearer]

For Indian 15 Corps only,
Its a MINIMUM of
36 infantry battalions
4 PARA SF units
19 artillery regiments
3 AD regiments
4 Engineer units

Apart from these, Corps troops include
The Corps Sub Area
RRF V force
RRF K force

Brilliant!

Now I hope they'll believe me!

 

[Cuirassier]

IA Northern Command has 7 regular infantry/mountain divisions + 5 RR Forces (each under a MG). The PA X Corps has 4 division equivalents against these 12.