This may be a personal blind spot, but to an Indian observer or analyst, the actions of Pakistan's 12th Div. (under Akhtar Hussain Malik; 7th Div. under Yahya Khan) are no more than a prologue, a small collection of scenes setting the tone of the play; furthermore, the folklore surrounding this action is also a fixed narrative.
THE NUMBERS INVOLVED: This section, the southern part of the State of J&K, just to the north of its boundary with the Indian State of the Punjab, had always been guarded by a brigade; the Pakistan Army assembled a full division opposite it, with 3 full Brigades under its command, attacked without warning, and created terrible pressure on the Indian defences. Well, yes, more or less; but when we examine the situation in detail, we find a surprising situation rather different from what this bald statement of facts tends to show us.
First, 191 Brigade was an oversized brigade. A typical Indian Army brigade has 3 battalions, and perhaps a field artillery regiment (105 mm guns). 191 Brigade had no less than 5 battalions, and a full battalion each of the J&K Militia and the Punjab Armed Police, these being
- 3rd Mahar (+ 2 coys. of 3 J&K Militia);
- 6th Sikh LI (+ 2 coys. of 3 J&K Militia);
- 15th Kumaon;
- 9th Punjab;
- 5th Gorkha Rifles;
- 14th Field Artillery Regt. (+ 1 troop from 39 Medium Artillery Regt.);
- C Squadron 20th Lancers (deploying AMX 13 light tanks)
In addition, the battalion of Punjab Armed Police on border duties.
Normally, three brigades would be (3 x 3 =) 9 battalions in an Infantry division, and it should, on the face of it, have been 9 battalions under Pakistan Army's 12th Div., and it should have been opposed by a mere 3 battalions under the Indian brigade. In reality, there were (as listed above) no less than 5 battalions under 191 Brigade,
and a full battalion of J&K Militia, so, 5 + 1, and we always omit to mention that two more brigades, 41st Mountain Brigade to serve in the front echelon and 28th Infantry Brigade in divisional reserve, had been assembled in the region, to serve under the newly raised 10th Infantry Division.
On top of that, the Pakistanis had 3 Brigades, but these were not 3-battalion brigades; 10th Brigade and 104th Brigade had only 2 battalions each, and the Azad Kashmir Brigade, 4th AK Brigade, had 3 battalions. So, a total of 7 battalions to oppose 191 Brigade's 6
and the strength of 41st Mtn Brigade and 28th Inf. Brigade; not the overwhelming odds as we tend to visualise when thinking of a forlorn brigade facing all the might of a division.
However, the Pakistanis were reasonably strong in artillery, with a full artillery brigade opposed to the regiment + a troop of the Indians; their armoured strength opposed 2 full armoured regiments, 11th Cavalry and 13th Lancers, to the solitary squadron of the Indian 20th Lancers.
It was by no means an overwhelming numerical superiority of the Pakistanis.
OTHER FACTORS: In fairness, the confusion on the Indian side needs to be understood.
- The brigade commander of 191 Brigade, Brig. Master, had been killed in action in mid-August, when a strong contingent of the Gibraltar Force overwhelmed the border defences of the 191 Brigade (the PAP battalion) with support from their artillery; death of the Brigadier and his GSO3 happened during the attempted counter-attack due to shelling by the Pakistan artillery.
- In addition, the induction of 10th Division into the field created its own confusion. It was inducted from Bangalore, so had no idea of local conditions or of the commanders' minds and personalities of the 191 Bde. and its constituent battalions, and certainly no idea about the newly-attached brigades, 41st Mtn Bde or 28th Inf. Bde.
- Finally, there was an intense pressure on the Indian side caused by the irregular warfare that had broken out due to Gibraltar, along with the heavy artillery firing that had caused casualties already, as noted above.
That leads us to summarise the lessons that might have been learnt by the Indian Army, below.
- Pakistan will tend to use, wherever possible, irregulars in the first wave; as has been seen in 47-48, again in 65, again in 99, and as it is continuing today;
- PA artillery and regulars will support these irregulars to the fullest extent, without any declaration of war. In this present instance, it is sufficient to cite the heavy artillery support that their 12th Div. received, first, during the irregular phase, during Operation Gibraltar, and second, during the regular set-piece attack by 12th Div., Operation Grand Slam.
- Indian artillery needs strengthening, both with towed weapons from Akhnoor southwards, and SP weapons between Rajauri to Leh;
- India has tended to perform badly during changes of command or changes of duty, for instance, during Kaul's attempted take-over of 4th Corps in 62, and during 10th Div. take-over of 191 Bde., 41 Mtn. Bde., and 28th Inf. Bde. For that matter, Pulwama happened during the replacement of one unit on the LOC by its successor.
- The Indian Army is always caught by surprise by the opposition. We need both to raise the quality of our field intelligence, and the reaction time that we take to react. The PA seems to react by an order of magnitude faster.
- A personal opinion: asking a Mtn. Div. to serve in the plains is just not logical.
There are several other rather painful conclusions that emerge not only from this conflict but also from the recent border crises on the border with China, but it is appropriate to raise this at a later point. Let us wait for that point.
We come next to action by XI Corps.
