India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[PanzerKiel]

It's a nice blog, as blogs go. I like him, but he has this appalling habit, like Armchair, of outlining the most outlandish manoeuvres, and then wishing into existence the entire logistics chain that would enable it (sometimes, very seldom, creating magic kingdoms of exotic weaponry as well). He refuses to use existing logistics capabilities as a constraint, and plan within that.

Aptly pointed out. Good read for Sunday morning..

Now that we have segued a bit to that theatre....you (and others) might find this blog post quite interesting to read:

http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2020/05/what-has-plagf-learnt-from-dogra-gen.html

 

[PanzerKiel]

Something which I've been pondering upon...


Keeping in view India's near military history...
And basing upon potential threats.... Like in planning we always say that you have to prepare for the worst... Which in this case is...

An offensive-defensive strategy based threat from Pakistan and China both...

A defensive-defensive strategy based threat from Bangladesh

And multiple threats to its vulnerable long sea coasts and port areas where its precious power projection assets are based

There ought to be separate air, land and sea components for all these threats to INDEPENDENTLY deal with these threats without waiting for or depending upon induction of outside forces. And then there ought to be SEPARATE theatre reserves for offensive or defensive contingencies. And superimposed upon all over this should be the national level reserves of army, navy and air force.

Example... Eastern Command forces have a big role to play against any offensive in the West.... What if some situation along Bangladesh or Siliguri ties them up? No offensive in the West then?

They against China... Same question... Are the already placed forces enough to ward off the worst of Chinese threat or potential threat? Or forces are inducted here as well to even out the odds?

Then the sea coast, sea flanks.... What if we see a permanent deployment of Chinese amphibious forces at some port in Arabian sea? Won't India be forced to permanently detach potent forces to defend the probable landing beachhead sites.

Isn't this what is happening to India right now? India voices its intentions to go for GB and AK... And then a small incursion by PLA along LAC almost off balances it.

Best deployment of forces must be like... A potent defensive posture to deal with Chinese while simultaneously retaining the capability to go across against Pakistan....which is not the case right now.

I believe that.... Of all the force tiers.... Tactical, operational, theatre and strategic... Some where, something is missing at a tier....

More thoughts might follow....

 

[SQ8]

Discussions that mirror the days gone by.. nostalgic and hopeful.

However that citation for the Wg. Cdr will never be without doubt especially for those with greater ties to the military on this side. But then false claims have been made by PAF personnel in previous wars although for the Wg Cdr it seems to be more a case of fait accompli from the “new reich” in India - hopefully the next elections change things for the better.

Another aspect which was highlighted by a SOCOM friend of mine is the mentality of officers being rolled out from the IA in join training - “arrogant and argumentative” for a Black cat group versus “attentive to criticism” for A SSG group. This is perhaps one of the major factors leading to 26th versus 27th February and contrats opposite to what was known of Indian military attitudes prior to the new millennium.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Something which I've been pondering upon...


Keeping in view India's near military history...
And basing upon potential threats.... Like in planning we always say that you have to prepare for the worst... Which in this case is...

An offensive-defensive strategy based threat from Pakistan and China both...

A defensive-defensive strategy based threat from Bangladesh

And multiple threats to its vulnerable long sea coasts and port areas where its precious power projection assets are based

There ought to be separate air, land and sea components for all these threats to INDEPENDENTLY deal with these threats without waiting for or depending upon induction of outside forces. And then there ought to be SEPARATE theatre reserves for offensive or defensive contingencies. And superimposed upon all over this should be the national level reserves of army, navy and air force.

Example... Eastern Command forces have a big role to play against any offensive in the West.... What if some situation along Bangladesh or Siliguri ties them up? No offensive in the West then?

They against China... Same question... Are the already placed forces enough to ward off the worst of Chinese threat or potential threat? Or forces are inducted here as well to even out the odds?

Then the sea coast, sea flanks.... What if we see a permanent deployment of Chinese amphibious forces at some port in Arabian sea? Won't India be forced to permanently detach potent forces to defend the probable landing beachhead sites.

Isn't this what is happening to India right now? India voices its intentions to go for GB and AK... And then a small incursion by PLA along LAC almost off balances it.

Best deployment of forces must be like... A potent defensive posture to deal with Chinese while simultaneously retaining the capability to go across against Pakistan....which is not the case right now.

I believe that.... Of all the force tiers.... Tactical, operational, theatre and strategic... Some where, something is missing at a tier....

More thoughts might follow....

Music to my ears.

Unfortunately, today these views can be expressed only in think-tanks in Delhi, and those are rarely consulted, being left to take up propaganda against the rivals of the ruling party.

What you have articulated is that the resources and capabilities for dealing with Indian threats and potential threats need to be concentrated into 'theatres', and that all three military arms need to be combined within these theatres, as far as management is concerned. For instance,

• China
  • Northern Command, from Leh to Bareilly
  • Central Command, from Bareilly to Kishanganj
  • Eastern Command, from Kishanganj to Tezpur
  • North-Eastern Command, from Tezpur to Walong
  • Island Command, Andaman & Nicobar Islands
  • Far Eastern Command, South Pacific Ocean
• Bangladesh
• Myanmar
• Indian Ocean
• Pakistan

On a careful working, it is possible to keep the head-count to reasonable limits, if not actually reduce them; the presence of the border forces is a factor, as they are about a platoon to every 3 kms in the west, two platoons to every 3 kms in the north. Unfortunately, we have to drop our obsession with aircraft carriers, and we need around 300 ships to give us coastal defence (in depth, including a land-based component attached to the maritime defences, and a long-range strike capability in the air), command over economic resources and sea lines of communications in the east, the south and the west, and war-fighting capabilities in the far east and in the west. Other requirements, such as anti-piracy patrolling, sea denial in the east and in the west, and amphibious capabilities, or expeditionary capabilities, are strictly secondary and must not be even thought of unless the basics have been met.

There is a real problem with the Air Force, and that has to be resolved on priority. The Navy needs re-orientation and a weaning away from their dreams of projecting national strength through carrier-borne aviation, together with a renewed focus on defending Indian sovereignty in the short-range, medium-range and the long-range. The Army needs to become specialist Armies, mission-oriented rather than formation oriented, and without the integumen of the old regiments, free of them without discarding them.

There may be a penalty to be paid for balancing forces; the head-count for the Air Force may treble from 140,000 to over 400,000, and the head-count for the Navy may be forced up from around 70,000 to over 300,000. This does not include production capacity.

Most of all, if nothing else happens, if the present rate of road-building and infrastructure development are continued, and if Logistics becomes a central military function common to all services, along with (electronic) Communications and Medical Support, we have overcome some of the obstacles of the past.

Discussions that mirror the days gone by.. nostalgic and hopeful.

However that citation for the Wg. Cdr will never be without doubt especially for those with greater ties to the military on this side. But then false claims have been made by PAF personnel in previous wars although for the Wg Cdr it seems to be more a case of fait accompli from the “new reich” in India - hopefully the next elections change things for the better.

Another aspect which was highlighted by a SOCOM friend of mine is the mentality of officers being rolled out from the IA in join training - “arrogant and argumentative” for a Black cat group versus “attentive to criticism” for A SSG group. This is perhaps one of the major factors leading to 26th versus 27th February and contrats opposite to what was known of Indian military attitudes prior to the new millennium.

The entire episode had to be dressed up. The past loyalties and personal connections with an older and much respected senior had to be accommodated. The citation is not something that any sensible Indian will comment on, in public.

As for the second observation, we are breeding too many Arnab Goswamis in uniform, and the presence of our own miniature G. D. Bakshi as an expert commentator in Republic TV doesn't help. Maroof Raza has now been displaced by his Sanghi equivalent. This is indeed a 180 degree change.

A very old member, Sr. Nair, made a telling observation; he pointed out that most of the social media garbage - most, but not all - is generated in the north. We have lost an entire generation. He concluded with the soothing thought that these immature idiots would grow and mature in due course of time, but that sadly seems to be whistling past the graveyard.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Music to my ears.

Unfortunately, today these views can be expressed only in think-tanks in Delhi, and those are rarely consulted, being left to take up propaganda against the rivals of the ruling party.

What you have articulated is that the resources and capabilities for dealing with Indian threats and potential threats need to be concentrated into 'theatres', and that all three military arms need to be combined within these theatres, as far as management is concerned. For instance,

• China
  • Northern Command, from Leh to Bareilly
  • Central Command, from Bareilly to Kishanganj
  • Eastern Command, from Kishanganj to Tezpur
  • North-Eastern Command, from Tezpur to Walong
  • Island Command, Andaman & Nicobar Islands
  • Far Eastern Command, South Pacific Ocean
• Bangladesh
• Myanmar
• Indian Ocean
• Pakistan

On a careful working, it is possible to keep the head-count to reasonable limits, if not actually reduce them; the presence of the border forces is a factor, as they are about a platoon to every 3 kms in the west, two platoons to every 3 kms in the north. Unfortunately, we have to drop our obsession with aircraft carriers, and we need around 300 ships to give us coastal defence (in depth, including a land-based component attached to the maritime defences, and a long-range strike capability in the air), command over economic resources and sea lines of communications in the east, the south and the west, and war-fighting capabilities in the far east and in the west. Other requirements, such as anti-piracy patrolling, sea denial in the east and in the west, and amphibious capabilities, or expeditionary capabilities, are strictly secondary and must not be even thought of unless the basics have been met.

There is a real problem with the Air Force, and that has to be resolved on priority. The Navy needs re-orientation and a weaning away from their dreams of projecting national strength through carrier-borne aviation, together with a renewed focus on defending Indian sovereignty in the short-range, medium-range and the long-range. The Army needs to become specialist Armies, mission-oriented rather than formation oriented, and without the integumen of the old regiments, free of them without discarding them .

Most of all, if nothing else happens, if the present rate of road-building and infrastructure development are continued, and if Logistics becomes a central military function common to all services, along with (electronic) Communications and Medical Support, we have overcome some of the obstacles of the past.

In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....

Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.

Aircraft carriers ... Yes.... In my opinion, Indians may require atleast 4 carriers each on both coasts.... With one in maintenance and 3 in seas.....and with them the usual paraphernalia of subs, ASW, AA and anti surface frigates, destroyers, replenishment oilers, minesweepers etc.... And then what use are these Carrier Battle Groups if you do not have big massive amphibious forces to land on enemy coast....

. By not presenting a potent amphibious threat, Indian CVBGs maybe nothing but potential targets for PAF and PLAF.

 

[Nilgiri]

Maroof Raza has now been displaced by his Sanghi equivalent.

It's getting that bad eh? Thankfully I quit watching...even peeking into all that mess quite a while ago.

He concluded with the soothing thought that these immature idiots would grow and mature in due course of time

They wont, they are clumsy unwieldy elephants that have gotten too emboldened from the peanut gallery....and they have convinced themselves they are ballerinas. Anyone gonna fancy sticking their neck out, stepping in and cutting them to shape? Nope. They essentially have to fall from their own giddiness at some point...everyone can see how dumb the circus was then...and smack their heads then like they knew it all along.

I take little solace in the fact this is happening closer to home in North America too....where I expect these people to know somewhat better on average. But it seems they just had a much longer sustained inertia of pleasantness and success behind them that kind of operates on a status quo vibe of its own.

Nice, we are all utterly united worldwide in our rotten complacency and emotional gamesmanship in the end. God help us all.

 

[Joe Shearer]

In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in...

I really wish (in an abstract sense) it were not you saying this.

27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....

I have an alternative explanation for this - underpreparedness.

We simply jumped the gun.

The massive holes in structure and in process that showed up were deeply disappointing. At the structural level,

• We effectively have no AD system in place; the PAF can walk in, position itself 20 to 50 kms inside its own air space and blow up anything at all that they want. Or, perhaps, we have the AD, but not the will to use it, especially against aircraft within their own air space and doing no harm until they squeeze the button.
• We went into the operation with no defence against the incremental range of the PAF air to air missiles. This is unbelievable.
• We have no additional air bases in the north to supplement Srinagar, and that frankly seems to be insufficient.

In terms of process,

• Why were we not ready for the inevitable retaliatory strike? It is true that the retaliation could have happened anywhere at all, but given Pakistan's consistent line of defining Kashmir as a disputed area and as a legitimate combat zone, surely the first piece of Band Aid should have been applied there?
• Where were the AWACS in support, and where were they if not in the sky? What is the point of acquiring all this glistening new machinery unless they are of use?
• Do we have anything like a standard operating procedure to cope with jamming, and had we done any physical or electronic simulations of combat with jamming and electronic warfare, AND anti-electronic warfare, as factors?
• Who planned the defence and stayed hands on, on the 27th? It is dismaying to see TV interviews of a Ground Controller; she did her best, but against jamming and against a pilot who seems to represent the worst of an already difficult lot, she was clearly out of her depth.

As you said, TOO MUCH TOO SOON.

Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.

Ouch.

Aircraft carriers ... Yes.... In my opinion, Indians may require atleast 4 carriers each on both coasts.... With new in maintenance and 3 in seas.....and with them the usual paraphernalia of subs, ASW, AA and anti surface frigates, destroyers, replenishment oilers, minesweepers etc.... And then what use are these Carrier Battle Groups if you do not have big massive amphibious forces to land on enemy coast....

. By not presenting a potent amphibious threat, Indian CVBGs maybe nothing but potential targets for PAF and PLAF.

The quick and dirty figure was 9, but not of equal size. Frankly, what we need for the Bay of Bengal are very small ones of the size of the original Vikrant, between 15,000 to 25,000 MT displacement, with two squadrons on board. What we need in the Arabian Sea has to rival a medium-sized US carrier, on non-nuclear propulsion. For the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean, perhaps the same. But in terms of numbers, for each Carrier Battle Group on active duty at sea, there has to another retiring to base or venturing out, and there has to be a third undergoing major refit. So, three in each area, but - the good news - not of uniform size, now the bad news, if different, then demanding diversity of naval aircraft; and then the worst news - all of these vulnerable to a single cruise missile out of a swarm, fired from a platform well outside the range of a carrier's strike aircraft, 'sighted' by an innocuous offshore patrol vessel lurking near the battle group.

It just isn't worth it.

 

[Nilgiri]

What we need in the Arabian Sea has to rival a medium-sized US carrier, on non-nuclear propulsion.

Nostalgia for me, many years back had a nice speculative convo with an American friend (retd USN) about USS kitty hawk being retired, overhauled and deployed for Indian Navy heh.

I like the smaller carrier approach of yours, given its more apt to following the rule of 3:

But in terms of numbers, for each Carrier Battle Group on active duty at sea, there has to another retiring to base or venturing out, and there has to be a third undergoing major refit.

The rule of 3! How I wish @Penguin were here for this discussion.

all of these vulnerable to a single cruise missile out of a swarm, fired from a platform well outside the range of a carrier's strike aircraft, 'sighted' by an innocuous offshore patrol vessel lurking near the battle group.

Well well, this scenario would be modelled and accounted for in the CBG deployment doctrine...how to best detect and eliminate threats that can do a snipe shot.

It just isn't worth it.

Especially not with this economic size we are at. These all cost big bucks....ramping up shipyard (build, maintain, upgrade, overhaul) capacity is already an issue in India with the current lower warship numbers. This all costs lot of money and resource.... this is why my interest over the years has changed drastically from the military side to more economic one.

 

[PanzerKiel]

I really wish (in an abstract sense) it were not you saying this.



I have an alternative explanation for this - underpreparedness.

We simply jumped the gun.

The massive holes in structure and in process that showed up were deeply disappointing. At the structural level,

• We effectively have no AD system in place; the PAF can walk in, position itself 20 to 50 kms inside its own air space and blow up anything at all that they want. Or, perhaps, we have the AD, but not the will to use it, especially against aircraft within their own air space and doing no harm until they squeeze the button.
• We went into the operation with no defence against the incremental range of the PAF air to air missiles. This is unbelievable.
• We have no additional air bases in the north to supplement Srinagar, and that frankly seems to be insufficient.

In terms of process,

• Why were we not ready for the inevitable retaliatory strike? It is true that the retaliation could have happened anywhere at all, but given Pakistan's consistent line of defining Kashmir as a disputed area and as a legitimate combat zone, surely the first piece of Band Aid should have been applied there?
• Where were the AWACS in support, and where were they if not in the sky? What is the point of acquiring all this glistening new machinery unless they are of use?
• Do we have anything like a standard operating procedure to cope with jamming, and had we done any physical or electronic simulations of combat with jamming and electronic warfare, AND anti-electronic warfare, as factors?
• Who planned the defence and stayed hands on, on the 27th? It is dismaying to see TV interviews of a Ground Controller; she did her best, but against jamming and against a pilot who seems to represent the worst of an already difficult lot, she was clearly out of her depth.

As you said, TOO MUCH TOO SOON.



Ouch.



The quick and dirty figure was 9, but not of equal size. Frankly, what we need for the Bay of Bengal are very small ones of the size of the original Vikrant, between 15,000 to 25,000 MT displacement, with two squadrons on board. What we need in the Arabian Sea has to rival a medium-sized US carrier, on non-nuclear propulsion. For the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean, perhaps the same. But in terms of numbers, for each Carrier Battle Group on active duty at sea, there has to another retiring to base or venturing out, and there has to be a third undergoing major refit. So, three in each area, but - the good news - not of uniform size, now the bad news, if different, then demanding diversity of naval aircraft; and then the worst news - all of these vulnerable to a single cruise missile out of a swarm, fired from a platform well outside the range of a carrier's strike aircraft, 'sighted' by an innocuous offshore patrol vessel lurking near the battle group.

It just isn't worth it.

You are right... Unpreparedness of IAF last February...
To put in tangible terms...
None of the PAF assets.... Fighter, fighter escorts, EW, strike.... None of them were procured the previous day... I mean their capabilities are well known to everyone... Latest being thy block 52s which are also many years old now....
Peace time is always used to analyze opponent's capabilities based on his held assets.... And then comparing own capabilities based on own asset , plans and contingencies are made.... There must be something wrong in the peacetime operational planning process of IAF....

and then, on the ultimate day in February..... How come they didn't think of any retaliation from a country you have just bombed, a country which is your declared enemy, fought so many wars with...

Is there a lack of C2 In IAF.... I mean once the PAF comes in, IAF interceptors go up on their own, Phalco comes and bugs out leaving everyone to PAF mercy, no SAR for the downed pilot... SAR would have required maybe Garuds standing by along with helis and fighter aircraft to provide top cover..... That Mi 17 shot down, again flying in a hot environment on its own....lack of situational awareness of Ground based AD elements since they didn't know who's in the air at the moment....... List goes on...

It all brings to one thing... Atleast.... On the Indian side... There was no ONE person who had the complete picture of the battlefield, both land and air.... If there were one, then this litany of mistakes would have been avoided...

 

[Joe Shearer]

You are right... Unpreparedness of IAF last February...
To put in tangible terms...
None of the PAF assets.... Fighter, fighter escorts, EW, strike.... None of them were procured the previous day... I mean their capabilities are well known to everyone... Latest being thy block 52s which are also many years old now....
Peace time is always used to analyze opponent's capabilities based on his held assets.... And then comparing own capabilities based on own asset , plans and contingencies are made.... There must be something wrong in the peacetime operational planning process of IAF....

and then, on the ultimate day in February..... How come they didn't think of any retaliation from a country you have just bombed, a country which is your declared enemy, fought so many wars with...

Is there a lack of C2 In IAF.... I mean once the PAF comes in, IAF interceptors go up on their own, Phalco comes and bugs out leaving everyone to PAF mercy, no SAR for the downed pilot... SAR would have required maybe Garuds standing by along with helis and fighter aircraft to provide top cover..... That Mi 17 shot down, again flying in a hot environment on its own....lack of situational awareness of Ground based AD elements since they didn't know who's in the air at the moment....... List goes on...

It all brings to one thing... Atleast.... On the Indian side... There was no ONE person who had the complete picture of the battlefield, both land and air.... If there were one, then this litany of mistakes would have been avoided

...

That's it.

I believe that there should have been local commanders in different zones empowered to coordinate integrated responses.

One input that is frankly unsatisfactory is that the AOC-in-C was just about being transferred. That is not much consolation; we cannot ask the PAF or the PLA AF to wait for our transfers to be complete and the incumbents to be in place and sufficiently briefed to be able to do their jobs. That seems to indicate that there is no continuity, and that the reporting level is quite paralysed during this transition.

Regarding the Air Rescue, we performed like the Keystone Cops. Believe me, no civilian project would have gone into action with such unpreparedness.

 

[PanzerKiel]

That's it.

I believe that there should have been local commanders in different zones empowered to coordinate integrated responses.

One input that is frankly unsatisfactory is that the AOC-in-C was just about being transferred. That is not much consolation; we cannot ask the PAF or the PLA AF to wait for our transfers to be complete and the incumbents to be in place and sufficiently briefed to be able to do their jobs. That seems to indicate that there is no continuity, and that the reporting level is quite paralysed during this transition.

Regarding the Air Rescue, we performed like the Keystone Cops. Believe me, no civilian project would have gone into action with such unpreparedness.

Yeah... Frankly, AO in C absence should not have been an issue....
On the battlefield, the peacetime planning and training speaks out on behalf of the Commander.... If the outcome is favorable, then it's good.... If outcome is bad enough, then it means bad peacetime planning and no Commander on ground to correct it.... Even if the Commander may be physically available, but then he cannot correct the loopholes of a bad plan during a fluid battle...

 

[Nilgiri]

Is there a lack of C2 In IAF.... I mean once the PAF comes in, IAF interceptors go up on their own, Phalco comes and bugs out leaving everyone to PAF mercy, no SAR for the downed pilot... SAR would have required maybe Garuds standing by along with helis and fighter aircraft to provide top cover..... That Mi 17 shot down, again flying in a hot environment on its own....lack of situational awareness of Ground based AD elements since they didn't know who's in the air at the moment....... List goes on...

It all brings to one thing... Atleast.... On the Indian side... There was no ONE person who had the complete picture of the battlefield, both land and air.... If there were one, then this litany of mistakes would have been avoided...

I personally have a feeling there was already stuff going on that disguised where PAF was gonna do something....starting right from after balakot happened (and IAF may have engaged in the same just before balakot to achieve a similar goal). Mock attacks, feints and more activity in general....like a disturbed hornet nest to provide cover for the final action time and place. All with knowledge of what various radars and sensors (on the other side) will likely show the opponent (and impress counter action and card-showing from him...or lull into false sense of security etc)....having modelled and trained on your own radar and sensor systems well beforehand. There was probably a few ladders to pick from already done by PAF's best, given the aptitude I have seen from just you here.

We won't be told any of this as its very classified stuff I would imagine.

The issue is the aggressor always has the initiative compared to the defender who must cover all bases and thus spread/hedge and not really have the same counter-initiative force, and in a one-off that counts for a lot.

There is also the different narratives of what exactly happened, which I wont go into, because that's all worn me out long ago.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Nostalgia for me, many years back had a nice speculative convo with an American friend (retd USN) about USS kitty hawk being retired, overhauled and deployed for Indian Navy heh.

I like the smaller carrier approach of yours, given its more apt to following the rule of 3:



The rule of 3! How I wish @Penguin were here for this discussion.



Well well, this scenario would be modelled and accounted for in the CBG deployment doctrine...how to best detect and eliminate threats that can do a snipe shot.



Especially not with this economic size we are at. These all cost big bucks....ramping up shipyard (build, maintain, upgrade, overhaul) capacity is already an issue in India with the current lower warship numbers. This all costs lot of money and resource.... this is why my interest over the years has changed drastically from the military side to more economic one.

.... Which means that India, as yet, may not be able to achieve her political and military aims due to on going expansion, transitions, an economy incapable of sustaining a LONG war which is the only option in which superiority of numbers can be exploited...

But then where is the problem? Because there is someone who just can't judge that what he's aiming for, can't be achieved and sustained.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Yeah... Frankly, AO in C absence should not have been an issue....
On the battlefield, the peacetime planning and training speaks out on behalf of the Commander.... If the outcome is favorable, then it's good.... If outcome is bad enough, then it means bad peacetime planning and no Commander on ground to correct it.... Even if the Commander may be physically available, but then he cannot correct the loopholes of a bad plan during a fluid battle...

On a lighter note, I used to enforce my General Managers' leave opportunities, because it was only when they were away that I could assess how good a system they had built. If it could not function without them, they would return to a very demanding few weeks of very interactive system-building!

The best team I had ran AS/400 programming for a famous logistics company. I was gobsmacked when, soon after joining, I was given their Black Book; they had a better operations manual than their clients had, an operations manual ABOUT THEIR CLIENTS' OPERATIONS. It was a $5.0 million dollar a year client, some 20 years ago, so this was very reassuring.

Then due to circumstances beyond my control - I was then posted abroad - they were decapitated. According to reports from the site people, they carried on without missing a beat. They were cropped a second time; the second echelon went. They performed just as well. A third, and then a fourth time followed.

This was the best team I have ever been associated with. Truly amazing.

In defence, similar things happened, but it is difficult to discuss those. There is an interesting story behind the five letter org. that you noticed, @Nilgiri, and it is connected to the Egyptians. It was stymied because of the most extraordinary reason, one that I cannot bring myself to mention on this forum.

.... Which means that India, as yet, may not be able to achieve her political and military aims due to on going expansion, transitions, an economy incapable of sustaining a LONG war which is the only option in which superiority of numbers can be explored...

But then where is the problem? Because there is someone who just can't judge that what he's aiming for, can't be achieved and sustained.

Bluntly, this is the problem, both in the civilian leadership and the military. It hurts to have it highlighted so starkly, but this is exactly where the problem is.I am sure that my political views are not influencing my judgement on this one.

@jbgt90

I personally have a feeling there was already stuff going on that disguised where PAF was gonna do something....starting right from after balakot happened (and IAF may have engaged in the same just before balakot to achieve a similar goal). Mock attacks, feints and more activity in general....like a disturbed hornet nest to provide cover for the final action time and place. All with knowledge of what various radars and sensors (on the other side) will likely show the opponent (and impress counter action and card-showing from him...or lull into false sense of security etc)....having modelled and trained on your own radar and sensor systems well beforehand. There was probably a few ladders to pick from already done by PAF's best, given the aptitude I have seen from just you here.

I don't agree.

This was a leadership failure. It simply means that our military leadership in the IAF hasn't figured out how to manage through a series of discrete state changes, opposed by changes in the adversary profile as well. The IAF was not in suspended animation; it was supposed to be, and is, an organisation tasked to meet certain national objectives. These change, but usually not abruptly. Some exigency might arise - Balakot - and the organisation needs to be able to cope with this seamlessly. In fact, it should be designed to cope with these, not to have to take them up as exceptions.

My feeling is that this was at the Air Commodore/ Air Marshal level, nothing to do with higher echelons EXCEPT THAT WHEN THINGS GO WRONG, IT IS ALWAYS THE HIGHER ECHELONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THINGS GOING WRONG.

The failure to verify the re-engagement of the IFF system, thanks to which the chopper was shot down, seems to point to some very weak leadership at that level. the Air Commodore/ Air Marshal level.

We won't be told any of this as its very classified stuff I would imagine.

The issue is the aggressor always has the initiative compared to the defender who must cover all bases and thus spread/hedge and not really have the same counter-initiative force, and in a one-off that counts for a lot.

There is also the different narratives of what exactly happened, which I wont go into, because that's all worn me out long ago.

You qualified your observation by referring to the situation as a one-off, but it is still objectionable. Does that mean that there is NO defence possible? That horse won't run.

I have just got a caution (not a warning), and am feeling gutted. I'll be back in an hour.

 

[Nilgiri]

.... Which means that India, as yet, may not be able to achieve her political and military aims due to on going expansion, transitions, an economy incapable of sustaining a LONG war which is the only option in which superiority of numbers can be explored...

But then where is the problem? Because there is someone who just can't judge that what he's aiming for, can't be achieved and sustained.

Its foolish (to me at least) to try defeat Pakistan militarily at this point. At best its about maintaining sufficient deterrence and always have the "all out" option there...but strictly not to be thought of as easy or lightly....or "first thing" like lot of (deplorable) mainstream interlocutors and politicians on our side have in fashion today. Your previous analysis that the best opportunities were earlier is spot on...but like you said it needed the cold stoic nerve to do so and to shoulder the economic cost then in doing so. Hindsight is 20/20.

With China there is only defensive deterrence on offer....they are simply a very different opponent of scale altogether (especially industrially and at bulk force), especially once you leave the tibetan plateau (which can at least be severed + constrained logistically somewhat in a capability that would likely be a stretch at India's current status and a true developed threat only in future).

We are basically lucky that Tibet exists as a major obstacle and that there are crafty opponents to the east of China and where the USN pacific fleet and more come into play...in relation to the core industrial and populated areas of China.

The answer to Indias problems lie in the economy for me. Simply we are not rich, prosperous or industrialized enough at scale....our (middle) society is not reformed enough at scale either and does not apply the correct sustained pressure on the correct issues at enough intensity to get there (given we have set ourselves for this to be the destiny over any authoritarian or totalitarian option).

i.e fight hard and well against the politicians, leaders and other kind of general upper crust villainy with entrenched and arrayed means and resources to keep a cushy status quo or an even better regression for them.

That to me is the real war to fight for us, before we get to big ambitious plans for anyone else. We have so much to do right here at home....while sufficiently guarding the home and ensuring its existence.

I do hope at which point in winning this first one (if we ever win it), we realise this first one is the only one truly worth achieving rather than becoming what ends up ruining egotistical powerful countries inevitably again and again in history....and that everyone else learns that too so there really is no need for this nasty business of war and domination at all.

Because (I say with highest regret) for every pure genuine warrior and noble spirit like you, there are simply too many lesser folks with lesser hearts that do not have honourable intentions for the vanquished...only fulfilling some terrible destiny of revenge or worse. They are simply going to ruin everything that give humans greatness given the opportunity, because they never see what they are...only what they think others are. These are the people that bring down every great human endeavour in the end....the painful laboured accumulation of so much truth, effort and worthiness ...destroyed so easily like flame to dry tinder.

I have a feeling there is just too many of them around at all times (being avid student of history), even lurking inside seemingly good or average people....and you give them a diet of enough ego and delusion somehow, they are capable of any kind of damage and evil. Yes it is why I wish no war at all (though in ways I do earn my bread from honing a warfighting potential)..on anyone, anywhere, though I always preach a suitable defense and deterrence for all, the best they can manage and balance while ascending to something better all together....hopefully some system where there is no war at all. I abhor the statement "only the dead have seen the end of war". It is far too unsettling for me....I reject it as something eternal for humanity to experience. But the fate for it is in billions of other souls in the end...I am just one.

I don't agree.

Oh what I am saying is in tandem to the great failures present and inherent in the system too. It does not excuse or explain away the problem you bring up.