By Shaukat Qadir
Baitullah Mehsud has claimed responsibility for this attack and has threatened two attacks per week from now onwards. Finally, our various political leaders can no longer remain in denial
Within a span of four weeks, we witnessed a second terrorist attack in Lahore. This time, the Police Training School at Munawan was the target. Terrorists some dressed in police uniforms, others in civilian clothes stormed the school at 7:20 am on March 30, as the recruits were assembled in the yard for their morning drill. After throwing some grenades and indiscriminate AK-47 fire, they entered the school building, held eighty or so recruits hostage and fought an eight-hour battle before security forces retook the building.
Considering the duration and the weapons involved, casualties were surprisingly low. The dead: eight police recruits; a civilian; and four terrorists, three of whom blew themselves up again, surprisingly, they did not do so at a time and place where they could have taken a number of hostages along with them. Ninety-three were injured; and one terrorist was captured. All we know about him is that he is an Afghan and claimed to be a Muslim speaking in Urdu before lapsing into (probably) Darri. Two suspects are in custody, being questioned. One wounded terrorist is said to have escaped.
As in the case of the Mumbai attacks last year, when I raised questions that a mere ten individuals could not possibly have attacked nine locations simultaneously, and that it was a matter of certainty that a large number had escaped, along with the hostages they released periodically, I am fairly certain that, even if the two suspects are found guilty, the total number of terrorists involved are likely to be not less than a dozen; implying that at least five escaped.
One can draw some consolation from the fact that within half an hour of the terrorist occupation of the building, security forces had surrounded the place and begun to respond; also that it took them a mere eight hours to recapture the building without any further loss of life of their forces during the action.
Compared to the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team, when our security forces failed miserably and the terrorists escaped unscathed, this was a remarkable performance. As a matter of fact, it would not be surprising in the least that some of the individuals involved in the Manawan attack were also involved in the earlier one on the Sri Lankan team.
Even compared to the Mumbai attacks, when it took Indian security forces sixty-two hours to retake the buildings after suffering a large number of casualties (even making allowances for the larger size of some of the buildings that Indian forces had to retake), this performance of the Pakistani security forces was quite encouraging.
However, once again, as in the case of the March 3 attack, intelligence agencies and even the army corps HQ had issued a warning of the possibility of such attacks. Intelligence agencies had even predicted that police installations would be likely targets! What more does the political administration need to improve security; will anyone ever be held accountable for these lapses?
Interior ministry officials inform us that these buildings are not constructed to cater for terrorist attacks; neither is my house, and my boundary wall is lower than the six-foot wall surrounding the police training centre. Nor can every government building be a fortress. But if I am warned of the possibility of a terrorist attack on my house, I will have the four corners of the boundary wall and the rooftop manned by armed men, and then I would like to see anyone stage such an attack as easily as these terrorists did.
That this attack, like the one on the Sri Lankan team and Mumbai, was very well planned is obvious. It demonstrates that the planner had detailed information, was imaginative and attended to all details. We know that one of the attackers was an Afghan; and we are told that this attack was planned in the tribal areas. Assuming that to be the truth, it is equally obvious that the attackers themselves must also have carried out detailed reconnaissance of the target. If so, some people would have been loitering in the area with nothing to do for some days before the attack.
With a warning of an impending attack, should not these loiterers have aroused suspicion? That is what our security services lack: training in the logical progression of how a criminal mind works, what to be on the lookout for and how to deal with it. And when warned of such a possibility, never let your guard down until the attack has occurred or the criminals apprehended before they could strike.
Baitullah Mehsud has claimed responsibility for this attack and has threatened two attacks per week from now onwards. Finally, our various political leaders can no longer remain in denial. We know the enemy within; and it is far more dangerous than any without. I have no idea why the US refused to recognise the threat from Baitullah Mehsud to Pakistan and refused to take him out when credible information of his location was provided. I can only hope that US and Pakistani forces can learn to trust each other and work together to rid the region of these inhuman terrorists who kill in the belief that they are on the path to heaven.
One thing is certain: this is not the last terrorist attack that we are likely to witness. Such horrible, dastardly events are here to stay for the foreseeable future. That means our intelligence services will need to continue to deliver, at least as well as they have been so far, preferably much better. However, their performance will be useless unless the administration heeds their warnings and security forces measure up to the standards necessary to deal with this scourge.
No wonder Barack Obama links aid to Pakistan to the governments ability to deliver. The US is not the only one fed up with our politicians inability to deliver, so am I. And what should concern these politicians is that I am not a small minority on this issue. If they continue to fail, we will soon become the majority.
This article is a modified version of one originally written for the daily National. The author is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
