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(In)Security Risks: Modi government’s China, Pakistan and Kashmir policies are at a dead end
August 13, 2016, 2:00 AM IST Kanti Bajpai in TOI Edit Page | Edit Page, India | TOI
How has the Modi government dealt with China, Pakistan and Kashmir? These three issues are central to Indian security. BJP criticised the UPA government on its handling of security. Has it done any better? It would seem not. Relations with China and Pakistan have scarcely been worse; and Kashmir faces the kind of turmoil we have not seen in the Valley for years.
Modi’s China policy seems to have boiled down to one thought. Beijing must speed up discussions on a final border settlement, and normalisation between the two countries depends on this. In 1988, when Rajiv Gandhi went to Beijing, he broke the stasis with China. He decided that normalisation of economic and social relations was good for India and would help soften diplomatic ties. Deepening ties in turn would help along a border settlement. Modi seeks to reverse course. As China has shown on the South China Sea and East China Sea, it is not easily pushed around. New Delhi therefore finds itself in more or less a diplomatic dead end with Beijing.
At the heart of the Modi policy towards Pakistan has been the refusal to discuss Kashmir, indeed to countenance regular, extensive talks in a comprehensive dialogue. It is true that the previous government too broke off talks with Islamabad after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Does that make Modi’s decision any better? Two wrongs don’t make a right.
Mani Shankar Aiyar is correct. No government in Pakistan today can altogether stop its army from protecting and promoting terrorism. If so, New Delhi’s categorical insistence it will not talk amounts to a complete dead end with our other neighbour as well. Both the Simla agreement of 1972 and the Lahore agreement of 1999 imply that Kashmir is a dispute and must be part of a dialogue with Pakistan. Modi and his ministers are pretending otherwise.
The third security challenge for India is Kashmir. In the past, New Delhi has either talked to Pakistan about Kashmir or it has talked to Kashmiris about Kashmir. When Kashmiris have been unable or unwilling to talk, the Indian government has threatened to do a bilateral deal; and when Pakistan has been difficult over Kashmir, the government has opened up discussions with Kashmiris. Sometimes India has pursued a dialogue with both Pakistan and Kashmiris simultaneously. Indeed, by turning a blind eye to Hurriyat’s meetings with Pakistani officials, it has over time allowed a triangular process of dialogue to emerge.
The Modi government’s Kashmir policy consists of three “nos”: no dialogue with Pakistan, no dialogue with Kashmiris, and no dialogue between Pakistan and Kashmiris. Now that violence has exploded in the Valley, New Delhi is pointing fingers at Islamabad and at “vested interests and misguided elements” (see Rajnath Singh’s pedestrian statement in Parliament). This is not altogether wrong, but again, as Aiyar points out, most of the responsibility for Kashmir’s instability rests with Srinagar and New Delhi.
What is the result of these policies? China has become more difficult than ever. It has promised Pakistan $46 billion as part of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It has opposed India’s efforts to get the UN to take action against the Pakistani extremist Masood Azhar as also New Delhi’s membership bid in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). More recently, Chinese troops have “transgressed” the Line of Actual Control in Uttarakhand. Worse, it has shown no appetite for speeding up the border negotiations. In the case of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif has gone hawkish on India, is resurrecting Kashmir as the core of Pakistani foreign policy, and is probably doing even less to rein in the military on pushing militants across the Line of Control. As for the Kashmir Valley, it may be more alienated than at any time since 1989-90.
The Modi government needs a rethink on the fundamentals of its security policies. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has become famous all over the world for his incessant travelling. Perhaps he needs to travel less and work through the basics more. China, Pakistan and Kashmir are not easy to deal with. Staying the course on dialogue, however unspectacular that might be, is worth considering.
http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatime...istan-and-kashmir-policies-are-at-a-dead-end/
August 13, 2016, 2:00 AM IST Kanti Bajpai in TOI Edit Page | Edit Page, India | TOI
How has the Modi government dealt with China, Pakistan and Kashmir? These three issues are central to Indian security. BJP criticised the UPA government on its handling of security. Has it done any better? It would seem not. Relations with China and Pakistan have scarcely been worse; and Kashmir faces the kind of turmoil we have not seen in the Valley for years.
Modi’s China policy seems to have boiled down to one thought. Beijing must speed up discussions on a final border settlement, and normalisation between the two countries depends on this. In 1988, when Rajiv Gandhi went to Beijing, he broke the stasis with China. He decided that normalisation of economic and social relations was good for India and would help soften diplomatic ties. Deepening ties in turn would help along a border settlement. Modi seeks to reverse course. As China has shown on the South China Sea and East China Sea, it is not easily pushed around. New Delhi therefore finds itself in more or less a diplomatic dead end with Beijing.
At the heart of the Modi policy towards Pakistan has been the refusal to discuss Kashmir, indeed to countenance regular, extensive talks in a comprehensive dialogue. It is true that the previous government too broke off talks with Islamabad after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Does that make Modi’s decision any better? Two wrongs don’t make a right.
Mani Shankar Aiyar is correct. No government in Pakistan today can altogether stop its army from protecting and promoting terrorism. If so, New Delhi’s categorical insistence it will not talk amounts to a complete dead end with our other neighbour as well. Both the Simla agreement of 1972 and the Lahore agreement of 1999 imply that Kashmir is a dispute and must be part of a dialogue with Pakistan. Modi and his ministers are pretending otherwise.
The third security challenge for India is Kashmir. In the past, New Delhi has either talked to Pakistan about Kashmir or it has talked to Kashmiris about Kashmir. When Kashmiris have been unable or unwilling to talk, the Indian government has threatened to do a bilateral deal; and when Pakistan has been difficult over Kashmir, the government has opened up discussions with Kashmiris. Sometimes India has pursued a dialogue with both Pakistan and Kashmiris simultaneously. Indeed, by turning a blind eye to Hurriyat’s meetings with Pakistani officials, it has over time allowed a triangular process of dialogue to emerge.
The Modi government’s Kashmir policy consists of three “nos”: no dialogue with Pakistan, no dialogue with Kashmiris, and no dialogue between Pakistan and Kashmiris. Now that violence has exploded in the Valley, New Delhi is pointing fingers at Islamabad and at “vested interests and misguided elements” (see Rajnath Singh’s pedestrian statement in Parliament). This is not altogether wrong, but again, as Aiyar points out, most of the responsibility for Kashmir’s instability rests with Srinagar and New Delhi.
What is the result of these policies? China has become more difficult than ever. It has promised Pakistan $46 billion as part of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It has opposed India’s efforts to get the UN to take action against the Pakistani extremist Masood Azhar as also New Delhi’s membership bid in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). More recently, Chinese troops have “transgressed” the Line of Actual Control in Uttarakhand. Worse, it has shown no appetite for speeding up the border negotiations. In the case of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif has gone hawkish on India, is resurrecting Kashmir as the core of Pakistani foreign policy, and is probably doing even less to rein in the military on pushing militants across the Line of Control. As for the Kashmir Valley, it may be more alienated than at any time since 1989-90.
The Modi government needs a rethink on the fundamentals of its security policies. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has become famous all over the world for his incessant travelling. Perhaps he needs to travel less and work through the basics more. China, Pakistan and Kashmir are not easy to deal with. Staying the course on dialogue, however unspectacular that might be, is worth considering.
http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatime...istan-and-kashmir-policies-are-at-a-dead-end/
