thesameguy
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Yeah,i was quoting Field marshal manikshaw who actually fought the war. Not some RSS nutter.
How to counter tactical nukes?
- Thread starter Brickwall
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cerberus
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and India will not have Intelligence of it Pakistan themselves Claim there is heavy Presence of Raw in Pakistan
Accept truth Without Nuclear Equation Pakistan is no where to challenge India's conventional Might it just a bargaining chip which is Losing its charm each year
Source Put the Link where he said that IA and PA not Fight Directly in 71.I can post you a BBC video where Indian army is Protecting Pakistani POW From Bengali's from being butchered
thesameguy
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Manikshaw was the person who despite being our enemy,our generals could trust. He was originally from Karachi and at Partition our Leader Jinah offered him to stay and join our army but he chose to immigrate to India. So he was well known to our generals and he was a true gentleman and a man of his words.
It was due to him that the 1971 war was far shorter and far less bloody than it could have been. Pakistan army lost interest due to Civilian casualties as mukti bahini were all civilians and Pakistan army did not want to fight them.
manikshaw brokered a deal of safe passage and safe return of our POWs and likewise safe return of Indian POWs in our custody. Manikshaw could be trusted and all that happened.
Indian army hasn't produced half a gentleman as manikshaw was and now we cannot trust any Indian general and there will no swift surrender if another war happens.
cerberus
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I just Want you to Post a Support Evidence where he said that
Cut all other arguments Do you have link to sustain you arguments any Link ???
thesameguy
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cerberus
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He No where Stated in his Statement that IA was not a Victor he only Praised his enemy for his Professionalism
He Only mentioned that India Army Properly Planned before Invasion which Give Eastern command Simply No chance to retaliate
Brickwall
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Isn't because Russia guaranteed Cuban security, it afterwall was socialist state
MastanKhan
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Hi,
The issue is the urgency with which the american attack stopped---right in its tracks and let everyone else defend for themselves. They basically found out or was revealed to them that not all tactical nucs had left the island---.
thesameguy
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Lol,that's why I was not posting the link. You Indians are strange. You can clearly hear him saying that logistics was big problem due to distance for Pakistan army,and that's what I said in the comments
To destroy Pakistan you need megatons range nuclear weapons. India has total nukes of less than 5 megaton. Hardly a country destroyer
Lol,another clown jumps in.
To destroy Pakistan you need megatons range nuclear weapons. India has total nukes of less than 5 megaton. Hardly a country destroyer
The same guy
You don't need nuclear weapons to destroy a country
There are lots of ways.
india control the water supply into Pakistan they could divert the water and bring famine to you.
navy blockade stop your imports exports.
spend billions on terror outfits to cause civil war.
conventionbaol attack on ports railways nuclear power station
THIS IS ALL WITHOUT EVEN CROSSING LOC.
" of course its just theory"
You don't need nuclear weapons to destroy a country
There are lots of ways.
india control the water supply into Pakistan they could divert the water and bring famine to you.
navy blockade stop your imports exports.
spend billions on terror outfits to cause civil war.
conventionbaol attack on ports railways nuclear power station
THIS IS ALL WITHOUT EVEN CROSSING LOC.
" of course its just theory"
PARIKRAMA
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I will explain here my views based on what i have read and collected reports/views over time. Pls be advised that people here are comparing lemon and oranges and are following false propaganda based on individual nationalities. TNW threshold is defined clearly in military parlance and does not follow rheortic which we keep hearing regularly. Pls bear with me and have patience.
First The TNW and first strike episode
Pakistan’s rationale for its first use doctrine has been spelt out by Lieutenant General Sardar F. S. Lodhi. Writing in the Pakistan Defence Journal, General Lodhi states:
“The exigency under which Pakistan may use nuclear weapons is spelt out as: ‘Although the precise contingencies in which Pakistan may use nuclear weapons have not been articulated or even defined by the government, the assumption has been that if the enemy launches a war and undertakes a piercing attack to occupy large territories or communications junctions, the weapon of last resort would have to be invoked.”
Second, Efficacy of Tactical Employment of Nuclear Weapons
Tactical or battlefield nuclear targets are normally those that are either located within the tactical battle area (TBA) or have a direct bearing on it. Besides the enemy’s combat echelons, tactical targets include his military infrastructure such as important bridges and choke points on the transportation systems, airbases and communications centres. Tactical military targets that may be attacked with nuclear weapons like Nasr or Nasr ER planned include the following:
Third,Indian Response- The truth on paper and the reality based on political will and strategic decision makings
General Sundarji wrote in 1992 that, “If the damage suffered by Indian forces (due to a Pakistani nuclear strike) is substantial, national and troop morale would demand at least a quid pro quo response. There might even be a demand in some quarters for a quid pro quo plus response.”
However, after over two decades of Pakistan’s proxy war and particularly after that country’s intrusions into the Kargil district of J&K in the summer months of 1999, the parliament attacks, Mumbai attacks etc etc the national mood is much different. Indian public opinion will accept nothing short of the final dismemberment of Pakistan in case that country chooses to cross the nuclear red lines and launches a nuclear strike, even if it is on Indian forces. This puts an enormous pressure on political will power to understand and translate the country's will into actions. Incredibly, India had so far used the word "restraint" and did whats known as "dossier diplomacy" which has been ineffective. The credibility of the longest ruling party till date after independence seems to suggest lack of a strong will for credible retaliatory actions and the other government in power atm needs to demonstrate its willpower far more credibly inspite of it posturing as more strong willed then previous governments.
Few analysts believe that “Pakistan knows a nuclear counter-strike would be devastating to its existence. Considering Pakistan’s nuclear policy, weaponisation options and (that) command and control of nuclear assets are likely to be the sole responsibility of the General Headquarters; the chances of a war escalating to nuclear level would be a professional, conservative and well thought through decision. A pre-emptive nuclear strike or an early employment of nuclear weapons in a conventional war is ruled out.” This was also precisely defined by general Lodhi as explained before.
If nuclear weapons are to be employed as battlefield weapons, in a tit-for-tat manner as recommended by some analysts, not only will the authority to order their firing have to be delegated to commanders at the theatre and the operational level at some stage of the war but, depending on the means of delivery, control over completely ready nuclear warheads will also have to be handed over to the subordinate commanders in charge of the firing platforms in the tactical battle area (TBA). This will naturally increase the risk of accidental and inadvertent employment of nuclear weapons. It is a risk that is best avoided.
The best counter strategy for taking the "head ON " approach to the incoming TNWS
Will such employment of TNW halt the Indian offensive?
If despite such a declaratory strategy, Pakistan persists with its stated policy of launching nuclear strikes on Indian forces inside Pakistan and India decides to reciprocate in kind with nuclear strikes on Pakistani forces rather than an all out decapitating strike, escalation control will be extremely difficult to manage. There would be a near certainty of the nuclear exchanges eventually graduating to massive strikes. Hence, ‘proportionate response’ would not be a practicable strategic option. (Option Y)
There is only one viable response to a Pakistani nuclear strike, whether on Indian cities or military forces, whether inside Pakistan or not, and that is massive punitive retaliation with the full force of India’s nuclear capability. (Option X (80%) and Option Z for strategic retaliation (20%))
Only such a policy would ensure failsafe deterrence. The Pakistani ruling elite must be made to understand that while India may choose to fight a limited war in certain cases, as it did in Kargil, it is prepared to upgrade its military response to ‘all out’ war if the situation so demands. Once this realisation dawns on the Pakistanis, they are unlikely to act irrationally and use tactical nuclear weapons to checkmate an Indian offensive, knowing fully well that a massive Indian nuclear counter-value and counter-force response will mean the end of Pakistan as a viable nation-state.
Three things need to be done to ensure that India can implement a deep strike strategy when the time comes.
Sources: Multiple based on collection of articles over time.
@MilSpec @Abingdonboy @others Pls correct me in case i am wrong.
First The TNW and first strike episode
Pakistan’s rationale for its first use doctrine has been spelt out by Lieutenant General Sardar F. S. Lodhi. Writing in the Pakistan Defence Journal, General Lodhi states:
- In a deteriorating military situation when an Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defences or has already breached the main defence line causing a major set-back to the defences which cannot be restored by conventional means at our disposal, the government of pakistan would be left with no option except to use nuclear weapons to stabilise the situation.
- India’s superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be offset by nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine would, therefore, essentially revolve around the first strike option.
- In other words, we will use nuclear weapons if attacked by India even if the attack is with conventional weapons
- Pakistan would use what Stephen Cohen calls an “option enhancing” policy. This would entail a stage-by-stage approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step to deter India from attack.
- The first step could be a public or private warning,
- The second a demonstration explosion of a small nuclear weapon on its own soil,
- The third step would be the use of a few nuclear weapons on its own soil against Indian attacking forces.
- The fourth stage would be used against critical but purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan – probably in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing least collateral damage…
- Some weapons would be in reserve for the counter value role.
“The exigency under which Pakistan may use nuclear weapons is spelt out as: ‘Although the precise contingencies in which Pakistan may use nuclear weapons have not been articulated or even defined by the government, the assumption has been that if the enemy launches a war and undertakes a piercing attack to occupy large territories or communications junctions, the weapon of last resort would have to be invoked.”
Second, Efficacy of Tactical Employment of Nuclear Weapons
Tactical or battlefield nuclear targets are normally those that are either located within the tactical battle area (TBA) or have a direct bearing on it. Besides the enemy’s combat echelons, tactical targets include his military infrastructure such as important bridges and choke points on the transportation systems, airbases and communications centres. Tactical military targets that may be attacked with nuclear weapons like Nasr or Nasr ER planned include the following:
- Locations of headquarters and adjacent communications centres.
- Bridgeheads established by a ‘break-in’ force on a defensive obstacle system such as a canal or ditch-cum-bund (DCB) to facilitate a ‘break out’.
- Leading ‘combat groups’ forming the spearheads of an ‘operational manoeuvre group’ (OMG) of an Indian Strike Corps.
- Defence fortifications and nodal/strong points, to facilitate a breakthrough.
- Mechanised forces – deployed for defence, assaulting, laying off in harbour or being transported to the TBA.
- Surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and rocket artillery positions.
- Self-propelled and towed medium artillery regimental gun areas.
- Logistics support areas (LSAs).
Third,Indian Response- The truth on paper and the reality based on political will and strategic decision makings
General Sundarji wrote in 1992 that, “If the damage suffered by Indian forces (due to a Pakistani nuclear strike) is substantial, national and troop morale would demand at least a quid pro quo response. There might even be a demand in some quarters for a quid pro quo plus response.”
However, after over two decades of Pakistan’s proxy war and particularly after that country’s intrusions into the Kargil district of J&K in the summer months of 1999, the parliament attacks, Mumbai attacks etc etc the national mood is much different. Indian public opinion will accept nothing short of the final dismemberment of Pakistan in case that country chooses to cross the nuclear red lines and launches a nuclear strike, even if it is on Indian forces. This puts an enormous pressure on political will power to understand and translate the country's will into actions. Incredibly, India had so far used the word "restraint" and did whats known as "dossier diplomacy" which has been ineffective. The credibility of the longest ruling party till date after independence seems to suggest lack of a strong will for credible retaliatory actions and the other government in power atm needs to demonstrate its willpower far more credibly inspite of it posturing as more strong willed then previous governments.
Few analysts believe that “Pakistan knows a nuclear counter-strike would be devastating to its existence. Considering Pakistan’s nuclear policy, weaponisation options and (that) command and control of nuclear assets are likely to be the sole responsibility of the General Headquarters; the chances of a war escalating to nuclear level would be a professional, conservative and well thought through decision. A pre-emptive nuclear strike or an early employment of nuclear weapons in a conventional war is ruled out.” This was also precisely defined by general Lodhi as explained before.
If nuclear weapons are to be employed as battlefield weapons, in a tit-for-tat manner as recommended by some analysts, not only will the authority to order their firing have to be delegated to commanders at the theatre and the operational level at some stage of the war but, depending on the means of delivery, control over completely ready nuclear warheads will also have to be handed over to the subordinate commanders in charge of the firing platforms in the tactical battle area (TBA). This will naturally increase the risk of accidental and inadvertent employment of nuclear weapons. It is a risk that is best avoided.
The best counter strategy for taking the "head ON " approach to the incoming TNWS
- The professed military utility of blunting a major armoured offensive with nuclear weapons is debatable as the Indian incursions would ensure that she does not present a concentrated target at any time during an offensive.
- The attacking IA strike corps would endeavour to concentrate rapidly for short durations only at the point of decision and then disperse quickly.
- The aim would be to move dispersed and fight concentrated.
- An armoured division would advance in desert and semi-desert terrain during the break out stage with two combat commands (an armoured brigade group, including mechanized infantry and artillery) forward and one to two in depth.
- A combat command normally advances with at least two combat groups (armoured regiment group) forward and one combat group in depth.
- With each combat group advancing on a frontage of 10 to 12 km and some gaps between them, a combat command would have a frontage of about 30 to 40 km and depth of about 25 km at least.
- This triangular formation would comprise about 200 AFVs (armoured fighting vehicles) and an EVC (essential vehicles column) consisting of some ‘soft’ logistics support vehicles at its tail
- Since mechanised forces move forward well dispersed and Indian forces advancing into Pakistan are likely to have a pyramidal structure of their advancing tanks and other CVs, one nuclear warhead dropped over one combat command will not result in more than 30 to 40 soldiers being killed and a slightly larger number being wounded. It may result in a maximum of eight to 10 AFVs being destroyed.
- A second nuke being dropped over the other leading combat command will achieve similar destruction.
Will such employment of TNW halt the Indian offensive?
- It is extremely unlikely to do so as the division commander would move his reserves forward and resume the offensive after the initial fallout has settled down.
- Unless the Pakistan army succeeds in evacuating the civilian in the area, its own population is likely to suffer far more than the advancing Indian forces.
- However, in the well developed, semi-urban terrain of Punjab on both the sides of the Indo-Pak boundary, the frontage of advance would be much narrower and the casualties would consequently be higher.
- Massive collateral civilian damage would also be unavoidable. Thousands of civilian casualties and refugees would be unmanageable for the Pakistan army fighting a war with India.
If despite such a declaratory strategy, Pakistan persists with its stated policy of launching nuclear strikes on Indian forces inside Pakistan and India decides to reciprocate in kind with nuclear strikes on Pakistani forces rather than an all out decapitating strike, escalation control will be extremely difficult to manage. There would be a near certainty of the nuclear exchanges eventually graduating to massive strikes. Hence, ‘proportionate response’ would not be a practicable strategic option. (Option Y)
There is only one viable response to a Pakistani nuclear strike, whether on Indian cities or military forces, whether inside Pakistan or not, and that is massive punitive retaliation with the full force of India’s nuclear capability. (Option X (80%) and Option Z for strategic retaliation (20%))
Only such a policy would ensure failsafe deterrence. The Pakistani ruling elite must be made to understand that while India may choose to fight a limited war in certain cases, as it did in Kargil, it is prepared to upgrade its military response to ‘all out’ war if the situation so demands. Once this realisation dawns on the Pakistanis, they are unlikely to act irrationally and use tactical nuclear weapons to checkmate an Indian offensive, knowing fully well that a massive Indian nuclear counter-value and counter-force response will mean the end of Pakistan as a viable nation-state.
Three things need to be done to ensure that India can implement a deep strike strategy when the time comes.
- Firstly, the Indian leadership must find ways and means to demonstrate its collective political will to convince Pakistan that a single nuclear strike on an Indian, soldier or civilian, inside Indian or Pakistani territory, will invite massive punitive nuclear retaliation. If it can do that, the nuclear deterrence battle with Pakistan would have been won.
- Secondly, the Indian army’s offensive punch and the air force’s ground strike capability must be upgraded to state-of-the-art standards so that the two services can launch joint Air-Land offensives deep into Pakistan to gain early tactical, operational and strategic advantage. For this a much deeper modernisation drive has to be accomodated via which the conventional capability between the two nations rise much beyond the present capacities
- Thirdly, a fleet of 3-5 SSBN with capability of launching at least 4 or more K4 or longer range K5 from each SSSBN must be made available in order to present a very serious second strike heavy retaliatory action capability. This inspite of PN claims of arming N tipped SLCMs (planned) acts as the second pressure tactic. With modernising IN and a greater impetus on ASW assets the chances of detecting and taking out conventional diesel electric submarines of PN can increase the pressure on Pakistan as a nation not to resort to N Strike especially as their ability to counter detect and neutralise Indian SSBNs is practically very difficult due to geographical limitations and also capability issues
Sources: Multiple based on collection of articles over time.
@MilSpec @Abingdonboy @others Pls correct me in case i am wrong.
Brickwall
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As far I know, Americans already knew missile was in Cuba, shipped by USSR.so naval blockade was enforced.
Blockade was removed,as USSR got cold feet so compromise was arrived USSR will remove nukes from Cuba, while us will remove Saturn ( not sure of name) from Turkey.
Is there anything more to that ?
Basel
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PA is not weak, they are also working on IBG type force to counter any rapid thrust from India, what many don't know here is that PA already have many Independent Brigades which are tasked to take rapid action against IA's advancing armour, they are now being upgraded and blended with other assets to handle new threat situation, a huge amount of ATGMs and other anti armour weapons are already available to take care of IBGs.
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