Ghosts Who Walk:a taskforce report on how to reform our intel agencies

[ajtr]

Ghosts Who Walk​

Long overdue, a taskforce report on how to reform our intel agencies

Spywork For Dummies

Lack of coordination: Turf battles have slowed down or completely blocked reform No financial accountability: Secret service funds steadily increasing, without unused funds being surrendered
Press reports as intelligence: Artfully cloaked news reports from international publications passed off as source reports
Poor recruitment policies: RAW suffers from the “tail-end syndrome” where UPSC bottom-rungers are offered jobs
Archaic training: The training curriculum in RAW remains archaic and too police-centric Drift in operational work: Breaches of national security due to poor analysis and inadequate follow-up action
Lack of cover: RAW operatives suffer from inadequate cover when posted abroad
***

Intelligence reforms in India have usually been an area that always sees a piecemeal approach, mostly crisis-driven and not based on a real assessment of need. Now, for the first time, a task force of the Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (idsa) has come up with a comprehensive set of recommendations by examining the processes that have plagued India’s intelligence community.

Making a strong pitch for greater accountability via a parliamentary oversight board, the task force has suggested the government also look at strengthening financial accountability as a measure to prepare Indian intelligence agencies for the challenges of the 21st century.

“About a year ago, vice-president Hamid Ansari pointed out that there is a need for statutory oversight of our intelligence agencies. That was the spark needed...for us at idsa,” director-general N.S. Sisodia told Outlook. In a first, the think-tank decided to look at preparing recommendations that examine the critical processes of national security “to promote a healthy debate and help the government take an informed decision”, says Sisodia.

The task force examined the efficacy of the current operational structure, recruitment, ability to process raw inputs into actionable intelligence, technology upgrades and better intelligence coordination between the agencies (currently riven by turf wars). Led by R. Banerji, a well-regarded former special secretary in raw, with P.K. Upadhya and Brig Raj Shukla as its members, it held a series of consultations with the strategic community, including former nsa Brajesh Mishra, the recently deceased K. Subrahmanyam and a host of ex-IB and raw chiefs before preparing its report.

Some of the key problem areas identified by the task force are:

Lack of national intelligence coordination: Acknowledging that turf wars have proved to be a major impediment, the report notes that they have “taken a toll by slowing down or even completely blocking reform”. The task force also felt that proposed organisations like the National Counter Terrorism Centre (nctc) have the “potential to intensify turf battles among existing agencies”. Hence, it has recommended that the government appoint a national intelligence coordinator to end turf battles and assist the national security advisor in preventing a repeat of intelligence failures like Kargil and the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008.

No financial accountability: The task force felt that “to improve efficiency... there can be no getting away from introducing some sort of external supervision and control, including legislative oversight”. It also examined critical lacunae in current procedures where there is no accountability of secret service funds. In fact, it observed that unlike other government budgetary allocations, funds here never lapse at the end of a financial year. “Ironically enough, the secret service funds portion has been steadily increasing and it is that portion which is never surrendered whereas other portions of funds allotted do lapse if schemes remain unimplemented.” It feels these “aberrations need to be controlled and scrutinised”.

Press reports passed off as secret intelligence: The task force did not mince words where “very common examples of misuse of operational practices” such as “artfully cloaking” news reports from “international publications such as the (International) Herald Tribune, Le Monde or foreign magazines such as Der Spiegel as source reports”. Many intelligence operatives would then source these news reports to their “non-existent human source assets” and even claim secret service funds. As a result, Indian intelligence has been plagued by spectacular failures on several occasions.

Poor recruitment policies: The task force noted that raw suffered from the “tail-end syndrome” where the “bottom of the entrance lists” of those appearing for the upsc examinations were offered jobs. Even the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which used to have an excellent earmarking system, has now “diluted” its standards. Both agencies seem to have confined their “deputation quotas” to the Indian Police Service. As a result, specialised requirements such as science and technology or intake of defence service officers have suffered. The task force has strongly recommended open recruitment to ensure that the most talented professionals are recruited. It noted that this is the current practice in frontline intelligence agencies of countries like the US, the UK and Israel.

Archaic training: The “training curriculum in raw”, the report notes, “remains archaic and too police-centric”. Training methods have not even incorporated “modern technological advances in methods of communication” for running a source. In the IB, training schedules have been ‘shortened” to meet operational needs, far short of the ideal two years needed to produce good intelligence operatives. The task force also points out that an earlier recommendation to establish a common training centre for all intelligence agencies “was not accepted”.

Poor analysis and drift in operational work: “Many breaches of national security occurred in the past and continue to occur today, not for want of intelligence, but due to poor analysis and inadequate follow-up action.” The task force analysed the problem and said operations is an area that needs urgent attention. It recommends that analysts be trained in modern prescriptive work which can then ensure better supervision in operations.

Lack of cover jobs: A major problem for raw operatives has been the inadequate cover they get when posted abroad. Sadly, the report says, “in India efforts were made earlier to experiment with non-official cover by setting up a travel agency or a security wing thereof with operations overseas. But these proposals did not get off the ground due to last-minute bureaucratic obstacles”. The current diplomatic cover “limits access to spot real targets” and causes issues on handling “high-value assets”. It also restricted gathering intelligence in specialised fields like economics and technology. “While working on the report, we noted that a balance must be maintained between operational efficiency and oversight mechanisms,” Banerji told Outlook. “All major democracies have gone in for several tiers of accountability and oversight and it empowers intelligence agencies to produce sharper results.”

The last major institutional and systemic reform in India’s national security was undertaken in the aftermath of the Kargil war. But in 2008, when LeT terrorists attacked Mumbai, it revealed that much of the improvements envisaged had failed to materialise. Now, an attempt has been made to address the needs of India’s intelligence community rather than take a crisis-driven approach. Hopefully, those responsible for India’s security will approach the recommendations with an open mind.

 

[harsh1488]

but isnt RAW supporting terrorism through out the region as mentioned by many pakistani members so how can it be so crappy if they dont even leave any proof for pakistani govt

 

[ganimi kawa]

That is a nice article. It does highlight some key issues ailing the Indian spy agencies. Press reports passed off as secret intelligence and poor recruitment policies have indeed been the achilles heel for us since a long time.


There really is no substitute for a robust intelligence network if we are to assert ourselves as a regional power, economical as well as military.

 

[angeldemon_007]

This article came 4-5 days back....Its a very nice article, i am posting it again.

Wannabe agents minus intelligence

New Delhi, Feb. 23: A candidate appearing before an interview board for a job with a desperately short-staffed intelligence agency identified Hyderabad, not Bangalore, as the capital of Karnataka.

Another candidate, asked about his opinion on the situation in Kashmir and what role cross-border infiltration played, was so nervous that he could barely stutter a reply.

A “tail-end” syndrome is plaguing India’s intelligence services that are attracting only those who are at the bottom of the pile in the civil services exams conducted by the Union Public Service Commission, a study by two think tanks, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and the Observer Research Foundation, has found.

In the shadowy world of espionage, the methods of functioning are rarely publicised. But the report by the IDSA and the ORF casts light on glaring communication gaps and deficiencies in and among the agencies. The outfits are hampered not only by the poor quality of staff but also by an absence of scientists and technologists who can deal with modern snooping equipment confidently.

Findings of the report were presented here today to a gathering of retired and serving intelligence officers and a prominent politician who often speaks for the Congress. Senior intelligence operatives are now saying there is a case for a direct recruitment system so that they are able to attract better talent to become agents, just like the UK’s MI-5 has done.

A retired bureaucrat who is often invited to interview prospective candidates said: “We are sent a list of candidates who are basically rejects of the other services. They either do not have it in them (to make the grade) or are overawed by the interview board and the questions or just do not turn up even after being appointed.”

The upshot is that the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the cabinet secretariat, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the National Security Council Secretariat, the National Technical Research Organisation — in fact, the entire alphabet soup of intelligence agencies run by the Centre — including the Military Intelligence and the Defence Intelligence Agency are unable to fill crucial posts.

The report, only parts of which were presented by the research team led by a retired IAS officer who served with the cabinet secretariat, urges the government to consider a drastic overhaul of the intelligence gathering, analysis and sharing mechanism.

In a marked departure from Union home minister P. Chidambaram’s proposal to make a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) an overarching intelligence outfit, the report treats the suggested centre as just one among several.

It says the government should review the role of the national security advisor (NSA). The NSA has in effect become the “chief diplomatic adviser” to the Prime Minister.

The report recommends that the government study the creation of a new portfolio in the cabinet — a minister for security because of the way the NSA’s role has evolved.

It recommends that a National Intelligence Co-ordinator reporting to the NSA should become the nodal office through which all intelligence agencies interact. During their study, the researchers said they found that the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the National Security Council Secretariat — which were merged and then separated — often overlapped.

The researchers found that even in Indian embassies, high commissions and consulates abroad, there was a disconnect between the heads of missions and the intelligence operatives. “It is all right if heads of missions want to know about developments but operatives feel uncomfortable about liaising because they are asked questions on operational issues (such as sources and informants),” one researcher said.

The researchers found that though RAW — the agency for gathering external intelligence — has 21 senior posts (of the rank of joint secretary and above) from the cabinet committee on appointments for officers from the armed forces, it was making do with only 13. The army, navy and the air force were unwilling to spare their resources, citing a shortage of officers.

The study found that while most operatives wanted to be intelligence-gatherers — because that is the “glamour job” — there was a reluctance to be analysts. Agents were not familiar with the language and the area they were assigned to.

“It may so often be that a man in China does not know Chinese, another in Russia may not know Russian and another in the Middle East will not know Arabic or Persian but the guy in Washington will know English,” the researcher scoffed.

The Telegraph - Calcutta (Kolkata) | Frontpage | Wannabe agents minus intelligence