Cybernetics
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A country's scope in operation and the strategy that is manifested is dependent on its perceived abilities and internal interests. France has its own geopolitical interests. Its vision is partly conjoined (though it often acts outside it, such as in Africa) with the greater entity of NATO which is underpinned by the US. This could contribute to its "small-vision" as it is a cog in a wheel not necessarily a bad thing for itself, it is for long term survival.
France and most major powers understand the need to maintain a "sharp sword" not just having many swords. Occasional usage in combat acts as a grinding stone and marketing for its "sword vendors", sword markers are a strategic asset that will provide the nation greater chance of long term survival. Sadly many costs are externalised onto proxies. China also had emphasis on "sharp swords". In the past it spent little on individual combat gear (that is set to change with more overseas deployment) but focuses its funds on research and deployment of high end weapon systems, cyber, "assassin's mace", "underground great wall", and networked weapons, etc, assets that are less visible but vital in great power relations. It strategically chose to focus on the largest and most complex systems as its core while assets like fighter jets, tanks, missiles, etc are "add-ons" for when there is more resources, this is fundamentally different to smaller nations due to perceived long term capability and needs. It is not in active conflict and soldiers with good individual combat gear isn't what can be used to posture against other great powers. UK chose to downsize its navy while maintaining a relatively technologically advanced one. As weapon systems become more complex and requiring a diverse industrial system to support, relatively small nations can no longer compete in all areas of this activity due to the need for specialisation in order to stay competitive. Only the largest and most advanced of large industrial systems are capable of playing the role of system integrator and developing increasingly complex systems domestically. For the West it is currently the US though if Europe was its own entity it could theoretically be capable of being independent but it is currently non-centralised, you need a defacto deepstate to coordinate these projects. Smaller nations can choose either to lose competitiveness (relative measure) or join a broader system that is capable of creating these high end systems.
Eventually this means the system integrator and ones that hold the key technologies hold a monopoly on war making or long term strategy. The holder of the key technologies knows ways to counter its own creations. These visible and fancy weapon systems are all supported by less flashy and less visible assets/industries that are vital in its production and operation. War making abilities make or break a nation in the long run.
The technology is the seed, having plenty is not important but having good ones are. That seed is active and requires an active environment, maintaining industrial capacity is the environment it needs to survive.
A good part of the long term power relations in the middle east will depend on Iran's ability to modernise which is also partly dependent on external factors. If sanctions are not applied on Iran, it would IMO modernise at a rapid pace. Its fundamentals are good but its external environment is terrible.
The Syrian war had been ongoing for many years now with no stable end game in sight. A rump state scenario is entirely possible. There is too much of a balance of power dynamic there and no major power is willing to bog themselves down in a major conflict. Lack of a major power delta creates a meat grinder situation.
"There is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged warfare."- Sun Tzu
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