nwmalik
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you mean the same people who said WMD in Iraq.
FM meetings : Peace momentum stalls
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Bang Galore
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Burying the India-Pakistan dialogue for now | Analysis & Opinion |
Burying the India-Pakistan dialogue for now
The foreign ministers of India and Pakistan have returned home, licking their wounds from their latest failed engagement. Both sides are blaming each other for not only failing to make any progress, but also souring ties further, with Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and his Indian counterpart S.M.Krishna openly sparring at a news conference following the talks in Islamabad. Qureshi suggested Krishna did not seem to have the full mandate to conduct negotiations because directions were being given from New Delhi throughout the day-long talks, drawing rebuke from India which said the foreign minister had been insulted on Pakistani soil.
Some people are asking why bother going through this painful exercise at this time when the chances of of the two sides making even the slightest concession are next to zero? India and Pakistan may actually be doing each other more damage by holding these high-profile, high-pressure meetings where the domestic media and the opposition in both the countries is watching for the slightest sign of capitulation by either government.
Its the worlds longest running soap opera, made for great television viewing, says a blog on the Indian National Interest. These events have become the drivers of the process each such opportunity attracting saturated media coverage and intense public scrutiny in both countries.
And these are only talks about what to talk about since they cant even agree on whether terrorism should be front and centre of the dialogue as New Delhi wants or the row over Kashmir be given top billing as Pakistan wants. If anything, the precarious relationship between India and Pakistan deteriorated after the countries two foreign ministers haggled in day-long sessions on July 15 not over substance but over what issues they would discuss and when they would discuss them, argues Michael Hughes in the Huffington Post
Thats pretty much been the the way the implacable foes have approached each public engagement for several decades except for bursts of high-powered diplomacy such as Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee riding the first bus service between New Delhi to Lahore in 1999 in a dramatic gesture to breach the walls of distrust that some compared to Egyptian President Anwar Sadats trip to Israel. Some of us who followed Vajpayee to the impenetrable border thought history was being made and that the whole India-Pakistan narrative was being transformed. But, as has happened so often in the past, Vajpayees peace-making ended in spectacular failure when three months later his government confronted hundreds of thousands of fighters backed by the Pakistani army who had occupied Indias part of Kashmir.
Two years later,Vajpayee made a second bold move for peace inviting President Pervez Musharraf for talks in Agra, the city of the Taj Mahal, to try and find a way to end half a century of animosity and get the two countries to live at peace with each other. Those marathon talks, again under the harsh glare of the media camped outside the hotel where they met, ended in failure with a bitterly disappointed Musharraf - who was equally determined in his pursuit of peace leaving for home in the dead of the night with barely a goodbye. Again, if you were there that night, you couldnt help thinking tthat the burden of expectations ultimately proved too much for the two unlikely peace-makers Vajpayee a dyed-in-the-wool Hindu nationalist leader and Musharraf, a military general who had fought Indian forces.
In hindsight then, the only times when the two countries have made real progress and even coming close to a breakthrough on Kashmir, have been when high-powered interlocutors have held talks away from the public eye, often in third countries. Three years ago these interlocutors were nearly ready to deliver a deal on Kashmir that has kept them apart for 60 years but political instability in Pakistan leading to Musharrafs resignation dashed all hopes. Again it was done in secret and these details are only now coming out. Which only goes to show that the only way the neighbours can overcome the trust deficit is to conduct negotiations under the radar, allowing them to explore a range of options including those they wold flinch from in the public glare. It also gives their governments the cover of plausible deniability.
At the moment, the two sides seem so far apart, though, that even a worthwhile Track Two engagement seem a bridge too far. New evidence has emerged that Pakistans ISI was involved in the Mumbai assault of 2008, Indian officials said based on the interrogation of Pakistan- American David Headley who has pleaded guilty to working with the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba to plan the attacks. Indeed, a top Indian official went public with the claims, just ahead of the foreign ministers talks, effectively sealing their fate.
Which begs the question why Delhi went through the talks in the first place ? Outside of the obvious attempt to assuage U.S. leaders, the biggest riddle is why India would ever agree to meet with Pakistan to discuss issues of trust in the first place, when India now has definitive proof in hand that Pakistans intelligence agency, army and navy were in league with the hateful Islamic jihadist group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks that led to the deaths of 173 people. Hughes says.
Equally, the mood is hardening on the other side of the border. Pakistan, as I wrote in this analysis, is the main power broker in the quickening search for a political settlement of the Afghan conflict, leaving India counting its losses after investing blood and treasure. The military led by General Ashfaq Kayani, who has just been given a rare three-year extension, is no mood to compromise with India as it seizes the upper hand in Afghanistan.
India must awaken to the reality that Pakistans army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani smells blood and thinks he can knock India out of the box in Afghanistan and he certainly isnt going to wait for the trust talks to come to fruition. The U.S. desperately needs Pakistan evidenced by the mad cash the U.S. has dished out and Kayani knows this and is going to make sure Pakistan has a foothold in Kabul when the dust settles. Its a good wager the wise General isnt going to let a minor issue impede progress, including the fact that Pakistans entire armed forces have been implicated in a terror plot, Hughes wrote.
Is it time then to inter the India-Pakistan dialogue, at least in its current, theatrical form ? There are too many layers to the Indo-Pak engagement on both sides of the border. The process as we understand it today driven by events and personalities is not only a non-starter but akin to a proverbial dead horse. When you are riding a dead horse, buying a stronger whip or greater riding ability wont help it move forward. Harnessing several dead horses together to increase the speed or asserting that This is the way we always have ridden this horse wont help either, says the Indian National Interest. It is time for India to dismount this dead horse.
Burying the India-Pakistan dialogue for now
The foreign ministers of India and Pakistan have returned home, licking their wounds from their latest failed engagement. Both sides are blaming each other for not only failing to make any progress, but also souring ties further, with Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and his Indian counterpart S.M.Krishna openly sparring at a news conference following the talks in Islamabad. Qureshi suggested Krishna did not seem to have the full mandate to conduct negotiations because directions were being given from New Delhi throughout the day-long talks, drawing rebuke from India which said the foreign minister had been insulted on Pakistani soil.
Some people are asking why bother going through this painful exercise at this time when the chances of of the two sides making even the slightest concession are next to zero? India and Pakistan may actually be doing each other more damage by holding these high-profile, high-pressure meetings where the domestic media and the opposition in both the countries is watching for the slightest sign of capitulation by either government.
Its the worlds longest running soap opera, made for great television viewing, says a blog on the Indian National Interest. These events have become the drivers of the process each such opportunity attracting saturated media coverage and intense public scrutiny in both countries.
And these are only talks about what to talk about since they cant even agree on whether terrorism should be front and centre of the dialogue as New Delhi wants or the row over Kashmir be given top billing as Pakistan wants. If anything, the precarious relationship between India and Pakistan deteriorated after the countries two foreign ministers haggled in day-long sessions on July 15 not over substance but over what issues they would discuss and when they would discuss them, argues Michael Hughes in the Huffington Post
Thats pretty much been the the way the implacable foes have approached each public engagement for several decades except for bursts of high-powered diplomacy such as Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee riding the first bus service between New Delhi to Lahore in 1999 in a dramatic gesture to breach the walls of distrust that some compared to Egyptian President Anwar Sadats trip to Israel. Some of us who followed Vajpayee to the impenetrable border thought history was being made and that the whole India-Pakistan narrative was being transformed. But, as has happened so often in the past, Vajpayees peace-making ended in spectacular failure when three months later his government confronted hundreds of thousands of fighters backed by the Pakistani army who had occupied Indias part of Kashmir.
Two years later,Vajpayee made a second bold move for peace inviting President Pervez Musharraf for talks in Agra, the city of the Taj Mahal, to try and find a way to end half a century of animosity and get the two countries to live at peace with each other. Those marathon talks, again under the harsh glare of the media camped outside the hotel where they met, ended in failure with a bitterly disappointed Musharraf - who was equally determined in his pursuit of peace leaving for home in the dead of the night with barely a goodbye. Again, if you were there that night, you couldnt help thinking tthat the burden of expectations ultimately proved too much for the two unlikely peace-makers Vajpayee a dyed-in-the-wool Hindu nationalist leader and Musharraf, a military general who had fought Indian forces.
In hindsight then, the only times when the two countries have made real progress and even coming close to a breakthrough on Kashmir, have been when high-powered interlocutors have held talks away from the public eye, often in third countries. Three years ago these interlocutors were nearly ready to deliver a deal on Kashmir that has kept them apart for 60 years but political instability in Pakistan leading to Musharrafs resignation dashed all hopes. Again it was done in secret and these details are only now coming out. Which only goes to show that the only way the neighbours can overcome the trust deficit is to conduct negotiations under the radar, allowing them to explore a range of options including those they wold flinch from in the public glare. It also gives their governments the cover of plausible deniability.
At the moment, the two sides seem so far apart, though, that even a worthwhile Track Two engagement seem a bridge too far. New evidence has emerged that Pakistans ISI was involved in the Mumbai assault of 2008, Indian officials said based on the interrogation of Pakistan- American David Headley who has pleaded guilty to working with the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba to plan the attacks. Indeed, a top Indian official went public with the claims, just ahead of the foreign ministers talks, effectively sealing their fate.
Which begs the question why Delhi went through the talks in the first place ? Outside of the obvious attempt to assuage U.S. leaders, the biggest riddle is why India would ever agree to meet with Pakistan to discuss issues of trust in the first place, when India now has definitive proof in hand that Pakistans intelligence agency, army and navy were in league with the hateful Islamic jihadist group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks that led to the deaths of 173 people. Hughes says.
Equally, the mood is hardening on the other side of the border. Pakistan, as I wrote in this analysis, is the main power broker in the quickening search for a political settlement of the Afghan conflict, leaving India counting its losses after investing blood and treasure. The military led by General Ashfaq Kayani, who has just been given a rare three-year extension, is no mood to compromise with India as it seizes the upper hand in Afghanistan.
India must awaken to the reality that Pakistans army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani smells blood and thinks he can knock India out of the box in Afghanistan and he certainly isnt going to wait for the trust talks to come to fruition. The U.S. desperately needs Pakistan evidenced by the mad cash the U.S. has dished out and Kayani knows this and is going to make sure Pakistan has a foothold in Kabul when the dust settles. Its a good wager the wise General isnt going to let a minor issue impede progress, including the fact that Pakistans entire armed forces have been implicated in a terror plot, Hughes wrote.
Is it time then to inter the India-Pakistan dialogue, at least in its current, theatrical form ? There are too many layers to the Indo-Pak engagement on both sides of the border. The process as we understand it today driven by events and personalities is not only a non-starter but akin to a proverbial dead horse. When you are riding a dead horse, buying a stronger whip or greater riding ability wont help it move forward. Harnessing several dead horses together to increase the speed or asserting that This is the way we always have ridden this horse wont help either, says the Indian National Interest. It is time for India to dismount this dead horse.
TaimiKhan
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Sorry Sir, but i have not mentioned anything being stealing, so i have no idea from where have you brought in the stealing thing. I just mentioned talks on water thing.
Plus i talked about water thing based on personal viewing of the rivers which have reduced water flow especially since the Indian dam constructions as well as lot of land becoming infertile due to less water. Why don't you come to Pakistan and see for yourselve. Water wastage is something else, which has been going on for decades and for rightly reasons steps should be taken for it.
And plzz don't bring in Hilary Clinton, she and US administration are the biggest liars and hypocrites.
Do come to Pakistan and see things for yourself.
TaimiKhan
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I am a mod over here, if it had been upto me, i would have done exactly what you just mentioned and even more, but unfortunately i can just say it for now and not act.
I don't need to give you support for that as this is what is in my mind also and you are not the one to be teaching me that.
www.outlookindia.com | Interview with FS on Indo-Pak talks
Foreign secretary Nirupama Rao was part of the Indian negotiating team at the failed Indo-Pak talks last month. In this interview with Pranay Sharma, she explains what happened and how India plans to engage with Pakistan in future. Excerpts:
Why did the foreign ministers’ meet in Islamabad end in such a disaster?
Disaster is the wrong word. Every Indo-Pak meeting is an exploration, a quest, an initiation. No absolutes can be applied while describing such meetings. Given the 60 years of relations, it should be apparent that there are no shortcuts to success. Moreover, a press conference cannot be the gauge with which to judge what transpired at the meeting.
Since Indo-Pak relations are fraught with such nasty surprises, why did you not stick to a joint statement instead of a joint press conference?
There are no easy or simple prescriptions. A categorical conclusion that a joint statement would have been better does not simply follow. The convention of a joint press conference is widely practised today when high-level diplomatic meetings take place. The opening statements made by the two foreign ministers were balanced in their tone and substance. At some stage into the press conference, after four questions had been raised—two from the Indian and two from the Pakistani side—as previously agreed, foreign minister (Shah Mahmood) Qureshi decided to allow more questions. Perhaps the outcome would have been less tendentious if this turn of event had not taken place.
When the press conference took this turn, why couldn’t you intervene and end S.M. Krishna’s agony?
Our minister was never in agony. I stoutly refute that. He is a seasoned and experienced minister. He was calm and restrained throughout—a perfect example of grace under pressure. He held his positions with equanimity and confidence. There was no intervention required.
The Pakistani side says you were constantly on the phone to get instructions from Delhi, implying you were not clear about your bottomline. Is that correct?
We had a very clear brief for the Islamabad talks. We knew our bottomline—and we enunciated it with clarity and precision. Normal communications with our government were maintained—as is always the case in delicate negotiations such as these. To insinuate that this was evidence of not being prepared is unfortunate, to say the very least.
Has India learnt any lessons from the press conference experience?
Whatever the Pakistani motives may have been, showing restraint, maturity and sobriety, as our minister did, cannot be construed as a drawback. Our minister conveyed through his demeanour and responses the strength, confidence and conviction of what India stands for. I know that the succinctness and calm with which our minister enunciated our position has been well-recognised.
What happens to Indo-Pak talks now?
I believe the dust needs to settle. Our minister of external affairs has invited the foreign minister of Pakistan to India for a continuation of our dialogue. A genuine, carefully formulated and reasonable approach to these talks by India, which is the victim of terrorism unleashed from Pakistani soil and territory under its control, should not be under- estimated and under-valued by Pakistan.
More than 20 months have passed since 26/11. Can you mention one significant step that Pakistan has taken against those behind the terror attack to instil confidence in India?
The very fact that Pakistan acknowledged that the Mumbai attack was planned and executed from Pakistan by some of its nationals was a signal development. Of course, while some steps have been taken on the Mumbai case by Pakistan, including arrests of seven persons, and the declaration of 20 more as proclaimed offenders, much more needs to be done. The focused and determined investigation of the conspiracy, the bringing of the perpetrators to justice, are all tasks that remain to be completed. The trial has moved at a glacial pace. This is a matter of concern.
When India talks about the ‘perpetrators’ of 26/11, does it include the ISI since the agency, according to information and evidence that are now with India, had been in total control of the operation?
India has not hesitated to share concrete evidence on the real masterminds and handlers of the Mumbai terror attack with Pakistan. During the visit of our home minister to Pakistan in June, further evidence was shared in this connection. For Pakistan to state that terrorism has not been used as an instrument of policy against India, and that there is no involvement of state actors in such activity, is unacceptable. The evidence suggests otherwise. Today, Pakistan says it is a victim of terrorism. It is unfortunate that many innocent citizens have lost their lives in terrorist attacks in Pakistan. But the fact that Pakistan suffers from the scourge of terrorism does not diminish its responsibility to address India’s legitimate concerns about Pakistan-organised terrorism against our citizens and our territory. A selective approach in such matters is not acceptable.
There’s a feeling that the external affairs ministry has kept the home ministry out of the loop on David Coleman Headley’s confession. Is that correct?
I want to dispel the impression that there is insufficient coordination between the two ministries. We are in constant communication. In the case of Headley, the mea and mha worked together to coordinate our actions and ensure that the national interest was met. In a matter of such critical importance, it could not be otherwise. We were not out of the loop.
How does India view the Wikileaks expose which shows how the isi had been behind every attack against Indians in Afghanistan?
What the disclosures indicate has been in the realm of our knowledge even before the leaks. Our concerns in this regard have been articulated on a number of occasions. Pakistani officials have time and again spoken out against India’s presence in Afghanistan and made no secret about their deep hostility about the work we do in that country. Our officials and our citizens have been victims of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. The Afghan authorities have said that those responsible for them were enemies of India-Afghan friendship. Seen against the background of Pakistani hostility towards India’s presence in Afghanistan, all this raises troubling questions about Pakistani complicity. The Wikileaks disclosures have brought this into even sharper focus.
With so much information about the isi now in the public domain, how do you see talks with Pakistan going forward?
The path to a lasting peace with Pakistan will not be easy. We have never nurtured any illusions about this. It is because of the inherently complex and seemingly intractable nature of our differences that we seek a way forward to address the difficulties. A serious, sustained and comprehensive dialogue remains the best option. But such a dialogue can thrive only in an atmosphere free of terrorism directed against us from Pakistan. Otherwise, the trust deficit and public alienation towards Pakistan will only deepen.
Foreign secretary Nirupama Rao was part of the Indian negotiating team at the failed Indo-Pak talks last month. In this interview with Pranay Sharma, she explains what happened and how India plans to engage with Pakistan in future. Excerpts:
Why did the foreign ministers’ meet in Islamabad end in such a disaster?
Disaster is the wrong word. Every Indo-Pak meeting is an exploration, a quest, an initiation. No absolutes can be applied while describing such meetings. Given the 60 years of relations, it should be apparent that there are no shortcuts to success. Moreover, a press conference cannot be the gauge with which to judge what transpired at the meeting.
Since Indo-Pak relations are fraught with such nasty surprises, why did you not stick to a joint statement instead of a joint press conference?
There are no easy or simple prescriptions. A categorical conclusion that a joint statement would have been better does not simply follow. The convention of a joint press conference is widely practised today when high-level diplomatic meetings take place. The opening statements made by the two foreign ministers were balanced in their tone and substance. At some stage into the press conference, after four questions had been raised—two from the Indian and two from the Pakistani side—as previously agreed, foreign minister (Shah Mahmood) Qureshi decided to allow more questions. Perhaps the outcome would have been less tendentious if this turn of event had not taken place.
When the press conference took this turn, why couldn’t you intervene and end S.M. Krishna’s agony?
Our minister was never in agony. I stoutly refute that. He is a seasoned and experienced minister. He was calm and restrained throughout—a perfect example of grace under pressure. He held his positions with equanimity and confidence. There was no intervention required.
The Pakistani side says you were constantly on the phone to get instructions from Delhi, implying you were not clear about your bottomline. Is that correct?
We had a very clear brief for the Islamabad talks. We knew our bottomline—and we enunciated it with clarity and precision. Normal communications with our government were maintained—as is always the case in delicate negotiations such as these. To insinuate that this was evidence of not being prepared is unfortunate, to say the very least.
Has India learnt any lessons from the press conference experience?
Whatever the Pakistani motives may have been, showing restraint, maturity and sobriety, as our minister did, cannot be construed as a drawback. Our minister conveyed through his demeanour and responses the strength, confidence and conviction of what India stands for. I know that the succinctness and calm with which our minister enunciated our position has been well-recognised.
What happens to Indo-Pak talks now?
I believe the dust needs to settle. Our minister of external affairs has invited the foreign minister of Pakistan to India for a continuation of our dialogue. A genuine, carefully formulated and reasonable approach to these talks by India, which is the victim of terrorism unleashed from Pakistani soil and territory under its control, should not be under- estimated and under-valued by Pakistan.
More than 20 months have passed since 26/11. Can you mention one significant step that Pakistan has taken against those behind the terror attack to instil confidence in India?
The very fact that Pakistan acknowledged that the Mumbai attack was planned and executed from Pakistan by some of its nationals was a signal development. Of course, while some steps have been taken on the Mumbai case by Pakistan, including arrests of seven persons, and the declaration of 20 more as proclaimed offenders, much more needs to be done. The focused and determined investigation of the conspiracy, the bringing of the perpetrators to justice, are all tasks that remain to be completed. The trial has moved at a glacial pace. This is a matter of concern.
When India talks about the ‘perpetrators’ of 26/11, does it include the ISI since the agency, according to information and evidence that are now with India, had been in total control of the operation?
India has not hesitated to share concrete evidence on the real masterminds and handlers of the Mumbai terror attack with Pakistan. During the visit of our home minister to Pakistan in June, further evidence was shared in this connection. For Pakistan to state that terrorism has not been used as an instrument of policy against India, and that there is no involvement of state actors in such activity, is unacceptable. The evidence suggests otherwise. Today, Pakistan says it is a victim of terrorism. It is unfortunate that many innocent citizens have lost their lives in terrorist attacks in Pakistan. But the fact that Pakistan suffers from the scourge of terrorism does not diminish its responsibility to address India’s legitimate concerns about Pakistan-organised terrorism against our citizens and our territory. A selective approach in such matters is not acceptable.
There’s a feeling that the external affairs ministry has kept the home ministry out of the loop on David Coleman Headley’s confession. Is that correct?
I want to dispel the impression that there is insufficient coordination between the two ministries. We are in constant communication. In the case of Headley, the mea and mha worked together to coordinate our actions and ensure that the national interest was met. In a matter of such critical importance, it could not be otherwise. We were not out of the loop.
How does India view the Wikileaks expose which shows how the isi had been behind every attack against Indians in Afghanistan?
What the disclosures indicate has been in the realm of our knowledge even before the leaks. Our concerns in this regard have been articulated on a number of occasions. Pakistani officials have time and again spoken out against India’s presence in Afghanistan and made no secret about their deep hostility about the work we do in that country. Our officials and our citizens have been victims of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. The Afghan authorities have said that those responsible for them were enemies of India-Afghan friendship. Seen against the background of Pakistani hostility towards India’s presence in Afghanistan, all this raises troubling questions about Pakistani complicity. The Wikileaks disclosures have brought this into even sharper focus.
With so much information about the isi now in the public domain, how do you see talks with Pakistan going forward?
The path to a lasting peace with Pakistan will not be easy. We have never nurtured any illusions about this. It is because of the inherently complex and seemingly intractable nature of our differences that we seek a way forward to address the difficulties. A serious, sustained and comprehensive dialogue remains the best option. But such a dialogue can thrive only in an atmosphere free of terrorism directed against us from Pakistan. Otherwise, the trust deficit and public alienation towards Pakistan will only deepen.
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