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Flight MH17 - What You're Not Being Told

The dutch safety board? Ahahaha. Nato proxies investigating their own crimes. What idiot would truly take anything these facists say at face value.

What we are not being told? That kolomoisky and the kiev junta had this passenger plane shot down by ukrainian airforce with the full suport and complicity of nato member states. This was done as a false flag attempt to try and portray Russia as the aggressor and the New Russians as terrorists. As soon as nato realized just how *** backwards the ukies fucked up the op and the opsec ( intercepted calls of ukie military and politicians admitting to the crime ) they quickly went into clean up mode. Blamed Russia, started a fake investigation and erased the whole terrorist act from news and media coverage. Now its only brought up by the talking heads on msm as " Russias aggression ".

This is pretty clear cut. Now I know nato trolls are paid to be ignorant of the actual facts and only post nato sources. But how could any other thinking individual ( not nato and uncle sam cock suckers) really not see whats so clear to the rest of the world?

Nato doesnt care about the truth. They already know it. They have real time sat video of the plane being shot down by ukraine. They are only interested in covering up their crimes ( by trying to create doubt and obfuscating the facts. I mean why else do they pay all these internet trolls to flood these forums with gibberish instead of the clear basic facts? ) and making the truth seem " unattainable " as in " we will never know ". What fucking idiots. Seriously. Any individual who has really looked at what happened and is still saying to themselves " ill take natos word for it, we will never know, unless the nato dutch shills tell me what to believe " deserves to be shot on site so they cant reproduce their retardation into the world.


Ok. End rant.
 
Preliminary report points towards external cause of MH17 crash
No evidence of technical faults

Flight MH17 with a Boeing 777-200 operated by Malaysia Airlines broke up in the air probably as the result of structural damage caused by a large number of high-energy objects that penetrated the aircraft from outside. This is mentioned in the preliminary report on the investigation into the crash of MH17 that has been published today by the Dutch Safety Board. There are no indications that the MH17 crash was caused by a technical fault or by actions of the crew.
Dutch Safety Board | Investigations & Publication | Investigation crash MH17, 17 July 2014

Full page here (includes PDF links to press announcement and report)
Dutch Safety Board | Investigations & Publication | Investigation crash MH17, 17 July 2014

The preliminary report in English http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/upload...3acad0ceprem-rapport-mh-17-en-interactief.pdf

Excerpt
This preliminary report is published under what are complex circumstances to conduct
the investigation. It is possible that the scope may change as the investigation progresses.
Further work will at least include the following areas of interest to substantiate the factual
information regarding:
• analyses of data, including CVR, FDR and other sources, recorded onboard the
aircraft;
• analyses of recorded ATC surveillance data and radio communication;
• analyses of the meteorological circumstances;
• forensic examination of wreckage, if recovered and possible foreign objects, if found;
• result of the pathological investigation;
• analyses of the in-flight break up sequence;
• assessment of the operator’s and State of Occurrence’s management of flight safety
over a region of conflict or high security risk;
•any other areas that are identified during the investigation

The investigation is ongoingand a final report will be published in due course. The Dutch Safety Board was assistedby experts from Australia (ATSB), France (BEA), Germany (BFU), Indonesia (NTSC), Italy(ANSV), Malaysia (DCA), the Russian Federation (Federal Air Transport Agency), InterstateAviation Committee (IAC), Ukraine (NBAAI), the United Kingdom (AAIB), the United States of America (NTSB) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). In addition,
several other countries offered their support to the Dutch Safety Board investigation team.

The investigation is making use of a wide range of information, including:
• aircraft maintenance data obtained from the operator;
• flight operational data obtained from the operator and various international service
providers:
– NOTAMs;
– Flight plan;
– Weather;
– Crew status;
• images available publicly and obtained from the NBAAI, Australian Federal Police
(AFP) and DCA;
• satellite imagery taken in the days after the occurrence;
• Air Traffic Control (ATC) surveillance data obtained from UkSATSE;
• ATC surveillance data obtained from the Russian Federation;
• Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data from the aircraft.
 
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@Pengiun Where blackbox go? Were crash investigators able to retrieve it ?
 
Research committee

Erwin Muller
Google Translate

Tjibbe Joustra (1951) is Chairman of the Safety Board. Since February 1, 2011 He began his career at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and was there from 1987 Secretary-General. In 2002-2004 Mr. Joustra was chairman of the UWV and then five years of national terrorism coordinator. In the years 2009-2011 he led include the Product Board for Horticulture.
Google Translate

Prof.dr.ir. M.B.A. van Asselt
Prof.dr.ir. M.B.A. van Asselt (http://www.narcis.nl)

BJAM Welten (MA)
former corpschief (commissioner) Regional police Amsterdam-Amstelland, currently special advisor.

@Pengiun Where blackbox go? Were crash investigators able to retrieve it ?
See report par. 2.9

The flight recorders were not recovered from the wreckage site by investigators of the Annex 13 investigation team, but individuals unknown to the team took them from the site. On 21 July 2014, the recorders were handed over to a Malaysian official in Donetsk by representatives of the armed group controlling the area. The recorders were transported by train from Donetsk to Kharkiv in custody of a Malaysian official and accompanied by Dutch officials and then transported to Kiev also in custody of a Malaysian official and accompanied by Dutch and ICAO officials. In Kiev the recorders were handed over to the Dutch Safety Board on 22 July 2014.

Immediately after the handover to the Dutch Safety Board, the recorders were transported to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch’s laboratory at Farnborough, United Kingdom, accompanied by an international team of air safety investigators from Germany, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and representatives of ICAO. At Farnborough a French investigator joined the team whereupon the work to download the data of both recorders was started. Later on an air safety investigator of the Interstate Aviation Committee also joined the team.

No evidence or indications of manipulation of the recorders were found.

par 2.5 deals with ATC recordings.
 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Crew
  • According to the information received from Malaysia Airlines the crew was properly licensed and had valid medical certificates to conduct the flight.

Aircraft
  • According to the documents, the aircraft was in an airworthy condition at departure from Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, there were no known technical malfunctions.

CVR/FDR
  • No evidence or indications of manipulation of the recorders were found.
  • No aural alerts or warnings of aircraft system malfunctions were heard on the Cockpit Voice Recorder. The communication between the flight crew members gave no indication of any malfunction or emergency prior to the occurrence.
  • The engine parameters were consistent with normal operation during the flight. No engine or aircraft system warnings or cautions were detected.
  • No technical malfunctions or warnings in relation to the event flight were found on Flight Data Recorder data.
  • Both recordings ended at 13.20:03.

ATC / Airspace
  • At the time of the occurrence, flight MH17 was flying at FL330 in unrestricted airspace of the Dnipropetrovs’k (UKDV) FIR in the eastern part of the Ukraine, the aircraft flew on a constant heading, speed and altitude when the Flight Data Recording ended. UkSATSE had issued NOTAMs that restricted access to the airspace below FL320.
  • The last radio transmission made by the crew began at 13.19:56 hrs and ended at 13.19:59 hrs.
  • The last radio transmissions made by Dnipropetrovs’k air traffic control centre to flight MH17 began at 13.20:00 hrs and ended at 13.22:02 hrs. The crew did not respond to these transmissions.
  • No distress messages were received by the ATC.
  • According to radar data three commercial aircraft were in the same Control Area as flight MH17 at the time of the occurrence. All were under control of Dnipro Radar. At 13.20 hrs the distance between the closest aircraft and MH17 was approximately 30 km.

Damage
  • Damage observed on the forward fuselage and cockpit section of the aircraft appears toindicate that there were impacts from a large number of high-energy objects from outside the aircraft.
  • The pattern of damage observed in the forward fuselage and cockpit section of theaircraft was not consistent with the damage that would be expected from any knownfailure mode of the aircraft, its engines or systems.
  • The fact that there were many pieces of aircraft structure distributed over a large area,indicated that the aircraft broke up in the air.
[Conclusion box]
  • Based on the preliminary findings to date, no indications of any technical oroperational issues were found with the aircraft or crew prior to the ending of theCVR and FDR recording at 13.20:03 hrs.
  • The damage observed in the forward section of the aircraft appears to indicate that the aircraft was penetrated by a large number of high-energy objects from outside the aircraft. It is likely that this damage resulted in a loss of structural integrity of theaircraft, leading to an in-flight break up

FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS
This report is preliminary. The information must necessarily be regarded as tentative and
subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available. Further work
will at least include the following areas of interest to substantiate the factual information
regarding:
• detailed analyses of data, including CVR, FDR and other sources, recorded onboard the aircraft;
• detailed analyses of recorded ATC surveillance data and radio communication;
• detailed analyses of the meteorological circumstances;
• forensic examination of wreckage if recovered and possible foreign objects, if found;
• results of the pathological investigation;
• analyses of the in-flight break up sequence;
• assessment of the operator’s and State of Occurrence’s management of flight safetyover a region of conflict or high security risk;
• any other areas that are identified during the investigation
 
still could be an air to air missile or Ukrainian BUK missile in the area.
The verdict is still out, yes. But consider...
  • a Buk Telar operating independently can autonomously search a 120 degree sector and track a target, either with radar or optonics, and an individual Telar does not have an IFF facility.
  • An ukrainian BUK Telar would be far less likely to operate on its own, imho. It was reported by Russian media that "A Ukrainian army battalion of Buk air defense systems was deployed near the city of Donetsk a day before the crash of a Malaysian passenger plane on Thursday," and if so a battallion implies a full system i.e. including command vehicles radar vehicles). The article also stated (probably incorrectly) that armed militia fighting Kiev-led forces in eastern Ukraine did not have Buk systems. To the extent that they operate BUK system or components, those militia forces are far more likely to operate an individual Telar than the Ukraininan military. Ukrainian Army Buk Missile Likely Downed Malaysian Plane - Source | World | RIA Novosti
  • An AAM would require the the presence of a fighter aircraft, which would be visible on radar.
  • According to the preliminary report by the DUtch safety board, at 13.20 hrs the distance between the closest aircraft and MH17 was approximately 30 km.
  • A Su-25 can carry K-13 (AA-2 Atoll) or R-60 (AA-8 'Aphid') AAM's, which are IRH, and have ranges far less than 30km (about 1/3). An aircraft gun would require presence within 1-4 km.
 
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Does civilavian trafic controlers use radars to detect airplanes or they use something like transponders ?And why there is no sat evidence of firing a BUK missile at the time in the area?
 
Does civilavian trafic controlers use radars to detect airplanes or they use something like transponders ?And why there is no sat evidence of firing a BUK missile at the time in the area?
WHo says there isn't? Note the areas of further research.

Poor Penguin, so much lies and yet not many take this crap anyway. :lol:
I'm not sold on any explanation yet and that's something you have difficulty with. You already 'know' for sure. Eventhough you have no access to any primary material. But that's just your 'gut feeling' isn't it.

Kindly point out what you think are lies in the preliminary report of the Dutch Safety board. Do also explain why and provide valid materials in support of your (and contrary to their) reading of the issues.

Oh wait, that would actually entail work for you.... as opposed to taking oneliner pot shots
Time to get out of your lazyboy.... and post something substantive and/or worthwhile.
 
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The verdict is still out, yes. But consider...
  • a Buk Telar operating independently can autonomously search a 120 degree sector and track a target, either with radar or optonics, and an individual Telar does not have an IFF facility.
  • An ukrainian BUK Telar would be far less likely to operate on its own, imho. It was reported by Russian media that "A Ukrainian army battalion of Buk air defense systems was deployed near the city of Donetsk a day before the crash of a Malaysian passenger plane on Thursday," and if so a battallion implies a full system i.e. including command vehicles radar vehicles). The article also stated (probably incorrectly) that armed militia fighting Kiev-led forces in eastern Ukraine did not have Buk systems. To the extent that they operate BUK system or components, those militia forces are far more likely to operate an individual Telar than the Ukraininan military. Ukrainian Army Buk Missile Likely Downed Malaysian Plane - Source | World | RIA Novosti
  • An AAM would require the the presence of a fighter aircraft, which would be visible on radar.
  • According to the preliminary report by the DUtch safety board, at 13.20 hrs the distance between the closest aircraft and MH17 was approximately 30 km.
  • A Su-25 can carry K-13 (AA-2 Atoll) or R-60 (AA-8 'Aphid') AAM's, which are IRH, and have ranges far less than 30km (about 1/3). An aircraft gun would require presence within 1-4 km.
I see I misread the report, which states the closest civilian aircraft was approx 30km.
 
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WHo says there isn't? Note the areas of further research.


I'm not sold on any explanation yet and that's something you have difficulty. You already 'know' for sure. Eventhough you have no access to any primary material. But that's just your 'gut feeling' isn't it.

Kindly point out what you think are lies in the preliminary report of the Dutch Safety board. Do also explain why and provide valid materials in support of your (and contrary to their) reading of the issues.

Oh wait, that would actually entail work for you.... as opposed to taking oneliner pot shots
Time to get out of your lazyboy.... and post something substantive and/or worthwhile.


Blablabla

Look up for your great friends: Azov Battalion - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

And this: The ideology of of the Social-National... - Nationalist traditions of Ukraine | Facebook

They love Jews!
 
Does civilavian trafic controlers use radars to detect airplanes or they use something like transponders ?

http://www.indracompany.com/sites/default/files/indra_in_ukraine_0.pdf.

December 2010
Indra will supply the systems for the control center that serves the airport of Kharkiv, one of the cities that will host Euro 2012 football matches in Ukraine. Additionally, Indra will provide the control center of Dnipropetrovsk with new positions for the airport control tower.
Indra has been awarded with this new contract in Ukraine after being selected as contractor for Donetsk airport last summer. These contracts are part of the plans established by UkSATSE (Ukraine air traffic service provider) to prepare the necessary infrastructure for UEFA Euro 2012, whose organization is shared with Poland.
The company will implement its automation air traffic management system in these centres to support approach operations. This will enable the centres to be prepared to cope with the great volume of flights expected as a result of this international event.
Indra’s system offers air traffic controllers a global vision of any movement in the air space. The solution combines the information coming from different sources, such as surveillance data, flight plans, or meteorological information. It also automates most of the activities and detects possible conflicts between aircrafts in advance.
This new contract reinforces Indra’s position in Ukraine and its relationship with the country’s air navigation service provided, UkSATSE. Indra has already supplied Dnipropretrovsk control centre, which coordinates air traffic in Eastern Ukraine, and two monopulse secondary radars deployed in Simferopol and Dnipropetrovsk.
Furthermore, Indra delivered a surface surveillance system (Surface Movement Radar) for Donetsk airport. Indra cutting-edge Surface Movement Radar system allows operations at the airport in events of very low visibility, since it detects the presence of aircrafts, vehicles and obstacles accurately.


Indra to modernise air traffic management system at Ukraine's Simferopol airport - Airport Technology
Indra to modernise air traffic management system at Ukraine's Simferopol airport
5 September 2013

Indra has secured a contract to install its air traffic control system in Ukraine's Simferopol Airport.

The contract is part of the ongoing modernisation of Ukraine's air navigation infrastructure, which is being carried out by UkSATSE, the country's air navigation services provider.
...
Indra, in partnership with UkSATSE, has previously equipped various control centres and airports with its system, and the latest contract has strengthened its relationship as UkSATSE's technology provider.

It also installed an air surveillance radar in both Simferopol and Dnipropetrovsk, and equipped Donetsk Airport with a surface radar that allows it to run operations in adverse weather and low visibility.
 
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Surveillance aids. Primary En-route Surveillance Radars, Secondary En-route Surveillance Radars and Airdrome Surveillance Radars. They are used for surveillance over aircraft in the areas of responsibility of ATS Units, for receipt of information on the aircraft location, which is necessary for the process of Air Traffic Control, and for transfer of necessary radar data to the ATC AS.
...
During the years 2008 – 2009, the ASR-22/AL Air Traffic Control Radar was upgraded and connected to «Tetiana» ATC AS and later, in 2012, it was connected to Aircon 2100 ATC AS.
Uksatse | Donetsk Regional Branch

Aerodrome radar ASR-22AL
Aerotechnica
1b.jpg


Dnipropetrovsk Flight Information Region
In 2010 Mode-S air traffic control radar ATCR 33S/SIR S was implemented, which provides high integrity of radar data.
Украерорух | Дніпропетровський регіональний структурний підрозділ

SELEX Sistemi Integrati Wins Contracts in Ukraine and Malaysia
SELEX Sistemi Integrati
Category: Air Traffic Control Radar Systems | Airport Radar Systems | Radars | 09/03/2011 - 03:32:33
...
The first four agreements refer to contracts underwritten between the Finmeccanica company and UkSATSE, the Ukrainian national service provider. The supply will include several radars and systems which will contribute the technological upgrade of the Ukrainian airports in view of the European football Championship in 2012.
...
provision of five secondary radars (SIR-S advanced) to cover the total en route air space in Ukraine and two new systems made by a primary and secondary radar (two advanced ATCR-33S and two advanced SIR-S), bound to the Donetsk and Kharkov airports.
Air Traffic Control Radars / Systems

Data on the radar
http://infocom.uniroma1.it/~robseu/Radar e navigazione aerea/Seminario 2/seminario AMS 2.pdf
Radar Basics

 
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