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Fareed Zakaria: Let’s be honest, Islam has a problem right now

all pakistanis are taught that pakistan won all wars with india

all pakistanis are taught that 1 pakitani = 10 hindus

lets see when these myths die out

not happened in last 60 years

Just like Indians are taught these days by saffronis that Porus defeated Alexander
 
Indians don't have to defend anyone since its the world view and correct in my opinion. One can argue round and round but truth doesn't change.

You indians are in love to see anything abusing Islam as truth. Open your eyes and if you have some brain left then see how ISIS was first helped by non-Muslim powers now when it has started shattering strategic interests of these Non-Muslim powers well you found fault with Islam.

funny.

Douche to you heroes to many .

:) Then there are no innocent neither no terrorists in the world. Simple as that



Porus lost .

na he won
 
can you suggest a tranlated copy of koran where all these wonderful things you say about it are mentioned?



come on you are not only victims but you are the ones who gave birth to them raised them gave funding to them radicalised them and now when they have turned on you

you are playing the victim card
They were born because off policies off the country in which retard Zakaria lives in USA. USA policies off attacking Muslim lands supporting its touts in governments and most importantly its support off Israel and its mass murder off Muslims are the reasons behind birth of groups like ISIS
 
:) Then there are no innocent neither no terrorists in the world. Simple as that
na he won

There might be no innocents but terrorists are definitely there but again one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter .
 
You indians are in love to see anything abusing Islam as truth. Open your eyes and if you have some brain left then see how ISIS was first helped by non-Muslim powers now when it has started shattering strategic interests of these Non-Muslim powers well you found fault with Islam.

funny.

So you are saying that before ISIS, islamic terrorists were not the biggest problem of the world?

There is a problem, the sooner one can realise and correct it, better it will be for the world.
 
There might be no innocents but terrorists are definitely there but again one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter .

Thats it.
When ISIS is helped and gtrained by US they are freedom fighters for them when they are operating without US control they become terrorists. This logic is stupid and root of all this nonsense going on.
 
So you are saying that before ISIS, islamic terrorists were not the biggest problem of the world?

There is a problem, the sooner one can realise and correct it, better it will be for the world.

:lol: no i meant and i mean Islamic terrorists funded / state sponsor by Non-Muslim terrorists (including Christian terrorist, Jewish terrorists, Hindu terrorists etc etc) were and are threat to the world ;)

exactly

but why was she afraid of falling in thier hands alive ?

For the same reason for which any girl is afraid of walking alone at midnight in Dehli
 
Thats it.
When ISIS is helped and gtrained by US they are freedom fighters for them when they are operating without US control they become terrorists. This logic is stupid and root of all this nonsense going on.


The real roots of this "nonsense" as you call it are much deeper than your trite point:

The Middle East fragments: The rule of the gunman | The Economist

The Middle East fragments
The rule of the gunman
Why post-colonial Arab states are breaking down
From the print edition

20141011_MAD010_0.jpg


THE residents of Derna, a sleepy port in eastern Libya, awoke to important news on October 5th: at a rally in the main square a powerful local militia, the Shura Council of Islamic Youth, pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS), the jihadist group that controls swathes of distant Syria and Iraq, and to its self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. A parade of masked men in heavily armed vehicles honked through the streets to celebrate Derna’s new status as an “emirate” within Mr Baghdadi’s pan-Islamic caliphate.

Three years after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya is in the throes of full-scale disintegration. Yet the collapse of Libya’s state no longer seems an anomaly. Across the Middle East non-state actors increasingly set the agenda, challenging governments, overthrowing them or prompting them to retrench behind increasingly repressive controls.

In Yemen an insurgent group known as the Houthis last month captured the capital, Sana’a, and dictates policies to the rump government, which is also struggling against al-Qaeda; jihadists are blamed for bombings and executions that killed scores this week. Over the three years of Syria’s civil war, the “government” forces battling against myriad rebel groups have increasingly devolved from a formal army into an amalgam of loyalist village-defence units, mafia-likeshabiha gangs, and Shia militiamen imported from Iraq and Lebanon. Lebanon’s own army, long outgunned by the country’s Shia militia, Hizbullah, has itself often acted more like a militia than a formal military force: one unit recently burned down a Syrian refugee camp and beat up its residents after attacks on soldiers by Syrian rebels.

The three-week-long battle for Kobane, a Kurdish enclave along Syria’s border with Turkey, has captured the headlines as a test for the American-led coalition fighting IS. Yet the battle on the ground is one between militias, not armies. Similarly in Iraq, the counter-attack against IS’s shock advance towards the capital, Baghdad, has been led not by the Iraqi army but by local tribesmen, Shia party militias and Kurdish peshmerga. And even these Kurdish fighters, despite the semblance of unified command by the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, are made up of two separate forces controlled by the rival parties that dominate different parts of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Back in Libya, there is not one but two rival governments: one in the capital, Tripoli, and the other in the eastern city of Tobruk. Each claims electoral legitimacy, and each is backed by a quarrelling coalition of militias. In Derna very few of the 80,000 residents felt much joy at learning they were now part of the Shura Council’s “emirate”. Another powerful militia in the town, the Abu Salim Martyr’s Brigade, a local affiliate of al-Qaeda, angrily rejects the notion of seceding from Libya. Rivalry between the jihadist gangs has already led to tit-for-tat murders. The fear is that it may now escalate into open warfare.

Meanwhile, in an apparent effort to assert state control, warplanes have bombed Shura Council bases on the outskirts of the town. They are assumed to be loyal to the Tobruk “government”, but no one is quite sure who ordered the raids or where they were launched from. “Ending this conflict is difficult,” admits Bernardino Leon, the weary UN official tasked with nursing Libya, “because the protagonists are hundreds of militias without a hierarchical relationship between them.”

In explaining the sudden rise of non-state forces in the region, many have faulted the supposed artificiality of Arab states, whose borders were in many cases defined by European colonial administrators. IS boasts of effacing the so-called Sykes-Picot accord between Britain and France that created much of the modern Middle East.

Yet the disintegration has not been limited to peripheral areas: it is the internal form of states, rather than the external shape of their territories, that has provoked a backlash. All too often the region’s insecure, control-obsessed governments—sometimes dominated by minorities—have failed to integrate citizens within an inclusive sense of nationhood. The major political ideologies—Arab nationalism, political Islam and now perhaps violent jihadism—transcend national borders.

Instead Arab rulers have wielded the apparatus of state power to obstruct any potential challenge, centralising all decisions and fomenting and exploiting divisions wherever possible. Syria, for instance, denied formal citizenship to tens of thousands of its Kurds for decades, and, like Iraq under Saddam Hussein, attempted forcibly to Arabise Kurdish regions.

Arab governments also often failed to provide public services or institutions such as decent courts, schools or hospitals, prompting citizens to take matters into their own hands. Especially among the poor and disenfranchised, it was religious groups and charities, many of them financed by conservative Gulf countries, that picked up the slack. National curriculums emphasised historical grievances and inculcated obedience to the state.

Where such hyper-centralised but ineffective one-party (or one-family) states have collapsed, there have been few structures to rebuild social cohesion. What had been small fractures between sects or tribes or ethnicities grew rapidly into wider cracks that are often exploited by external actors eager to exercise influence. Even seemingly benign interventions have made divisions worse: in Syria, competition for aid funding made rivals out of groups ostensibly devoted to the same goal of overthrowing President Hafez Assad.

Depressingly, those Arab states that have weathered the Arab Spring seem to have drawn the wrong lessons. Instead of promoting political reform, many have instead opted to harden the organs of repression. “The police state is back in full force,” says an Egyptian activist. “They are patching every crack in their wall of fear.”

From the print edition: Middle East and Africa

but it ruins your argument that education will solve problems

Not at all. My argument remains perfectly valid in the context of this thread.
 
Islam is just a Religion.It's you people who have a problem.
 
It is rather interesting how people who dont know an iota about Islam are screaming their lungs out for its reform...

Its like saying no I dont agree with so and so and when the so and so comes face to face you ask who he/ she is ....


How about reforming yourself maybe or individuals?

I found @TankMan and @The SC arguments really good :tup:

You do not have to be an automobile engineer to know that something is wrong with a car.

The car was designed for optimal performance and for the riding comfort of its occupants which it did in the past.

If now it is not performing optimally or gives trouble consistently - it needs repairs. Either some components need replacement or the servicing is due.

Maybe bad driving skills of the driver too.
 
The real roots of this "nonsense" as you call it are much deeper than your trite point:

The Middle East fragments: The rule of the gunman | The Economist

The Middle East fragments
The rule of the gunman
Why post-colonial Arab states are breaking down
From the print edition

20141011_MAD010_0.jpg


THE residents of Derna, a sleepy port in eastern Libya, awoke to important news on October 5th: at a rally in the main square a powerful local militia, the Shura Council of Islamic Youth, pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS), the jihadist group that controls swathes of distant Syria and Iraq, and to its self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. A parade of masked men in heavily armed vehicles honked through the streets to celebrate Derna’s new status as an “emirate” within Mr Baghdadi’s pan-Islamic caliphate.

Three years after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya is in the throes of full-scale disintegration. Yet the collapse of Libya’s state no longer seems an anomaly. Across the Middle East non-state actors increasingly set the agenda, challenging governments, overthrowing them or prompting them to retrench behind increasingly repressive controls.

In Yemen an insurgent group known as the Houthis last month captured the capital, Sana’a, and dictates policies to the rump government, which is also struggling against al-Qaeda; jihadists are blamed for bombings and executions that killed scores this week. Over the three years of Syria’s civil war, the “government” forces battling against myriad rebel groups have increasingly devolved from a formal army into an amalgam of loyalist village-defence units, mafia-likeshabiha gangs, and Shia militiamen imported from Iraq and Lebanon. Lebanon’s own army, long outgunned by the country’s Shia militia, Hizbullah, has itself often acted more like a militia than a formal military force: one unit recently burned down a Syrian refugee camp and beat up its residents after attacks on soldiers by Syrian rebels.

The three-week-long battle for Kobane, a Kurdish enclave along Syria’s border with Turkey, has captured the headlines as a test for the American-led coalition fighting IS. Yet the battle on the ground is one between militias, not armies. Similarly in Iraq, the counter-attack against IS’s shock advance towards the capital, Baghdad, has been led not by the Iraqi army but by local tribesmen, Shia party militias and Kurdish peshmerga. And even these Kurdish fighters, despite the semblance of unified command by the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, are made up of two separate forces controlled by the rival parties that dominate different parts of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Back in Libya, there is not one but two rival governments: one in the capital, Tripoli, and the other in the eastern city of Tobruk. Each claims electoral legitimacy, and each is backed by a quarrelling coalition of militias. In Derna very few of the 80,000 residents felt much joy at learning they were now part of the Shura Council’s “emirate”. Another powerful militia in the town, the Abu Salim Martyr’s Brigade, a local affiliate of al-Qaeda, angrily rejects the notion of seceding from Libya. Rivalry between the jihadist gangs has already led to tit-for-tat murders. The fear is that it may now escalate into open warfare.

Meanwhile, in an apparent effort to assert state control, warplanes have bombed Shura Council bases on the outskirts of the town. They are assumed to be loyal to the Tobruk “government”, but no one is quite sure who ordered the raids or where they were launched from. “Ending this conflict is difficult,” admits Bernardino Leon, the weary UN official tasked with nursing Libya, “because the protagonists are hundreds of militias without a hierarchical relationship between them.”

In explaining the sudden rise of non-state forces in the region, many have faulted the supposed artificiality of Arab states, whose borders were in many cases defined by European colonial administrators. IS boasts of effacing the so-called Sykes-Picot accord between Britain and France that created much of the modern Middle East.

Yet the disintegration has not been limited to peripheral areas: it is the internal form of states, rather than the external shape of their territories, that has provoked a backlash. All too often the region’s insecure, control-obsessed governments—sometimes dominated by minorities—have failed to integrate citizens within an inclusive sense of nationhood. The major political ideologies—Arab nationalism, political Islam and now perhaps violent jihadism—transcend national borders.

Instead Arab rulers have wielded the apparatus of state power to obstruct any potential challenge, centralising all decisions and fomenting and exploiting divisions wherever possible. Syria, for instance, denied formal citizenship to tens of thousands of its Kurds for decades, and, like Iraq under Saddam Hussein, attempted forcibly to Arabise Kurdish regions.

Arab governments also often failed to provide public services or institutions such as decent courts, schools or hospitals, prompting citizens to take matters into their own hands. Especially among the poor and disenfranchised, it was religious groups and charities, many of them financed by conservative Gulf countries, that picked up the slack. National curriculums emphasised historical grievances and inculcated obedience to the state.

Where such hyper-centralised but ineffective one-party (or one-family) states have collapsed, there have been few structures to rebuild social cohesion. What had been small fractures between sects or tribes or ethnicities grew rapidly into wider cracks that are often exploited by external actors eager to exercise influence. Even seemingly benign interventions have made divisions worse: in Syria, competition for aid funding made rivals out of groups ostensibly devoted to the same goal of overthrowing President Hafez Assad.

Depressingly, those Arab states that have weathered the Arab Spring seem to have drawn the wrong lessons. Instead of promoting political reform, many have instead opted to harden the organs of repression. “The police state is back in full force,” says an Egyptian activist. “They are patching every crack in their wall of fear.”

From the print edition: Middle East and Africa



Not at all. My argument remains perfectly valid in the context of this thread.


Thank you i know and many on this forum know as well . The crux is it is all about International POLITICS so why blame Islam.

But interestingly many refuse to accept this fact and cling to wholly solely blaming Islam
 
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Thank you i know and many on this forum know as well . The crux is it is all about International POLITICS so why blame Islam.

But interestingly many refuse to accept this fact and cling to wholly solely blame Islam

To be fair, it is the followers of Islam (albeit a minority) that are indeed involved in activities that give the whole religion a bad perception. What the OP makes is a valid point, that it is the duty of those followers of Islam who know and act better, to step up to their responsibilities in stopping the fanatics hiding among them and perpetrating crimes in the name of their religion. It is only when that does not happen does the generalization that you object to tries to follow.
 
You do not have to be an automobile engineer to know that something is wrong with a car.

The car was designed for optimal performance and for the riding comfort of its occupants which it did in the past.

If now it is not performing optimally or gives trouble consistently - it needs repairs. Either some components need replacement or the servicing is due.

Maybe bad driving skills of the driver too.

The same can be said about your religion too. How much you have re-designed it since then?
 
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