What "inroads"? GNA and Libyans (expect for the Syrian mercenaries that Erdogan has sent to Libya) have now turned into some imaginary Turks? If anything has been proven in this region in the modern era, it is that you can't control foreign nations effectively (even the superpower USA failed), proxies are mostly a financial burden and a political liability.
The issues in Libya can only be solved by Libyan themselves and neighboring Arab nations such as Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria should be playing the biggest roles and most constructive ones ideally.
Do you think that hurts us or something?
Turkeys NATO membership was nothing but benefical for Turkey, we get tech, we get protection, we get political levarage.
Those are things that Egypt has to pay a high price for, like buying Mistrals that France couldnt get rid of otherwise and that are useless in its current shape and form for Egypt.
Or selling Islands to Saudi Arabia etc etc. Yet in the end Egypt doesnt even get 1/10 of the benefits that Turkey gets.
So yeah, you might try to mock us with it but any smart person
who knows anything about Geopolitics will understand how valuable a membership in such an alliance is.
When did Egypt "sell" any islands to KSA?
The Legal Status of Tiran and Sanafir Islands (72 page report)
http://www.kfcris.com/pdf/01b7caee30524d724432198c6819bb035988303421a61.pdf
Conclusions and Recommendations
Saudi Arabia’s full sovereignty over the islands of Tiran and Sanafir had long explicitly been recognized by Egypt through two separate, valid and binding international agreements. The first was the 1988–90 exchange ofletters between the Egyptian and Saudi foreign ministers, and the second was the Egyptian presidential decree 27 of 1990 (deposited with the UN), establishing Egypt’s territorial sea, which had placed Tiran and Sanafir Islandsoutside the territorial jurisdiction of Egypt. Separately and together, these two legal instruments constitute, under customary and conventional law, treaties establishing future rights and obligations on both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, including the permanent territorial settlement pertaining to the sovereigntyover Tiran and Sanafir. This has been legally enhanced by the 2016 publicforum held by Egypt’s head of state, head of government, and foreign minister who, separately and together, reconfirmed the undisputed Saudi sovereigntyover the islands in question.
Consequently, neither Egyptian court ruling of January 16,2017 declaring the two islands to be part of Egyptian territory, nor the current status and ultimate legal fate of the 2016 maritime boundary delimitation agreement will have any legal bearing whatever on the status of Saudi full sovereignty over Tiran andSanafir islands that had been settled permanently in the 1990 two international agreements, and further reconfirmed officially in the 2016 public statements ofthe Egyptian president and his government. Thus, all claims and their supporting evidence by Egypt prior to and following the conclusion of the 1990 agreements become legally irrelevant.
The median line adopted in the 2016 maritime boundary delimitation agreementwas defined principally by the 1990 Egyptian presidential decree establishing Egypt’s territorial sea, which had already placed Tiran and Sanafir Islandsoutside its territorial jurisdiction; that action, in turn, was based on Article 15 of the UNCLOS, to which Egypt had acceded to 1983. However, for Saudi Arabia to exercise actual sovereignty over the two islands, by establishing itsphysical presence, it has first to absolve Egypt of its contractual obligationsunder the terms and protocols of the peace treaty with Israel by formally assuming Egyptian commitments through becoming a signatory to the treaty.
In view of the Egyptian high administrative court ruling on January 16, 2017, voiding the 2016 agreement, followed, on February 16, 2017, by the Egyptian government’s formal reservation with UNCLOS rejecting all options of dispute
settlement mechanism, Saudi Arabia could initiate legal countermeasures. Theseshould commence in the first instance with the registration of the 1988–90exchange of letters, as constituting one international agreement, under the terms of the VCLT, in accordance with the relevant article of the UN Charter. The same action could also be taken with respect to the 2016 maritime agreement.205 Moreover, the Saudi government could also move to modify and update its current registered declarations and reservations pertaining to provisions of dispute settlement options in both the UNCLOS and the VCLT. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia could, under the relevant clauses of both the UNCLOS and ICJ, unilaterally and without the consent of Egypt, submit a potential dispute to judicial and arbitral courts as the Philipines had done and won in July 2016, in its case against China over South china Seas islands before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) that China refused to attend or recognize. 206 In such an eventuality, Saudi Arabia, in seeking arbitration, should avoid, at all cost, a settlement by compromise that would inevitably lead to a concession on its part,.i.e., conceding to Cairo,the strategic Tiran, theisland nearer to Egyptian coast, while retaining the almost worthless Sanafir.Thus, the unconditional return of both islands , not who has sovereignty over them, should form the purpose and object of the statement of claim and its legal basis, that Saudi Arabia would be required to formulate and submit along witha written notification to any potential judicial or arbitral tribunal.
In addition, a group of private Saudi citizens could file a carefully preparedlaw suit with the high administrative court in Saudi Arabia to counter the onethat was filed in Egypt by ‘a group of concerned private Egyptian citizens.’ Tiran and Sanafir Islands should also appear prominently on Saudi officialand school maps, included in weather forecast, and introduced into history and geography textbooks as being an administrative subdistrict of the Saudi province of Tabuk since 1926, with all this may entail.
About the Author
Dr. Askar Enazy is an independent researcher and author in international relations and international law. He holds a PhD in international relations from Cambridge University, and PhD in international law from Moscow State University of International Relations (MGIMO). He earned his master degree from McGill University, Canada, and his BA degree from the University of Maine, USA. One of his publications is “The Long Road from Taif to Jeddah: Resolution of a Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Dispute” (2006).
http://www.kfcris.com/pdf/01b7caee30524d724432198c6819bb035988303421a61.pdf
So much for those empty claims but this is PDF so not exactly a surprise.
