What's new

Drone Arms Race: The Great Sky Game in the Middle East

bsruzm

SENIOR MEMBER
Joined
May 10, 2015
Messages
5,218
Reaction score
0
Country
Turkey
Location
Turkey
"As drone technology matures, payloads will increase while prices decrease. Drone attacks will become more common in warfare and eventually pose a global concern. Non-state armed groups equipped with state sponsored military-grade drones are expected to pose a far greater threat.


During a fishing trip of the U.S. President, as 30 secret service agents stand guard, a dark van parks in the woods near the river. Soon after, the van which carries an integrated drone launcher fires a swarm of suicide mini drones programmed in an autonomous seek-and-kill mission. Acting like smart bombs and equipped with facial recognition technology, the drones attempt to kill the president and his team. This was a scene from a movie I watched last week. Given the great leaps in drone technology during the last two decades, this drone-assassination scenario may no longer be science fiction.

Since the U.S launched the first registered drone attack in 2001 in Afghanistan, defense experts have been arguing that drones will become an increasingly common feature of modern warfare. Not only has this proved to be right, but also drone proliferation in the battlefield has been increasing lately at an alarming pace.

Drones (or UAVs) were initially designed as a non-lethal utility to conduct intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance missions. However, soon enough, drones were upgraded to become lethal, and ever since they have been used as a weapon. Nowadays, there are different types of drones ranging in size from as small as a finger weighing only 16g to as big as some commercial private airplanes. The costs of producing or acquiring a drone also vary from as little as $100 to as much $400 million.


With the proliferation of drone technology and its constantly increasing lethality, both state and non-state actors are racing to acquire and utilize drones in their field operations. For states, drones are much cheaper to produce, operate, and maintain than the normal fighter jets. They come with several operational and tactical advantages that surpass those of fighter-jets. Unlike fighter-jets, drones can expose a movable target, hover over it for a long time, track it, and finally hit it, all while in the sky providing real-time surveillance and collecting valuable information to allow sharp decisions and flexible scheduling to execute a mission.

For a long time, the U.S. and Israel enjoyed a sort of monopoly over drone technology, but not anymore. Both states are still superior in many respects, but more states are stepping up their efforts to manufacture, acquire, and operate drones. The Middle East region, in particular, has seen a proliferation of drones in the last few years. Although the need for military defense is one reason for the phenomena, a report prepared for the UK’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that “national prestige and status is the main reason that most states” in the Middle East are increasingly acquiring drones.

Chinese drones in particular have gained popularity lately in the region. According to a 2019 for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “China is a niche provider of armed [drones] in the Middle East,” and because it is not a member of any international export control body, it faces little competition. The most famous types of China’s drones in the region belong to the medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drone families: Wing Loong manufactured by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG), and Cai Hong “Rainbow” built by the Chinese Aerospace Science & Technology Corporation (CASC). UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, and several other countries operate Chinese drones.

The proliferation of Chinese drones in the region is due, first, to their relatively cheap price compared to other unmanned systems from the U.S. Second, they come free of strings. Today, Chinese drones are present on nearly every battleground in the Middle East (Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Niger, etc.).

Since 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have extensively used Chinese Wing Loong drones to perform airstrikes and targeted assassinations in Yemen. In one Emirati operation, a Chinese drone equipped with Arrow-7 missiles assassinated the Houthi leader Saleh Ali al-Sammad. In 2017, Saudi Arabia struck a deal with Beijing to set up the first Chinese drone-factory in the Middle East and around 300 Wing Loong-IIs and CH-4 drones in the kingdom.

In Libya, Chinese drones have been employed to support the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar who has used them in his offensive against the internationally recognized government (GNA) in the capital of Tripoli. The strikes resulted in no strategic outcome but it has fueled the conflict and increased the death toll among civilians. Moreover, China’s drones there have been locked in a face-off battle with Turkish drones.

Turkey, although a newcomer to drone technology, has rapidly emerged in the last five years and is becoming a drone power. Ankara designed, developed, and produced several indigenous unmanned systems that proved to be very efficient and effective in its counter-terrorism efforts inside Turkey and outside its borders, mainly in Syria and Iraq. The most famous type currently is the Bayraktar TB2. It can fly at an altitude of 27,000 feet for up to 24 hours with a range of up to 150 km while carrying a payload of 55 kg. The drone has been exported so far to Qatar, Ukraine, and Libya.

The Guardian newspaper claims that Ankara would not have been able to develop its drone power without the help of UK technology, yet the godfather of Turkey’s drone program, Selcuk Bayraktar categorically denies this claim. Today, Turkey which is on its way to becoming the world’s second-largest user of lethal drones is looking for opportunities to export its drones while aspiring to develop autonomous and supersonic drones. Turkey is reportedly set to become the first nation to use drones able to find, track, and kill targets without human intervention.

Unlike Turkey, Iran produces relatively primitive drones using parts and engines smuggled from the outside, especially from Germany. Tehran has also used reverse-engineering to clone many of its drone systems based on captured Western UAVs. The 2019 DIA report on Iran’s military power describes the UAVs as “Iran’s most rapidly advancing air capability.” The IRGC carried out its first drone long-range, cross-border strike in 2018, and deployed various armed and unarmed UAVs to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. These countries have been used as a testing ground for Iran’s drones against the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others.

Iran has always had a problem in weaponizing its drones with advanced systems. However, that has not prevent it from turning some types into suicide drones/flying bombs. This kind of drone presents a challenge that can be clearly seen in the Houthis attack in September against the critical facilities of Saudi oil giant Aramco. The attack cut off around 50% of Saudi Arabia’s oil production or around 6% of global supplies of oil.

The most dangerous aspect of Iran’s drone program, however, is Tehran’s transfer of the lethal technology to its regional militias such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. This makes Iran the number one supplier of lethal drones to non-state armed actors in the world. These militia groups are increasingly able to utilize different types of drones and employ them in their operations.

In general, non-state actors have never enjoyed, until now, access to the aerial dimension of warfare. This was initially their most fatal disadvantage. However, due to the proliferation of drone technology in the last decade, non-state armed actors are increasingly able to create a threat from above, a threat that remained till recently the exclusive domain of states against non-state actors. Drones psychologically boost the status of the non-state actor and its capacity to cause harm and terror.

Hezbollah is the oldest non-state or semi-state actor to use drones in the region. It has a fleet of more than 200 drones. Some of them were used against Israel in 2004, 2006, 2012, 2016, and against Syrian rebels in 2014 and 2015. In 2012, Hezbollah conducted its most drone-daring mission against Israel’s nuclear complex at Dimona using a drone equipped with components manufactured in Germany by Siemens AG.

In the last several years, the Houthis in Yemen have used Iranian drones extensively against Saudi Arabia. The Iranian drones hit a wide range of targets deep inside Saudi territory including missiles batteries, critical oil infrastructure, military bases, civilian and military airports, ships in the red sea, etc.

As drone technology matures, undoubtedly payloads will increase and prices will decrease. Attacks involving drones will only become more common weapons of war and will eventually pose a global concern. In the future, non-state armed groups equipped with military-grade drones provided by state sponsors—such as those supplied to Hezbollah and to the Houthis by Iran—are expected to pose a far greater threat from above."


Drone Arms Race: The Great Sky Game in the Middle East

____
"Turkey, although a newcomer to drone technology,"

One of the written statements that I object is that, Turkish Aerospace ANKA has made Turkey the 3rd country in the world that can design and produce a MALE UAV after USA and Israel.
 
"As drone technology matures, payloads will increase while prices decrease. Drone attacks will become more common in warfare and eventually pose a global concern. Non-state armed groups equipped with state sponsored military-grade drones are expected to pose a far greater threat.


During a fishing trip of the U.S. President, as 30 secret service agents stand guard, a dark van parks in the woods near the river. Soon after, the van which carries an integrated drone launcher fires a swarm of suicide mini drones programmed in an autonomous seek-and-kill mission. Acting like smart bombs and equipped with facial recognition technology, the drones attempt to kill the president and his team. This was a scene from a movie I watched last week. Given the great leaps in drone technology during the last two decades, this drone-assassination scenario may no longer be science fiction.

Since the U.S launched the first registered drone attack in 2001 in Afghanistan, defense experts have been arguing that drones will become an increasingly common feature of modern warfare. Not only has this proved to be right, but also drone proliferation in the battlefield has been increasing lately at an alarming pace.

Drones (or UAVs) were initially designed as a non-lethal utility to conduct intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance missions. However, soon enough, drones were upgraded to become lethal, and ever since they have been used as a weapon. Nowadays, there are different types of drones ranging in size from as small as a finger weighing only 16g to as big as some commercial private airplanes. The costs of producing or acquiring a drone also vary from as little as $100 to as much $400 million.


With the proliferation of drone technology and its constantly increasing lethality, both state and non-state actors are racing to acquire and utilize drones in their field operations. For states, drones are much cheaper to produce, operate, and maintain than the normal fighter jets. They come with several operational and tactical advantages that surpass those of fighter-jets. Unlike fighter-jets, drones can expose a movable target, hover over it for a long time, track it, and finally hit it, all while in the sky providing real-time surveillance and collecting valuable information to allow sharp decisions and flexible scheduling to execute a mission.

For a long time, the U.S. and Israel enjoyed a sort of monopoly over drone technology, but not anymore. Both states are still superior in many respects, but more states are stepping up their efforts to manufacture, acquire, and operate drones. The Middle East region, in particular, has seen a proliferation of drones in the last few years. Although the need for military defense is one reason for the phenomena, a report prepared for the UK’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that “national prestige and status is the main reason that most states” in the Middle East are increasingly acquiring drones.

Chinese drones in particular have gained popularity lately in the region. According to a 2019 for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “China is a niche provider of armed [drones] in the Middle East,” and because it is not a member of any international export control body, it faces little competition. The most famous types of China’s drones in the region belong to the medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drone families: Wing Loong manufactured by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG), and Cai Hong “Rainbow” built by the Chinese Aerospace Science & Technology Corporation (CASC). UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, and several other countries operate Chinese drones.

The proliferation of Chinese drones in the region is due, first, to their relatively cheap price compared to other unmanned systems from the U.S. Second, they come free of strings. Today, Chinese drones are present on nearly every battleground in the Middle East (Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Niger, etc.).

Since 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have extensively used Chinese Wing Loong drones to perform airstrikes and targeted assassinations in Yemen. In one Emirati operation, a Chinese drone equipped with Arrow-7 missiles assassinated the Houthi leader Saleh Ali al-Sammad. In 2017, Saudi Arabia struck a deal with Beijing to set up the first Chinese drone-factory in the Middle East and around 300 Wing Loong-IIs and CH-4 drones in the kingdom.

In Libya, Chinese drones have been employed to support the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar who has used them in his offensive against the internationally recognized government (GNA) in the capital of Tripoli. The strikes resulted in no strategic outcome but it has fueled the conflict and increased the death toll among civilians. Moreover, China’s drones there have been locked in a face-off battle with Turkish drones.

Turkey, although a newcomer to drone technology, has rapidly emerged in the last five years and is becoming a drone power. Ankara designed, developed, and produced several indigenous unmanned systems that proved to be very efficient and effective in its counter-terrorism efforts inside Turkey and outside its borders, mainly in Syria and Iraq. The most famous type currently is the Bayraktar TB2. It can fly at an altitude of 27,000 feet for up to 24 hours with a range of up to 150 km while carrying a payload of 55 kg. The drone has been exported so far to Qatar, Ukraine, and Libya.

The Guardian newspaper claims that Ankara would not have been able to develop its drone power without the help of UK technology, yet the godfather of Turkey’s drone program, Selcuk Bayraktar categorically denies this claim. Today, Turkey which is on its way to becoming the world’s second-largest user of lethal drones is looking for opportunities to export its drones while aspiring to develop autonomous and supersonic drones. Turkey is reportedly set to become the first nation to use drones able to find, track, and kill targets without human intervention.

Unlike Turkey, Iran produces relatively primitive drones using parts and engines smuggled from the outside, especially from Germany. Tehran has also used reverse-engineering to clone many of its drone systems based on captured Western UAVs. The 2019 DIA report on Iran’s military power describes the UAVs as “Iran’s most rapidly advancing air capability.” The IRGC carried out its first drone long-range, cross-border strike in 2018, and deployed various armed and unarmed UAVs to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. These countries have been used as a testing ground for Iran’s drones against the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others.

Iran has always had a problem in weaponizing its drones with advanced systems. However, that has not prevent it from turning some types into suicide drones/flying bombs. This kind of drone presents a challenge that can be clearly seen in the Houthis attack in September against the critical facilities of Saudi oil giant Aramco. The attack cut off around 50% of Saudi Arabia’s oil production or around 6% of global supplies of oil.

The most dangerous aspect of Iran’s drone program, however, is Tehran’s transfer of the lethal technology to its regional militias such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. This makes Iran the number one supplier of lethal drones to non-state armed actors in the world. These militia groups are increasingly able to utilize different types of drones and employ them in their operations.

In general, non-state actors have never enjoyed, until now, access to the aerial dimension of warfare. This was initially their most fatal disadvantage. However, due to the proliferation of drone technology in the last decade, non-state armed actors are increasingly able to create a threat from above, a threat that remained till recently the exclusive domain of states against non-state actors. Drones psychologically boost the status of the non-state actor and its capacity to cause harm and terror.

Hezbollah is the oldest non-state or semi-state actor to use drones in the region. It has a fleet of more than 200 drones. Some of them were used against Israel in 2004, 2006, 2012, 2016, and against Syrian rebels in 2014 and 2015. In 2012, Hezbollah conducted its most drone-daring mission against Israel’s nuclear complex at Dimona using a drone equipped with components manufactured in Germany by Siemens AG.

In the last several years, the Houthis in Yemen have used Iranian drones extensively against Saudi Arabia. The Iranian drones hit a wide range of targets deep inside Saudi territory including missiles batteries, critical oil infrastructure, military bases, civilian and military airports, ships in the red sea, etc.

As drone technology matures, undoubtedly payloads will increase and prices will decrease. Attacks involving drones will only become more common weapons of war and will eventually pose a global concern. In the future, non-state armed groups equipped with military-grade drones provided by state sponsors—such as those supplied to Hezbollah and to the Houthis by Iran—are expected to pose a far greater threat from above."


Drone Arms Race: The Great Sky Game in the Middle East

____
"Turkey, although a newcomer to drone technology,"

One of the written statements that I object is that, Turkish Aerospace ANKA has made Turkey the 3rd country in the world that can design and produce a MALE UAV after USA and Israel.

first turkey drone key system such as engine and gps navigation depends on western countries,

Compare turkey’s drone to Chinese drones in terms of quality and quantity is ridiculous, it’s like compare a poor peasant house to a billionaire house
 
Akinci will be the king of drones(UCAV category)
Songar drone is first of its kind(americans are crazy about this machine gun drone) already delivered to TSK
Kargu swarm drones enabled by AL will be a game changer in syria/libya they will be active from January 2020

first turkey drone key system such as engine and gps navigation depends on western countries,

Compare turkey’s drone to Chinese drones in terms of quality and quantity is ridiculous, it’s like compare a poor peasant house to a billionaire house
That’s why jordan wants to sell their chinese drones
 
Akinci will be the king of drones(UCAV category)
Songar drone is first of its kind(americans are crazy about this machine gun drone) already delivered to TSK
Kargu swarm drones enabled by AL will be a game changer in syria/libya they will be active from January 2020


That’s why jordan wants to sell their chinese drones

that’s why Egypt, Saudi and Iraq widely deployed Chinese drones in active battles and killed your terrorists pets?
 
first turkey drone key system such as engine and gps navigation depends on western countries,

Compare turkey’s drone to Chinese drones in terms of quality and quantity is ridiculous, it’s like compare a poor peasant house to a billionaire house
The only ridiculous thing here is your post which reflects your intellectual level and knowledge.
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...44b02c-14ea-11ea-bf81-ebe89f477d1e_story.html

MISURATA, Libya — In the predawn darkness, the missile smashed through the cement wall. It shattered the leg of a mother, burned the feet of her 12-year-old daughter and forced the family from their home.

The weapon that tore their lives apart wasn’t launched by a fighter jet, tank or mortar — once the main culprits in Libya’s long history of conflicts. It was fired by a Chinese-made drone.

Eight months into Libya’s worst spasm of violence in eight years, the conflict is being fought increasingly by weaponized drones — and civilian casualties are mounting.

The United Nations blames airstrikes for the deaths of more than 60 percent of the 284 civilians killed since the eastern warlord Khalifa Hifter started his offensive to oust the U.N.-installed government from Tripoli in April. Recent drone attacks killed 12 members of a family, including 10 children, in southern Libya, and at least 10 people, mostly African migrants, in a biscuit factory in Tripoli, according to U.N. and Libyan officials. The assaults, U.N. officials and human rights activists say, could constitute war crimes.

“The rockets from the drones are getting stronger,” said Gen. Mohammed Haddad, the top pro-government commander in Misurata. “Before, they did not go through concrete buildings.”

imrs.php

Militiamen observe a drone flying over the front line of Al Aziziya, Libya. (Lorenzo Tugnoli for The Washington Post)
imrs.php

A drone over Al Aziziya. (Lorenzo Tugnoli for The Washington Post)
Drones have been deployed in Middle Eastern conflicts from Yemen to Syria to the Palestinian territories. But no other war has been marked by the rapid intensification of remote-controlled air power now unfolding in Libya. The U.N. has counted more than 1,000 strikes since April. Analysts say the lethal machines are prolonging the conflict and offering daily evidence it has become a proxy war, fought by multiple nations in violation of a U.N. arms embargo.

AD

“Outside powers are the driving force,” said Matthew Herbert, senior research consultant for the South Africa-based Institute of Security Studies. “They supply the drones, the ammunition, and the pilots to fly the craft.

“Without foreign intervention, there might be drones in the Libya conflict, but there would not be the sort of high-intensity drone war we’re now witnessing.”

The U.N.’s top envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salamé, told the U.N. Security Council last month that “the use of air power and precision technology has become a dominant feature of an otherwise low-intensity conflict.”

Drones are playing a pivotal role in the Libyan conflict
Chinese-made Wing Loong drones deployed by the United Arab Emirates are playing a pivotal role in the campaign by Hifter, whose forces have laid siege to Tripoli. In recent weeks, the increasing aerial war and an influx of Russian mercenaries have built momentum for Hifter’s ambitions to control Libya, according to Libyan commanders, analysts and Western officials.

AD

Turkey is funneling its own Bayraktar TB2 drones to the U.N.-installed Government of National Accord, but they have less range and are less powerful than Hifter’s. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is seeking a greater role in Libya, recently inking economic, security and military agreements with the GNA and offering to send troops.

Neither UAE nor Turkish officials responded to requests for comment.

Libya’s civil war creates opening for ISIS return as counterterrorism effort falters

imrs.php

A militiaman in Tripoli handles the wreckage of what appears to be a drone-fired missile. (Lorenzo Tugnoli for The Washington Post)
The precision of the strikes suggests the drones are not being operated or maintained by Libyans, who lack the technical expertise, U.N. investigators reported this month. They suggested their use has led to less collateral damage than would be seen in a conflict driven by street fighting.


Still, drones are wreaking havoc on the civilian population. A strike at a field hospital in July killed five medical personnel. An attack by Hifter’s forces on a community meeting in August killed 45. And a strike in a Tripoli suburb this month killed five. Ambulances and field hospitals, too, have been targeted in recent weeks.

AD
“Most were hit by drone strikes, if not all,” said Ridah Shotah, a director of the Health Ministry in Tripoli.

The Chinese and Turkish drones cost far less than manned warplanes or the roughly $15 million American MQ-9 Reaper drones that the U.S. military uses to target Islamic militants in Libya. That has allowed both sides to build up airborne arsenals that are less expensive than fighter jets to maintain and replace.


“In Libya, drones have given both sides significant air power at relatively little costs,” said Chris Cole, the director of Drone Wars UK, an Oxford-based organization that monitors drone activity. “The use of these armed systems — both large and small — at distance has enabled both nonstate and state actors to engage in warfare with virtual impunity.”

Omar Amir’s mother and sister were among the victims.

AD
One recent night, he said, the large family was inside their palatial home, with its large pool and palm trees. They had been planning for Amir’s wedding, and the bride’s dress was upstairs.

Nobody could sleep. They could hear the whirring sound of drones outside, and every few minutes the sound of a strike. But they felt protected.


“We never expected the missile to enter,” said Amir, 21, as he stood in the rubble- and soot-covered living room three days after the attack.

Russia, France, Saudi Arabia, UAE wage a proxy war
When Hifter launched his Tripoli offensive, few Libyans expected an aerial war — and certainly not one dictated by drones.

imrs.php

A supermarket’s windows were smashed by a drone strike in Misurata. (Lorenzo Tugnoli for The Washington Post)
Since the 2011 Arab Spring revolution and NATO attacks toppled Libyan dictator Moammar Gaddafi and plunged the oil producer into lawlessness and chaos, militias seeking influence, wealth and territory have clashed frequently. But those battles have been fought largely on the ground, with heavy guns, mortars, tanks and poorly trained fighters with AK-47 rifles.

AD

This time, sophisticated weaponry and military strategies prevail, as regional and Western governments back both sides. The UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, France and Russia are supporting Hifter. So are Russian military contractors from the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group and African mercenaries from Sudan and Chad.

Turkey, Qatar, Italy and other European countries are supporting the GNA. The United States ostensibly backs it as well, but the Trump administration’s continued contacts with Hifter, a dual Libyan-U.S. citizen and former CIA asset who lived for years in Northern Virginia, have sent mixed signals.

Arrival of Russian mercenaries adds deadlier firepower, modern tactics to Libya’s civil war

When Hifter’s ground offensive stalled in April, his self-described Libyan National Army turned to drones and warplanes, including French Mirage and Rafale jets, Russian Sukhoi aircraft and MI-35 combat helicopters. By summer, the Governmente of National Accord was deploying its own drones.

AD

Hifter has launched more than 800 drone strikes, according to the most recent U.N. data. The GNA has launched more than 240.

By comparison, the British military has launched 974 warheads from drones in Iraq and Syria since August 2014, according to Drone Wars UK.

In Libya, the warheads of the Chinese drones used by Hifter’s forces are heavier and more destructive than the Turkish weapons used by the GNA.

“This has meant that Hifter has de facto managed to gain superior control over the skies,” said Emadeddin Badi, a Libya analyst with the Middle East Institute.

Drones now dictate the rhythms of war in Libya — and of life.

Militia fighters drive in civilian cars or set up checkpoints under bridges to avoid being targeted. When a drone is spotted, civilian drivers abandon their cars and take cover. The machines have entered everyday vocabulary: An armed drone is called “Musayer”; a smaller reconnaissance drone is known as “Yasmina.”

imrs.php

Physician Haytham Garabiyah, left, stands with paramedics near the entrance of the field hospital of Siedi Salim after a drone strike. The hospital was moved to a nearby building, where medics still work under the constant threat of more strikes. (Lorenzo Tugnoli for The Washington Post)
imrs.php

Workers clean the entrance of the field hospital after a drone strike. (Lorenzo Tugnoli for The Washington Post)
Doctors and medics were setting up a clinic at an abandoned gas station in Tripoli one recent day to receive fighters battling less than a mile away. Every few minutes, a shell would crash nearby.

AD

At 3:16 p.m., Hamza Ali pointed at the sky: “Yasmina!”

The team took cover. A few minutes later, militiamen in a pickup truck mounted with a heavy machine gun pulled into the station. Ali and other medics implored them to leave, fearing they would make the clinic a bigger target. The fighters refused.

“Let’s go,” yelled Ali, and the team swiftly packed up and left.

‘We watched death pass through our home’
Misurata, nestled on Libya’s coast 116 miles east of Tripoli, is pocked with the scars of drones. Several have struck factories and the civilian airport, disrupting flights. In a field lies the wreckage of a Chinese drone that was shot down.

“People are scared,” said Yousuf Jamal, a senior tribal leader in Misurata. “They don’t know what’s going to happen at night.”

Some residential areas that were hit were near military bases, he said. But the attacks would not have happened if the U.N. weapons embargo were honored.

AD
“Now we have new military equipment, new machines and new sophisticated weapons targeting us,” Jamal said. “Had they enforced the ban, we would not have reached this point.”

Under fire on Libya’s front lines

Inside the family mansion of Omar Amir, workers were fixing the damage.

His mother, Amal, and his sister, Mariam, were at a hospital in neighboring Tunisia. His wedding had been canceled. But there was also a sense of appreciation.

“Thank God there were not more injuries,” someone had scrawled on a wall mirror coated in soot and dust.

“We watched death pass through our home,” Amir said. “A house can be rebuilt. A family cannot.”

imrs.php

Omar Amir, 21, was about to celebrate his wedding in his family’s house in Misurata when it was hit by a drone strike. The fire that followed destroyed most of the building. (Lorenzo Tugnoli for The Washington Post)

In battle for Tripoli, medical workers are becoming casualties

In a city of ever-shifting front lines, Libyans confront their worst fighting in years

He once attacked Tripoli. Now a Libyan militia leader defends it from another invader.

Today’s coverage from Post correspondents around the world

Like Washington Post World on Facebook and stay updated on foreign news

28 Comments
Home

@lonelyman
 
first turkey drone key system such as engine and gps navigation depends on western countries,

Compare turkey’s drone to Chinese drones in terms of quality and quantity is ridiculous, it’s like compare a poor peasant house to a billionaire house

Although The spreading ignorance in many geopolitic and strategic subject become a common chinese member behavior in threads, It is the first time I agree with this boy. Comparing a chinese drone that is expelled from costumers’ inventory cause of quality issues with state of art Turkish drones are ridiculous. ☺️ Egypt voices many complaint about them, Iraq have many difficulty to operate them, Jordan is totally expelled them and so on.

Spamming the thread with multiple articles won’t help a troll hide the truths about cheap quality of chinese drones. ☺️
 
Although The spreading ignorance in many geopolitic and strategic subject become a common chinese member behavior in threads, It is the first time I agree with this boy. Comparing a chinese drone that is expelled from costumers’ inventory cause of quality issues with state of art Turkish drones are ridiculous. ☺️ Egypt voices many complaint about them, Iraq have many difficulty to operate them, Jordan is totally expelled them and so on.
Why keep harping on the old propaganda? We have already debated on the issue that the rejection is more politics than technical. US gives Jordan extra USD 6.3 billion dollar military aid. You think Jordan will not listen to their US master order to throw away Chinese drone and get US one?

https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/us-aid-jordan-‘-likely-exceed’-pledged-63-billion
 
If “military aid” excuses make you sleep better, then OK for me.
Its not an excuse but facts or common sense which of cos you refuse to admit.

Our Drone dominated Turkish drone in Libya in terms of range, payload and command and control.
A very big reason why Hatfar are attacking Tripoli LNA and not the other way round.
 
Its not an excuse but facts or common sense which of cos you refuse to admit.

Our Drone dominated Turkish drone in Libya in terms of range, payload and command and control.
A very big reason why Hatfar are attacking Tripoli LNA and not the other way round.

Indeed they are. Your MALE drones with 1,5-2t MTOW can not dominate our tactical drones with 650kg MtOW. At least, comparing chinese drone having a length of 12m with Turkish tactical level drone with 6,5m is an clear indication of the quality differences between both states. ☺️ You have numerical advantages while Turks have quality in our hands. All world knows that. No need to stress yourself with trying to prove otherwise.
 
Indeed they are. Your MALE drones with 1,5-2t MTOW can not dominate our tactical drones with 650kg MtOW. At least comparing chinese drone with 20m length with Turkish tactical level drone with 6,5m is an open indication of the quality differences between both states. You have numerical advantages while Turks have quality in our hands. All world knows that. No need to stress yourself with trying to prove otherwise.
LOL.. Self denial. Turkish drone are running around trying to hide from Chinese drone hunting them like eagle and chicken game. Your drone not only got low payload, low speed but operating range of COC at 150km only.

If Chinese drone rigged up with Beidou II/III and network, it can even be operative few thousands km away which Turkish drone at this stage still not possible.

https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/strike-capable-wing-loong-ii-drone-enters-service-with-chinas-plaaf/

The Wing Loong II UAV can carry a number of different missiles and bombs, including Lan Jian 7 (Blue Arrow 7) laser-guided air-to-surface missiles, TG100 laser/INS/GPS-guided bombs, and the AR-1/HJ-10 anti-tank missile — the Chinese equivalent to the American-made Hellfire missile. Overall, the Wing Loong II can purportedly carry a payload of up to 400 kilograms. The UAV can fly for about 20 hours with a maximum speed of 370 kilometers per hour. The Wing Loong II has an operational radius of 1,500 kilometers.
 
Akinci will be the king of drones(UCAV category)
Songar drone is first of its kind(americans are crazy about this machine gun drone) already delivered to TSK
Kargu swarm drones enabled by AL will be a game changer in syria/libya they will be active from January 2020


That’s why jordan wants to sell their chinese drones

well with all do respect that i have for Akinci and Turkey but that drone is not stealth and its slow its good for air defense so i will not call it king of the sky ( i do not call any drone from any country a king not just Akinci ) every drone has its shortcomings the biggest danger that middle east countries like Israel and SA and US forces in particular will face is Sejil drone an drone built to penetrate enemy airspace with supersonic speeds and stealth technology with internal weapons bay.

Indeed they are. Your MALE drones with 1,5-2t MTOW can not dominate our tactical drones with 650kg MtOW. At least, comparing chinese drone having a length of 12m with Turkish tactical level drone with 6,5m is an clear indication of the quality differences between both states. ☺️ You have numerical advantages while Turks have quality in our hands. All world knows that. No need to stress yourself with trying to prove otherwise.
hi brother i have Q that unfortunately i could not fine an A to in google and that is how much is akinci length?


turkey-develops-new-heavy-armed-uas.jpg
 
well with all do respect that i have for Akinci and Turkey but that drone is not stealth and its slow its good for air defense so i will not call it king of the sky ( i do not call any drone from any country a king not just Akinci ) every drone has its shortcomings the biggest danger that middle east countries like Israel and SA and US forces in particular will face is Sejil drone an drone built to penetrate enemy airspace with supersonic speeds and stealth technology with internal weapons bay.


hi brother i have Q that unfortunately i could not fine an A to in google and that is how much is akinci length?


turkey-develops-new-heavy-armed-uas.jpg


about 12,5 m..

it should get about 1,3 ton payload.. it should be able to carry cirit, mk81 mk82, som

but it is not ready yet,, but first flight did happen some weeks ago..
 

Back
Top Bottom