Soumitra
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A Recent report of Washington Post (30 Jan. 2011) based on the analysis of a well-known expert that Pakistan had increased its nuclear arsenal to more than 100 deployed weapons as well as the Chinese projections to discard the policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons in its own territory and its deployment of nuclear weapons in Qinghai province, which clearly target India as also creation of fully operational airbases in Tibetan Autonomous Region have started a debate in the strategic community to re-examine the effectiveness of our deterrence. Several suggestions are being made. A few experts point to the need to review our nuclear doctrine as they feel that in the changed security environment the nuclear doctrine does not project sufficient deterrence to our adversaries. Others project the need for acquiring and deploying more nuclear weapons matching the levels of our adversaries and for lowering the threshold of use of nuclear weapons like Pakistan and to some extent by China. In short the suggestions include the changes in nuclear doctrine as well as nuclear strategy, policy and posture.
The above mentioned issues need to be examined in the light of Indias Nuclear Doctrine. As is well known that Indian Nuclear Doctrine was based on the Draft Nuclear Doctrine prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) in 1999, it is desirable to examine the suggestions of the NSAB in the light of discussions held in the board and what the authors intended to convey. The 27 Member board included inter-alia well known nuclear or strategic experts like (Late) Sri K Subrahmanyam (Convenor), Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, Dr Raja Ramanna, (Late) Sri J N Dixit, M K Narayanan, Bharat Karnard, Brahma Challney, Raja Mohan, Roddam Narsimha etc. It may be mentioned at the outset that the consensus was obtained after the original draft which was prepared by Subrahmanayam, was revised several times to accommodate the views of all members.
In essence, the draft doctrine was based on the following objectives-
Nuclear weapons are meant for deterrence. The basic thrust was to deter the use of nuclear weapons and not fight a nuclear war.
Nuclear weapons are to be used only in retaliation of nuclear attack on India. Therefore the doctrine was purely defensive in nature.
Nuclear weapons would not be used to deter the threat or use of conventional weapons, biological or chemical weapons.
It placed emphasis on minimum credible deterrence to avoid any unnecessary arms race.
The draft doctrine was based on two elements. In the first place, it was intended to convey the message that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances and therefore the concept of No First Use. And in the second place it was meant to convey that any nuclear attack on India or Indian forces anywhere would attract punitive retaliatory nuclear attack that the adversary would find it unacceptable. At the time of preparation of the draft doctrine, it was made clear that this would be a draft paper meant for informed debates. It was also clarified that the doctrine contained only the broad principles and the nuclear strategy, policies and posture would flow from this doctrine (Para 1.6). The official announcement of Indias Nuclear Doctrine was made in January, 2003 after substantive discussions on various aspects pertaining to the posture, targeting strategies, deployment and development as also command and control system. The note released along with the doctrine suggested a slight change in the formulation of response. The note substituted the word suitable to massive and designed retaliation to nuclear strike to inflict unacceptable damage. In both the cases, the retaliation was linked to the unacceptable damage to the aggressor. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine reiterated the NFU and a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. A command and control system was also announced with the formation of Nuclear Command Authority having two bodies- the Political Council under the PM to take a view on the use of nuclear weapons and the Executive Council under the National Security Advisor. The latter body is to assist the former by providing necessary inputs for decision making. A Strategic Command Force was also created for operationalization of deterrence.
However, recently experts have challenged that the validity of the concepts contained in the doctrine and pointed out the need for changing our posture, strategy and policies in view of the changing security environment. They point out the development and deployment of nuclear weapons in our neighbourhood as also the changes in the nuclear doctrine to press their point. The points raised by them are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs to examine what changes are needed to maintain our deterrence.
DISCARD NO FIRST USE FROM THE DOCTRINE
Several experts have been challenging the concept of NFU. They point out that when our adversaries have lowered the threshold, it is necessary to revisit this concept. Besides the experts, Gen Deepak Kapoor the then Army Chief in 2009 had stated that if the reports of Pakistans expanded arsenal were correct, then India would have to reconsider its strategic stance. This was considered all the more important as Pakistan has lowered its threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistans use of nuclear weapons against India was clarified in 2002 by Gen Khalid Kidwai, Head of Pakistans Strategic Plans Division. He had stated that in case deterrence failed, in four conditions Pakistan would use nuclear weapons
If India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold)
India destroys a large part of its land or air forces (military threshold)
India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic threshold)
India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization)
Pakistan in fact has deliberately lowered the threshold and is treating nuclear weapons as one of the weapons to be used in the war. Experts point out that the addition of long range missile delivered nuclear weapons to the Pak arsenal has taken away the traditional Indian advantage. Brahma Chellaney has noted that Pakistan has now extended its reach to the depths of Indian heartland and thereby forever erasing the last bastion of immunity that India once enjoyed. Moreover, as Pakistans nuclear weapons are controlled by the Pak Army, the chances of use of nuclear weapons are greater once it feels that it was going to lose war. The increasing Chinese aggressiveness on Arunachal Pradesh and to some extent in J&K and threatening deployment pattern of nuclear capable missiles are also noted by the security experts who advocate the change in the concept of NFU. Chinese official and media comments indicate that China would not hesitate in discarding the NFU for taking back its own territory. The continued stress on tactical nuclear weapons too are seen by experts as a possibility of China using them in the bordering areas. In addition, the on-going cooperation in nuclear and missile fields between Pakistan and China too is taken into our strategic calculus by these experts. They argue that NFU in the present circumstances is not likely to have the intended impact of the deterrence. There are experts who favour an effective deployment pattern of nuclear weapons to convey the credibility of our deterrence. This would mean that a number of weapons would have to be kept in mated condition. These arguments have value and must be taken into consideration for determining nuclear posture and strategy.
MASSIVE RETALIATION VERSUS FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
As mentioned earlier there was a change from the original draft on the punitive attack. While the draft stated that any adversary must know that India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces, the accepted doctrine states (as was indicated by a paragraph released along with the approval of the nuclear doctrine) that No First Use posture would mean that Nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere and that Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. While the emphasis is on unacceptable pain to the adversary in both the cases, the critics often miss this point. The critics point out that the word massive removes the set of less expansive strategies for the decision makers and that this could unnecessarily escalate the nuclear war. The possible use of tactical weapons is also mentioned in this regard. The supporters of this view quote McNamara in this respect who desired flexibility in responses. The intent in both the cases was to deter the aggressor by assuring a second strike capability that the aggressor would find it difficult to bear. The basic premise on which the Indian Nuclear Doctrine is based is that nuclear weapons are instruments of deterrence and not weapons to fight a war. It may be mentioned that in the NSAB meetings this issue was raised and while there were differences among the members, the consensus was that unacceptable pain to the adversary is important and that would determine the level of punitive action. Thus flexibility is envisaged in the Doctrine. Para 5.2 specifically mentions that an effective and survivable command and control system with requisite flexibility and responsiveness shall be in place and that an integrated operational plan or a series of sequential plans predicated on strategic objectives and a targeting policy shall form the part of system.
MINIMUM OR CREDIBLE DETERRENCE
Other critics of the doctrine point out the need for removing the term minimum as that goes against the concept of credibility. They argue in favour of maximum deterrence by increasing the number of war-heads. While certain numbers of war-heads are necessary to deter the adversary, the doctrine desired that such number should be kept at the minimum level to avoid a nuclear arms race. It may be recalled that such a concept during the cold war period had led to the development and deployment of about 67000 nuclear weapons. Our doctrine desires to avoid this kind of arms race. The number of weapons required would depend upon the realistic assessment of the likely adversaries capabilities to bear the cost of such an action. The authors of the draft doctrine did discuss the issue of numbers and there was a consensus that this number would vary in view of likely changes in the regional security environment. What was stressed was the fact that the number should be kept at the minimum required for maintaining the nuclear deterrence .Para 1.6 clearly stated that details of policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will flow from this framework and would be laid down separately and kept under constant review.
This also brings the question of targeting strategy. While the authors of the draft doctrine, of course with some members dissenting, were of the view that in the second strike the focus should be on the counter-value targets (economic and industrial assets, critical infrastructure and population centres) and on counter-force (adversarys nuclear forces, launch control centres weapon storage sites). There was a feeling that adversarys nuclear forces would be dispersed and it would be difficult to locate the exact position and therefore the focus should remain on the counter-value targets. The example of bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was mentioned in this context. Those who differed suggested cities as targets and not a small section of population to make the deterrence credible. Their arguments are worthy of consideration in the present circumstances.
MORE TESTS NEEDED OR NOT
The yield of weapons is also being debated. A number of experts now feel that India should have higher yield nuclear weapons for making the deterrence credible. Thermonuclear bombs in this context are being mentioned. The advantages of this device are well covered in the discussions. It would be sufficient to mention at this stage that the thermonuclear bombs would significantly increase the effective size of its weapon-usable fissile material stockpile and the yield of weapons could be considerably increased. This would also help in miniaturization of the core. Whether there is a need for further testing or not is a debatable question. Dr Santhanam recently raised the issue which was supported by other scientists. He had mentioned the thermonuclear test was not a success. This aspect had been later clarified by Dr Anil Kakodkar in an interview with Karan Thapar on 14th Dec. 2009. He confirmed that the yield of thermonuclear test was verified, not by one method but by several redundant methods based on different principles and carried out by different groups. He also clarified that the measurement instruments deployed by DRDO did not work which were meant for thermonuclear test. He further stated that the two devices were 1.5 km apart and that geological features within that distance had changed partly because of the layers that exist and their slopes and more importantly the depths had been different and therefore there was less damage to the shaft. He further confirmed that the thermonuclear device was kept in hard rock granite. At that time none suggested that more tests would be required. And this was accepted by the policy makers as was stated by Sri Brijesh Mishra who was then the National Security Advisor. One may argue that that more tests may be required for developing better design but Kakodkar and Dr R Chidambram are of the view that the design for thermonuclear bomb was validated and within this configuration which was tested in 1998, one can build devices from low kiloton to 200 kilotons.
CONCLUSION
It is not easy to discard the arguments in favour of review of the nuclear doctrine. The circumstances have changed and our adversaries are developing new capabilities. According to the advocates of this view, the NFU does not strengthen the deterrence. However, we need to see the Indian Nuclear Doctrine in the backdrop of our over-all concept. The nuclear weapons are meant to maintain deterrence and not to fight a war. The possession of sufficient number of nuclear weapons with an assured capability to survive the first strike and ability to cause unacceptable pain to the aggressor is sufficient to deter the use of nuclear weapons by our adversaries. This is a rational thinking. It is possible that deterrence may fail because of irrational thinking of any of our adversaries. It has been mentioned by Scott Sagan that in countries where military control the governments, biases and parochial interests of the military might determine state behaviour leading to deterrence failures. That may happen even if we discard the NFU. Therefore there is no need to discard this sound principle. Our stress on building deterrence capability as against acquiring threat capability is sound and should not be discarded. This concept also avoids unnecessary arm race witnessed during the cold war period.
As far as the number of nuclear weapons required for building deterrence capability, this would certainly depend on the capabilities of our adversaries, our assessment of what would cause unacceptable damage to our adversaries and the vulnerabilities of our adversaries which would keep increasing as they develop their infrastructures. The counter force targets should keep in view the deployment pattern of adversaries as well as dummies created by them. The adversaries are also developing mobile ballistic missiles. There would also need to keep counter military targets in the calculus. Thus the minimum requirement of number of weapons would keep on varying and this must be kept under constant review. The targeting strategy would be dependent on number of variables. Hence the minimum requirement of number of nuclear weapons should not be made public but should be kept under constant review. Broadly, it can be said that we need to improve our nuclear arsenal to maintain credible minimum deterrence.
The basic thrust should remain on maintaining a credible and survivable system. Indias nuclear forces as also their command and control system should be organized for very high survivability against surprise attacks and for a rapid (this is again a relative term) retaliatory response. The triad is essential for this purpose. The manner in which our adversaries are formulating their strategies, we need to be prepared to operate in NBC environment. A few units indeed have been trained for this purpose. The National Disaster Management Authority needs to pay special attention to deal with nuclear attacks. This is indeed been done to some extent but require much more attention.
The nuclear posture is intended to convey our intentions clearly of massive response to our adversaries. Several options have been worked out by Ashley J Tellis in his book entitled Indias Emerging Nuclear Posture. These deserve serious attention by our policy planners. The policy makers need to continuously review various dimensions of the nuclear posture and work out the best strategy to make deterrence more credible while not entering into unnecessary arms race. One thing can be made clear to our adversaries that India would use higher yield weapons even if an adversary uses tactical nuclear weapons. This would enhance the deterrence of our nuclear posture. One thing should be clear that India is only thinking of nuclear weapons as weapons of deterrence and not for fighting a nuclear war. Once deterrence fails, like in any war India would be free to take actions for the protection of its national interests.
The nuclear policy linked to research and development of weapon designs and other related issues must be given priority. Under the present circumstances, we can, as suggested by scientists, go ahead with advanced computer simulation using extensive data of previous explosive tests and weapon related applications of laser ignition. In short, the country should not accept any restraints on building our R&D capabilities. Indias nuclear development policy should concentrate to produce more thermonuclear bombs for deterrence.
Do we require more nukes? : India : SD Pradhan : TOI Blogs
The above mentioned issues need to be examined in the light of Indias Nuclear Doctrine. As is well known that Indian Nuclear Doctrine was based on the Draft Nuclear Doctrine prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) in 1999, it is desirable to examine the suggestions of the NSAB in the light of discussions held in the board and what the authors intended to convey. The 27 Member board included inter-alia well known nuclear or strategic experts like (Late) Sri K Subrahmanyam (Convenor), Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, Dr Raja Ramanna, (Late) Sri J N Dixit, M K Narayanan, Bharat Karnard, Brahma Challney, Raja Mohan, Roddam Narsimha etc. It may be mentioned at the outset that the consensus was obtained after the original draft which was prepared by Subrahmanayam, was revised several times to accommodate the views of all members.
In essence, the draft doctrine was based on the following objectives-
Nuclear weapons are meant for deterrence. The basic thrust was to deter the use of nuclear weapons and not fight a nuclear war.
Nuclear weapons are to be used only in retaliation of nuclear attack on India. Therefore the doctrine was purely defensive in nature.
Nuclear weapons would not be used to deter the threat or use of conventional weapons, biological or chemical weapons.
It placed emphasis on minimum credible deterrence to avoid any unnecessary arms race.
The draft doctrine was based on two elements. In the first place, it was intended to convey the message that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances and therefore the concept of No First Use. And in the second place it was meant to convey that any nuclear attack on India or Indian forces anywhere would attract punitive retaliatory nuclear attack that the adversary would find it unacceptable. At the time of preparation of the draft doctrine, it was made clear that this would be a draft paper meant for informed debates. It was also clarified that the doctrine contained only the broad principles and the nuclear strategy, policies and posture would flow from this doctrine (Para 1.6). The official announcement of Indias Nuclear Doctrine was made in January, 2003 after substantive discussions on various aspects pertaining to the posture, targeting strategies, deployment and development as also command and control system. The note released along with the doctrine suggested a slight change in the formulation of response. The note substituted the word suitable to massive and designed retaliation to nuclear strike to inflict unacceptable damage. In both the cases, the retaliation was linked to the unacceptable damage to the aggressor. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine reiterated the NFU and a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. A command and control system was also announced with the formation of Nuclear Command Authority having two bodies- the Political Council under the PM to take a view on the use of nuclear weapons and the Executive Council under the National Security Advisor. The latter body is to assist the former by providing necessary inputs for decision making. A Strategic Command Force was also created for operationalization of deterrence.
However, recently experts have challenged that the validity of the concepts contained in the doctrine and pointed out the need for changing our posture, strategy and policies in view of the changing security environment. They point out the development and deployment of nuclear weapons in our neighbourhood as also the changes in the nuclear doctrine to press their point. The points raised by them are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs to examine what changes are needed to maintain our deterrence.
DISCARD NO FIRST USE FROM THE DOCTRINE
Several experts have been challenging the concept of NFU. They point out that when our adversaries have lowered the threshold, it is necessary to revisit this concept. Besides the experts, Gen Deepak Kapoor the then Army Chief in 2009 had stated that if the reports of Pakistans expanded arsenal were correct, then India would have to reconsider its strategic stance. This was considered all the more important as Pakistan has lowered its threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistans use of nuclear weapons against India was clarified in 2002 by Gen Khalid Kidwai, Head of Pakistans Strategic Plans Division. He had stated that in case deterrence failed, in four conditions Pakistan would use nuclear weapons
If India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold)
India destroys a large part of its land or air forces (military threshold)
India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic threshold)
India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization)
Pakistan in fact has deliberately lowered the threshold and is treating nuclear weapons as one of the weapons to be used in the war. Experts point out that the addition of long range missile delivered nuclear weapons to the Pak arsenal has taken away the traditional Indian advantage. Brahma Chellaney has noted that Pakistan has now extended its reach to the depths of Indian heartland and thereby forever erasing the last bastion of immunity that India once enjoyed. Moreover, as Pakistans nuclear weapons are controlled by the Pak Army, the chances of use of nuclear weapons are greater once it feels that it was going to lose war. The increasing Chinese aggressiveness on Arunachal Pradesh and to some extent in J&K and threatening deployment pattern of nuclear capable missiles are also noted by the security experts who advocate the change in the concept of NFU. Chinese official and media comments indicate that China would not hesitate in discarding the NFU for taking back its own territory. The continued stress on tactical nuclear weapons too are seen by experts as a possibility of China using them in the bordering areas. In addition, the on-going cooperation in nuclear and missile fields between Pakistan and China too is taken into our strategic calculus by these experts. They argue that NFU in the present circumstances is not likely to have the intended impact of the deterrence. There are experts who favour an effective deployment pattern of nuclear weapons to convey the credibility of our deterrence. This would mean that a number of weapons would have to be kept in mated condition. These arguments have value and must be taken into consideration for determining nuclear posture and strategy.
MASSIVE RETALIATION VERSUS FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
As mentioned earlier there was a change from the original draft on the punitive attack. While the draft stated that any adversary must know that India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces, the accepted doctrine states (as was indicated by a paragraph released along with the approval of the nuclear doctrine) that No First Use posture would mean that Nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere and that Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. While the emphasis is on unacceptable pain to the adversary in both the cases, the critics often miss this point. The critics point out that the word massive removes the set of less expansive strategies for the decision makers and that this could unnecessarily escalate the nuclear war. The possible use of tactical weapons is also mentioned in this regard. The supporters of this view quote McNamara in this respect who desired flexibility in responses. The intent in both the cases was to deter the aggressor by assuring a second strike capability that the aggressor would find it difficult to bear. The basic premise on which the Indian Nuclear Doctrine is based is that nuclear weapons are instruments of deterrence and not weapons to fight a war. It may be mentioned that in the NSAB meetings this issue was raised and while there were differences among the members, the consensus was that unacceptable pain to the adversary is important and that would determine the level of punitive action. Thus flexibility is envisaged in the Doctrine. Para 5.2 specifically mentions that an effective and survivable command and control system with requisite flexibility and responsiveness shall be in place and that an integrated operational plan or a series of sequential plans predicated on strategic objectives and a targeting policy shall form the part of system.
MINIMUM OR CREDIBLE DETERRENCE
Other critics of the doctrine point out the need for removing the term minimum as that goes against the concept of credibility. They argue in favour of maximum deterrence by increasing the number of war-heads. While certain numbers of war-heads are necessary to deter the adversary, the doctrine desired that such number should be kept at the minimum level to avoid a nuclear arms race. It may be recalled that such a concept during the cold war period had led to the development and deployment of about 67000 nuclear weapons. Our doctrine desires to avoid this kind of arms race. The number of weapons required would depend upon the realistic assessment of the likely adversaries capabilities to bear the cost of such an action. The authors of the draft doctrine did discuss the issue of numbers and there was a consensus that this number would vary in view of likely changes in the regional security environment. What was stressed was the fact that the number should be kept at the minimum required for maintaining the nuclear deterrence .Para 1.6 clearly stated that details of policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will flow from this framework and would be laid down separately and kept under constant review.
This also brings the question of targeting strategy. While the authors of the draft doctrine, of course with some members dissenting, were of the view that in the second strike the focus should be on the counter-value targets (economic and industrial assets, critical infrastructure and population centres) and on counter-force (adversarys nuclear forces, launch control centres weapon storage sites). There was a feeling that adversarys nuclear forces would be dispersed and it would be difficult to locate the exact position and therefore the focus should remain on the counter-value targets. The example of bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was mentioned in this context. Those who differed suggested cities as targets and not a small section of population to make the deterrence credible. Their arguments are worthy of consideration in the present circumstances.
MORE TESTS NEEDED OR NOT
The yield of weapons is also being debated. A number of experts now feel that India should have higher yield nuclear weapons for making the deterrence credible. Thermonuclear bombs in this context are being mentioned. The advantages of this device are well covered in the discussions. It would be sufficient to mention at this stage that the thermonuclear bombs would significantly increase the effective size of its weapon-usable fissile material stockpile and the yield of weapons could be considerably increased. This would also help in miniaturization of the core. Whether there is a need for further testing or not is a debatable question. Dr Santhanam recently raised the issue which was supported by other scientists. He had mentioned the thermonuclear test was not a success. This aspect had been later clarified by Dr Anil Kakodkar in an interview with Karan Thapar on 14th Dec. 2009. He confirmed that the yield of thermonuclear test was verified, not by one method but by several redundant methods based on different principles and carried out by different groups. He also clarified that the measurement instruments deployed by DRDO did not work which were meant for thermonuclear test. He further stated that the two devices were 1.5 km apart and that geological features within that distance had changed partly because of the layers that exist and their slopes and more importantly the depths had been different and therefore there was less damage to the shaft. He further confirmed that the thermonuclear device was kept in hard rock granite. At that time none suggested that more tests would be required. And this was accepted by the policy makers as was stated by Sri Brijesh Mishra who was then the National Security Advisor. One may argue that that more tests may be required for developing better design but Kakodkar and Dr R Chidambram are of the view that the design for thermonuclear bomb was validated and within this configuration which was tested in 1998, one can build devices from low kiloton to 200 kilotons.
CONCLUSION
It is not easy to discard the arguments in favour of review of the nuclear doctrine. The circumstances have changed and our adversaries are developing new capabilities. According to the advocates of this view, the NFU does not strengthen the deterrence. However, we need to see the Indian Nuclear Doctrine in the backdrop of our over-all concept. The nuclear weapons are meant to maintain deterrence and not to fight a war. The possession of sufficient number of nuclear weapons with an assured capability to survive the first strike and ability to cause unacceptable pain to the aggressor is sufficient to deter the use of nuclear weapons by our adversaries. This is a rational thinking. It is possible that deterrence may fail because of irrational thinking of any of our adversaries. It has been mentioned by Scott Sagan that in countries where military control the governments, biases and parochial interests of the military might determine state behaviour leading to deterrence failures. That may happen even if we discard the NFU. Therefore there is no need to discard this sound principle. Our stress on building deterrence capability as against acquiring threat capability is sound and should not be discarded. This concept also avoids unnecessary arm race witnessed during the cold war period.
As far as the number of nuclear weapons required for building deterrence capability, this would certainly depend on the capabilities of our adversaries, our assessment of what would cause unacceptable damage to our adversaries and the vulnerabilities of our adversaries which would keep increasing as they develop their infrastructures. The counter force targets should keep in view the deployment pattern of adversaries as well as dummies created by them. The adversaries are also developing mobile ballistic missiles. There would also need to keep counter military targets in the calculus. Thus the minimum requirement of number of weapons would keep on varying and this must be kept under constant review. The targeting strategy would be dependent on number of variables. Hence the minimum requirement of number of nuclear weapons should not be made public but should be kept under constant review. Broadly, it can be said that we need to improve our nuclear arsenal to maintain credible minimum deterrence.
The basic thrust should remain on maintaining a credible and survivable system. Indias nuclear forces as also their command and control system should be organized for very high survivability against surprise attacks and for a rapid (this is again a relative term) retaliatory response. The triad is essential for this purpose. The manner in which our adversaries are formulating their strategies, we need to be prepared to operate in NBC environment. A few units indeed have been trained for this purpose. The National Disaster Management Authority needs to pay special attention to deal with nuclear attacks. This is indeed been done to some extent but require much more attention.
The nuclear posture is intended to convey our intentions clearly of massive response to our adversaries. Several options have been worked out by Ashley J Tellis in his book entitled Indias Emerging Nuclear Posture. These deserve serious attention by our policy planners. The policy makers need to continuously review various dimensions of the nuclear posture and work out the best strategy to make deterrence more credible while not entering into unnecessary arms race. One thing can be made clear to our adversaries that India would use higher yield weapons even if an adversary uses tactical nuclear weapons. This would enhance the deterrence of our nuclear posture. One thing should be clear that India is only thinking of nuclear weapons as weapons of deterrence and not for fighting a nuclear war. Once deterrence fails, like in any war India would be free to take actions for the protection of its national interests.
The nuclear policy linked to research and development of weapon designs and other related issues must be given priority. Under the present circumstances, we can, as suggested by scientists, go ahead with advanced computer simulation using extensive data of previous explosive tests and weapon related applications of laser ignition. In short, the country should not accept any restraints on building our R&D capabilities. Indias nuclear development policy should concentrate to produce more thermonuclear bombs for deterrence.
Do we require more nukes? : India : SD Pradhan : TOI Blogs
