I wrote the following last Saturday:
A brief listing of takeaways by Iran to the U.S. response towards the test launch of a ballistic missile (or SLV platform) occurring 29JAN2017:
— Iran determined the new U.S. Administration responded to the ballistic missile test in nearly the same manner as the preceding administration, in applying roughly a dozen new sanctions on individuals and entities. Moreover, the tendered response remained consistently symbolic. The U.S. did not unilaterally withdraw from JCPOA, invoke a military show of force or draw a red line for imminent initiation of armed conflict.
— The political spectrum of Iran rallied in support of the defense doctrine based on the deterrent force provided by IRGC-ASF, with its developing second-strike ballistic missile capability.
( IRGC-ASF were subsequently put on simulated alert status during exercises held on 04FEB2017 in Semnan Province. The drills had likely been planned in advance.)
— Iran’s leadership noted a resumption of the country being targeted by the U.S. for combat actions taken by regional allies, or armed groups it is sympathetic towards. In this case, it was the Houthi naval naval engagement with a RSNF Al Madinah-class frigate off the coast of Yemen. This resumption signals a return to relations where they stood during the Bush Administration, severing a level of cooperation engaged upon with the Obama Administration that saw signing of JCPOA, rapid release of trespassing USN personnel in the Persian Gulf, the negotiated release of American citizens in Yemen, etc.
COMMENT: Two certainties emerged from this episode:
— The United States will make all ballistic missile and SLV launches public and continue to render some level of response. (The variable posed is whether responses will remain within the status quo.)
— Iran will continue to maintain its defense doctrine based on deterrence, with further development and testing of its ballistic missile force.
