Dassault Rafale, tender | News & Discussions [Thread 2]

[randomradio]

You cant fight china which can churn out 2 j 10 per month among other fighters with x number of imported rafales without ruining the indian economy.

Have you read up on the Iran-Iraq war? I would suggest reading up on how much external support Iraq had at the time.

2 J-10s a month is peanuts. I'm sure China can produce 4 J-10s a month, maybe even 6. But at the same time I'm sure India can get 14 jets a month from Indian and foreign sources. India is building capacity to produce at least 7-8 jets a month in India over the next 10 years. Both Russia and France can deliver 6 jets a month with their normal construction speed. If we opt for an American jet like the F-16 in the second MRCA deal, the numbers can increase to 20 jets a month. A lot of these jets will be paid for by the West.

 

[PARIKRAMA]

You know if India wants and invest in manufacturing line and capacities, Dassault would be happy to churn out even 100-120 jets a year...

Its after all an investment.. If India invests to facilitate such massive increase in production i am sure the manufacturer will be happy to oblige..

Only one hiccup i see is such a humongous line will also require investments in supply chain and thats not going to be easy.. particularly for items with long lead times.

@Picdelamirand-oil @Vauban - Am i wrong to assume this..

 

[randomradio]

You know if India wants and invest in manufacturing line and capacities, Dassault would be happy to churn out even 100-120 jets a year...

Its after all an investment.. If India invests to facilitate such massive increase in production i am sure the manufacturer will be happy to oblige..

Only one hiccup i see is such a humongous line will also require investments in supply chain and thats not going to be easy.. particularly for items with long lead times.

@Picdelamirand-oil @Vauban - Am i wrong to assume this..

Our subcontractors for Rafale may not be able to handle that surge in production in India. But French suppliers can easily take care of that.

No chance France or Russia churn out fighters for India, they have far too a close relationship with China for that to ever occur.

Actually, no. The Russians don't trust the Chinese yet. And France is part of NATO, they will support India.

In any case, a war between India and China will see huge international backing for India from the West.

Not to mention India don't even have the pilots for 20 jets p/month.

Peacetime recruitment is different from wartime recruitment. IAF will head to colleges and recruit their pilots on spot for tests.

Anyway, the production of jets will happen after the war is over. A prolonged war between India and China is impossible because of the terrain.

 

[Vergennes]

You know if India wants and invest in manufacturing line and capacities, Dassault would be happy to churn out even 100-120 jets a year...

Its after all an investment.. If India invests to facilitate such massive increase in production i am sure the manufacturer will be happy to oblige..

Only one hiccup i see is such a humongous line will also require investments in supply chain and thats not going to be easy.. particularly for items with long lead times.

@Picdelamirand-oil @Vauban - Am i wrong to assume this..

No way Dassault can produce so much jets in a year.

 

[randomradio]

No way Dassault can produce so much jets in a year.

Picdel says Dassault can match LM in the number of F-35's produced per year.

If Airbus can deliver 600+ jets a year, then 100+ Rafales from Dassault won't be a big problem.

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

Picdel says Dassault can match LM in the number of F-35's produced per year.

If Airbus can deliver 600+ jets a year, then 100+ Rafales from Dassault won't be a big problem.

Yes but not with the current assembly line. You need big perspective to build a new assembly line. What I wanted to say is only that it is technically possible.

 

[Abingdonboy]

Dassault would be happy to churn out even 100-120 jets a year...

I'm not sure about that, the productive capacity (and thus capital outlay) required to make such a vast amount of jets would be HUGE and would only be justifiable if you had >1000 orders in advance ie an assured 10 years of work. With a 200 unit order this production run would be completed in <2 years and that wouldn't be able to justify the allocation of resources. You would hten have thousands (if not tens of thousands) of a highly trained workforce to cull.

It's technically possible but highly improbable unless India commits to >1000 unit order (which won't happen).

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

I'm not sure about that, the productive capacity (and thus capital outlay) required to make such a vast amount of jets would be HUGE and would only be justifiable if you had >1000 orders in advance ie an assured 10 years of work. With a 200 unit order this production run would be completed in <2 years and that wouldn't be able to justify the allocation of resources. You would hten have thousands (if not tens of thousands) of a highly trained workforce to cull.

It's technically possible but highly improbable unless India commits to >1000 unit order (which won't happen).

In fact for 200 an assembly line similar to the existing one is fine. You will be able to deliver from 11 to 33 plane a year. For 1000 you would have to build an assembly line able to deliver from 33 to 100 plane a year. But everything in between is possible. Just it has to fit with your needs.

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

Thanks a ton

You could also look page 6-125 paragraph 6-11-5

 

[PARIKRAMA]

You could also look page 6-125 paragraph 6-11-5

I was going through that chapter only.. In fact i wanted to understand the HARPAGON situation actually..

O- Operational/Organisational and I -industrial/Intermediate
In O Level there is on-board diagnosis,
and ongoing diagnosis and prognosis. In I Level there is the capability for complementary tests, performed
without a test bench and with the engine turned off. The tests include fuel leakage tests, fault localization tests,
control loop tests (e.g. inlet air control system), tests of the anti-icing vane, tests of the fuel flow meter, etc.

Now,

The M-88 also features some performance malfunction analysis. Various malfunctions are recorded for this
purpose. They include start sequence anomalies, such as overheating, stall, and slow start. They include other
performance anomalies such as long rotation, turbine overheat, electronic control unit overheating, compressor
stall, HP or LP shaft overspeed, and post-combustion anomalies. To minimize false alarms, there are two
monitoring channels, which are continuously compared. If necessary, other data is used to resolve discrepancies
between channels. If there is a control loop malfunction, a snapshot of all data at the moment of the event is
recorded.

For full prognosis (estimation of remaining life), Snecma’s SIAD system is interfaced with Dassault’s
HARPAGON ground-support system (Figure 6-47).

It also allows the Time Between Overhaul (TBO) of components to be increased (Figure 6-50). This in turn
provides the flexibility to increase the installed time of the engine and/or manage the maintenance of the
engine and its modules so as to optimize aircraft availability and life-cycle cost.

Now practically this whole concept is all too new for IAF i guess.. This is actually a jet whose data gets analysed and based on that effective action is taken to ensure minimal downtime and increase in mission reliability..

This implies the training imparted for Rafale Ground staff has to be pretty high in terms of standards and skill sets..

I am wondering how long does it take for a ground crew to complete such training... Bcz practically i see a huge employment opportunity for our Engineering graduates/post graduates in this segment..

Secondly, you are sure India can incorporate such changes or such high soft requirement over traditional hard maintenance? .. You know our fleet does not have such hi end stuff surely..

@Abingdonboy @Taygibay @Vauban @MilSpec @anant_s
I remember Tay commenting on similar lines when we talked about high availability requirement for IAF and he pointed out the way processes and quality checks are undertaken for Rafales is completely different especially since FrAF methodology is pretty "revolutionary" if we consider from Indian angle..

I am indeed fascinated what kind of qualification you will require to be in rafale Support team as compared to any other IAF other jet..

 

[PARIKRAMA]

You could also look page 6-125 paragraph 6-11-5

Ya its a big chapter but the basically decision is divided among two ways - one via The Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR) and other being inhouse advance computer assessment to improve repair decision making.

6.11.5 The Rafale Repair Vision
6.11.5.1 Short Description of Rafale
As said before, an aircraft can be repaired easily only if it has been designed as a repairable item (size and
number of the parts – even if it is a trade-off with manufacturing cost – interchangeability, modularity, etc.).
Therefore, the repair vision presented hereafter really fits the Rafale, but most techniques or solutions could
be also used in other aircraft using similar technologies. In order to better understand them, the basic design
features of the Rafale are shown below:

• Structure using composites for 75% of the wet surface and 25% of the weight, new self-reinforced
structural elements (co-cured ribs inside the composites, titanium SPF-DB elements) and new low
observability features.
• Twin-engine aircraft with increased redundancies, strong integration of all sub-systems, full integrated
testability (structure, aircraft sub-systems, WDNS) with centralized failure management (including
visual and voice warnings), new wiring (buses and hyper frequencies), and high pressure hydraulics
(5,000 psi)​

6.11.5.2 Principles of the Structure Maintenance Study
The Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR) for the structure remains in line and follows the principles
of the initial maintenance study of the structure, but with specific requirements. Its principles are listed below.
There is a clear separation between the maximum allowable damage and the maximum repairable damage:
For maximum allowable damage, visual checks or NDI tests are defined with a detection threshold
compatible with the safe use without repair;

• For maximum repairable damage, the functional role (structural, electrical continuity, aerodynamics,
Radar Cross-Section (RCS), etc.) is analysed and the repair is defined to satisfy both the structural
strength and the functional performance; and
• For both categories of damage, the design criteria are simplicity, ease of use and minimum need of
Ground Support Equipment (GSE).​

6.11.5.3 The Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR) Concept Evolution
Though the abbreviation RDC (which translates as Battle Damage Repair) is still in the title of [204],
its application is not limited to war time but includes particular circumstances where repairs have to be
performed under constraints of time or of lack of means and where standard maintenance procedures cannot
be applied. This has three consequences:

• A degraded level of safety must be accepted;
• The operational capabilities of the aircraft must be known precisely; and
• The behaviour in time and the reversibility of the repair must be insured.
During the years 2001 and 2002, a Working Group including Dassault Aviation, representatives of the Ministry
of Defence and of the French Air Force and Navy (basically an Integrated Product Team – IPT) conducted
studies to:
• Translate the “particular circumstances” concept into Rafale needs;
• Define a methodology to assist the “assessment” or “expertise aspect” (see Figure 6-84 below); and
• Validate the methodology on a number of examples.
​

6.11.5.4 Damage Assessment of the Aircraft
6.11.5.4.1 Structural Assessment of the Airframe
The first task is to detect the damage by visual inspection or with the use of available NDI standard means.
The second task is then to identify the structural elements which are concerned. The third task is to analyse
whether the damage is in the allowable limits for “no repair” (allowable damage) or whether it is repairable
(dimensions of the damage within the repairable limits). The fourth task is to identify the impact of the
potential repair on the structural strength and on other aircraft functional performances in order to define the
operational limitations which would apply to the repaired aircraft.
Some significant structural items are not repairable in a BDAR context. It is the case for the main structural
components, as a general rule, for all integrally machined parts and for some secondary structure components
which are subjected to particularly high stress levels (see Figure 6-85 below for criticality). For those
elements, in case of damage, two options exist depending on the “damage tolerance tables” (or, better,
on calculation results of the structural strength) and of the acceptable degradation in mission capability:

• A certain level of damage will be accepted to perform specific missions (for example air/ground
mission without external tank under the fuselage).
• A certain level of damage may be permissible by load factor limitation for instance for a ferry flight.
​

This goes on to systems assessment

followed by operational assessment to repairs to maintenance and documentation to assessments via inhouse tools like CECILIA

The conclusion seems to be
While the section focuses on the Rafale aircraft, the subjects raised are universal and apply to many aircraft
facing the same context of Battle Damage Assessment and Repair. Through the example used, it looks clear
that the major challenge in a BDAR context is the “system assessment” (expertise), and that this will be the
case for any new modern weapon system. It is obvious that Integrated Testability is a powerful tool to assist
the sub-systems assessment and that modularity and structural repairability (size and removability of parts)
are strong enablers to put the aircraft back to a flight worthy condition. Both are available if they have been
incorporated to the design through an ILS approach; it is what Dassault Aviation has tried to do on Rafale to
make it a deployable and easily repairable aircraft.

NTIC and computer models can still offer a significant improvement potential to assist the repair decision.
We are clearly in favour of interactive computer tools which bring a considerable improvement over static
charts or data bases or manuals which cannot fit as closely the real damage to assess. It would be a subject by
itself to review them in detail due to their fast progress … and it is also probable that several of them will have
been presented in other sessions of this Workshop. As a simple example of further improvements, we have
demonstrated solutions to keep on the hardware (aircraft part or equipment) the description or the indication
of the repair which has been performed (4 Kbytes RFID tags or memory buttons – both have been tested
successfully in the aircraft environment) and, thus, to facilitate further proper repair in peace-time with simple
update of the repair information which is also automatically transferred to the Maintenance Management
System. The major advantage is that the “source information” is on the hardware itself where the work has
been performed and that it avoids the very well-known loss of accompanying documents

 

[Taygibay]

Secondly, you are sure India can incorporate such changes or such high soft requirement over traditional hard maintenance?

It relates to what you describe in your first point and the answer is yes ... with a caveat!
You correctly point out how revolutionary skills and attitude will be required of the crews.
The same is required of the whole supply chain within and without IAF/India.That is why
way back after winning the MMRCA, Dassault had asked to use Reliance as a a partner.
Reliance as many worried Bharatis pointed out had no experience in the field. No but it
had a modern attitude towards work, less burdened by cultural traits, more streamlined!
That's what Dassault needed. Build the plant to our specs, hire your best open and dedi-
cated young minds and we'll do the teaching and overseeing. Which is a form of ToT ...

Just use those highly efficient employees later in another venture AMCA maybe!

But not being racist, there is no reason why it can't happen if you want to learn it!
It's not an ability problem but a mindset one, Tay.

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

Secondly, you are sure India can incorporate such changes or such high soft requirement over traditional hard maintenance? .. You know our fleet does not have such hi end stuff surely..

I remember Tay commenting on similar lines when we talked about high availability requirement for IAF and he pointed out the way processes and quality checks are undertaken for Rafales is completely different especially since FrAF methodology is pretty "revolutionary" if we consider from Indian angle..

I am indeed fascinated what kind of qualification you will require to be in rafale Support team as compared to any other IAF other jet..

But software is an Indian specialty?

 

[PARIKRAMA]

It relates to what you describe in your first point and the answer is yes ... with a caveat!
You correctly point out how revolutionary skills and attitude will be required of the crews.
The same is required of the whole supply chain within and without IAF/India.That is why
way back after winning the MMRCA, Dassault had asked to use Reliance as a a partner.
Reliance as many worried Bharatis pointed out had no experience in the field. No but it
had a modern attitude towards work, less burdened by cultural traits, more streamlined!
That's what Dassault needed. Build the plant to our specs, hire your best open and dedi-
cated young minds and we'll do the teaching and overseeing. Which is a form of ToT ...

Just use those highly efficient employees later in another venture AMCA maybe!

But not being racist, there is no reason why it can't happen if you want to learn it!
It's not an ability problem but a mindset one, Tay.

Indeed you are correct in every point.. The skillset learned is perhaps as you rightly said is the biggest TOT we can get here... and yes taht will surely help us in taking the MIC skill levels up surely..which in turn helps AMCA project or future other projects..

But software is an Indian speciality?

Software in terms of coding is of course.. What i mean from soft side is like a Business Analyst job here.. Once who looks into the requirements talk with the vendor, make a tailor made customized solution to the requirement..

Here the Rafale data and the Harpagon assessment for engines or for repairs BDAR (Battle Damage Assessment & Repair) is a revolutionary concept. The requirement is Rafale should be available for missions.. The crew perhaps a 2 member team acts as a business analyst analyzing the requirements and assessment by both systems (Harpagon and BDAR) and authorises the support team to proceed against the solution for a quick turnaround.. ala customised solution

Now presently, this plug and play approach for assessing is not widely used.. I think perhaps barring USA C17s and C130s or here and there few assets.. Most of the fleet is still "hard" repaired where technicians and ground crew knows stuff like back of their hand.. An experienced retired technician looking at old jets can tell you what is the problem just by hearing what pilots say about how he felt flying the jet.. You see what i am trying to point..

The way of approach is indeed changed.. The hangar may see a smartly suit wearing young kids with specs tapping onto his workstation (portable military grade) to understand the "health" of the jet.. He let the software act as a "Doctor" and he later uses "diagnosis" as directed to ensure jet is "healthy"

The decision making process is changing completely in the case of rafale.

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

What puzzle me in the paper, is that we have a theoretical presentation of automatic inspection systems and diagnostic chapter 6.7.2, which ends with a paragraph of 9 lines in 6.7.2.4 to tell the hopes we have about the F-35 with full contingent, then there is chapter 6.7.3 which is the application of these theories and which is entirely devoted to the Rafale! All this in a NATO document.