Somehow poor Shanixee plea of not derailing this thread has gone unheard
..
We are back to MQM bashing.. soon it will turn into a racist fest.
However, prototype has found the vein of the transport purchase's actual purpose, Being able to rapidly deploy troops to bases or makeshift postions just behind the border where a possible surprise attack could be mounted. However, the advantage such a maneuver would have given in terms of time has been greatly reduced with the Induction of AEW systems. Since it would be fairly difficult for an airborne transport force to go undetected anywhere close to the border. However, the prospect of using this fleet to rapidly resupply established forward bases is still very good.
This capability was sorely missed during the 2001 standoff since a two pronged attack via Kashmir and in the Desert plains was planned and about to be executed( the much rumored last minute diplomacy by the Americans prevented the first phase of this attack..through the desert..from happening).
In any case, the crux of Cold start is built on rapid movement and destruction of Pakistani forces ala Desert Storm. And rapid resupply of fast moving troops mandates a fast and adaptive supply line for the attacking force. Something which will most likely fall on C-17s and C-130s supplying to forward operating hubs while the Heli's and possibly the An-32 moving it forward to the immediate lines.
Gentlemen,
I believe Shanixee had a point. I believe that it was a completely mistaken point, based on some misunderstanding of what 'Cold Start' is. It was, however, extremely surprising to see a highly knowledgeable commentator failing to set things right and to put a perspective on things.
First, a brief word about the peacetime establishment and positions of the respective armies, from Pakistan and India. A look at the map will indicate that,
for wars to be fought mainly in the Punjab, the Pakistan Army is uniquely well-placed to deploy quickly from its peace-time stations and reach its selected lines of defence.
This is, ironically, the flip side of Pakistan's lack of strategic depth, that the GHQ has been so agitated about. Lack of strategic depth also means that all the resources are within a short march of the deployment areas, and also, taking things in an attacking context, as has been done in 65 as well as in 71, to mount a rapid attack on weak points in the Indian defences.
By contrast, the Indian Army has neither had the cantonments, bases and establishment that would enable rapid deployment, nor has its growth been entirely Pakistan-centric.
A quick look at the map will show what the situation is. Both the PA's Corps level and Division level locations (in normal times; there has obviously been some dislocation due to disturbances on the western borders) and the IA's corresponding locations are clearly marked.
Second, we need to consider what happened when IA tried out the rapid mobilisation scenario in live exercises, given the above state of affairs.
Nothing happened.
It was a bloody mess. The IA has overwhelming strength against the PA. In practice, it was found, little of this could be delivered with the old, pre-independence style of barracks and peace-time establishments, division of troops and order of battle, logistics and basic doctrine, both at strategic levels and command and control levels.
A full mobilisation would take so long that Pakistan's friends and allies would stop the development of hostilities well in time to prevent any major damage.
The Indian Army therefore took up a re-thinking along several axes:
- Dividing responsibilities between Strike Corps and Holding Corps;
- Assigning quick-reaction tasks and duties to the Holding Corps, which were effectively those troops deployed close to the border and ready to move at relatively short notice);
- Reform of the Strike Corps into Battle Groups, to follow on the initial wave of development of the front by the holding corps;
- Close air-land integration, far beyond what had been attempted before;
- A significant enlarging of the theatre of combat by bringing troops in the southern sector into a line capable of rapid deployment against the PA;
- A deep-strike capability using special operations forces deep behind the front;
What this sought to achieve was a meaningful use of forward echelons, hitherto earmarked for defensive operations, and the understanding that the strike corps needed to be smaller, more agile units, capable either of following up on the holding corps attacks, or of counter-attacking PA ripostes and counters. It also sought to knit together superior strength on the ground and superior strength in the air to achieve multiplicative results in a South Asian prototype of air-land battle.
So what is the point of all this?
The point is that there is nothing in the Cold Start doctrine that requires significant airlift across major distances. Other geopolitical circumstances do.
The point is that the IA is equipoised between its focus on Pakistan and its focus on China. While the Mountain Divisions really ought not to be deployed on the plains, or the plains divisions in the mountains, war does not permit these niceties.
The IA has the need to move formations rapidly between the western front, the northern front and the eastern front. Neither India nor any other country can afford to have three different military organisations for each theatre that is likely to develop. So the high-performance military transport aircraft are not intended to drop swarms of para-troopers into Pakistan; they are intended to transport troops and armour across very long distances.
My suggestion to my friends is that Pakistan has little to fear from these purchases. The time to panic is when the Indian Air Force buys 250 SU 25s or A10s, and the Indian Army buys 300 attack helicopters. Transport aircraft won't hurt; these may.
Sincerely,
