Please stop making fun of yourself, dear military professional!
At the end of my response, it will be clear that it is I who made fun of you.
Telling us Israel doesn't have nuclear bomb because it never tested real one?
Take your source...
Nuclear Weapons - Israel
Teller said that, based on conversations with friends in the Israeli scientific and defense establishment, he had concluded that Israel was capable of building the bomb, and that the CIA should not wait for an Israeli test to make a final assessment because that test would never be carried out.
Capable of building does not automatically mean the product is assembled. Teller is saying that the US should not wait to make the declaration that Israel is a nuclear weapons state, which clearly begs the question of
WHY is there a need to wait and wait for what? Answer -- For an actual nuclear device detonation that would confirm that Israel's indigenous nuclear weapons program is fully functional.
So what could compel Teller to make such an advice?
The answer is here...
Some type of non-nuclear test, perhaps a zero yield or implosion test,...
You previously highlighted it without realizing its significance and how it actually support my arguments, not yours, that an actual nuclear detonation, or an actual shoot down of an orbiting satellite, is required before a declaration can be made that such-and-such program is functional.
An 'implosion test' is a series of tests...
Nuclear Weapon Hydrodynamic Testing
...that mock the conditions of an actual nuclear weapon are detonated using high explosives.
The reasons for the development of these tests are that an actual nuclear detonation, not only is it obvious and would confirm to the world that a nuclear state have just entered nuclear weapons state status, but also ultimately destructive to the final product, which is the warhead itself. If conducted on land, considerable amount of land must be allocated and practically condemned. That is why nuclear weapons states like land scarce France or Britain, conduct nuclear weapons detonations in the vast Pacific ocean. So did the US as we allocated desert land for R/D. Ocean nuclear detonations also allowed final testing of large yield devices.
What the US and other technologically sophisticated countries devised for non-nuclear testings, under the broad term 'implosion test' is called 'one-point safe' testing...
'The idea of a nuclear deterrent is questionable'
And then in the late 1950s we had the one-point safe criterion. Typically an implosion weapon has many points of detonation, and (you) must have at least two mechanically separate explosive points of detonation. Otherwise if you detonate at that one point you will get the full yield. So even though you can have an explosive distribution system, it will have to be at least two, and maybe, in some cases, dozens of points of detonation. And the system has to be such, in our case, that if you detonate the explosive at the worst point, again the fission yield should be less than two kilograms of high-explosive equivalent. So we actually tested all of our weapons to make sure that they are one-point safe. And if you have a lot of weapons it is desirable. "Weaponeers" want to do that. But it is an expensive system; it is a discipline that has to be maintained. One needs a good deal of independence and openness within the community in order to ensure that the weapons are safe.
One-point safe testing ability must be built-in into every warhead. To properly maintain large stockpiles of nuclear weapons, I must be able to pull at random a nuclear warhead
FROM DEPLOYED INVENTORIES and conduct one-point safe testing. I must be able to either detonate any single explosive point in the chain that lead up to the fissionable core and declare that point to be functional. Or set off the entire chain itself. All without me losing valuable processed fissionable materials, uranium or plutonium, and the warhead package.
Israel is able to do this because Israel is a technologically sophisticated society and have the wealth to develop and maintain this rigorous testing and safety regime. One-point safe testing allowed confidence that as the explosive chain is in progress, if there is any flaw in the design, that flaw will be revealed at the next point in the chain. Instead of the final fissionable core, tiny amount of fissionable materials are used...
But we did use explosive testing and we had tiny yields because of this "creep up" process but we used a lot of plutonium and we used a lot of tests for that purpose.
The data from those 'tiny yields' will be used to predict what the larger fissionable core should yield. As Garwin pointed out, this process for US nuclear weapons stockpiles are so refined that there is no need for US to perform these tests as often as in the past. But these tests in no way negate the fact that they were developed from actual nuclear detonations. So for any state that aspire to become nuclear weapons states, their indigenous program
MUST produce at least one actual nuclear detonation, that is why
YOUR source has this comment...
There is no evidence that Israel has ever carried out a nuclear test, although many observers speculated that a suspected nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 was a joint South African-Israeli test.
Why? What else could it be other than the fact that in order to declare an indigenous nuclear weapons program a technical success, a real nuclear detonation must be done.
So what Teller is saying that Israel's nuclear weapons program has reached a point of sophistication and successes in one-point safe testings that it would be irrelevant to deny the reality that Israel is fully capable of producing nuclear warheads, not that such actual nuclear detonations are no longer needed. Note that Teller's comment was dated in 1968 while the suspected joint South African-Israeli detonation was in 1979. Why the 11-year gap if an actual nuclear detonation is no longer needed? The more sophisticated the one-point safe testing program, the less the need to perform actual detonations. Still -- Israel needed to verify if the program is a technical success, Israel is a land scarce country, and the South Africans provided the opportunity for that verification. The uncertainty if Israel was involved worked in Israel's favor in creating another uncertainty -- Does Israel have or have not a functional nuclear weapons stockpile?
Do you know why China finally joined US in nuclear test ban? But not India or other countries? Yearh, I know it serves yet another mental challenging question for you.
Yes I do...But
YOU do not...
Inside China's Nuclear Weapons Program
In Beijing, I met with Chinese nuclear weapon designers who worked for the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics. China's nuclear weapons are not designed to be one-point safe like American weapons. (One-point safe means there is only one in a million chances of exceeding greater than four pounds of high explosive equivalent yield.) Since their nuclear weapons are not one-point safe, excess amounts of fissile material can be used in the weapon to ensure that they will work properly.
China knows that nuclear states like Iraq or South Africa who aspire to become nuclear weapons states does not have the technological sophistication and wealth like the US or the Soviets to have the patience to build quality nuclear weapons. Designs that are
NOT one-point safe are simpler and far less costly, as Garwin pointed out on how expensive the regime can be. Designs that are
NOT one-point safe also enable rapid escalation from nuclear states to nuclear weapons state status but these designs, as we have seen, would require multiple actual detonations in order to certify the program to be a technical success and to verify if long term nuclear warheads built are still operational -- random removal of a weapon from deployed stockpile and detonate it, but losing one expensive weapon in the process.
So it would be in China's interests in keeping the nuclear weapons states club as exclusive as possible by agreeing to such a ban. This is purely from a geopolitical perspective, not because China has a vast reservoir of humanitarian concerns for the planet. No one, not even China, can 'ban' any nuclear weapons states from conducting non-nuclear implosion, aka one-point safe, testings as Garwin pointed out that such testings can be done out of sight and date unknown to most. You embarrassed yourself by bringing on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because the CTBT specified actual nuclear detonations...
Nuclear Testing: CTBTO Preparatory Commission
Page 1: Types of Nuclear Weapons Tests: CTBTO Preparatory Commission
Verification Regime: CTBTO Preparatory Commission
The verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is designed to detect any nuclear explosion conducted on Earth in the underground, underwater or in the atmosphere.
So that further support my argument that for any program, be it building a tricycle or a nuclear bomb or an ASAT missile, an actual ride of a tricycle or detonation of a nuclear warhead or destruction of a satellite
MUST take place.
You bringing up Israel stopping just short of an actual detonation to mean that the 'real thing' is not needed is false. Hence, unless China actually destroy a satellite, China cannot declare that indigenous program functional.
But here is the clincher that made
YOU look absolutely silly...
Articles #2276 , China's ASAT Test: Implications for India
China's ASAT test is not the first attempt of its kind; there were three unsuccessful attempts earlier...
United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing March 29-30, 2007 - Statement of Dr. Michael Pillsbury
SEN. NELSON: Well, the Chinese have shown us that they can hit a less challenging target. Now that they've done an ASAT, tell us what you think about that.
GEN. CARTWRIGHT: The ASAT test by the Chinese, one, was not a surprise. This was their third attempt. What was for us impressive was that in three attempts, they made significant changes each time and were able to, in three attempts, come to a -- successful intercept, I guess is the way we would term it, on their third attempt.
Each attempt, successful or not, intended to hit the target or not, qualified as a 'test'. One test can be for target detection, another for interceptor-target alignment, and so on...With the latest test
INTENDED to actually hit the target. If the interceptor merely glanced off the target, this 'test' can still be considered a success, although a partial one as the intention was to utterly destroy the target.
So this statement from
YOU...
you dont actually shot down an object to prove to yourself (not anyone else) that you have the capability.
Is patently
FALSE as evidenced by
THREE previous failures by China. By your way of thinking, China could have just declare to the world that there is a functional ASAT capability after the first failure, right?
Why do you want to limit your capability of creative thinking? God gives you brain not just for copying and pasting. It's more for thinking, thinking and more thinking!
That's the difference between us.
What a lame attempt at deflecting attention from your obviously wrong definition on what is a 'proximity fuse'.
Please provide authentic source. Believe we all love to hear for this particular incidence.
The burden of proof is upon those who believe this tall tale in the first place. So for those who believe that a Song-class sub was able to elude US sonars and surface just to show-off, please provide an authentic source with attributable names.
It is clear to me that despite your weak attempts to cast doubts on my arguments by calling me 'mentally challenged',
YOU are the one who seems to be still playing in the local university sandbox.
YOU seems to have no technical experience, especially in the areas of testing and development of any kind, to understand the thought processes involved. Despite the computer in front of you and the Internet beyond, your arguments are poorly technically supported and indicative of the lack of critical thinking skills. Give up this discussion.
