China's Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) capability

[Martian2]

China's MAD capability, Diayou Islands, and South China Sea

Nuclear Coercion

The ultimate military power is nuclear coercion. We first saw nuclear coercion in the Korean War (1950-1953). At that time, China had not yet detonated its first atomic/fission bomb (1964) or hydrogen/thermonuclear/fusion bomb (1967).

The United States threatened to use nuclear weapons against China if the PLA Army pushed the US Army into the sea. Thus, the threat of nuclear coercion prevented a complete military victory for China on the Korean peninsula.

Today, the United States is using nuclear coercion again against China. Basically, the U.S. has more thermonuclear ICBM and SLBM thermonuclear warheads. This means in an all-out exchange, the U.S. will suffer less damage than China. Using this line of thinking, China must be circumspect in dealing with its Asian neighbors due to U.S. support for them.

To solve the problem of U.S. nuclear coercion, we will take the concept of Chinese nuclear coercion and apply it to Russia. China has plenty of MRBM/IRBM, SLBM, GLCM, and ALCM thermonuclear warheads. The goal is to transform a plentiful supply of medium-range thermonuclear warheads into thousands of long-range ICBM or SLBM thermonuclear warheads.

In the event of an U.S. nuclear attack on China, China has nothing to lose. Thus, China will unleash hundreds of intermediate-range thermonuclear warheads on Russian cities. China has created a situation where Russia has nothing to lose as well.

At this point, China and Russia have both lost. The United States is in pretty good shape with some Chinese ICBM retaliation. However, the Russians have to consider the war after the nuclear winter. If the Russians don't nuke the U.S. then the U.S. will rule the world forever.

Due to Chinese nuclear coercion, Russia has only one rational choice. Russia must nuke the U.S. to give the Russian post-nuclear war survivors an equal chance to win.

China invokes Russian nuclear umbrella

The impetus behind China's thermonuclear attack on Russian cities is to force the launch of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs in a retaliatory strike on China's behalf against the United States. This means Russia can avoid an attack on its cities if it agrees beforehand with China to launch the Russian thermonuclear arsenal against the United States if the U.S. attacks China.

By using nuclear coercion, China can force the Russians to shelter China under the Russian nuclear umbrella. Militarily speaking, the United States must consider China and Russia as joined at the hip. Any nuclear attack on China should be considered as an attack on Russia.

Overthrowing conventional military strategy

Currently, it is widely believed that China does not possess sufficient long-range thermonuclear weapons to deter the United States. Using the new strategy of attacking Russian cities, China has acquired access to the Russian thermonuclear arsenal to deter the United States. Effectively, China has acquired Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) capability against the United States.

The other pillar of conventional military wisdom is that China will sail its Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs eastward into the Pacific to bring parts of the United States within firing range. The Jin-class SSBNs are not as quiet as American subs and China lacks experience in long-range patrols. This is dangerous for China, because 50 American nuclear attack subs are waiting to intercept the Chinese Jin-class SSBNs.

We can avert the problem of losing the Jin-class SSBNs by launching their SLBMs with 288 MIRVed warheads toward Russian cities and effectively transforming them into thousands of Russian thermonuclear warheads headed for the United States.

MAD gives China a free hand in Asia

Previously, without MAD capability, China could not use its full military arsenal to win in the Diaoyu Islands and South China Sea disputes.

If the United States intervenes militarily over the Diayou Islands, China has two good replies. The first option is to abandon the conventional air and naval battle over the Diayou Islands. The PLA re-annexes Mongolia (which was part of China prior to 1945) and spends ten years to build a second Underground Great Wall about 2,000 miles long to protect about 5,000 thermonuclear warheads on 500 DF-41 ICBMs (which have 10 MIRVs per ICBM).

The second option is to nullify the entire U.S. Navy and Air Force in Asia with Chinese megaton-class EMP (electromagnetic pulse) weapons. By sending a surge of 50,000 volts per meter through all electronics and electrical wiring, all American naval ships and aircraft within a 3,000-mile diameter would be rendered useless.

Both options of annexing Mongolia and using megaton-class EMPs are risky without the ability to deter the United States from the ultimate threat of all-out thermonuclear war. By attacking hundreds of Russian cities, China has acquired MAD capability to deter the United States.

Using the new Chinese MAD capability, China should feel free to re-annex Mongolia or use megaton-class EMPs whenever it feels like it.

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China's Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) against the United States

The pictures below show three Chinese Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs.

Each Jin-class SSBN carries 12 JL-2 SLBMs.

According to Jane's Defence, one JL-2 SLBM can carry 8 MIRVed thermonuclear warheads. (Source: Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (Offensive Weapons). September 30, 2012.)

3 Chinese Jin-class SSBNs x 12 JL-2 SLBMs per SSBN x 8 MIRVs per SLBM = 288 thermonuclear warheads

This is counter-intuitive, but China can deter the United States by aiming 288 thermonuclear warheads at Russian cities. In an all-out thermonuclear war with the United States, China already knows that American nukes are headed for China. This means China is finished.

In retaliation, China wipes out 288 Russian cities and towns. Basically, Russia is finished.

China will leave all Russian nuclear forces untouched. The Russians have a choice to launch all of their ICBMs against the United States. This is important for the war after the nuclear winter. If Russia does not launch all of its ICBMs against the U.S. then the handful of Russians who survive in underground cities will have to face 310 million Americans in an undamaged America.

The only logical choice is for Russia to launch all of its MIRVed thermonuclear warheads against the U.S. to level the playing field after the nuclear winter. Any launch of Russian nuclear missiles against China is redundant and pointless.

Since China has mutually assured destruction capability against the United States (by leveraging the Russian thermonuclear arsenal), this means the U.S. cannot pressure China in Asia or the South China Sea.

From the Bohai Sea or South China Sea, China's three Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs can maintain China's MAD capability against the United States.

Three Chinese Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs seen at dock.

By counting the launch tubes, it is obvious the Type 094 Jin-class SSBN carries 12 SLBMs.

[Note: Thank you to ChineseTiger1986 for the pictures.]

 

[Hypersonicmissiles]

What a nut job theory.

 

[Indischer]

Looks like the OP too has acquired MAD capability. A visit to the Asylum is recommended.

 

[ChineseTiger1986]

The Type 094 is a deterrence against USA, not against Russia.

Right now, China doesn't need to borrow Russia's MAD to conduct a MAD with USA.

BTW, it is good to see you coming back Martin.

 

[ChineseTiger1986]

Also, China has its own SBIRS, and its capability was fully demonstrated during the recent Shenzhou missions.

Space-Based Infrared System - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

USA cannot successfully launch a surprised nuclear attack to eliminate China's land nuclear deterrence and command & control center at once.

When a US ICBM was launched, China's SBIRS will quickly notify it and being able to calculate its brief trajectory and the type of warhead (nuclear or conventional) that it carries. If it is a nuclear one towards China, then China will immediately send its own ICBMs back to USA as a response.

With China's recent HGV, it further dwindles the possibility of nuclear attack against China.

 

[Martian2]

Video of China's Julang-1 SLBM launch

Here are 12 extra JL-1A SLBMs that can be used to trigger the Russian thermonuclear arsenal.

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The launch of China's Julang-1 (JL-1) SLBM starts at 26 seconds into the video. According to Jane's Defence, the JL-1 SLBM carries a 250 or 500 kiloton thermonuclear warhead.

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It is easy to identify a Chinese JL-1 SLBM, which has a diagonal-stripe pattern.

Launch of China's JL-1 SLBM from the video.

"The Julang 1 is China’s first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). It was also the first Chinese-built missile that employed solid-propellant technology." (Caption credit: China Tech Gadget)

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From the Federation of American Scientists, we have the following chronology.

1978: JL-1 solid-propellant rocket engine successfully tested in 1978.
1982: First JL-1 test launch from a submerged pontoon near the Yellow Sea on April 30, 1982.
1982: First successful JL-1 launch from a Golf Class test-bed submarine on October 12, 1982.
1982: Second successful JL-1 launch from the Golf submarine also occurred on October 12, 1982.
1988: First successful launch of JL-1 from a Xia SSBN on September 27, 1988.
1988: JL-1 is fully operational with the successful test firing from a submerged Xia in September 1988.

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JL-1 [CSS-N-3] | Federation of American Scientists

"JL-1 [CSS-N-3]

The JL-1 [CSS-N-3] is a two-stage solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile deployed on the Type-092 Xia class submarines. The Ju Lang-1 [or "Giant Wave-1"] missile is a sea-based variant of the land-based ground-mobile DF-21. JL-1 is ejected from a submerged submarine with the first-stage engine igniting after the missile has emerged from the water. The first successful test of the 1.4m-diameter solid-rocket engine for the JL-1 came in early 1978. The first test launch of the two stage CSS-NX-3 missile took place on 30 April, 1982 from submerged pontoon near Huludao (Yellow Sea). The first successful launch of the JL-1 was achieved on 12 October 1982, from a Golf Class trials submarine, marking a major milestone in a development program that had been initiated in March 1967. The second was launched on 12 October 1982. The first firing from Xia was in 1985 and was unsuccessful and it was not until 27 September 1988 that a satisfactory launch took place. Although the missile put to sea as early as 1983, it did not become fully operational until the successful test firing from submerged Xia in September 1988."

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JL-1/-1A (CSS-N-3) | Missile Threat

"JL-1/-1A (CSS-N-3)
...
The JL-1 has a range of 2,150 km (1,336 miles) with an accuracy of 700 m CEP obtained from an inertial guidance system. It delivers a single warhead payload that weighs up to 600 kg, which is believed to carry a 250 or 500 kT yield nuclear device. As the DF-21 is essentially a modified JL-1, it is likely that the JL-1 can be equipped with the same high explosive, EMP, submunition and chemical warheads. The JL-1 has a launch weight of 14,700 kg, a length of 10.7 m and a width of 1.4 m. It uses a two-stage solid propellant engine which initiates after the missile leaves the water. The missile is cold-launched from a submarine canister.[3]
...
An upgraded version of the missile, the JL-1A (or the JL-21A), probably entered service around the same time as its land-based counterpart, the DF-21A in 1996. Some reports suggest that the Xia-class submarine was outfitted for these newer missiles – which would leave the original missile without a launch platform. It is assumed that the Type 094 submarine replaced the Xia-class as the primary nuclear deterrent submarine in 2009 or 2010, but reports cannot confirm this.[6]

The JL-1A has a range of 2,500 km (1,553 miles) with an accuracy of 50 m CEP. This accuracy is obtained from an inertial guidance system that is integrated with a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) and radar correlation systems. It delivers a single warhead payload that weighs up to 500 kg which is believed to carry a 90 kT nuclear warhead, though it is possible it uses a selectable yield nuclear device with settings of 20, 90 and 150 kT. As the DF-21 is essentially a modified JL-1, it is likely that the JL-1A can be equipped with high explosive, EMP, submunition and chemical warheads. The JL-1A has a launch weight of 15,200 kg, a length of 12.3 m and a width of 1.4 m. It uses a two-stage solid propellant motor that initiates from a cold launch once the missile has left the submarine canister and exited the water.[7]

1. Lennox, Duncan. “JL-1/-21 (CSS-N-3).” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (Offensive Weapons). August 28, 2012. (accessed September 12, 2012). ↩
...
3. Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems. ↩
...
6. Lennox, Strategic Weapon Systems. ↩
7. Ibid. ↩"

 

[ChineseTiger1986]

Right now, China's naval nuclear deterrence can cover the entire part of America into its range.

But as you suggested before, it is only slightly inferior in quality and much smaller in quantity.

In order to fully match USA in the naval nuclear deterrence, China still has to deploy the more advanced JL-3 and at least 8 Type 096 SSBNs.

Since USA has by far the most powerful naval nuclear deterrence, but compared to the rest of the three permanent members in UN, you can see how much China has progressed during the last several decades.

UK: doesn't possess its own SLBM
France: having a lot of trouble with its M-51 SLBM
Russia: the reliabiliy of its Bulava SLBM is still not fully solved

China has just conducted another JL-2A test in December 22nd of last year, so far how reliable do you think China's JL-2A is right now?

 

[Martian2]

It's been over thirty years since the first successful JL-1 SLBM launch. China has also been successful with two DF-41 ICBM launches.

China had 2.5 rocket failures in the last 16 years for the Long March series, which is the civilian equivalent of the Dong Feng missiles and the Julang series (which is navalized Dong Feng missiles).

The quality of Chinese missiles is extremely good; probably the best in the world.

However, the weakness is in the submarine itself. The Type 094 isn't streamlined. The Type 096 Tang-class SSBN won't be ready until 2015 at the earliest.

The other big problem is the lack of numbers. China would need 50 nuclear attack submarines to hunt down the current 50 American SSNs. Like you said, you also need a large fleet of SSBNs to deter the American fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs.

In conclusion, I doubt China can achieve MAD deterence against the United States based solely on the current Chinese thermonuclear arsenal. China should target its SLBMs at Russian cities to elicit a massive Russian thermonuclear response against the United States. There is no other way for China to achieve MAD against the United States at the present time.

 

[ChineseTiger1986]

It's been over thirty years since the first successful JL-1 SLBM launch. China has also been successful with two DF-41 ICBM launches.

China had 2.5 rocket failures in the last 16 years for the Long March series, which is the civilian equivalent of the Dong Feng missiles and the Julang series (which is navalized Dong Feng missiles).

The quality of Chinese missiles is extremely good, probably the best in the world.

However, the weakness is in the submarine itself. The Type 094 isn't streamlined. The Type 096 Tang-class SSBN won't be ready until 2015 at the earliest.

The other big problem is the lack of numbers. China would need 50 nuclear attack submarines to hunt down the current 50 American SSNs. Like you said, you also need a large fleet of SSBNs to deter the American fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs.

In conclusion, I doubt China can achieve MAD deterence against the United States based solely on the current Chinese thermonuclear arsenal. China should target its SLBMs at Russian cities to elicit a massive Russian thermonuclear response against the United States. There is no other way for China to achieve MAD against the United States at the present time.

Well, Russia currently only has a huge number of landbased ICBM, while their SLBM right now is probably even weaker than China's.

While their ICBMs are not being protected by the nuclear underground tunnel, can it work efficiently as a second strike deterrence?

The problem is that USA's 14 Ohio class boats each with 24 most advanced Trident II SLBMs is a huge unbalanced capability against both China and Russia combined.

That's why China has to be rushed to develop its Type 096 as soon as possible.

 

[Martian2]

Russian ICBMs are in well-protected silos and on mobile TELs.

The Russian mobile TELs (and upcoming railroad-based TELs) are hard to find. They're pretty safe.

There is a misconception about the idea of a First Strike. No one gets a First Strike. The other side can see the launch of your ICBMs or SLBMs on their infrared satellites. The target country will immediately launch in retaliation.

As soon as one side launches, the other side will counterstrike. For example, within the first five minutes of detecting an American ballistic missile launch towards Russia, the Russians will retaliate. The flight time for an ICBM from the U.S. to Russia is about 20 to 30 minutes. Thus, we will have near-simultaneous thermonuclear strikes.

The only way to achieve a true First Strike is to use stealth cruise missiles. The problem is that stealth cruise missiles aren't that stealthy. They should be detectable on long-wavelength radar. Thus, the other side knows you've launched stealth cruise missiles at them and they'll launch a nuclear counterstrike. Cruise missiles also take too long to reach their targets deep inside Russia or China (e.g. Tibet).

The same problem exists with the B-2. The other side knows its coming. Also, the B-2 is subsonic and this will allow Russia/China to quickly launch their solid-fueled ICBMs.

In conclusion, don't worry about a First Strike. I don't see how it is achievable without the other side seeing it coming.

 

[ChineseTiger1986]

Russian ICBMs are in well-protected silos and on mobile TELs.

The Russian mobile TELs (and upcoming railroad-based TELs) are hard to find. They're pretty safe.

There is a misconception about the idea of a First Strike. No one gets a First Strike. The other side can see the launch of your ICBMs or SLBMs on their infrared satellites. The target country will immediately launch in retaliation.

As soon as one side launches, the other side will counter-strike. For example, within the first five minutes of detecting an American ballistic missile launch towards Russia, the Russians will retaliate. The flight time for an ICBM from the U.S. to Russia is about 20 to 30 minutes. Thus, we will have near-simultaneous thermonuclear strikes.

The only way to achieve a true First Strike is to use stealth cruise missiles. The problem is that stealth cruise missiles aren't that stealthy. They should be detectable on long-wavelength radar. Thus, the other side knows you've launched stealth cruise missiles at them and they'll launch a nuclear counter-strike. Cruise missiles also take too long to reach their targets deep inside Russia or China (e.g. Tibet).

The same problem exists with the B-2. The other side knows its coming. Also, the B-2 is subsonic and this will allow Russia/China to quickly launch their solid-fueled ICBMs.

In conclusion, don't worry about a First Strike. I don't see how it is achievable without the other side seeing it coming.

As i said before, to successfully conduct a first strike nuclear attack against the countries such as Russia and China is almost impossible.

Only USA/Russia/China possess the SBIRS, so a fast counter strike can immediately respond if any side fired the first shot.

 

[ChineseTiger1986]

BTW, China's new Type 095 can cruise in a higher speed than CV Liaoning (a 30 knots carrier).

It features a newly designed conning tower and the pump-jet tail. If it is compable to the Seawolf/Virginia class SSN, then there is no doubt about the capability of the Type 096.

 

[Akasa]

BTW, China's new Type 095 can cruise in a higher speed than CV Liaoning (a 30 knots carrier).

It features a newly designed conning tower and the pump-jet tail. If it is compable to the Seawolf/Virginia class SSN, then there is no doubt about the capability of the Type 096.

That's a Type 093B, buddy.

 

[ChineseTiger1986]

That's a Type 093B, buddy.

Its surface cruising capability is a bit too much for a Type 093G.

 

[Akasa]

Its surface cruising capability is a bit too much for a Type 093G.

How is that relevant to the fact that this is clearly not a new type of submarine?