(S/NF) During the June 7 U.S.-China Consultation on Arms Control and Nonproliferation (ref A), Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Frank Record provided Chinese Foreign Ministry Director General for Arms Control Zhang Yan with additional information on Chinese national Gao Yiming's efforts to supply Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program with an aluminum production line that could assist Pakistan's development of an indigenous capability to manufacture uranium centrifuge components (refs B and C). For informational purposes, Washington would like to provide Embassy Beijing a copy of the interagency-cleared non-paper provided to DG Zhang.
¶2. (S/Rel China) Begin non-paper. -- We raised with your Government in January 2006 that Chinese national Gao Yiming was engaged in efforts to provide enrichment-related items to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program. -- In particular, we shared that Gao was coordinating the supply of an aluminum production line from China's Taiyuan Heavy Industry Company. -- We are troubled to have received reports that the transfer of this aluminum production line to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program continues to move forward. -- Our information indicates that Taiyuan Heavy Industry Company recently received a payment associated with the extrusion press contract and that the entities involved are now involved with preliminary shipping details. -- Additionally, another Chinese entity, China Nonferrous Metals Processing Technology (CNPT) Company, Ltd., is also involved in the transaction. CNPT is located at No. 1 Xiyuan Rd., Luoyang, Henan. -- We would also like to make you aware that the contract may identify the buyer of the equipment as a Pakistani metal works firm, rather than Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program. -- We continue to be very concerned about the transfer of this aluminum production line to the recipient country's unsafeguarded nuclear program. As we shared with you in January, the production line could be used for the production of thick-walled aluminum tubes, which could assist the recipient country's development of an indigenous capability to manufacture uranium centrifuge components such as outer casings, molecular pumps, crash rings and cascade piping. -- The Basic Principle as prescribed in the NSG Guidelines asks NSG Participating Governments not to authorize transfers of items that would contribute to a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity or, in general, where there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity. We believe you would agree that the transfer to an unsafeguarded nuclear program of such an aluminum production line would meet this level of concern. -- We would also like to underscore our previously stated concerns that this transaction would be inconsistent with China's 1996 pledge to not assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities anywhere. -- We urge you to re-double your efforts to act upon the additional information we have provided by taking aggressive steps to prevent this transfer from going forward. We are very seriously concerned that as the transfer proceeds, our window to stop this export is closing. We encourage you to make every effort to stop this transaction now.
