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统计局年内出新GDP核算办法 调整后部分省份GDP将大增_凤凰财经

数字显示,2013年中国全年研究与试验发展(R&D)经费支出11906亿元,比上年增长15.6%,占国内生产总值的2.09%。有统计专家指出,上述研发支出约有3/4的将转为GDP,这样2013年GDP总量可能会增加1万亿元左右。

美国于2013年重新修订了GDP数据,最主要的修订内容是将研究与开发支出以及娱乐、文学和艺术品原件支出等作为固定资本形成计入GDP。这使得2012年美国GDP比原先统计的增加了3.6%,约5598亿美元。
 
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Foreign brands losing ground to domestic firms
China.org.cn

Amid a sluggish consumer goods market in China, foreign brands are facing pressure, with six out of 10 losing market share to their domestic rivals last year, an industry survey has found.

China's market for soft drinks, packaged foods, personal care products and other consumer staples has contracted by two-thirds since 2011, according to China Shopper Report 2014, the third annual study jointly conducted by Bain & Co and Kantar Worldpanel.

Market growth for non-durable consumer goods slowed to 4.6 percent in the first quarter of 2014, down from 10 percent growth in 2012 and 15 percent three years ago. The rate of decline was consistent across all cities regardless of size.

Volume growth was mostly stable as price increases declined, in large part due to fewer new premium products entering the market.

Growth in annual spending per household dropped from 9 percent in 2012 to 4.6 percent last year, while the number of urban households grew by 2.6 percent per year, contributing to volume growth.

The survey, released on Tuesday in Beijing, projects continued single-digit market growth this year, a significant drop from previous years, as a result of lower growth in disposable income and annual spending per household.

The study surveyed 40,000 Chinese households and analyzed 106 product categories covering personal care, home care, beverages and packaged goods, which account for 80 percent of the country's non-durable consumer goods market.

Foreign brands overall lost share across 26 categories. Some saw marginal share gain, but the overall scorecard was negative, with 60 percent of foreign brands losing share, the survey said.

For example, in the carbonated soft drinks category, foreign brands saw a 6.3 percent share loss, while domestic brand Wahaha increased market share by 3.8 percent through product innovation and large scale marketing, according to Kantar.

However, foreign brands achieved marginal share gain in some categories, including hair conditioner and cookies.

A key reason for the growth deceleration was that premiumization (the move toward luxury products) slowed noticeably over the past year, said Jason Yu, general manager of Kantar Worldpanel China.

"With premiumization, retailers were unable to easily push through the price increases that helped drive growth in previous years," Yu said.

Bruno Lannes, a partner at Bain's Shanghai office who leads the firm's consumer products and retail practice division in China, said: "Market implications for both foreign and domestic consumer goods companies in China are clear and direct: Growth must come from share gain, and share gain comes from penetration gain.

"Building penetration means treating each consumer as a new consumer and recruiting them at each purchase occasion," he said.

To increase market share and penetration for both domestic and foreign brands, Lannes said that "it is vital to create mental and physical availability of their products in stores through enhancing consumers' memory structure and streamlining selective innovations of products to avoid confusing consumers".

He also suggested that companies enhance store activation as shoppers need to be confronted by the brand to trigger purchasing decisions.

Speaking on the outlook for foreign brands in China, Lannes said that 40 percent of foreign brands still gained share in the market last year.

"Results from this year show volatility and the challenges of maintaining consistent share-gain strategy in China," he said. "This year, more foreign brands are losing share. But next year, it might be the other way around.

"It is true that the market is more complicated," he said.
 
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It's always good to support the domestic economy, so no big surprise. One variable that might influence the preference would be cost. cost comparison of domestic and foreign brands.
 
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Interesting, but exceptionally vague counter-point to the received wisdom about China's rebalancing. The writer focuses too much on changing the financing model and not enough on the reform that will enable the capital markets to develop to the point where this will become possible.

Guest post: China rebalancing is a dangerous obsession – beyondbrics - Blogs - FT.com

Guest post: China rebalancing is a dangerous obsession
Jul 2, 2014 7:47amby guest writer
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By Qu Hongbin, Co-Head of Asian Economic Research, HSBC

For many, China’s growth model, which has delivered average annual GDP growth of 10 per cent over the past three decades, simply looks wrong: a national savings rate of around 50 per cent is unheard of in a large, modern economy.

A typical diagnosis states that China invests too much and consumes too little. The prescription is “rebalancing” – moving the economy away from investment towards consumption-led growth. However, a consumption-led growth model has little in theory or evidence to support it.

For developing economies (which China still is in per capita terms), the theory is quite clear: they should invest in building up their capital stock per worker. A higher savings rate will mean less consumption, but it funds greater investment too. That ultimately allows poorer countries to catch up to higher per-capital GDP levels faster.

Economists generally agree that sustained economic growth depends on supply-side fundamentals such as the stock of capital and technological innovation. Ultimately, it is productivity growth that drives GDP growth in the long run. There is little in the academic literature that suggests a causal link between higher consumption and higher growth rates.

Consumption-led growth models have also performed poorly in practice. In the 1970s and before economic reforms, China’s household consumption share of GDP was over 60% – higher than that of the US at the time. However, growth during the decade was significantly slower than what came after, when investment as share of GDP rose steadily.

Furthermore, a credit-driven consumption model is not only unsustainable, but the debilitating effects of consumers deleveraging from high levels of debt in a deflationary environment will make the recovery much more difficult. Of course, no country consumes nothing and saves everything for investment; it would be a bad idea even if it could as the investment would eventually run into diminishing returns.

The key debate then, is whether China has already reached the point where extra investment becomes over-investment. On a macro level, we think China’s capital stock per worker is still low and less likely to be subject to diminishing returns. China’s development into a modern economy is far from finished. Much more infrastructure investment is still needed to cope with the rapid pace of urbanisation and industrialisation.

While the recent infrastructure boom has boosted the country’s transport capacity, China’s railway network is still shorter than that of the US in the 19th century. There are no doubt plenty of examples of over-investment in certain sectors. But it does not mean one can draw a simple with the economy as a whole. There are still more useful infrastructure projects to be built before China is overrun by bridges to nowhere.

Critics would point to data showing the incremental capital-output ratio in China coming down substantially since the global financial crisis. But this mainly reflects a shift in the focus of investment away from say, toy factories, and toward subways, which are more capital-intensive and generate less of a boost to short-term output.

That would indeed pull down the short-term return on capital (which still remains high). However, it does not imply diminishing returns have set in because infrastructure investments generate significant spill-over effects through lifting the whole economy’s efficiency and labour productivity, which will boost return on capital in the future.

China’s problem is not that investment is too high, but that underdeveloped capital markets have meant investment has been funded through the wrong financing model. Too much has been funded by short-term bank lending, sometimes through non-transparent local government vehicles or other parts of the shadow banking system.

This creates a duration mismatch, as many of these projects have returns that accrue over a long period of time. The real rebalancing challenge is therefore more subtle. It involves changing the way investment is funded by improving credit supply through a more developed credit market, improving access for small and medium-sized enterprises, and expanding the local government bond market to fund long-term infrastructure investment.

This would be more efficient than having the government introduce further distortions by micro-managing the demand side. In the long term it is inevitable that the savings rate will fall due to demographics, but that makes it even more important for China to invest now. Otherwise, once the savings rate begins is natural decline, it becomes more difficult to fund investment.

Rebalancing through deliberately forcing down the savings rate would be more difficult and dangerous. Say the authorities tried to reduce the real interest rate to discourage saving. Without all manner of reforms to boost the social safety net, that could lead to even greater precautionary savings.

Consumption would fall, as would firms’ profits and government tax revenues, making it more difficult to finance the required safety net. Far better, we would argue, to target the distortions at source with structural reforms. The obsession with rebalancing China’s economy is instead leading to misguided policy recommendations that are too blunt, and which may carry unintended consequences.

This piece was written jointly by Qu Hongbin and John Zhu, HSBC’s Greater China Economist.

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This rambles a bit, but touches on some of the main themes of China's rebalancing: increase disposable income, stop with wasteful real estate development projects, price capital according to its risk, and develop the capital markets.

Piketty with Chinese Characteristics by Andrew Sheng
and Xiao Geng
- Project Syndicate



BUSINESS & FINANCE
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ANDREW SHENG
Andrew Sheng, Distinguished Fellow of the Fung Global Institute and a member of the UNEP Advisory Council on Sustainable Finance, is a former chairman of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, and is currently an adjunct professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing. His latest book is From Asian to Global Financial Crisis.

28a99c1905c4b4cb93a2781fddaa783c.square.jpg

XIAO GENG
Xiao Geng is Director of Research at the Fung Global Institute.

JUL 2, 2014
Piketty with Chinese Characteristics
HONG KONG – In his bestselling book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty argues that capitalism aggravates inequality through several mechanisms, all of which are based on the notion that r (the return on capital) falls less quickly than g (growth in income). While debate about Piketty’s work has focused largely on the advanced economies, this fundamental concept fits China’s recent experience, and thus merits closer examination.

Of course, a large share of China’s population has gained from three decades of unprecedentedly rapid GDP growth. The fixed-capital investments that have formed the basis of China’s growth model largely have benefited the entire economy; infrastructure improvements, for example, have enabled the rural poor to increase their productivity and incomes.

As the investment rate rose to almost half of GDP, the share of consumption fell to as little as a third. The government, recognizing the need to rebalance growth, began to raise the minimum wage in 2011 at nearly double the rate of real GDP growth, ensuring that the average household had more disposable income to spend.

But property prices have risen faster than wages and profits in manufacturing, causing the return on capital for a select few real-estate owners to grow faster than China’s GDP. The same group has also benefited from the leverage implied by strong credit growth. As a result, China’s top 1% income earners are accumulating wealth significantly faster than their counterparts in the rest of the world – and far faster than the average Chinese.

In fact, while the rise of China and other emerging economies has reduced inequality among countries, domestic inequality has risen almost everywhere. The Piketty framework highlights several drivers of this trend.

For starters, by lowering trade and investment barriers, globalization has created a sort of winner-take-all environment, in which the most technologically advanced actors have gained market share through economies of scale. In particular, as the global economy moves toward knowledge-based value creation, a few innovators in global branding, high-technology, and creative industries win big, with the global boom in tech stocks augmenting their gains.

The resulting concentration of revenue, wealth, and power undermines systemic stability by creating too-big-to-fail entities, while hampering smaller players’ ability to compete. The global financial system reinforces this concentration, with negative real interest rates promoting financial repression on household savings. Given that banks prefer lending to larger enterprises and borrowers with collateral, small and medium-size enterprises struggle to gain access to credit and capital.

Another problem is that the low interest rates generated by advanced-country central banks’ unconventional monetary policies have led to the “decapitalization” of long-term pension funds, thereby reducing the flow of retirement income into the economy. In many emerging economies, including China, widespread fear of insufficient retirement income is fueling high household saving rates.

Economists largely agree that this trend toward inequality is unsustainable, but they differ on how to curb it. Those on the right argue for more market-based innovation to create wealth, while those on the left argue for more state intervention.

In fact, both approaches have a role to play, particularly in China, where the government is pursuing a more market-oriented growth strategy but retains considerable control over many aspects of the economy. China needs to strike a balance between policy-supported stability and market-driven progress.

In particular, policy and institutional factors have led to the underpricing of key resources, generating significant risk. The vast workforce has driven down the price of labor, impeding the transition to a high-income, domestic-consumption-driven growth model. Similarly, failure to account for environmental externalities has contributed to the underpricing of natural resources like coal, fueling excessive resource consumption and creating a serious pollution problem.

Moreover, policies aimed at stabilizing the exchange rate and keeping interest rates low have caused capital and risk to become undervalued in large projects. And local governments’ effort to finance development by selling land to investors at artificially low prices has spurred massive investment in real-estate development, causing property prices to rise at unsustainably high rates. Given property’s role as the main form of collateral for bank loans, financial risk has risen sharply.

The government is now attempting to mitigate the risks that investors and local governments have assumed by allowing more interest- and exchange-rate flexibility. But the transition must be handled carefully to ensure that property prices do not plummet, which would increase the ratio of non-performing loans – and possibly even trigger a major financial crisis.

In order to ensure long-term social stability, China must promote inclusive wealth creation, for example, by establishing strong incentives for innovation. The rise of high-tech companies like Huawei, Tencent, and Alibaba is a step in the right direction, though the fact that the most successful Chinese tech companies are listed overseas, and are thus not available to mainland investors, is problematic. Regulations and exchange controls prevent the retail sector from benefiting from new wealth creation.

Another challenge lies in the decline in the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index from its 2007 peak of 6,000 to around 2,000 today. With financial assets failing to bring adequate dividends or capital appreciation, many investors have switched to real estate as a hedge against inflation.

China’s leaders are already working to guide the transition to a growth model driven by domestic consumption and higher-value-added production. But the challenge is more complex than that. The new model – with the help of market forces, where and when appropriate – seeks to ensure that wealth is created sustainably and shared widely. To succeed would fulfill the Chinese Dream. Failure would mean that inequality would continue to fester worldwide.

Andrew Sheng

and Xiao Geng
apply to China Thomas Piketty's framework for understanding the country's rising income inequality.

- Project Syndicate



Read more at Andrew Sheng

and Xiao Geng
apply to China Thomas Piketty's framework for understanding the country's rising income inequality.

- Project Syndicate
 
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Foreign brands losing ground to domestic firms
China.org.cn



Market growth for non-durable consumer goods slowed to 4.6 percent in the first quarter of 2014, down from 10 percent growth in 2012 and 15 percent three years ago. The rate of decline was consistent across all cities regardless of size.

Volume growth was mostly stable as price increases declined, in large part due to fewer new premium products entering the market.

Growth in annual spending per household dropped from 9 percent in 2012 to 4.6 percent last year, while the number of urban households grew by 2.6 percent per year, contributing to volume growth.

The survey, released on Tuesday in Beijing, projects continued single-digit market growth this year, a significant drop from previous years, as a result of lower growth in disposable income and annual spending per household.

...

A key reason for the growth deceleration was that premiumization (the move toward luxury products) slowed noticeably over the past year, said Jason Yu, general manager of Kantar Worldpanel China.

"With premiumization, retailers were unable to easily push through the price increases that helped drive growth in previous years," Yu said.

Bruno Lannes, a partner at Bain's Shanghai office who leads the firm's consumer products and retail practice division in China, said: "Market implications for both foreign and domestic consumer goods companies in China are clear and direct: Growth must come from share gain, and share gain comes from penetration gain.

These are the key points. The market isn't growing anymore, and consumer income growth is slowing. Currently, growth comes from taking market share, not from segment growth. That is a worrying sign for all, not just foreign companies. Still, congratulations to Chinese domestics.
 
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These are the key points. The market isn't growing anymore, and consumer income growth is slowing. Currently, growth comes from taking market share, not from segment growth. That is a worrying sign for all, not just foreign companies. Still, congratulations to Chinese domestics.

But the car market in May,Domestic brand car losed ground to foreign brands. Domestic car shared only 38% market in May.

Top1 Ford focus (福特福克斯)sold 33341
00052657971501_1844890_14.jpg


Domestic top1 ChangAn EADO(长安逸动)sold 12991
20120322175001_53691.jpg


SUV market
top1 GreatWall HAVAL H6(domestic b) sold 24404
Img327530836.jpg


top2 VW Tiguan 19778
m_20110415164006657555.jpg
 
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Img327530836.jpg


But the car market in May,Domestic brand car losed ground to foreign brands. Domestic car shared only 38% market in May.

Top1 Ford focus (福特福克斯)sold 33341
00052657971501_1844890_14.jpg


Domestic top1 ChangAn EADO(长安逸动)sold 12991
20120322175001_53691.jpg


SUV market
top1 GreatWall HAVAL H6(domestic b) sold 24404
Img327530836.jpg


top2 VW Tiguan 19778
m_20110415164006657555.jpg

What was the growth rate of the overall Chinese car market?
 
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What was the growth rate of the overall Chinese car market?

I don't know the growth rate, but the in 2014, the new car sales in China market will be more than 24 million as of the end of 2014. It's just my estimation. Data indicates by the end of May 2014, the car sale is 9.8 million.
 
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That is good news. The slowdown in TaiShang's article appears to have been temporary. I wonder why foreign firms were able to capture the majority of the growth.

I don't know the growth rate, but the in 2014, the new car sales in China market will be more than 24 million as of the end of 2014. It's just my estimation. Data indicates by the end of May 2014, the car sale is 9.8 million.

It would be interesting if the US and China were able to upgrade trade relations so China could export cars to the US, much like Mexico can.
 
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That is good news. The slowdown in TaiShang's article appears to have been temporary. I wonder why foreign firms were able to capture the majority of the growth.



It would be interesting if the US and China were able to upgrade trade relations so China could export cars to the US, much like Mexico can.

Yes, the number of car production in China is more or less the same as car sales. If China want to export cars to the U.S., it should be our domestic brand, not the foreign brand I think. But I'm afraid most of car produced in China are WV, Toyota, Honda and GM joint capital companies like Shanghai Volkswagen. Actually I've seen a Shanghai Volkswagen Polo in the U.S., it really shocked me when I saw the Chinese characters on its back.
 
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That is good news. The slowdown in TaiShang's article appears to have been temporary. I wonder why foreign firms were able to capture the majority of the growth.

Consumers are more concerned about quality than price after domastic car sale grew rapidly durring 2011~2013.

Is there any Mexico car brands ?
 
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Consumers are more concerned about quality than price after domastic car sale grew rapidly durring 2011~2013.

Is there any Mexico car brands ?

I am not aware of any Mexican car brands in the US, but a large percentage of US-brand cars were manufactured in Mexico and then exported to the US.
 
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China's Services Sector Grows at Fastest Pace in 15 Months
By M Rochan | IB Times – Thu, Jul 3, 2014

China's services sector accelerated at its fastest pace in 15 months in June, according to a survey.

The HSBC/Markit services purchasing managers' index (PMI) bounced back to 53.1 in June from 50.7 in May, well above the 50-point threshold that demarcates an expansion from contracting activity.

In addition, in a sign that the world's second-largest economy is gathering some internal strength, a gauge of new business jumped to 53.8 in June, the strongest expansion since January 2013.

"Total new work expanded at a accelerated and robust pace at service providers in June, [just as] manufacturers [witnessed] the first increase in new business for five months. Furthermore, the expansion of new orders at service providers was the strongest since January 2013. As a result, new work rose solidly at the composite level," the HSBC/Markit survey noted

"Service sector firms increased their payroll numbers for the tenth successive month in June, and at the second-fastest rate in 2014 so far... [But] staff numbers fell again at manufacturing companies, albeit at the slowest rate in three months. Consequently, employment at the composite level was little-changed from the previous month in June," it added.

Qu Hongbin, chief economist for China at HSBC, said in a statement: "The expansion in the service sector reinforces the recovery seen in the manufacturing sector, and signalled a broad-based improvement over the month. We think the economy is slowly turning around, and expect the recovery to remain supported by accommodative policies on both the fiscal and monetary fronts over the coming months. The slowdown in the property market still poses downside risks, however, and may warrant further easing measures in 2H 2014."

Cai Jin, a vice-president at the China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing – which compiles the official PMI – said in a statement on the agency's official Weibo account: "We should especially note the evident rebound in services businesses related to manufacturing activities.

Big rebound


"New orders from commodity retailers showed a big rebound, indicating that the stabilising growth momentum in the factory sector is filtering into the services industry."

RBC Capital Markets said in a note to clients: "CNH was a modest outperformer. China's final service PMI came in at 55.0 (no consensus) while HSBC's final reading increased from 50.7 to 53.1, bringing the composite PMI up from 50.2 to 52.4, a 15-month high. The USD/CNY fix of 6.1581 was up 32 pips from [2 July], but lower than model predictions."

Nordea Markets said in a note: "The current CNY depreciation is a result of PBoC intervention to discourage one-way speculation in the CNY. It has been effective, as the estimated hot money inflows in May fell sharply to $3bn.

"Given the wider trading band and Beijing's wish for a flexible currency, CNY volatility will increase from here. Uncertainty remains high in the near term."

The services sector accounted for 45% of China's GDP in 2012 and roughly half of all jobs in the world's most populous nation.

China's Services Sector Grows at Fastest Pace in 15 Months - Yahoo News UK
 
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I am not aware of any Mexican car brands in the US, but a large percentage of US-brand cars were manufactured in Mexico and then exported to the US.

It is on the way to some contries. Will developed countries or origin countries buy cars made by us?
 
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