China building airstrip-capable island on Fiery Cross Reef

[Beast]

It is not so simply. Islands and reefs in East Sea there is sea of us, our ancestor have been controlled officially from many hundred year ago, from Nguyễn warlord of Lê Dynasty, without trouble with China in the past.

This is our legal territory, we never give it up.

View attachment 156868

You can say 1000 times but the islands will still be China ones and worst is your economy will end up like Japan with slow or no growth. Japanese now lose confident with Abe. This guy knows nothing about building countries. Now he wants to delay raise tax in Japan. And we shall see where he get those extra money to fill the hole. All the aid Japan promise to vietnam will be cancelled becos Japan is broke too. You vietnamese got scam.

 

[S10]

The biggest challenge for China to assert control over South China Sea is distance. Ships and planes have to depart from Hainan province and travel nearly 1000 kilometers before reaching the area. China's coast guard cannot respond quickly to incidents, and air patrols can only stay for a short duration due to fuel limit. Having an airbase and a port in that area would change all of that. Once the construction of island is complete, China could in respond to any crisis in South China Sea within minutes.

It's a game changer.

 

[dichoi]

Beijing seeking to 'change facts' in South China Sea
Despite protests from Manila, China continues to build artificial islands in the Spratlys in a bid to assert its sovereignty claims before a UN court rules in an arbitration case, as analyst Gregory Poling tells DW.

"Millions of tonnes of rock and sand have been dredged up from the sea floor and pumped into the reef to form new land. There are cement-pumping trucks, cranes, large steel pipes, and the flash of welding torches." These are the words of BBC journalist Rupert Wingfield-Hayes describing China's construction activities at the Johnson South Reef in a disputed area of the South China Sea.

Until early 2014 the only manmade feature at the reef was a small concrete platform that housed a communications facility, garrison building, and pier, according to James Hardy and Sean O'Connor, analysts at IHS Jane's Defence Weekly. But the platform has now been surrounded by an island that is approximately 400 meters across at its widest points and has an area of about 100,000 square meters, the analysts said in a recent report.

Beijing is currently building new islands on five different reefs as part of its projects to reclaim land also claimed by the Philippines. Manila has protested China's move, saying the artificial land could be used to build an airstrip or an offshore military base in the increasingly volatile region. Last year, the Philippines also filed a formal plea to the United Nations challenging Beijing's claims. But while the court takes time to decide, the construction of the reefs goes on.

Gregory Poling, Southeast Asia expert at the Washington-based Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), says in a DW interview that Beijing seems to be trying to change facts on the ground to make it more difficult, if not impossible, for the court to decide what the original status of these features may have been.

DW: Why is China creating these features in the South China Sea?

Gregory Poling: China's choice of these five features - the status of which (as islands, rocks, or low tide elevations) are all part of the Philippines' case against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration - was no accident. It seems Beijing is trying to change facts on the ground to make it more difficult, if not impossible, for the court to decide what the original status of these features may have been.

Potential access for small aircraft or patrol vessels might also be a benefit, but it is too early to say. We should regard the alarm bells from Manila and elsewhere about military bases in the Spratlys to be premature at best. These features are unlikely to be capable of hosting any substantial facilities in the near future on the level of those Taiwan maintains at Itu Aba or the Vietnamese have at Spratly Island.

How long has China been building up these features?

Construction and limited reclamation work by China in the Spratlys is not new - China began engaging in such work at Mischief Reef not long after occupying it in 1995. It is important to remember that by the time China entered the Spratlys in the 1980s, there was nothing left to occupy but low-tide elevations and submerged reefs with a couple of dry rocks.

The basic process of expanding these islands simply involves dredging sand from the seafloor and dumping it onto the shallow reefs around China's previously raised structures. Little by little it is raised above the high water line, hiding the original status of the bank or reef beneath.

The sand is then smoothed out using bull dozers and the like. Once the desired amount of reclaimed land is created, China will presumably surround the island with a concrete barrier to protect against erosion and storm surge, as we have seen on other Chinese-, Malaysian-, and Vietnamese- occupied features, and begin construction of new facilities - docks, helipads, military and civilian structures, and potentially small airstrips.

Why is Beijing selecting these precise locations in the South China Sea to build their islands?

The legal and political reasoning behind these seems to derive from their status as low-tide elevations or rocks - a fact which China would like to obscure. None of them appear to lie near substantial hydrocarbon resources, much less commercially viable reserves, and it is difficult to see how the construction could assist in the exploitation of fisheries.

In legal terms, would it make any difference if those islands were inhabited?

Habitation would be unlikely to make any legal difference. As far as sovereignty over the islands is concerned, any court would deem that the "critical date" - the legal term for the date when a dispute between nations has crystallized and after which no changes of facts on the ground can affect its legal status - is long past.

As for whether construction or reclamation could affect the legal status of these features as islands entitled to their own vast maritime entitlements and continental shelves, or merely rocks or low-tide elevations, the answer appears to be no.

The vast majority of legal scholars have come to the conclusion that reclamation cannot change the status of a feature; it can merely create an "artificial island," which under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, generates no entitlements. Of course, if reclamation makes it impossible for any court in the future to determine the original status of these features, then China's work could certainly stymie the legal process.

Beijing seeking to ′change facts′ in South China Sea | Asia | DW.DE | 19.09.2014

 

[applesauce]

so much butthurt lol
fact is, among the claimants china is one of the last to build airfields, and one of the last to try and explore for resources but what china does it does comprehensively.

 

[riotfromhell]

I feel so great when those vietty saying nothing but rubbish over and over and over and over agian

 

[bolo]

This is the advantage of having huge national reserve. Most other countries hardly can afford such big land reclaim project.

You need to combine money with Chinese expertise.

 

[bolo]

It's hilarious when Viets try to claim Chinese culture as their own. If it weren't for China, Viets would still be walking around naked, throwing bananas at each other. Viets should be grateful for Chinese civilization.

What's worse is that the international historian community do not take their folklore of Long Dong dynasty or whatever the Phuc they call it seriously, but these Viets still claim to be real because their ancestors told them a tale that was passed down--most likely from a Chinese bard.

 

[AgentOrange]

so much butthurt lol
fact is, among the claimants china is one of the last to build airfields, and one of the last to try and explore for resources but what china does it does comprehensively.

Precisely. The Viets were the ones who started building little shacks on stilts and now that they've forced the world's 2nd largest economy to focus on the SCS, they're crying foul because China's building airstrips while the dumb little Viets are still lashing bamboo rafts together and calling it an "island."

 

[dichoi]

Why China’s U-shaped claim and argument are wrong?

The U-shaped line

First, let’s consider whether this line can be consistent with the extent of an EEZ and continental shelf belonging to the Paracels and Spratlys.

That line lies beyond the equidistance line between the disputed islands and the territories around the East Sea. Jurisprudence by the International Court of Justice always gives such small islands EEZs or continental shelves that fall far short of the equidistance line, usually not much father than 12 nautical miles from the islands.

Pursuant to these rules, the U-shaped line is too excessive and arbitrary to be justified as the Paracels and Spratlys’ EEZ and continental shelf boundary. Consequently, the maritime zone around Reed Bank rightfully belongs to the Philippines; the area around James Shoal to Malaysia; the Natuna region to Indonesia; the maritime zones around Nam Con Son and the Vanguard Bank to Vietnam. These delimitations are incontestable regardless of the fact that the Paracels and Spratlys and Scarborough Shoals are disputed.

Furthermore, the U-shaped line covers an area in the middle of the East Sea where the international community might well have the right to exploit economically the column of water, for example, to fish.

Thus, that line encircles an excessive area, adversely affecting the rights of the nations entitled to EEZs and continental shelves in the East Sea, as well as those of the international community.

To justify such extensive claim, Beijing would have to adduce the status of historic sovereignty and rights over maritime space.

However, UNCLOS only recognizes historic sovereignty and rights over maritime space within 12 nautical miles of baselines, not over the area enclosed by the U-shaped line. As a signatory to UNCLOS, China must respect this rule and cannot allege historic sovereignty and rights over maritime space in order to justify the U-shaped line. In addition, there is no evidence that China has historical sovereignty over the maritime space enclosed by that line.

Next, let’s consider the U-shaped line in terms of what rights, under international law, China intends to claim for it.

So far, China has been opaque about this claim. This “Middle State” [Editor’s note: Another translation of the ancient name for China are “the Middle Kingdom.”] has never stated exactly what rights it is claiming inside that line, even when it included a map showing the U-shaped line with its note verbale to the United Nations in 2009 to protest against continental shelf submissions by Vietnam and Malaysia.

Whether China claims the maritime space within the U-shaped line as EEZ and continental shelf, or as a maritime zone similar to “historic waters,” such claim is a threat to the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam. In addition, it affects considerably the rights of the international community, because UNCLOS grants rights within this body of water to all nations in the world.

The U-shaped line is like a dagger pointing at the heart of the East Sea without the holder giving any explanation or saying how he intends to use it. Supported by an increasingly powerful navy, it constitutes a threat to all nations in the world.

While the international community can be neutral on the disputes over the islands, it cannot afford to be neutral on China’s U-shaped line.

Both maritime history and UNCLOS show that the East Sea is an international sea, like the Mediterranean. The international community has an interest and the right to have a say in the maritime claims there. China’s opposition to the “internationalization” of the East Sea issue is tantamount to an attempt to de-internationalize an international sea. Once the East Sea has been de-internationalized, Beijing will be able to bring its strength to bear on the East Sea nations and impose its own rules on this body of water.

To understand China's vague U-shaped line and its plot in the East Sea, please read the following articles on VietNamNet Bridge:
Overview of the East Sea Dispute - News VietNamNet

 

[帅的一匹]

China will set up ADIZ next year as long as the airstrip is ready;

 

[帅的一匹]

Why China’s U-shaped claim and argument are wrong?

The U-shaped line

First, let’s consider whether this line can be consistent with the extent of an EEZ and continental shelf belonging to the Paracels and Spratlys.

That line lies beyond the equidistance line between the disputed islands and the territories around the East Sea. Jurisprudence by the International Court of Justice always gives such small islands EEZs or continental shelves that fall far short of the equidistance line, usually not much father than 12 nautical miles from the islands.

Pursuant to these rules, the U-shaped line is too excessive and arbitrary to be justified as the Paracels and Spratlys’ EEZ and continental shelf boundary. Consequently, the maritime zone around Reed Bank rightfully belongs to the Philippines; the area around James Shoal to Malaysia; the Natuna region to Indonesia; the maritime zones around Nam Con Son and the Vanguard Bank to Vietnam. These delimitations are incontestable regardless of the fact that the Paracels and Spratlys and Scarborough Shoals are disputed.

Furthermore, the U-shaped line covers an area in the middle of the East Sea where the international community might well have the right to exploit economically the column of water, for example, to fish.

Thus, that line encircles an excessive area, adversely affecting the rights of the nations entitled to EEZs and continental shelves in the East Sea, as well as those of the international community.

To justify such extensive claim, Beijing would have to adduce the status of historic sovereignty and rights over maritime space.

However, UNCLOS only recognizes historic sovereignty and rights over maritime space within 12 nautical miles of baselines, not over the area enclosed by the U-shaped line. As a signatory to UNCLOS, China must respect this rule and cannot allege historic sovereignty and rights over maritime space in order to justify the U-shaped line. In addition, there is no evidence that China has historical sovereignty over the maritime space enclosed by that line.

Next, let’s consider the U-shaped line in terms of what rights, under international law, China intends to claim for it.

So far, China has been opaque about this claim. This “Middle State” [Editor’s note: Another translation of the ancient name for China are “the Middle Kingdom.”] has never stated exactly what rights it is claiming inside that line, even when it included a map showing the U-shaped line with its note verbale to the United Nations in 2009 to protest against continental shelf submissions by Vietnam and Malaysia.

Whether China claims the maritime space within the U-shaped line as EEZ and continental shelf, or as a maritime zone similar to “historic waters,” such claim is a threat to the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam. In addition, it affects considerably the rights of the international community, because UNCLOS grants rights within this body of water to all nations in the world.

The U-shaped line is like a dagger pointing at the heart of the East Sea without the holder giving any explanation or saying how he intends to use it. Supported by an increasingly powerful navy, it constitutes a threat to all nations in the world.

While the international community can be neutral on the disputes over the islands, it cannot afford to be neutral on China’s U-shaped line.

Both maritime history and UNCLOS show that the East Sea is an international sea, like the Mediterranean. The international community has an interest and the right to have a say in the maritime claims there. China’s opposition to the “internationalization” of the East Sea issue is tantamount to an attempt to de-internationalize an international sea. Once the East Sea has been de-internationalized, Beijing will be able to bring its strength to bear on the East Sea nations and impose its own rules on this body of water.

To understand China's vague U-shaped line and its plot in the East Sea, please read the following articles on VietNamNet Bridge:
Overview of the East Sea Dispute - News VietNamNet

SCS is territory of China, period!

 

[dichoi]

SCS is territory of China, period!

this is big lie.

 

[Beast]

this is big lie.

Then what can you do? EU are no time for this nonsense. They are more worry of Russia and maintain good r/s with China to promote trade. Same as South America, Africa. US will encourage Vietnam to stand up against China but only short of action.

You shall start building an airstrip to match China. Oh sorry, we know vietnam is broke and lack the resources.

 

[帅的一匹]

Then what can you do? EU are no time for this nonsense. They are more worry of Russia and maintain good r/s with China to promote trade. Same as South America, Africa. US will encourage Vietnam to stand up against China but only short of action.

You shall start building an airstrip to match China. Oh sorry, we know vietnam is broke and lack the resources.

No matter how they struggle to make the false claim of CHina lands, they fail in the end cause a lie is a lie.

 

[帅的一匹]

Without China support, Vietnam communist party would have been swept off its feet in 1960s. 忘恩负义，猪狗不如。