Chengdu J-10 Multirole Fighter Air Craft News & Discussions

[SBD-3]

J-10, Chengdu

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Photo from Chinese Defence Today

J-10 (Project 10/Project 8810?) is a multi-role single-engine fighter being developed by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) and 611 Institute. It has been selected by PLAAF as the next generation fighter to replace the obsolete J-7 fighter and Q-5 attack aircraft. The aircraft appears to have an Su-27 style nose and retangular air intake, an AL-31F type engine, twin nosewheels, and a distinct low-visibility camouflage color scheme. The aircraft also has a large vertical tail plus twin F-16 style ventral stablizers believed to provide greater stability at high AoA. Its fuselage looks considerably longer compared to Israeli Lavi. However its bubble canopy appears less elevated than that of F-16, suggesting the pilot has yet to possess a true 360° view. Unlike J-7E with double-delta wings, it appears to have a pair of inverted gull wings (i.e. the inner portion extends slightly downward, while the outer portion extends flat). Two red dummy PL-8 AAMs are regularly seen carried under the wing as well.

The J-10 project was started in the mid-80s based on the experience (tailless delta wing and canard foreplanes) with J-9 which was cancelled earlier in favor of the less risky J-7C/MIG-21MF project. An early model of J-10 revealed a Mirage 2000 style intake with a center shock cone for better high speed performance and a Lavi style tail section, suggesting a possible connection with the cancelled Israeli fighter (however this was firmly denied by both parties). The change indicates that J-10 has gone through at least one major redesign in its 10-year development period from the initial conventional layout (as an air-superiority fighter) to the latest semi-stealthy design (as a multi-role fighter). This change may reflect a shift of its potential adversaries from former Soviet MiG-29/ Su-27 to current American F-15/F-16 after end of the Cold War.

The new design will certainly be fitted with advanced avionics including a "glass cockpit" (1 wide-angle HUD + 2 monochrome MFD + 1 color MFD), HMS, HOTAS, GPS/INS, air data computer, RWR, digital quadruplex FBW, digital fuel management system, 1553B databus, and a new PD fire-control radar (search distance 52~148 km, track 8 targets simutaneously), which can be either Israeli Elta EL/M 2035, Russian Phazotron Zhuk derivative (Zhemchoug?), or the indigenous JL-10A from LETRI (with technical assistance from Phazotron?). A variety of newly developed air-to-air (e.g. PL-8 short-range IR-guided AAM and PL-11/PL-12/SD-10 medium-range radar-guided AAM) and air-to-surface weapons (e.g. C-701 TV-guided ASM & LGBs) are also expected to be carried under 11 hardpoints. Although it was believed to be powered initially by a 27,560 lb/12,500 kg thrust AL-31FN turbofan, a modified AL-31F which itself powers Su-27/J-11, Russia reportedly had denied China the license to produce the engine locally. As the result, an indigenous engine (WS-10A?) may be fitted later when the serial production starts.

Some US military analysts believe that J-10 could pose a serious challenge to the F/A-18E in terms of maneuverability. Some specifications of J-10 are (speculated): empty weight 9,750kg, max TO weight 18,500kg, internal fuel 4,500kg, external load 4,500kg, g load -3~+9, max speed Mach 2.0 (high altitude)/Mach 1.2 (sea level), take-off distance under 500m, combat radius 463~566 km.
The development of J-10 has proven to be tortuous. The prototype was rumored to have first flown in 1996, but the project suffered a serious setback in late 1997 when the 02 prototype lost control and crashed, as the result of certain system failure, presumably with either the FBW system or the engine. After careful redesign and extensive ground test, the successful flight of the new prototype (J-10A?) took place on March 23, 1998, which put the project back on the track. Initially 6 prototypes (serial numbers 1001-1006) were built undergoing various static and flight tests at CAC in Chengdu and at the CFTE in Yanliang. Subsequently 3 more prototypes were built (1007-1009) as the project is moving to the pre-production phase while PLAAF remains fully committed. A carrier based version (J-10B?) was rumored but never confirmed. The J-10 entered service at the end of 2005. The first J-10 in production standard first flew on June 28, 2002.

Type: Chendgu J-10
Country: China
Function: Fighter
Year: 2003
Crew: 1
Engines: 1 * Lyulka Saturn AL-31F turbofan, rated at 79.43 kN dry and 122.58 kN with afterburning
Wing Span: 8.78 m
Wing area: 33.10 m2
Canard area: 5.45 m2
Length: 14.57 m
Height: 4.78 m
Ceiling: 18000 m
Empty Weight: 9750 kg
Max.Weight: 18400 kg
Speed: Mach 2.0
g-Limits: +9/-3 g
Ferry Range: 1850 km
Combat radius : 550 km
Armament: 1 * g 23 mm, 4500 kg payload on 11 hardpoints



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

NAME:
PLA Designation: J-10 Westernised Name: F-10

MANUFACTURER:
Chengdu Aircraft Industry Co. (CAC)

TYPE:
Single-engine, single-seater multirole fighter capable for interception, air superiority, and ground attack missions.

PROGRAMME:
The Chengdu (CAC) J-10 fighter, China's fourth generation multi-role fighter aircraft, will be the most advanced fighter in the PLAAF's inventory once introduced to service. The J-10 programme (Project No.10) has been under way for over a decade. Six prototypes have been built by 2001 and these aircraft are reported being undertaking extensive test flights at CAC's test site.

The J-10 programme can trace its origins back to the J-9, a Mach 2.5 canard-delta fighter, which is a blend mixture of MiG-23 and Saab JA-37 Viggen. The J-9 project was transferred from Shenyang to Chengdu in 1969 and was later cancelled due to insufficient funds.

Work on the J-10 began in the 1980s as a counter to the Soviet Union's fourth-generation fighters, the MiG-29 and Su-27. The original mission was air superiority, but the break-up of the Soviet Union and changing requirements shifted development towards a multirole fighter to replace the Shenyang J-6 (MiG-19) and Chengdu J-7 (MiG-21), which are backbone of China's air force.

Originally based on the cancelled Israel Avation Industry (IAI) 'Lavi' lightweight fighter, the J-10's development has experienced some major re-design work due to the changes of requirements. Some estimates project that the as many as 300 aircraft will be produced for the Chinese air force, although reports suggest as few as 30 aircraft will have been built by 2005 - a drop in the ocean of J-6s and J-7s in the PLAAF's inventory waiting to be replaced.

DESIGN FEATURES:
The J-10 has a rectangle belly air intake, with low-mounted delta wings, a pair of front canard wings, a large vertical fin, and two underfuselage fins. The design is aerodynamically unstable, to provide a high level of agility, low drag and enhanced lift. The pilot controls the aircraft through a computerised digital fly-by-wire system, which provides artificial stabilisation and gust elevation to give good control characteristics throughout the flight envelope.

COCKPIT:
The J-10's cockpit is fitted with three flat-panel liquid crystal multifunction displays (MFDs), including one colour MFD, wide field-of-view head-up display (HUD), and possibly helmet-mounted sight (HMS). It is not know whether the HMS is the basic Ukrainian Arsenel HMS copied by China's Luoyang Avionics, or a new helmet display featured briefly at the 2000 Zhuhai air show.

The pilot manipulates the J-10 by the 'Iron Bird' flight-control system, a quadruple (four channels) digital fly-by-wire (FBW) based on the active control technology tested by the Shenyang J-8IIACT demonstrator aircraft. The pilot will also be aided by advanced autopilot and air data computer.

RADAR:
Several options are available for the J-10 fighter. These include the Russian Phazotron Zhuk-10PD, a version of the system in later Su-27s, with 160 km search range and ability to track up to six targets. Israel has offered its Elta EL/M-2035 radar for competition. In addition, China has also developed its own design JL-10A, which might be assisted by Russian technology.

For low-level navigation and precision strike, a forward-looking infrared and laser designation pod is likely to be carried F-16-style on an inlet stores station. A Chinese designed pod similar to the Israeli Rafael Litening was revealed at the 1998 Zhuhai air show.

ENGINE:
The single-seat, single-engine J-10 is similar in size to the Lockheed Martin F-16C/D. The initial batch J-10s are going to be powered by 27,500 lb-thrust (120 kN) Russian Lyulka Saturn AL-31F turbofan, the same power plant also being used by Chinese air force Sukhoi Su-27s and Su-30s. Some report indicated that 100 AL-31F engines with features specially designed for the J-10 have already been delivered to China in early 2001.

China is also developing its own WS-10 turbofan power plant, and it could be fitted on the later versions of the J-10. According to the U.S. intelligence, the J-10 might be slightly more manoeuvrable than the F-18E/F, which is slated to become the U.S. Navy's next principal combat aircraft.

ARMARMENTS:
The J-10 has 11 stores stations - six under the wing and five under the fuselage. The inner wing and centre fuselage stations are plumped to carry external fuel tanks. Fixed weapon is a 23-mm inner cannon hidden inside fuselage.

In addition to the PL-8 short-range infrared-guided air-to-air missile, which was derived from Israeli Rafael Python-3 technology, the J-10 could also carry Russian Vympel R-73 (AA-11) short-range and R-77 (AA-12) medium-range missiles carried by Chinese Flankers. It may also be fitted with indigenously developed PL-11 or PL-12 medium-range AAM for BVR combat.

For ground attack missions, the J-10 will carry laser-guided bombs, YJ-8K anti-ship missile, as well as various unguided bombs and rockets. Some missiles surrently under development such as the YJ-9 ramjet-powered anti-radiation missile may also be carried by the J-10.

UPGRADE:
An all-aspect vectored-thrust version of the AL-31F was revealed for the first time at Zhuhai Air Show 1998, leading to speculation that this advanced engine may wind up on the J-10, potentially conferring phenomenal manoeuvrability. It also projects that a naval variant of the J-10, perhaps with twin-engines, may equip a possible Chinese aircraft carrier. China might also be considering upgrading the J-10 with more advanced phased-array radar to improve its combat capabilities.



SPECIFICATIONS
Crew: One
Dimentions: N/A
Weight: N/A
Powerplant: One Lyulka Saturn AL-31F turbofan, rated at 17,857 lb (79.43 kN) dry and 27,557 lb st (122.58 kN) with afterburning
Maximum Speed: Mach 1.2 (sea-level) or Mach 2.0 (high altitude)
Range: Combat radius over 550 km Service
Ceiling: 18000 m
Maximum Climb Rate: N/A
G Limit: -3/+9 G
Avionics: One PD radar (Russian Phazotron Zhuk-10 or Israeli EL/M-2035), with a detect-range 52.5~148 km, being able to track up to 8 targets simultaneously
Fixed Weapon: One 23 mm internal cannon
Stores Stations: 11, six under the wing and five under the fuselage, up to 4,500 kg
Air-to-Air Missiles: PL-8, PL-9, Python-4, R-73, R-77
Ground Attack Weapons: Laser-guided bomb, YJ-81 (C-801) anti-ship missile
Chengdu J-10

 

[SBD-3]

The J-10 is a fourth-generation multi-role fighter, produced by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Co. (CAC). The secretive program started in the late '80s, and is reportedly based on the Israeli Lavi fighter, Israels attempt to develop its own F-16. Pakistan also provided F-16 technology, which was given to the PLAAF as part of a secret military trade deal between Pakistan and China.



A two-seat J-10B fighter-trainer version first flew in December 2003, and in early 2006 Jane's reported that a more advanced version of the J-10 is planned. Russian sources told Jane's the new J-10 version is called the Super-10, and has a more powerful engine, thrust-vector control, stronger airframe and passive phased-array radar.

Dispite the fact that the program got off with a slow start, and is based on old, foreign technology, many experts now believe the J-10 has the potential of becoming one of the most significant fighters in the next few decades.
Air-Attack.com :: Chengdu J-10 Factsheet

 

[Arsalan]

President Asif Ali Zardari has left Pakistan on a four-day visit to China today. During this visit to china he will explore avenues for cooperation with China in the fields of energy and agriculture resources. An 11-member delegation will accompany Zardari. President Zardari will hold talks with the Chinese counterpart about the acquisition of two squadrons of Fc-20 fighter jets which are customized version of Chinese J-10 jets on easy terms in the first phase of cooperation. Pakistan air force has an eventual requirement of five squadrons of Fc-20.
These fighter jets from china will be powered by the Russian AL-31 turbojet engine with thrust vectoring technology. First of these jets will land within one year on the agreement on final aspects of technology and finances.Fc-20 will serve as frontline fighter jet equipped with AESA radar, advance BVRAAM and WVRAAM for PAF to counter Indian Su-30MKI.
ASIAN DEFENCE: President Zardari to discuss the purchase Fc-20 for PAF

well these are the comments posted on this reports on the site:

Anonymous said...
from where you got this news? I don see it reported anywhere

February 20, 2009 10:48 AM
ASIAN DEFENCE said...
First I got this news from my own sources which I consider reliable and you are wrong this news is reported by different Pakistani news channels in local language. You might not see the deal signing ceremony in his visit as there are few issue related to final avionics configuration of Fc-20. PAF pilots are conducting lots of trials of modified J-10 and are helping Chinese side to meet its requirements. One thing my source was sure was that by mid next year(most likely by 23rd March ) PAF will have its first operation squadron of Fc-20. PAF has held its option for 18 Block 52+ F-16 C to save money for this deal and now china is also offering soft loan for the purchase.

i guess this sayts it all! nothing to get excited about.
moreover this was posted way back in February and we havent heard of any thing regards the deal being finalized so i suggest we should sit tight as the will not be comming before 2014-2015! nothing public about FC20 as yet!

i hope you people get the point!
anyway tanks for the post (though a bit too old and unreliable )

regards!

 

[Arsalan]

J-10 looks great but reminds of Israel Lavi aircraft

it surely have taken some of its designed features from the LAVI!
it have been discussed already!

regards!

 

[SBD-3]

Musharraf Visits China: Current Issues In Pakistan-China Relations
by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on February 25th, 2006
ARTICLES

On the eve of President George W. Bush’s visit to India, Afghanistan and Pakistan the first week of March, Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf visited China from February 19 to 24. While public reports of his visit reveal little of its substance, it can be assumed that Musharraf and Chinese leaders addressed a range of strategic, nuclear, military, as well as economic concerns. However, with both Washington and Beijing in a galloping competition to court Delhi’s strategic alignment, Islamabad is anxious as well to seek assurances and added benefits from both its main strategic partners. At the same time, Beijing and Washington, from differing perspectives, want Pakistan’s leadership to crack down on terrorist groups that it is often unwilling to oppose.

Prior to President Musharraf’s visit some effort was made to highlight that 2006 marks the 55th year of formal China-Pakistan relations. In the post Cold War era, especially following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, it is China which has emerged as Pakistan’s most important strategic guarantor vis-a-via its much larger and longstanding rival India. China was the source of initial design information for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, assisted the building of its nuclear technology complex, and has enabled Pakistan to build three types of solid-fuel ballistic missiles which can deliver nuclear weapons. China is Pakistan’s the most important source of modern conventional weaponry as well as a key source of trade and investment. And for China, a nuclear missile armed Pakistan stokes a continued over-arching strategic preoccupation in Delhi with its traditional rival, which diverts Delhi as Beijing builds relationships of future strategic importance in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal and Iran, which all serve to surround India.

Following the Al-Qaeda led attacks of 9/11/01 and the subsequent U.S.-led War on Terror, President Bush sought to accelerate a new strategic alignment with India, with special stress on counter-terrorism and increased military cooperation as a hedge against a potentially more dangerous China. U.S. officials have openly stated their intention "to help India become a major world power in the 21st century."[1] At the same time Bush pursued a more vigorous engagement with Pakistan, which was needed as a staging point for operations to defeat the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001. Since then the Bush Administration has ended U.S. sanctions imposed after Pakistan’s 1997 nuclear tests (as it has done with India), committed to provide over $3 billion in economic and military aid from 2003 to 2007, and has resumed the sale of weaponry embargoed in 1990 like advanced Lockheed-Martin F-16 jet fighters and Lockheed-Martin P-3 anti-submarine patrol aircraft. Following Pakistan’s devastating October 8, 2005 earthquake the U.S. committed to providing $200 million in emergency assistance. Washington hopes that by promoting democracy in Pakistan that it can strengthen a greater regional democratic trend.

Both China and Russia reacted with alarm to the rapid U.S. move into Central Asia. Despite the seeming contradiction of having made Pakistan a nuclear missile power, China has sought to revive relations with India by stressing trade and investment and appearing to allow concessions on long-standing border disputes. China also led the formation of the Shanghai-based Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001, originally comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, but expanded in 2005 to include India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia as "observers." As largescale China-Russia military exercises were held in China in August 2005, it is reasonable to consider that China hopes to lead the SCO into becoming a military-economic entente powerful enough to sway India away from the U.S orbit.

It is against this backdrop that China might be justified in viewing its role as Pakistan’s strategic nuclear guarantor as an increasing liability. This should certainly worry Islamabad, which does not have the market, economic dynamism or geostrategic potential India can offer China. Nevertheless, while the prospects are low for a dramatic improvement in China-India relations that would diminish Chinese strategic support for Pakistan, Islamabad is keen to preserve and strengthen its unique strategic relationship with Beijing. Initial reviews of Musharraf’s visit indicate that China will sustain that steadfast strategic support.

Allied Rhetoric

Upon their meeting on February 20, Chinese President Hu Jintao called Musharraf an "old friend of the Chinese people" and praised him for making "an important contribution to the development of our relations". But in an even stronger statement, Pakistan’s Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad told a Chinese TV interviewer that Pakistan will stand beside China if the United States ever tries to "besige" it.[2] While there has not yet been any official Pakistani elaboration on this statement, at face value it appears to constitute one important official’s acknowledgement of Chinese government fear of U.S. appeals for democratic reform in China. But is also may signify a preference for authoritarian China over the democratic United States. For China such a statement would be comforting on the eve of President Bush’s visit to Islamabad. For Washington, this statement serves as a reminder that as it seeks to strengthen democratic forces in Pakistan, it must consider that many Pakistani anti-democrats are allied with China.

While Pakistan is receiving generous U.S. aid, it is also receiving generous Chinese economic assistance. China is involved in many key infrastructure projects in Pakistan, to include upgrading the Karakorum Highway and building a new deep-water port in the coastal town of Gwadar. The later will feature railroad and possibly pipeline linkages that will extend into China’s western provinces, giving China an additional avenue for Persian Gulf petroleum transport that will lessen its current dependence on Indian Ocean sea lanes it cannot yet ensure. However, when the Chinese Navy becomes larger and features aircraft carriers, it should not be surprising that they find welcome facilities in Gwadar.

Full SCO Membership: Dilemma For China

One important request that Musharraf was not afraid to publicly telegraph before going to Beijing was that of having Pakistan elevated to the level of "full member" of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Hoping to prove that the SCO is a consensus organization, SCO Secretary General Zhang Deguang said, "We will relay Pakistan’s hope to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to all members of the group."[3] But it is instructive that Pakistan chose to convey its request to China. Musharraf is very likely putting China on the spot to demonstrate that Pakistan retains greater Chinese favor than India. This is timely as Indian sources note that later this summer, Russia and China hope to include Indian military forces in a counter-terrorism exercise under the auspices of the SCO—that will not include Pakistan. While China has conducted anti-terror exercises with Pakistan, the unlikely inclusion of Pakistani forces in this summer exercise, plus any delay in advancing Pakistan’s full membership before that of India, will be viewed in Islamabad as a negative tilt. And likewise, China’s decision to allow Pakistan to be elevated before India will likely increase the perception in Delhi that the SCO is but a budding Anti-NATO alliance and a future threat. This would then defeat both Russia’s and China’s desire that the SCO become more attractive power-center to Delhi, at least to the point of moderating its deepening cooperation with Washington.

Nuclear Upgrade?

China may also be considering upgrading Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. China is already the widely acknowledged source of Pakistan’s initial nuclear weapon design, the major partner in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex, the major source of Pakistan’s short and medium range solid fuel missile technology[4], and the likely partner in the development of Pakistan’s Land Attack Cruise Missile tested in 2005.[5] Through the network led by Pakistan’s former chief nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, Pakistan sold Chinese nuclear weapons plans to Libya.[6] Then last January, press reports noted the International Atomic Energy Agency had disclosed that Iran had obtained data needed to fabricate the enriched uranium "pit" necessary to make a nuclear weapon from "the same network [that] provided Libya with drawings of a crude nuclear bomb."[7] It is thus logical to conclude that the A.Q. Khan network also sold China’s nuclear weapon plans to Iran..

In January The Financial Times reported that China and Pakistan are negotiating the purchase of 6 to 8 new Chinese nuclear power reactors, in addition to the one Chinese-built nuclear power reactor now at Chasma in the Punjab Province.[8] Following the October earthquake there were reports that nuclear-related facilities had been damaged, reports that were quickly denied by Pakistan.[9] Nevertheless, there have been repeated Indian press reports that China has offered to upgrade Pakistan’s nuclear weapon and nuclear storage facilities.[10] These reports, which have not been confirmed in the U.S. or Western media, also note that Washington has protested this Chinese intention.

Military Sales

China has proven to be a reliable supplier of conventional military equipment for Pakistan, selling F-7 fighters, a version of the T-96 main battle tank, and subsidizing the future construction of four frigates for the Pakistan Navy. Pakistan’s Navy is also considering the future purchase of Chinese conventional submarines.[11] In contrast, the U.S. embargoed F-16 fighters purchased by Pakistan in 1990 and has just resumed arms sales. Pakistan recently took delivery of two of the formerly embargoed F-16A fighters and may take delivery of another 10 older F-16s from the U.S. in 2006.[12] Following the October 2005 earthquake Musharraf delayed plans to buy up to 75 new F-16s and may instead pursue a mix of 35 to 50 new and used F-16s.[13] India has protested U.S. plans to sell new F-16s to Pakistan.

On February 23 President Musharraf took a day to visit Sichuan Province and the Chengdu Aircraft Company, where he was photographed in the cockpit of a new FC-1 fighter, called the JF-17 "Thunder" in Pakistan service.[14] In 1999 Pakistan and China agreed to co-develop and co-produce Chengdu’s FC-1 lightweight fighter, which had originally started in the late 1980s as a co-development of the J-7 fighter with the former U.S. Grumman Corporation. The FC-1 has been in flight testing since 2003, is now undergoing design refinements and is expected to begin production within a year, and enter Pakistan Air Force service by 2009.[15] Pakistan has a stated requirement for 150 and most will be co-produced in Pakistan. With an expected cost of less than $20 million each, the FC-1 is a modern multi-role fighter that can fire advanced self-guided medium range air-to-air missile and deliver precision guided air-to-ground weapons, which the U.S. F-16 can do too with somewhat better performance, but at about double the price. While chances are good the FC-1 will be purchased by the Chinese military, that has not materialized, but with Pakistan’s help, Chengdu now has a modern fighter that will soon compete with U.S., Russian and European fighters in the low-price market.

Pakistan is also considering the purchase of the more capable Chengdu J-10. Depending on the availability of the U.S. F-16, Pakistan’s Air Force Commander Air Marshal Kaleem Sadat has noted that Chengdu’s more capable J-10 is also an option for Pakistan. In September 2004 he noted that Pakistani pilots were to test the J-10 later that year.[16] The J-10 is just now entering Chinese Air Force regiments and offers performance and weapons capabilities that are more comparable to modern variants of the F-16. Soon upgraded versions will feature a thrust-vectored engine[17] and possibly new electronics[18], enhancing the maneuverability of this already quite agile canard fighter. If as expected, China meets with success in building its indigenous WS-10A turbofan engine, Pakistan may view a thrust-vectored engined J-10 as its match for India’s thrust-vectored engined Sukhoi Su-30MKI. So even if Pakistan does purchase more F-16s that does not rule out a future J-10 purchase.

Terrorism

The increasing radicalization of Islam in Pakistan combined with the growing weakness the Pakistani government faces in confronting real terrorist organizations, poses a threat to China’s relations with Pakistan as it does with the United States. Overshadowing Musharraf’s visit to China was the February 15 killing of three Chinese engineers by rebels in Balochistan[19], the third such attack against Chinese nationals in Pakistan since May 2004. In that attack, a bomb killed three Chinese engineers working on the large Chinese-Pakistani Gwadar port construction, and then later that October, two Chinese were kidnapped, with one later being rescued while one died during the rescue attempt. In response to China’s increasing role in supporting the Pakistani government, Baloci rebels have decided to target Chinese nationals in Balochistan. Deeply embarrassing for Pakistan, these deaths, including the latest, featured formal Pakistan military ceremony and transport of the deceased to China, who were then received in a military-like ceremony and extensive Chinese media coverage. While Pakistani authorities responded the day after this latest attack by rounding up 55 suspects[20], it fell to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to admonish, "I hope Pakistan will adopt measures to guarantee the personal safety and property of Chinese in Pakistan."[21]

 

[SBD-3]

well these are the comments posted on this reports on the site:





i guess this sayts it all! nothing to get excited about.
moreover this was posted way back in February and we havent heard of any thing regards the deal being finalized so i suggest we should sit tight as the will not be comming before 2014-2015! nothing public about FC20 as yet!

i hope you people get the point!
anyway tanks for the post (though a bit too old and unreliable )

regards!

But with MRCA in IAF FC-20 are going up for sure eventually 80 to 100 FC-20s are in Plans and further if F-16s are uncertain FC-20s will be procured in greater numbers

 

[SBD-3]

China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-to-Air Missiles
by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on February 2nd, 2008
ARTICLES

Internet source imagery from January 4 has offered the first glimpses of what may be China’s emerging 5th generation air-to-air missiles (AAM). One missile, called the PL-ASR or PL-10, shows a very close resemblance to the South African Denel A-Darter AAM. A second image, discovered on a China’s Northwestern University web site in mid-December, shows another missile similar to the radar-guided South African Denel R-Darter, designed in cooperation with Israel. Both of these missiles are likely designed for use with modern Helmet-Mounted Displays (HMD), which enable pilots to “look to kill” their targets. But there is more: additional imagery suggests that a previously reported ramjet powered development of the Chinese Luoyang PL-12 active-radar guided AAM, called the PL-13, could give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) an AAM that could out-range existing U.S. AAMs.[1]



Luoyang PL-ASR/PL-10: This image obtained from Chinese web pages on January 4 was the first revelation of the existence of the advanced PL-10 5th generation AAM. The text indicates development began in 2004 and production is expected by 2010. The missile also has a 90 degree off-bore-sight view and a “Lock On After Launch” capability, meaning it can better exploit high off bore-sight firing. Source: CJDBY web page.

Data along with one image suggests the PL-10 could enter production in 2010 but it is not known when the other two new AAMs would enter production. When they do enter service, these AAMs could give both old and new PLA Air Force fighters a decisive advantage over Taiwan Air Force fighters armed with shorter range U.S. AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles. The PL-ASR/PL-10 could have up to double the range of the new U.S. AIM-9X, the first U.S. HMD sighted AAM, which is just now entering service with U.S. Air Force and Navy squadrons. The ramjet powered “PL-13” may out-range current variants of the AIM-120.

Absolute determination of AAM capabilities is greatly hampered by the efforts of governments and manufacturers to deny information, such as that regarding missile range and countermeasures, which would allow potential adversaries to gain an advantage.[2] Furthermore, the utility of an AAM is also determined by many attributes of the carrying aircraft: its radar and electronic support systems, the availability of off-board sensor data, and the degree of training and experience of the launching pilot. But there is little margin for error when considering a major factor such as weapons, especially when considering that China’s increasing numbers of competitive 4th generation combat aircraft may be followed by 5th generation combat aircraft early to mid-next decade. Absent a U.S. response, such as the purchase of more 5th generation fighters, the development of a new generation of AAMs, or even the purchase of more capable European AAMs, the air power balance in Asia could shift dangerously toward China.

5th Generation Short Range Air to Air Missiles

Since the 1940s the progress of combat aircraft and their weapons have been measured in “generations.” The latest 5th Generation combat aircraft, of which the U.S. Lockheed-Martin F-22A Raptor is the only one operational, are defined usually by their ability to combine the attributes of stealth, advanced electronically scanned (AESA) radar, and engines powerful enough to cruise supersonically without recourse to fuel-guzzling afterburners (super-cruise). These capabilities give the F-22A the ability to detect and attack before being detected, and to evade new and deadly Russian surface-to-air missiles. But since their introduction in the 1970s, American, Russian and other manufacturers have been constantly upgrading their 4th generation fighters such as the Boeing F-15 Eagle and the Sukhoi Su-27/30 Flanker with ever more modern electronic systems and weapons.

In the 1980s Russia began the trend toward the 4th generation AAMs with the introduction of the Vympel R-73, the first thrust-vectored AAM with a 45-degree off-bore-sight view (90-degree field of view) infrared seeker, and the ability to be targeted with a helmet-mounted sight (HMS). This gave Soviet-Russian fighters a decisive advantage over U.S. and European fighters: the Soviets could always launch their short-range AAMs first as they did not have to orient or “dogfight” their fighter, but merely needed to “look” at the target to direct the R-73 AAM. This technology has evolved into a 5th generation defined by the inclusion of more sensitive imaging-infrared seekers that home in on a specific part of the target aircraft; seekers with wider 90-degree off-bore-sight view(180-degree fields of view); seekers that incorporate advanced anti-jamming and anti-decoy technology; and those which use more advanced helmet-mounted displays. Examples of 5th generation infrared guided AAMs include the British ASRAAM, German IRIS-T, Israeli Python-5, Japanese AAM-5, U.S. AIM-9X, the improved Vympel R-73 and the South African A-Darter. Should a longer range 5th generation AAM like the Python-5 miss its target on the first pass, it usually has the range and agility to attack once more.



MBDA’s Modern AAMs: The ASRAAM short-range and Meteor long-range AAMs seen at the recent Dubai Airshow. Source: RD Fisher

While first generation short range infrared guided AAM relied on the pilot to find and maneuver to attack an often rapidly moving target, 4th and 5th generation short-range AAMs rely on aircraft sensors and advanced helmet mounted displays to target these latest AAMs which usually have much greater range than a pilot’s sight. In the 1980s, in addition to using the aircraft’s radar, the Soviets introduced more sophisticated optical infrared search and tracking (IRST) systems, which allowed aircraft to turn off emitting radars which in turn could be targeted by opposing electronic sensors and jamming. The Russian OLS-30 IRST used in late versions of Sukhoi fighters, and Shenyang co-produced Su-27/J-11 fighters, is reportedly able to passively search and track targets out to 50-90km. While Russian IRSTs are reportedly not able to determine range, the Russians apparently network several fighter IRSTs and radar to find the range of targets, even stealthy targets.[3] HMDs are able to collate data from radar, optical sensors, plus aircraft performance data onto the pilot’s helmet visor, allowing him to target distant threats without having to concentrate on cockpit instruments. Israel’s DASH HMD became the basis for the U.S. Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) HMD, which support the AIM-9X AAM that in 2003 started entering service on U.S. F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 fighters.



Active Radar-Guided AAMs

While the U.S. has lagged in the development of 5th generation HMD sighted AAMs, it has helped to lead the field in the development of medium range active-guided AAMs. The Raytheon AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) began in 1975 leading to fielding in the early 1990s, while the Vympel R-77 program began in 1982 and first appeared in the early 1990s. Both missiles sought to perfect the advancement of incorporating an active radar seeker to allow the AAM to guide itself autonomously for part of its flight. Previous “semi-active” radar guided AAMs like the AIM-7 Sparrow and the Vympel R-27 required continuous “painting” by aircraft radar with constant radio signals to guide the missile until reaching its target. Active radar guided missiles like the AIM-120 and R-77 still require target location data from the launching aircraft, or more recently, from an off-board sensor like an AWACS aircraft, but after the missile’s active radar acquires the target the launching aircraft has the option to maneuver to safety or commence another attack.




AIM-120D and R-77: The AIM-120D is the latest model of the AMRAAM due to enter service soon, whereas China may have purchased up to 1,000 of the Vympel R-77 AAM. Source: US Air Force and RD Fisher

The AIM-120, the Russian R-77 and the French MICA dominate the market for active-guided AAMs. In this decade Japan, China and Taiwan have fielded active guided AAMs, with the latter two relying on imported technology. All active-guided AAM makers have sought to improve their products with better seekers, some using satellite navigation guidance, enhanced electronic counter measures, the addition of data links to provide updated target location data, and better engines to enable longer range. The U.S., Russia, Europe, South Africa, and perhaps more recently China, have developed ramjet engine powered AAMs to achieve longer ranges without increasing missile size. Ramjets also allow the missile to sustain its high speed over most of its range, which significantly expands the “no escape zone” or area within which a target will likely be killed. The only ramjet powered AAM soon to enter service is the MBDA Meteor, which advertises a 100+km range, and a constant Mach 4+ speed and a “no escape zone” three times that of early AIM-120 AAMs.[4] More recently Russia has revived its very long range missile program with the Novator K-100 or K-172, which has been variously reported to have a 200km to 400km range. The last U.S. very long range Hughes AIM-54C Phoenix, capable of reaching 150km, was retired from U.S. Navy service in 2004. While the U.S. had two-stage and ramjet missile engine AAM test programs in the 1980s and 1990s,[5] it has chosen not to replace the long range AIM-54C.



China’s Record of Foreign AAM Technology Reliance

Almost from the beginning the PLA has relied on foreign technology, whether from the United States, Russia, Israel and now South Africa, to develop ever more modern air-to-air missiles. In September 1958 a U.S. AIM-9B Sidewinder short range air-to-air missile (AAM) was captured by China after it was fired by a Taiwanese F-86 Sabre fighter at a Chinese MiG-17, becoming lodged in the airframe without exploding. At the time the AIM-9B was the most modern air-to-air missile anywhere and it was soon copied by the Soviet Union and China. For the Soviets it became the K-13 (NATO: AA-2 Atol) and for China the PL-2 (PL meaning Thunderbolt). During the Vietnam War China was able to obtain unexploded copies of more advanced AIM-9 missiles, which influenced the PL-5, as well as early version of the Raytheon AIM-7 Sparrow, which influence the radar-guided PL-11. During the 1980s China obtained the French Matra 550, which was copied as the PL-7 and the Israeli Python-3, which was copied as the PL-8.

From the 1990s to the present period the PLA has purchased thousands of modern Russian AAMs, including the Vympel R-73 short-range AAM, and multiple variants of the semi-active radar and infrared guided Vympel R-27 medium range AAM. In addition the PLA has purchased about 1,000 of the more modern active radar guided Vympel R-77 medium range AAM. These missiles almost exclusively arm Sukhoi/KnAAPO made Su-27SK/Su-30MKK/MKK2 fighters or the Shenyang Aircraft Co. co-produced version of the Su-27SK called the J-11, or J-11A. It has been reported that some number of early purchase Su-27SKs and early J-11s were upgraded in order to be able to fire the R-77, whereas the Su-30s had this capability from delivery.

Starting in the 1990s, as it did with other weapons purchases, the PLA decided to purchase the underlying technology of weapons systems or their components, so as to make weapon systems with increasing indigenous Chinese content. By the mid 1990s China’s main missile maker Luoyang had developed the PL-9, which took the fuselage of the Python-3, attached different guidance fins, and incorporated a copy of the Ukrainian Arsenel helmet sight, called the TK-14 in Chinese service, to make a new AAM.[6] The latest PL-9C features an increase in range to 22km, up from 15km for the PL-9, PL-8 and Python-3 AAMs. One mystery has been why the PL-9 has not seen widespread usage in the PLA air forces. From the 1996 Zhuhai show and at subsequent shows, Luoyang officials have noted to the author that the PLA was not interested in buying the PL-9, even though it has occasionally been seen on some fighters like the late model Chengdu J-7G.




PL-9C and HMS: It is not clear that the PL-9C AAM with the TK-14 helmet sight is in widespread PLA service, an indication that the PLA was instead waiting for a more advanced short-range AAM. Source: RD Fisher

Perhaps a key reason for not purchasing the PL-9 has been the expectation that the PLA would be building an even better AAM. At the 2002 Zhuhai Airshow Luoyang officials told this analyst and other reporters that the company was working on an advanced AAM. The few details disclosed, such as advanced guidance, the use of thrust vectoring and helmet displays created a basis for speculation that Luoyang was interested in an AAM like the British ASRAAM. Despite the heavy reliance on purchased Russian short range AAMs like the R-73, the inspiration for Luoyang’s 5th generation AAM was to come from elsewhere.

Possible “South African” AAMs

At the 2002 Zhuhai Airshow South African firms set up a small booth and spoke of their desire to do business with the PLA but did not go into specifics. At subsequent shows the South African presence grew larger and it is now clear that there have been several cooperative programs, including unmanned aircraft, air defense systems and air to air missiles. While South African firms have said little about the latter, in 2004 Yihong Chang reported on PLA interest in purchasing the 5th generation Denel A-Darter AAM.[7] The data revealed on January 4 indicated that development of the PL-10 started in 2004, which might track very well with the reported deepening of South African-PLA cooperation. The few clear images of the PL-ASR/PL-10 show a near 95 percent similarity with the Denel A-Darter AAM. The main differences are in the rear fin shape and configuration, but it is a relatively minor difference. So it is possible to speculate that the PL-10 may very well have a performance similar to or better than the A-Darter, which would include use of advanced imaging infrared guidance and a maximum range of 20km or better. The January 4 revelation indicates the seeker has a 90-degree off-bore-sight capability (180 degree field of view). It also has a lock-on-after-launch capability, meaning it can be launched from a high off-bore-sight position and acquires the target, usually accomplished with the aid of a helmet sight or IRST.




PL-10 and A-Darter: This comparison shows the basic similarity between the Denel A-Darter (top) and the Luoyang PL-10. Source: CJDBY and Internet

This missile could arm most PLA fighters equipped with an IRST, even a short range radar but also with computers capable of processing for the helmet mounted display. This would likely initially include J-10 and J-11B fighters, but then older J-11As, and then late model J-8II and J-7 fighters.

New Type AAM

The revelation of PL-10 imagery with the clear implication of South African technical participation also provides possible insights into another AAM found on a Chinese university website in mid-December 2007. This AAM has not yet been identified by any official or unofficial PLA source, but this single picture shows some similarity to the Denel radar-guided R-Darter, which is virtually the same missile as the Israeli Aircraft Industries Derby. The product of Israeli and South African cooperation during the 1980s and 1990s, the R-Darter has a light weight of 120kg and reported range of 63km.[8] It appears that the R-Darter/Derby program intended to produce a very maneuverable but light-weight radar-guided AAM that could be back-fitted to advanced 3rd and 4th generation fighters. R-Darter entered service with the South African Air Force but Derby has not yet entered service with the Israeli Air Force, though it is reportedly being used by the Singapore Air Force.




New Radar Guided AAM: Two new-type AAMs straddle a single PL-12 on a three-missile pylon on a JH-7A fighter bomber (top). This vague image was obtained from a Chinese university web site, and appears to show some similarity to the somewhat larger South African/Israeli R-Darter (bottom) radar-guided AAM. Source: Internet

The key similarity between the new PLA AAM and the R-Darter appears to be their shape and the possible inclusion of a small roll stabilization fins behind the front fins. However, it also appears that this new missile is appreciably smaller than the R-Darter, perhaps weighing only about 100 to 110kgs.[9] This would mean a shorter range, perhaps 20 to 30km. It is not known whether this new AAM has a semi-active, active, or even a passive seeker. One possibility may be a version of the new small 150mm seeker being marketed by Russia’s AGAT.[10] It is clear that the PLA intends to exploit this missile’s light weight, as its first public illustration shows two of the new missiles paired with a PL-12 on a single three-missile launch pylon. This pylon configuration allows newer fighters such as the FC-1, J-10, J-11B and JH-7A to increase their beyond-visual-range AAM carriage capability. This missile could also be intended to quickly upgrade the latest models of 3rd generation fighters like the Shenyang J-8IIF/H and the Chengdu J-7E/G with a lightweight radar guided AAM to complement the PL-10 infrared/imaging AAM.

If these two new PLA AAMs were aided substantially by South Africa, then it would stand to reason that South Africa may have also provided key enabling technologies such as Helmet Mounted Display systems and data links. Denel’s Archer HMD was developed to support the A-Darter and R-Darter and would likely have been sold to China along with the AAM technology. China’s Luoyang group has also long commented, albeit cryptically, on its interest in developing HMD technology, with images of experimental HMDs appearing from time to time. A new Luoyang HMD may benefit from indigenous and foreign technology. A helmet mounted sight displayed by the Cigong Group at the 2004 Zhuhai show uses prominent light-emitting diodes to allow cockpit computers to track the position of the pilot’s head, in order to target weapons, the same system used by the Denel Archer HMD.




Advanced Helmet Systems: The South African “Archer” helmet mounted display (top) uses light emitting diodes to track pilot head position in order to target weapons. The Cigong Group helmet sight seen a the 2004 Zhuhai show used a similar head tracking system. Any potential South African help with new PLA AAMs likely included the sale of advanced helmet display technology. Source: Denel and RD Fisher

PL-12

Indicating a major advance in its AAM technology, in 2001 Chinese sources began revealing the first data on the Leihua Electronic Technology Research Institute (LETRI) SD-10, later PL-12 active radar guided AAM. It is likely that at about the same time that the PLA was negotiating to purchase the R-77, it was also pressing Russia’s missile concerns for technology to support an indigenous Chinese program. Russia’s missile radar maker AGAT reportedly sold China drawings of the 9B-1103M radar for the active-guided version of the R-27 AAM. But China presumably also gained insights from the AGAT 9B-1348 radar on the R-77.[11] The PL-12 also reportedly has a “passive” seeking mode that would allow it to home in on an emitting target, such as a jamming or AWACs radar aircraft.[12] However, the SD-10 uses a Chinese-made missile motor, which when combined with a “lofted” flight profile, can achieve a maximum range of 70km, about 10km less than the R-77. Nevertheless, in the PL-12 the PLA has a modern self-guided AAM that is in the same class as the U.S. AIM-120 and the Russian R-77. In 2002 China revealed basic data about the SD-10 and began to display models of the missile at air-shows, such as Zhuhai in November 2002. By 2005 to 2006 the PL-12 began to appear in photos of PLA fighters, especially the Chengdu J-10 and some versions of the Shenyang J-8II. It has also been tested on the Shenyang J-11B, now in advanced development, and has been seen in at least on photo on a wing pylon of a Xian JH-7A fighter attack fighter.




PL-12 In Service: The 70km range PL-12 active-guided radar is known equip some Shenyang J-8II fighters (top), all Chengdu J-10 fighters (bottom) and will in the future equip the Shenyang J-11B. Source: Chinese Internet

“PL-13”

Another surprise in the imagery made available on Chinese web pages on January 4 was a curious computer-generated depiction of a missile called the “PL-13.” However, it must be stressed that this is the first image of this missile and a definitive determination of its existence and performance must await further disclosures. Arguing in favor of this program’s existence is the fact that its image appears with clear images of the PL-12 and the new PL-10, which would tend to lend credibility to the new missile depiction. In addition, Luoyang was reported to have been interested in ramjet propulsion to develop the PL-12.[13] This PL-13 image also points to the possibility that Vympel has sold China the technology needed to make such an AAM. The PL-13 image appears to show a two-intake ramjet motor, a configuration that Vympel had come to prefer as it was developing its R-77M-PD, following early 1990s collaboration with France’s former MATRA Corporation.[14] The ramjet intake shape on the PL-13 appears to conform to one known Vympel configuration. Furthermore, the four cruciform fins at the front end of the PL-13 are also characteristic of other Vympel missiles like the R-27, and Vympel was also reportedly discarding the “grid” shape fins for conventional fins,[15] which also coincides with the PL-13 image. Inasmuch as Russia apparently decided not to purchase the R-77M-PD, it is possible that Vympel was allowed to sell this missile technology to China.[16] But it is also possible that South Africa was a source for some AAM ramjet engine technology, inasmuch as South Africa also had an unrealized program called the Long Range Air-to-Air Missile (LRAAM).



First “PL-13” Image: This computer generated image appeared on the CJDBY website on January 4, 2008. While little is known about this missile the image’s credibility is supported by the inclusion of images of the PL-12 and the recently revealed PL-10. Source: CJDBY web site

If a real program, then the PL-13 would give the PLA a long-range AAM with considerable new capabilities. The R-77M-PD was reported to have an estimated range of 160km and the PL-13 should be expected to do as well or better. Furthermore, as it a ramjet powered missile, it is expected to sustain its high speed, likely about Mach 4 and greater, throughout its engagement, meaning that it has a substantial “no escape” zone, perhaps similar to that of the MBDA Meteor. Should the PL-13 see a near-term introduction, the it will likely be used in conjunction with the PLA’s AWACS aircraft that can find distant targets and then pass targeting data to attacking aircraft, likely J-11B and J-10 fighter. But the potential range of the PL-13 offers an indication that the PLA is also likely developing long-range radar for its 4th and 5th generation fighters, or may be interested in upgrading existing fighters with new longer range Russian radar. Inasmuch as Vympel has been marketing passive guided versions of the R-27 and R-77, it is reasonable to speculate that a version of the PL-13 may feature a passive guidance system, to better enable long-range attacks against critical support aircraft like AWACS, electronic warfare and tanker aircraft. The PL-13 could also form the basis for a future light-weight anti-radar or supersonic anti-ship missile.




PL-13 and R-77M-PD Compared: The ramjet intakes of the PL-13 (top) and the R-77M-PD (bottom) show a clear similarity, whereas the PL-13 adopts the two-intake configuration Vympel reportedly settled upon following early 1990s collaboration with France’s MATRA. Source: CJDBY and Internet

There is also the possibility that the PLA could purchase new Russian very long-range AAMs or develop similar AAMs themselves. Inasmuch as the PLA is reportedly interested in purchasing some number of the new Russian Sukhoi Su-35 fighter, it may also purchase the unique weapons offered with this fighter, like the 300-400km range Novator K-100/172. India may be interested in an advanced version of this missile capable of anti-missile intercepts.[17] Asian military sources also note that China is developing a 400km range surface-to-air missile.[18] If this new PLA SAM is based on Russian S-400 components, for which China is reportedly an investor, then this new SAM may be small enough to be developed into a very long-range AAM, perhaps even with future anti-missile intercept capabilities.



Novator K-100/172: In development since the late Cold War, the latest version of the very long range Novator K-100 design was revealed at the 2007 Moscow Airshow. Source: Internet

Growing PLA Airpower, Growing Intimidation

After nearly 15 years of effort, by 2005 the PLA’s many investments in modern air combat capabilities began paying off. The Chengdu J-10 4th generation fighter and the indigenous Xian JH-7A fighter-bomber were both entering production. About a hundred or so of each have now been produced, each comprising about three to four operational units. In recent months the JH-7 has been seen with new electronic warfare pods perhaps conferring a capability similar to the U.S. Northrop Grumman EA-6B. By 2005 PLA Air Force and Naval Air Force had completed acceptance of 180+ Russian made Sukhoi Su-27 fighters and Su-30 attack fighters. The Shenyang Aircraft Corporation had co-produced about 100 Su-27s as the J-11, and was making breakthroughs in its effort to absorb and “indigenize” the Su-27 as the J-11B fighter. Furthermore, by 2005 the PLA had two types of phased array radar AWACS and a possible phased array radar ground mapping aircraft in advanced development, The venerable Xian H-6 (Tu-16) bomber was also being upgraded into a more powerful land attack cruise missile and PGM carrier. While open data is very scant, U.S. and Chinese sources indicate that both Chengdu and Shenyang have 5th generation combat aircraft programs that could fly by the middle of the next decade, and both companies are likely developing a range of unmanned combat aircraft. The first PLA Naval Air Force carrier wing may include modified J-11B or J-10 fighters, to be followed by a Chinese or Russian 5th generation naval fighter.

These hardware improvements have been accompanied by the development of new offensive and joint-force aerial doctrines, and increases in training time and training sophistication. China’s leadership has also shown its willingness to use its Air Forces to intimidate Japan and Taiwan. Japan had to scramble fighters to intercept intruding PLA aircraft 13 times in 2005 and 107 times in the first three months of 2006.[19] For two days in September 2007 the PLA sent 40 bomber sorties into the disputed Shirakaba/Chunxiao East China Sea gas field region, prompting 12 Japanese fighter intercept sorties.[20] In November 2007 PLA Air Force exercises with KJ-2000 AWACS apparently followed coordinated East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet naval exercises designed to intimidate Taiwan. Starting abruptly in 1999 the PLA Air Force has increased its presence in the Taiwan Strait, often flying up to or over the “mid line,” an unofficial boundary both sides have honored, offering some degree of “confidence,” but which Chinese commentators now say is not recognized by China.[21] From 1998 to 1999 PLA air sorties in or near the Strait jumped from 400 to 1,100, and then jumped from 940 to 1,700 from 2005 to 2006.[22]

But in late 2007, in a move consistent with Beijing’s efforts to intensify its “Legal Warfare” against Taiwan, China began indicating its intention to create a new air transport corridor which at some points would be barely 30km from the Taiwan Strait mid line, and also indicated it was going to create a Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Taiwan Strait.[23] By one definition, an ADIZ is “The area of airspace over land or water, extending upward from the surface, within which the ready identification, the location, and the control of aircraft are required in the interest of national security.” While China may want the new air corridor to help ease airport congestion, China currently only allocates 30 percent of its airspace for civil traffic,[24] raising questions about its real intent on the Taiwan Strait. Both the new air corridor and a new ADIZ over the Taiwan Strait would offer multiple opportunities for miscalculation or for the creation of “aerial incidents” that could justify military escalation. For example, what if Taiwanese fighters or SAM bases could not identify a Chinese airliner that has strayed well over the “mid line” prompting a tragedy similar to the 1983 Soviet shoot-down of the Korean Airlines Flight 007? Might China then attack Taiwan or just force concessions? Or might a Taiwan Air Force scramble to indentify such an intruder give the PLA cause to launch S-300 SAMs or fighters at the Taiwanese?

As there appears to be a relationship between China’s growing airpower in its willingness to use its new capabilities to intimidate its neighbors, U.S. policy makers to pay close attention to how the PLA is quickly shifting the airpower balance on the Taiwan Strait. For example, Taiwan does not have a 5th generation helmet display guided AAM that can counter the PL-10. Should the PLA decide to upgrade its late model third generation J-7E/G and J-8F/H and newer 4th generation J-10 fighters with the PL-10 and its new light-weight radar guided AAM, it might quickly gain over 500 fighters that could dominate Taiwan’s 126 F-16s, 57 Mirage-2000s, 90 or so F-5 and 126 IDF combat aircraft in a short-range battle. The PLA’s Sukhoi fighter fleet has had this superiority since the mid-1990s due to its R-27 helmet sighted AAMs. All Taiwan fighters save the F-5s have the ability to fire self-guided medium range AIM-120, MICA EM or Sky Sword 2 AAMs, but these could in the future be handily outranged by a ramjet-powered PL-13. The PL-13 would also pose a new threat to Taiwan’s six E-2 Hawkeye AWACS, essential for Taiwan to appropriately employ its smaller number of fighters against a larger force. The introduction of these new PLA AAMs place greater pressure on Taiwan to replace its F-5s with 66 F-16 Block 50 fighters, as it has been trying to do for some time, and also to upgrade other elements of its air force. Taiwan now has an urgent requirement for the helmet display sighted AIM-9X AAM for all of its fighters, as it also could handily justify an early purchase of Lockheed Martin F-35 fighters which would give it a modest technical advantage in terms of stealth.

Narrowing Choices for Washington

China’s growing airpower also creates greater pressure for the United States to react, both in terms of improving its own capabilities and those of its allies and friends. The advent of the PL-10 and possibility the PL-13 raises the possibility of a new “AAM Gap,” a condition that U.S. Air Forces endured for the 1990s. Soon after the Cold War it was determined that former East German MiG-29 fighters had a decisive “first-shot” close-in battle advantage over U.S. fighters due to the helmet-sighted Vympel R-73 AAM. The PLA purchased this AAM with its Su-27SK and Su-30MKK fighters in the 1990s, and had the same advantage over U.S. fighters until the 2003 introduction of the AIM-9X. But in the PL-ASR/PL-10 the PLA may have a close-in combat AAM that could potentially have twice the range of the AIM-9X.[25] This presents U.S. defense planners with little alternative but to seek an upgraded longer-range AIM-9. In 1998 Australia chose the 20km range HMD sighted British ASRAAM over the AIM-9X to arm its F/A-18A fighters.

Furthermore, save for the F-35 which will not enter U.S. units until 2012, no U.S. fighter has an integral Infrared Search and Tracking (IRST) system, as is carried by PLA Su-27, Su-30 and J-11 fighters, and is employed by the European Eurofighter and the French Rafale. This may enable the PLA to get the first shot with its new PL-10 AAMs when targeted passively by their IRST. The U.S. Navy is proposing adding an IRST to the F/A-18E/F, but its placement on a centerline fuel tank offers a restricted field of view.[26]

At the same time the U.S. may be facing stronger competition regarding longer-range AAMs. While the maximum range of the AIM-120D remains a classified number, limitations of size dictate that it may very well be outranged by a ramjet powered missile that does not need to include an oxidizer in its fuel. For the 1990s the U.S. justified its lag in developing a 5th generation short-range AAM due to the superiority of the Raytheon AIM-120 self-guided AAM family. This, combined with the use of E-3 and E-2 AWACS, was believed to enable existing F-15 air superiority fighters to sustain a commanding edge in battle. This proved valid against lesser air forces like those of Iraq and Bosnia. And the U.S. expects that the Lockheed Martin F-22A’s impressive advantages in stealth, long range AESA radar and passive sensors, and super-cruising speeds to sustain the ability of the U.S. to find and attack it opponents first, thus securing air dominance.

But as the emergence of PLA 5th generation AAMs indicates, this picture could change quickly absent U.S. action. China is developing long-range AAMs like the PL-13 or could purchase the longer range Russian Novator K-100 and present an unacceptable threat to critical U.S. AWACS aircraft. Denied superior “situational awareness” from AWACS, U.S. F-15s and F-16s would be forced to rely on their own radar, electronics and weapons. The PLA’s development of new AAMs and its purchase of Russian AAMs would then raise the possibility of uncomfortably reducing the U.S. margin of superiority, and thus reducing deterrence. The U.S. is now introducing the AIM-120D, which may have range in excess of 100km and has the advantage of a two-way data-link, so the missile’s radar can increase the situational awareness of the combat network. The U.S. is also developing a next generation AAM designed to combine short-range, medium range air combat superiority and ground attack capabilities, called the Joint Dual Role Air Dominance Missile (JDRADM). But despite experimental programs in the 1980s and 1990s the U.S. does not appear interested in a very long range AAM. It may now be necessary for the U.S. to revisit programs that sought to develop two-stage and ramjet powered very long-range AAMs,[27] or consider purchasing the ramjet powered MBDA Meteor.



Ramjet ARM: The U.S. Air Force recently released this image of a new ramjet-powered missile being tested from a QF-4 drone, apparently a new version of the AGM-88 anti-radar missile. This power plant could also form the basis for a new very long range AAM. Source: U.S. Air Force

The U.S. introduction of the F-22A offers substantial compensation, as its stealth and super-cruise offer great tactical advantages over most 4th generation fighters. But the U.S. decision to limit the number of F-22As to 183 means that only 58 are going to be based in Alaska and Hawaii.[28] This advantage is also in danger of being neutralized by the potential emergence of Chinese 5th generation fighters in the next decade, or a possible Chinese decision to purchase Russia’s 5th generation fighter. Meanwhile, the U.S. faces even greater pressures from the potential loss of over one-third of its 440 F-15 fighter fleet due to recently discovered structural flaws.[29] Even though there have been longstanding concerns about the aging F-15,[30] the U.S. Air Force has plans to upgrade about 177 with new AESA radar, a plan that may be reconsidered.[31] It may now be more important that the U.S. build up to the U.S. Air Force’s requirement for 381 F-22As, or even better, consider an upgraded version that could carry more and better long, medium and short-range AAM, and include an IRST device.

The brutal surprise of Russian MiG-15s early in the Korean War helped push the U.S. to remain a leader in air superiority, an expensive investment sustained for three generations. Preserving air superiority has also been a critical factor in America’s ability to deter large-scale conflict, especially in Asia. The U.S. has also sustained a policy of providing its allies and key friends with ever more modern air defense systems so that they in turn contribute to the deterrence of conflict. Washington has especially relied on maintaining Taiwan’s technical superiority in the air to undergird its ability to deter Chinese aggression. But China’s sustained across-the-board investment in modern air combat capabilities is but one of many emerging areas of U.S.-Chinese military competition. The U.S. has little choice but to exceed China’s capacity to produce superior combat aircraft, the weapons to arm them, and the support aircraft to ensure they sustain the ability to quickly establish command of the air in order to dominate battlefields below.



Two of Japan’s Choices: Japan wants the F-22A and perhaps Australia may elect to seek it as well. But of the two only Japan has a fall-back indigenous 5th generation fighter program. Source: RD Fisher

Furthermore, it is necessary for Washington to consider additional measures to allow U.S. allies and friends to sustain local air superiority. The U.S. will not sell the F-22A to Australia and Japan, despite their strong interest.[32] Australia has decided to purchase up to 100 F-35s, which are optimized for attack missions, and the new Labour Party-led government is now re-evaluating the Liberal government’s 2007 decision to buy F/A-18E/F fighters, in part because they do not offer commanding superiority over Russian Sukhois being sold to China, Indonesia and Malaysia. Given China’s all-around progress in air power building, it may be necessary to review F-22 export restrictions, and perhaps consider a version that can be more safely exported. Japan has an urgent requirement to replace its 1960s vintage F-4EJ fighters but is also quietly investing in its own 5th generation fighter that could fly by the end of the next decade if the U.S. does not sell the F-22A.[33] In addition, the U.S. must become far more responsive to Taiwan’s needs, to include rapid approval of Taipei’s request for 66 new F-16 Block 50 fighters, which can use the AIM-9X AAM. Assisting Taiwan’s ability to deter China in the air can also serve to deter China’s ongoing buildup of missiles, naval blockade forces and invasion forces aimed at Taiwan.

 

[SBD-3]

China’s J-10 Jet Fighter: How Much Do We Know?

emailEmail this article
printPrint this article

by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on January 16th, 2007
ARTICLES

Since late December 2006 China has been rolling out its Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) Jian-10 (Fighter-10, or J-10) multi-role fighter, with some publicity. We have seen unprecedented video[1] and print press coverage[2] of the fighter and interviews with prominent members of the CAC design team.[3] The purposes seem to be, first, to demonstrate to Chinese and foreigners alike that China can build her own "indigenous" aircraft itself, without relying on foreign help, and second, that as a responsible "rising power," China has nothing to hide from the world (the theme of the National Defense White Paper of December 29, 2006).

But the whole exercise has also been conspicuous for what it lacks. First, no official data have been provided regarding the actual capabilities and performance of the J-10. And second, we have heard little or nothing from the many Israeli and Russian engineers who helped make this aircraft possible.





After 20 Years, A J-10 Party: Some of the current issues of Chinese military magazines that feature cover stories on the J-10; for most Chinese military journalists, a very long wait to cover a well known story. Credit: Chinese Internet

From the early 1990s to the present period the J-10 has been viewed by government and non-government analysts as a key indicator of Chinese military potential, and as such, has been an object of intense scrutiny and speculation. In 1997 the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence produced speculative artist imagery of the J-10 (an honor previously reserved for mysterious new Soviet combat aircraft) estimating that an eventual twin-engine version would fly off a future Chinese aircraft carrier. But at about the same time, many U.S. government and non-government analysts regarded the J-10 (and the idea of Chinese aircraft carriers) as far-fetched.



American Estimates: In 1997 the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence produced speculative imagery of a twin-engine J-10 flying form a future Chinese aircraft carrier, which at that time, was an estimate viewed by some U.S. analysts as “humorous.” Credit: Office of Naval Intelligence

The J-10 program started in the 1960s with the J-9, a canard (horizontal stabilizer in front of the wing) fighter (like the J-10) which resembled the Swedish JA-37 Viggen. The J-9 was conceived of then, in the years of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, as short take-off and fast climbing interceptor to ward of invading Soviet aircraft. Work started at the Shenyang Aircraft Company, but was switched to CAC. As time passed, however, with no plane, the concept of the J-10 evolved into that of a full multi-role fighter. The Chinese would like the world to believe that the J-10 is "designed and made entirely in China."[4] However, over the course of its development the J-10 required substantial technical and consulting inputs from Israel and then Russia. The J-10’s basic configuration has clear influences from the Israeli Aircraft Industries Lavi,-- an aircraft program, never completed, that was largely paid for by the United States.[5] These include its underslug air intake and slightly anhedral delta wings. What appears to be a likely early concept for the J-10 even copies the Lavi’s vertical stabilizer.




Possible Early Configuration: In the mid-1990s this model of an early configuration of the J-10 was given legitimacy by the presence of former Politburo member Li Peng in the picture. The Israeli Lavi-style vertical stabilizer is apparent. Credit: Chinese Internet

The J-10 is furthermore completely "fly by wire," or computer driven, an achievement probably to be credited to Israeli consultants, who in turn may in turn have relied on their exposure to U.S. technology associated with the pioneering fly-by-wire Lockheed-Martin F-16. Chengdu did develop its own system, however, which it tested on a modified JJ-6 training aircraft.

Finally, the J-10 was developed in considerable secrecy. Planned debuts in previous years were evidently canceled. The aircraft has been unveiled just now not as a prototype but as an aircraft already in production and serving with the PLA air force. What do we know about it?



Debut Canceled: A week before the November 2006 Zhuhai Airshow, CAC flew a special J-10 painted in AVIC-1 markings before assembled journalists, only to have its triumphal Zhuhai debut cancelled at the last minute. Despite a press embargo, some images from that demonstration flight were leaked to the Internet. Source: Chinese Internet

We Know #1: The CAC J-10 is now in production and is serving in PLA Air Force units.

Internet source imagery confirms that the J-10 is flying in at least two active PLAAF regiments, the first becoming operational in 2005, plus a testing regiment. Other reporting indicates that another two more regiments may be transitioning to the J-10. At least one regiment contains two-seat J-10S versions, which reportedly first flew in December 2003. The J-10S is designed for training, but could in the future be upgraded to dedicated attack variant. It should be expected that the PLA Navy will purchase some to replace obsolete J-7 fighters. And furthermore, Pakistan may be first in line to purchase the J-10, perhaps toward the end of this decade, or soon into the next.



One of the First J-10 Units: So far, it appears that the J-10 only serves in two PLAAF regiments, with reports of two others working up. Source: Chinese Internet

We Know #2: China now has a 4th generation multi-role fighter having performance that will soon approach that of the Lockheed-Martin F-16 Block 40.

The J-10 exhibits the major characteristics of 4th generation fighters such as the F-16 and F/A-18, such as computer driven or "fly-by-wire" control systems that ensure far greater flying precision; use of high-thrust turbofan engines to ensure a near 1 to 1 thrust-to-weight ratio for high performance 8-9G combat maneuvering; and the ability to employ advanced radar and weapons.

With its canard configuration and slightly larger wing, the J-10 can probably be credited with slightly better maneuverability than the F-16.

The fighter employs a Chinese developed radar, which, although it may rely on technology obtained from Russian or other sources, is nevertheless a Chinese product it can now sell. This radar, the maker, name or performance of which has not been officially disclosed, is usually assumed to employ a mechanically slewed planar array comparable to early 1990s era Western fighter radar, but with the performance enhancements gained from integrating more modern computer components.

Multiple images also confirm the J-10 uses modern Chinese-made cockpit systems to include hands-on-throttle-and-stick (HOTAS) controls that enable use of the range of combat systems while hands remain on these critical aircraft controls, and glass multi-function displays which allow a pilot to view flight system data or target imagery by pressing a button.

We Know #3: The J-10 is armed with modern weapons systems and can be refueled in flight.

The J-10 employs now (or will soon be able to employ) modern anti-air and ground attack weapons. In early 2005 Chinese sources disclosed to the author that CAC had completed integration of the PL-12/SD-10 self-guiding medium range air-to-air missile,[6] two to four of which can be carried by the J-10. While the PL-12 relies on a Russian/Ukrainian developed missile radar, its Chinese designed missile engine is credited with giving it a slightly greater range than the comparable Russian Vympel R-77, which makes it very competitive with relatively recent versions of the U.S. Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAM.

As for ground attack, an early January AVIC-1 press conference displayed a J-10 model equipped with two low-light/laser targeting pods attached to the engine intake. While this modification has yet to be seen on J-10s "in the field," this modification is how the F-16 employs the twin-pod LANTRIN targeting and low-light navigation system, or the new singke-pod systems. The F-16 did not integrate LANTRIN until its Block 40 version, which began delivery in 1989, a decade after the initial F-16As entered service. This Chinese targeting pod was developed, according to Russian sources, with the help of the Russian UOMZ optical targeting system company, but again, it will be marketed as a Chinese system. Imaging made available over the last 18 months and more recent videos show the J-10 can carry bombs on wing and fuselage, for a total of 11 weapon attachments. The use of targeting pods indicates the J-10’s potential to employ the laser and navigation satellite guided bombs revealed by the Louyang Company and CASIC consortium during the 2006 Zhuhai show.



Press Con Model: At a January 5 press conference AVIC-1 revealed a J-10 model equipped with two targeting pods of a type that received Russian technical assistance. In service it is likely the J-10 will use only one such pod, to target new Chinese-made laser and satellite-guided munitions. Credit: CCTV

A video released late December also included the first ever images of a J-10 equipped with a fixed probe for aerial refueling, taking fuel from a Chinese-built Xian H-6U tanking aircraft. Images of initial J-10 units do not indicate this is a current standard feature for the J-10, but it could for future versions. Such tanking ability would significantly increase the J-10’s operational flexibility to sustain longer combat air patrols or to undertake longer range attack missions.




This is new: One of the actual real revelations of late December 2006 was that at least one J-10 has been successfully modified for aerial refueling. Credit: AVIC-1; CCTV

We Know #4: The Chinese are about to master complex propulsion technology, and with the imminent production of the Shenyang WS-10A "Taihang" turbofan engine, the J-10 can soon be marketed as a fully indigenous Chinese 4th generation fighter.

Turbofan and jet engine technology has been one area in which the Chinese have encountered great difficulty in developing indigenous systems. The metallurgy of long-lasting fan blades is extremely complicated, as is the engineering, which is often viewed as much art as science.

Today the J-10 is powered by a Russian AL-31FN engine. China has purchased 150 AL-31FNs and in the recent past Russian sources have spoken of their expectation that China would purchase another 200 or so. The final number purchased will depend on how quickly China’s WS-10A Taihang turbofan engine can complete final testing and reach sufficient production to contribute to the J-10 program.

China’s quest for a modern high performance turbofan combat aircraft engine has lasted as long as the J-10’s story. While WS-10A is given a lower profile in reporting about the PLA, is perhaps a more important accomplishment than the J-10, inasmuch as this new engine enables multiple combat aircraft, enables the development of modern turbofans for airliner and cargo transports and its establishes a critical knowledge base for developing 5th generation fighters engines.



Taihang: The first “official” picture of China’s WS-10A turbofan appeared on a wall at the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow. While the chief designer has been feted in the Chinese press, as of yet there are no officially released performance statistics on this engine. Source: Chinese Internet

Official performance statistics for the Taihang have yet to be revealed. Numerous Chinese sources credit this engine with a 13,200kg maximum thrust, which could compare very favorably to the 12,500kg rating for the AL-31FN now used by the J-10.

China is also developing thrust vectoring for this engine, which serves to greatly enhance maneuverability and is also useful under certain conditions, for lowering landing speeds.

However, it appears that Shenyang and its J-11B, a greatly indigenized version of the Sukhoi Su-27 being co-produced by Shenyang, will have first claim on Taihang engine production. This J-11 may prove to be a more important combat aircraft than the J-10 in terms of performance. But perhaps because it is largely based on a foreign Russian design, it will not be given the same "debut" party as the J-10.

The J-10’s future, especially its export prospects, are tied to the Taihang engine. For example, Chengdu’s smaller FC-1 Fierce Dragon fighter, which is part of a major co-development and co-production agreement with Pakistan, has been bedeviled by Indian pressure on Russia not to sell its rival the Russian-made Klimov RD-93 engines which now power the FC-1. Pakistan is also planning to purchase an initial batch of 36 J-10s, and the Taihang would allow CAC to avoid foreign engine entanglements.

We Don’t Know:

Even by her own standards, China has been rather secretive with respect to the development of the J-10. Evidently the desire was to garner the full publicity value of the unexpected revelation of existing production and in place operational capabilities about which foreigners had hitherto only speculated. Some attempt was probably made as well to divert foreign attention away to major technology indigenization. Now after the debut, there is still much we do not know.

The Chengdu Aircraft Corporation has yet to release its own dimension, weight and performance statistics for the J-10 and twin-seat J-10S. Barring such a release it is not possible to know from open sources or from what may appear to be reasonably sound estimates, what is the real performance of the J-10. Such information remains a state secret.

We do not know how many J-10s the PLA Air Force will purchase. Some analysts estimate the PLAAF may only purchase 300 to 400 J-10s. At the 2003 Moscow Airshow a Russian source gave the author his estimate that total lifetime production for the J-10 could reach 1,200. This number has since been reported in the Department of Defense annual reports to the U.S. Congress on Chinese military modernization.

Nor do we know how quickly will modified versions emerge, or will the J-10 soon be eclipsed by a new 5th generation fighter.

In early 2005 Chinese sources told the author that "advanced" versions of the J-10 were in development, but would not elaborate.[7] In late 2005 and early 2006 reporting emerged that China was potentially basing new versions of the J-10 on a combination of up-rated and possibly thrust-vectored AL-31FN engines and new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.[7] Such an upgrade path is quite plausible and follows the example set by other 4th generation fighters now in production. Nevertheless there is no definitive information from CAC on new versions of the J-10.

At the 2005 Moscow Airshow one Russian source believed that China’s interest in a thrust-vectored version of the AL-31FN engine was driven primarily by its intention to develop a carrier-capable version of the single-engine J-10. The combination of canard configuration, precise computer controls, and thrust vectoring might indeed allow the J-10 to achieve rather slow landing speeds, a critical factor in carrier operations safety. However, a carrier capable J-10 would require extensive airframe and undercarriage strengthening and modification. In addition this fighter would have to prove significant cost and safety advantages over the carrier-proven twin-engine Russian Sukhoi Su-33, which so far appears to be favored by the PLA for the first Chinese aircraft carrier.




Carrier bound?: Russian sources believe CAC’s interest in a thrust-vectored version of the AL-31FN is for a new aircraft carrier version of the J-10. The former Russian-Ukrainian carrier Varyag continues to undergo refurbishment in Dalian harbor for an undisclosed military purpose: Credit: RD Fisher, Chinese Internet

There is also the possibility that in the next decade that the J-10 may become eclipsed by a new 5th generation (4th generation in China) combat aircraft. J-10 program director Liu Gaozhou recently stated that, "…we are researching and developing a fourth generation to meet the requirements of defending the motherland."[8]

A Chinese source disclosed in early 2005 that CAC was considering a program to build a "F-35" class fighter. This would likely mean that CAC is considering stealthy, AESA-radar equipped, internal weapon carrying high performance combat aircraft. It is logical that CAC would consider such a "lightweight" fighter project, inasmuch as Shenyang seems to be building "heavy" fighters. Nevertheless, brochures from the 601 Design Institute, usually associated with CAC, appear to indicate they are considering a "heavy" twin-engine 5th generation design that may be in competition with Shenyang’s longstanding 5th generation fighter program. However, Shenyang’s revelation of an advanced forward-swept wing but single-engine 5th generation fighter concept at the recent 2006 Zhuhai Airshow, may mean it also is aiming for an “affordable” next-generation design.




5th generation concepts?: The yellow image from a 601 Institute brochure may indicate CAC’s interest in developing a heavy twin-engine 5th generation fighter. The Shenyang concept was revealed in November 2006. Source: Chinese Internet

Conclusion

All indications are that China has successfully completed the development and commenced deployment of a competitive 4th generation combat aircraft, that when modified with better engines and AESA radar, perhaps in the near-term, will provide the PLAAF and its clients with a multi-role combat aircraft competitive with advanced versions of the F-16C/D Block 50+ and the Boeing F/A-18E/F. Even with advanced features, the J-10 will be sure to beat the U.S. fighters in terms of price, which offers the chance of real success in the market. There are indications it could sell for between $25 and $40 million, much better than the $60 million Chile recently paid for F-16s.

Furthermore, as Liu Gaozhou and other Chinese press reports have elaborated, the J-10 and J-11 “indigenization” programs have allowed China to give a relatively young cadre of aircraft, engine, component and weapons engineers their first taste of success. Having mastered the initial version of the J-10 and its many subsystems, it should not take long for upgraded models to follow, and this broad experience can be expected to accelerate progress on 5th generation combat aircraft programs.

This is not good news for any of China’s neighbors: not for Japan, or Korea, or for Taiwan, which was just had its request for a small number of new F-16 Block 50s rebuffed by Washington. Nor is it good news for India, once the J-10 lands in Pakistan. Middle Eastern and Latin American countries may prove interested as well. This news will disappoint Russians who had looked to a steady stream of Chinese purchases to fund their own advanced aircraft development. Finally, this not good news for the United States, which will now require far more than the U.S. Air Force’s currently planned 182 Lockheed-Martin F-22, the only 5th generation fighter available to the U.S. which offers decisive superiority over the J-10 and J-11. Nor can the U.S. cannot rest on its laurels. China should not be expected to take another 20 years to unveil its 5th generation fighter designs.

 

[Arsalan]

come on friend, these are very very old articles and all these points have already been discussed to death. most of the members will agree with this!
let us move forward now. it will be much better for all of us if you can come up with some latest informationabout the FC20 and not the one that is already known to all and have been discussed!

i hope you will understand!
thanks dear!

regards!

 

[SBD-3]

come on friend, these are very very old articles and all these points have already been discussed to death. most of the members will agree with this!
let us move forward now. it will be much better for all of us if you can come up with some latest informationabout the FC20 and not the one that is already known to all and have been discussed!

i hope you will understand!
thanks dear!

regards!

ok I am trying to get as much info as possible

 

[Arsalan]

ok I am trying to get as much info as possible

that is what will really be appreciated by anyone and everyone here!
just keep up with the good work and try to avoide repeatition of years old news that have been discussed in detail!

i hope you understand this and its benifits for all of us!

regards!

 

[a1b2c145]

J10 refueling

 

[SBD-3]

J10 refueling

this is JF-17 snaps i think they could be posted on relevant thread

 

[pakpower]

Hello to all

I hope all you guys are doing fine and well. I keep get confused by people remards about JF-17 that it's a low tech jet it can't compete against the likes of SU-30MKI, Rafale, MK2, Mig 29 etc... and the list goes on and on.

So now my question is this from all you guys that why than PAF insisting to procure lot's of these jets i heard about 250-350 if the JF-17 is not that capable?

If this the case then it's total no must be reduce to let's say about 100 and procure FC-20's in big no's likes of 200, and a squardon of two Rafale if our chiefs of the country allow this country to build and didn't loot this country much let some money go into the treasure box of this country and not in their pockets and personal bank accounts.

 

[TaimiKhan]

Hello to all

I hope all you guys are doing fine and well. I keep get confused by people remards about JF-17 that it's a low tech jet it can't compete against the likes of SU-30MKI, Rafale, MK2, Mig 29 etc... and the list goes on and on.

So now my question is this from all you guys that why than PAF insisting to procure lot's of these jets i heard about 250-350 if the JF-17 is not that capable?

If this the case then it's total no must be reduce to let's say about 100 and procure FC-20's in big no's likes of 200, and a squardon of two Rafale if our chiefs of the country allow this country to build and didn't loot this country much let some money go into the treasure box of this country and not in their pockets and personal bank accounts.

Dear, only Indians over here say that JF-17 is not a capable aircraft, we Pakistani's are in full agreement that its a capable aircraft for its size and will keep on getting much much better in future.
Plus, comparing it with a twin engined aircraft is a total mis-match.
u can't fight a Light Weight Competitor with a Heavy Weight Contender. J-10 may become a contender to Su-30 series but not JF-17 for the time being.

PAF is a very sound and sensible organization, they know what they are doing, and they are going with a lo-hi combination. One light weight contender for Indian LCA kind of aircraft, and one heavy weight contender J-10 kind for the MMRCA & Su-30 type aircraft.

PAF strength will never be stagnant at 350 to 450 combat aircraft, as time passes it will increase also. 300 JF17s, plus 100s of J-10s and some other latest types too.