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Can Indian T-90, T-72 MBTs be considered obsolete?

Russian armor has utterly failed in Ukraine, including its most advanced T-90 models which India is buying in large numbers.

Q: Considering that the Indian armor deployed against Pakistan mostly if not entirely comprises of the Russian export versions of T-72 and T-90 MBTs in various iterations, what does it mean for the Indian Army's capabilities to wage a short lightening war against a well armed, trained and entrenched adversary like Pakistan?

Q: What should Pakistan be doing in light of learnings drawn from Nagorno Karabakh and Ukraine conflicts, especially with regards to the use cases of armored formations in saturated threat environment?

Q: The Russian made armor has been mercilessly massacred by cheap anti tank solutions in Nagorno Karabakh, Syria and Ukraine, while some cases of German tanks in Turkish service being destroyed have also been noted. What sort of learnings can we draw from these trends?
Dear! T90 and T72 aren't obslete, still they are capable and worthy tanks. T90 especially is still a potent platform for modern armies. Only 36 T90s are visually confirmed destroyed in Ukraine according to Oryx. Out of them only 8 are newest T90M MBTs while the other 28 are older A versions. The main problem faced by Russians was that of lack of coordination and communication we saw Russian convoys moving ahead of their main force and being easily destroyed by AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine). Tanks without infantry support capturing dozens of villages and towns but not holding on as proper infantry was unavailable. Russian lack of proper recon assets and intel also played a large part in Russian armour especially older versions of T72s being destroyed in large numbers. Also to be noted is the Javelin ATGM, which is the most modern or one of most modern ATGMs in the world. Majority of Russian tanks were easy target for AFU but the low number of destroyed T90s tells us that still the newer tanks fell good in this situation compared to older ones some even accepted obsletes. The most important factor during a war air superiority was completely ignored by Russians. Reportedly it only used 300 jets during initial invasion and put so much beleif in land forces that faliure was inevitable. Russia should have deployed more planes and especially assembled a force of drones before invading. Russian tanks were out of fuel many times making it easy for Ukrainians to blow them up easily with artillery or capture them. US sharing intel with AFU easily alerted Ukrainians of nearly all big Russian initiatives easily deploying its forces in proper places to surprise the Russians with sudden barrage of artillery and ATGM fire.

As of India it has seen the results of Russo-Ukrainian War and has learnt lessons. It has seen how drones and ATGMs make difference. PAKISTAN has invested for good in drones and now out matches India in drones' field, if India wants to win it needs to take drones seriously. Coming to ATGMs although Pakistan has more than 25000+ anti tank missiles but these are not even near match of Javelins, majority of Pakistani anti tank are Baktar Shikan which is not comparable slightly to Javelin. Air Superiority also matters India will most probably deploy most of its air force against Pakistan unlike Russians who didn't even deploy half of their fleet.
Also to be noted is this that India's main tank isn't T72 but T90 which has fared ok in Ukraine. India is still a worthy opponent, it would be a mistake to underestimate them.
 
@SQ8 you said that Russia's tank armor technology is 50 years ahead of China. And Chinese tank technology is not even close to Russia?

OK. You want to tell us that Pakistan's VT-4 is 50 years behind India's T-90.

I don't have any questions.




Exactly. Ignore him. He is a known arrogant Anti China tard A@@hole here.
 
West has not been tested in a battle where the enemy has the same access to firepower as Ukraine. If you use drones against armour then the western tanks would be butchered too. Iraq and Lebanon showed that tanks are particularly vulnerable.
The merkava is a very well designed and protected tank bug against a determined and well equipped enemy the tanks were butchered. Numerous Abrams have been taken out in Iraq.
Yeah but, end of day if you hit ammo on an Abrams or Chally 2 then the ammo will be safely dispensed via blowout panels. Russian tanks will suffer a catastrophic loss, not to mention western tanks usually have better armor and reverse speed. T72 is also an older design than the abrams, and i believe T90 is a development of T72
 
But I have reservations about this observation: "Russian armor has not failed in Ukraine."
If a piece of equipment or a soldier isnt being employed in the conditions for which he is trained, made, equipped etc, then we shouldnt be citing it as its / his failure. Planners need to take the blame then.

US-led forces fought and defeated the Wehrmacht much like any other opposing force around the world where they could execute armored thrusts and/or apply combined arms doctrine. Where the political intent aligned with good planning if not outright technological supremacy.
We just take airpower out of that equation (Luftwaffe was almost nonexistent then), then i am sure Wehrmacht wouldnt have been over whelmed that easily, maybe at all.

It is important to look at developments in proper context. Israeli Armor suffered losses in its war with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. This experience motivated Israel to develop Trophy APS.
Interestingly, you wont see any israeli infantry maybe in the 50 yd radius of a Merkava in active combat or active threat environment. I hope you get the point.
 
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@SQ8 you said that Russia's tank armor technology is 50 years ahead of China. And Chinese tank technology is not even close to Russia?

OK. You want to tell us that Pakistan's VT-4 is 50 years behind India's T-90.

I don't have any questions.



English comprehension isn’t a common skill so I can understand your frustration.

When I said 50 year lead which not the same as ahead in this context - it means that the Russians have had 50 years ahead to develop their tank industry versus China. Which means their knowledge based is deeper than China for now in terms of design concepts.
In the same paragraph I also put that China is very close to catching up but not yet.

As for the example you gave, since you didn’t read the thread in general you missed out where the shortcomings of the T-90S especially because it was not equal to the top end model is provided hence the VT-4 is superior.

Once again, your lack of English comprehension and not my post is at fault here.

Exactly. Ignore him. He is a known arrogant Anti China tard A@@hole here.
At least I am not of harami corruption khor DNa
 
Very well written.
In summary what you have said is the the battle field is ever evolving. The great tank vs tank battles of yesteryear don't actually happen today.

Appreciated, bro. :tup:

If you look at the article regarding iraqi army adapting to ISIL drones. It's was the yanks that provided it withe the equipment. The article says no American lives were lost due to drones. Well ISIL was always an American asset.

ISIL obtained, studied, modified, and used Chinese commercial drones to strike at opposing forces in combat situations. These drones can be easily obtained from the markets of any country. I have seen many in Pakistani shops.

Terrorist groups have weaponized commercial drones for high-profile attacks around the world from Venezuela to Yemen, but ISIL’s drone program stood out for its large scale and impact on major combat operations. In its heyday in 2017, ISIL launched 60 to 100 drone attacks per month across Syria and northern Iraq. The group flew a combination of modified commercial drones, most often Chinese-made DJI Phantom quadcopters, and bespoke drones manufactured in its own workshops. These improvised weapons were grimly effective, destroying at least 56 Iraqi military vehicles and killing or wounding more than 100 Iraqi soldiers.

American forces serving in Iraq also engaged ISIL drones hundreds of times from 2016 to 2018, but compared to Iraqi security forces, they suffered much less: As of the publication of this article, no U.S. troops have been killed by ISIL drones directly. Overall, U.S. forces “had an overwhelming success rate in either repelling, shooting down, or chasing away the majority of [ISIL drones] in Iraq and Syria [from 2016 to 2018] before they could harm our personnel or do any damage to equipment or infrastructure,” according to a Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson. A key reason for this success is that, years before American forces encountered enemy small drones on the battlefield, the U.S. Army’s emerging threat experts in the Asymmetric Warfare Group had identified drones as a viable threat and deployed counter-drone training, technology, and tactics to Army units in combat. The Army’s largely successful efforts to defeat ISIL’s improvised attack drones are an important case study in how to use rapid observation, experimentation, and collaboration to change the Army in order to defeat enemies who will continue to exploit open technological innovation and devise innovative asymmetric weapons and tactics.



See the blue highlights? I pointed out this reality in my previous response:

"Americans have developed and demonstrated different types of weapon systems to detect and shoot down different types of UAVs in various live-fire trials at home, and also had the opportunity to do so in Iraq."

American armed forces were preparing to fight and counter UAVs in live-fire trails and drills in their homeland YEARS BEFORE encountering these technologies in Iraq and Syria. This is the hallmark of a professional army that thinks ahead of the time.

Long before ISIL’s drones inflicted their first casualties in late 2016, American forces had learned to search the skies for the threat. In fact, by the end of 2015, almost all American soldiers deploying to Iraq had been trained on drone recognition, most had received some basic training on drone defeat, and some had been armed with commercially available counter-drone systems. This training significantly reduced the likelihood that American soldiers would be shocked the first time they saw a small drone in action. Just as importantly, it minimized the risk they would be caught unaware while ISIL drones spied on them. The Army’s efforts had robbed ISIL’s drones of the element of surprise, one of the key advantages of any new weapons system. In hundreds of engagements since 2015, the Army’s rapidly developed counter-drone capabilities have proven successful in protecting U.S. troops.


American training regime paid off in the war against ISIL.

You will see American Media complaining about various issues and perceived threats [all the time] but American military is doing its homework without making noise and projections. This might surprise you but American armed forces are prepared to fight a nuclear war and even a biological war. American armed forces also have a contingency plan and arrangements for HOW to REBUILD their country in case American homeland is struck.

Americans literally come up with theories of warfare and define standards for warfare from time-to-time.

But WE are distracted by conspiracy theories and state-sponsored propaganda efforts of some countries that seem to have a negative view of USA. ISIL being an American asset is unsubstantiated theory advanced by some in Iran, Russia and Pakistan. Does it surprise you that EACH is under-performing in the present? Pakistan is on the verge of bankruptcy in fact.

Islam teach Muslims to seek knowledge and strive for truthfulness but many are being deceived by conspiracy theories and state-sponsored propaganda efforts of some countries in current times which is most unfortunate. I am an advocate of Facts & Figures in person for good reason.

Rumors about American support to ISIL stem from Timber Sycamore but this covert program was aimed to support authentic Syrian Rebels who were attempting to overthrow Assad regime. Trump administration scrapped this covert program in 2017 because weapons provided to authentic Syrian rebels were ending up in the hands of ISIL as well. US decided against toppling Syrian regime due to ISIL factor. Even though Assad regime is oppressive, it is infinitely better than ISIL governing Syria.

US played a pivotal role in defeating ISIL across Iraq and Syria in the (2014 - 2020) period - no country had the capacity to strike at ISIL positions across the breath of Iraqi and Syrian landscape from various directions but USA due to its superior naval capability and footprint. There is ample evidence of American strikes reducing ISIL strongholds to rubble in both countries. This COIN operation is officially identified as Operation Inherent Resolve.

In The Conflict with ISIS: Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, June 2014–January 2020, Mason W. Watson chronicles how a U.S.-led coalition fought against the Islamic State (ISIS)—a terrorist organization that, at its height, controlled a span of territory in Iraq and Syria the size of Kentucky. A campaign of targeted airstrikes, beginning in August 2014, slowed ISIS’s offensive momentum and gave U.S. military advisers a chance to help rebuild the shattered Iraqi Security Forces. With coalition assistance, the Iraqis then liberated their country in a series of major operations that culminated in the battle for Mosul (2016–2017), one of the largest urban battles in recent history. Watson’s narrative further describes how U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces enabled local partners, including the Syrian Democratic Forces, to retake ISIS-held areas of eastern Syria. By January 2020, Iraqi and Syrian forces—supported by U.S. airpower, armed with U.S. equipment, and trained and assisted by U.S. military advisers—had defeated ISIS on the battlefield and ended its pretentions to statehood.


More on this theme:


Operation Inherent Resolve is a COIN masterstroke and should be STUDIED up close. Pakistan Army should pay close attention to this American COIN effort and make notes.

ISIL is largely dismantled as an organization but some of its elements continue to exist in Syria. This is why American troops are stationed in Syria. ISIL remnants should NOT be allowed to regroup and recover in the larger interest of mankind. But Middle East is rife with conflict due to localized tensions between multiple countries and entities in the region.

As for the Lebanon war and the Merkava. Its an excellent tank. My point was that there were many many losses and Israel claims only 5. U just have to check pictures. Russian anti tank missiles were effective. Certainly, that has given rise to systems protecting tanks.
The use of armour has certainly evolved significantly and I think in the future it may well be reduced

Israeli Merkava is GOOD but USA, UK, and Germany have produced better tanks in comparison.

Israel acknowledge that Hezbollah was able to engage dozens of Israeli tanks and damage them. Russia continues to develop and export increasingly potent ATGMs to interested customers and these weapons cannot be taken for granted.

Perhaps, but AbramsX shows that tanks can be prepared to fight battles of the future.

A country with strong economy and industrial base can keep up with times.
 
T-90MS vs VT-4


- T-90MS has better armor package.
- Both are comparable in terms of firepower.
- Both are comparable in terms of electronics.
- VT-4 has better mobility.

T-90MS vs T-90M Proryv 3


- T-90M Proryv 3 has better armor package.
- T-90MS has better mobility.

In terms of protection:

T-90M Proryv 3 > T-90MS > VT-4

In terms of mobility:

VT-4 > T-90MS > T-90M Proryv 3

These MBT are comparable otherwise.

---

Type 99 is a departure from VT-4 in many aspects.

Type 99 has better turret design, technology, and mobility than VT-4 at a closer look:



But Type 99 125 mm main gun armor penetration capability is on the level of T-90A due to similar technology:


---

T-14 is a departure from T-90 series in many aspects.

T-14 turret design is different from that of any T-90 variant:


This turret is not heavily armored but Afghanit APS is used to compensate for said weakness:

chto_predstavlyaet_iz_sebya_tank_armata_2.jpg


T-90M Proryv 3 is equipped with Relikt ERA tiles:

t-90ms_81_20110921_2082084811.jpg


T-14 is equipped with Malachit ERA tiles:


t-14-armata-tank-armor-1024x499.jpg


For perspective:

Malachit = Russian 4th generation ERA
Relikt = Russian 3rd generation ERA
Kontakt-5 = Russian 2nd generation ERA

Russians have REVISITED ammo compartmentalization, ammo shielding, and their approach to ammo loading in T-14 in comparison to any T-90 variant to improve crew survivability:

f2e61484b3e8.jpg


main-qimg-2a980bc23d74ed9d708dfebf4dc4a55b



T-14 is equipped with a more powerful main gun than any T-90 variant:

t-14-armata-tank-cannon.jpg


Russians are also developing a new generation of ammo for T-14 to increase its armor penetration capacity yet further.

T-14 is equipped with better electronics than in any T-90 variant:

chto_predstavlyaet_iz_sebya_tank_armata_1.jpg


giphy.gif


T-14 is equipped with a more powerful engine than in any T-90 variant:


T-14 power-to-weight ratio at 30+ is remarkable by extension.

---

T-14 seems to offer superior protection to crew, firepower*, and mobility in comparison to any Type 99 variant on the whole.

*In addition to being equipped with a more powerful main gun, its rate of fire at 10 rounds per minute is superior to that of any Type 99 and T-90 variant as well.

It would be interesting to see how T-14 will fare against Type 99 variants in combat situations, nevertheless.

@renhai

---

@iLION12345_1 - you may add to my observations to plug potential gaps in my assessment.
As a tanker myself, I don't usually do "Tank vs Tank" comparison, because it is actually quite pointless. I personally got schooled by a bunch of National Guard Desert Storm vet using M-60 Patton on a maneuver on my squadron of M1. Abrams.

There is a saying in Armour School

"You learn how not get into trouble, not how to get out of it"

Because when you are in the shit, it's already too late, a good commander can spot ambush before it materialises. If something is too good to be true, then most likely it is. And if you cannot do that, then it doesn't really matter if you are using a state-of-the-art tank, or a piece of junk, your survivability maybe extended for 1 or 2 more shot but then more likely than not, you are going to get ding.

As for whether or not T-72 or T-90 is obsolete. I wouldn't make a judgement from Russian invasion of Ukraine alone. Because this is not a true reflection on how they use tanks. What the Russian being let down is how they use their asset. not what or how good or bad their asset was. They have ISTAR, SIGINT, CAP and everything under their disposal, and yet they still get into ambush after ambush, that's how they use those asset is failing them, not the asset itself, it's like they are playing with a giant lotto to see who are going to get kill next, because superior equipment aside, if you are put into those situation frequently, there are going to be one bullet/round with your name on it.

I have made a thread on explaining how Russia Tank got ambush and why Ukrainian are successful in these ambushes here. Cannot say more than I could on that thread.

 
West has not been tested in a battle where the enemy has the same access to firepower as Ukraine. If you use drones against armour then the western tanks would be butchered too. Iraq and Lebanon showed that tanks are particularly vulnerable.
The merkava is a very well designed and protected tank bug against a determined and well equipped enemy the tanks were butchered. Numerous Abrams have been taken out in Iraq.
Butchered? 5 destroyed tanks isn't butchered. 2 of those 5 were destroyed by mines no tank would survive and only 3 of those tanks were actually Merkava Mk4.

Cope hard.
 
Butchered? 5 destroyed tanks isn't butchered. 2 of those 5 were destroyed by mines no tank would survive and only 3 of those tanks were actually Merkava Mk4.

Cope hard.
Yes only 5
Loooool. Is there anything at all you people won't lie about
 
Me: China has very advanced industry and is making the right decision by not wasting money on tanks it does not need.

You: Wow you are so anti-china

Brother I am literally praising China not insulting it, i am sorry if I cannot explain that to you in a better way.
There was some discussion about the Alkhalid armor plates, and someone, maybe you, posted a few pictures from the manufacturing phase. Could you point me towards it please.

Thanks.
 
Sir,

Your capacity to put things into perspective is impressive and helpful. You are the "Ustaad" here, after all.

I completely agree with this observation: "Deployment pattern, terrain limitations, defender capabilities...all have their distinct effects." Brief but on the mark. I also tend to look at these factors in my evaluation of any conflict.

But I have reservations about this observation: "Russian armor has not failed in Ukraine."

In view of defeat in the Battle of Kyiv in 2022, Russian forces shifted to siege warfare involving heavy and indiscriminate bombardment to secure a Ukrainian city in other locations by using artillery pieces to this effect but this is a brutal and time-consuming approach to Urban Warfare. The Battle of Mariupol in 2022 is a notable Case Study in this respect.

I have yet to see a Case Study of Russian Armor (and also Ukranian Armor) providing breakthrough in a conventional battle of the ongoing Russia - Ukraine War. Both sides are OVER-RELYING on artillery pieces to duke it out in any sector and expending too much ammo in the process, to pave way for gains on the ground which are slow to materialize due to this approach.

Is the Main Battle Tank (MBT) not supposed to punch through enemy lines and pave way for the troops to secure the location of interest in sector by sector fashion? How can troops secure the location of interest in sector by sector fashion when the Armored Vehicles [in use] are NOT up to the challenge and can be easily knocked out?

For perspective:


The Persian Gulf War that was fought in 1991 was the FIRST to EXPOSE vulnerabilities of the Russian MBT design standard in comparison to the M1 Abrams design standard in terms of SURVIVABILITY in conventional battlespace.

1. Lack of baseline armor package:

Since Russia aims to limit the gross weight of the MBT around 50 tons mark, not much baseline armor can be applied to it.

2. Risky ammo storage due to requirement of the Russian auto-loader design:



Russian workaround is to apply ERA tiles and Cope Cage(s) on the MBT. These measures create the impression of a well-protected MBT on paper but have FAILED to ensure SURVIVABILITY of Russian MBTs in Ukraine.

Now, I shall clarify that I do NOT have unrealistic expectations from Armored Vehicles in warfare but I insist that the MBT should be SURVIVABLE in the face of enemy responses to it from the ground in order for it to move through heavily guarded spaces and HELP secure the location of interest in sector by sector fashion. In line with this expectation, I have noticed that American Armor can deliver in Urban Warfare situations and even in relatively open environments.

Below is a glimpse:


This is the M1A1M variant (exported to Iraq) - it has Chobbam Armor [without DU mesh found in American M1 variants]. Even this variant could endure deadly hits and allowed its crew to take out as many targets as possible in a battle with ISIS.

American Armor could produce desired results in Iraqi cities such as An-Nasiriyah in 2003, Najaf in 2003, Baghdad in 2003, Fallujah in 2004, and Sadr City in 2008. These experiences motivated improvements in American M1 variants.

Difference in SURVIVABILITY of Russian Armor and American Armor is apparent when the Battle of Grozny in 1995 and the Battle of Fallujah in 2004 are compared for perspective.

Russian Armor in the Battle of Grozny in 1995:

Although lighter than Western designs, most analysts gave high marks to the assortment of infantry fighting vehicles possessed by the Russians. The T-80 and T-72 tanks were assessed to be on par with their Western counterparts; with their advanced armor, they were expected to take a great deal of punishment. But, the battle for Grozny exposed some of the flaws of Russian armor. The tanks could not depress or elevate their main guns adequately to engage targets in basements or high in the buildings or rooftops. The armor protection on the top and rear was relatively thin, and the RPG-7s and antitank mines stood a good chance of penetrating these areas. The long tubes of the 125mm cannon had a very narrow traverse radius in the narrow streets that limited firing generally to the frontal arc. Clearly, the Russian tanks were designed to fight in the open country and not in the confines of a large city. To their credit, many tanks took multiple hits by RPG fire before their destruction. However, when the lead and trail vehicles in the column were disabled, even the best tank and crew found they were stationary targets with little ability to return fire. Much the same can be said for the infantry fighting vehicles, but their armor could not take the same amount of punishment.

With the failure to take Grozny quickly, the Russians returned to their traditional means of taking an urban area. Unconcerned with collateral damage or civilian casualties, they used massed artillery and aerial strikes systematically and literally to pulverize the city into rubble. This application of firepower eventually overcame the difficulties in communications, intelligence, unit coordination, and a host of other problems the Russian units faced.

The lessons of Grozny are sobering for anyone who contemplates using armor in an urban environment. Yet it was not a fair test of the tanks’ ability to fight in the city streets. Had the Russians followed the basic tenets of using combined arms with adequate communications and control, the results could have been far different. This fight emphasized the need to train completely the crews and troops in their weapons, tactics, and doctrine to employ them effectively. The battle for Grozny was actually a historical aberration in the use of armor in the urban fight. Far different results were possible had the Russians employed and supported their armor correctly.



Emphasis mine: I am not sure HOW most analysts assessed T-72 and T-80 to be on par with American M1 variants when the Russian MBT design standard has vulnerabilities that I pointed out above. I would say that Russian tactics to secure Grozny were initially detached from survivability expectations of the the Russian MBT design standard.

T-80 is definitely superior to T-72 but:

490.png


Turret blown off like in the case of T-72.

Complete list of Russian Armor losses in the First Chechen War is provided in following link:


American Armor in the Battle of Fallujah in 2004:

If the insurgents were hoping for a replay of the Russian debacle in Grozny in 1994, they were disappointed. The strategy of “defenseless defense” used so effectively there did not work in Fallujah. The American and Iraqi forces were successful in countering this tactic by not rushing to the center of the city to be surrounded and eliminated piecemeal. Instead, they cleared and secured each building and the routes of ingress before moving on to the next. Additionally, some American and Iraqi forces remained behind the advance to keep the insurgents from reoccupying previously cleared areas. Establishing clear zones of operation and excellent communications facilitated this.

A key element in the success of the coalition in Fallujah was the application of American armor, namely the M1A2 Abrams tank. The Abrams was able to take enormous punishment and continue operating. In many instances, these tanks received multiple hits from RPG-7s, which failed to penetrate the heavy armor; even large improvised explosives failed to knock tanks out. Although the actual number is not currently released to the public, contemporary media reports show only two Abrams tanks were destroyed during this bitter battle. The tactics used by the Americans offset the inherent design weaknesses of tanks in the cities. Operating in pairs, tanks covered each other while others remained a short distance behind lending support. The same can be said about the Bradley vehicles, although their armor was far less capable. The Marines had dispersed their tanks to provide direct support to the riflemen, and this time-honored tactic worked to destroy systematically tough enemy positions. Conversely, the Army battalions assigned to this operation used a different approach. Instead, they led their assault with the heavy armor, which blasted through the city and unhinged the enemy defenses. This allowed for the rapid advance of the infantry and the clearing of their zone and ensured a swift victory.

The battle for Fallujah was a stunning victory with a historically low casualty rate for an urban fight of this size. It reaffirmed the capabilities of heavy armor in cities.



Emphasis mine: American Armor could produce desired results in the Battle of Fallujah irrespective of the tactics applied - a testament to its SURVIVABILITY in Urban Warfare situations in comparison to Russian Armor. I pointed out this fact in following post:


Americans are not taking their chances either. The baseline armor protection levels of the American M1 variants continue to increase in time:


Meaningful estimates of the American M1 variants up to the M1A2 SEP are available, but evolution of the M1 continues in view of new developments, and the current M1A2 SEPv3 might be the most protected MBT in existence due to a REVISIT to its baseline armor package when coupled with additional measures to make it survivable such as with TUSK kit and Trophy APS.

Like this:

message-editor%2F1641839412910-m1a2sep3.jpg


I wholeheartedly accept that the MBT should be utilized sensibly in combat situations irrespective of how good it is. The crew should NOT become complacent and try to play rambo in combat situations.

But I insist that the M1A2 SEPv2 and further updates are FAR more SURVIVABLE than any type of Russian Armor in existence on purely technical grounds. These M1 variants provide the capacity to punch through enemy lines and recover from a potential mistake in the thick of combat which is an important consideration in itself. Things can go wrong in the battlefield due to a lapse in judgement or due to a move that might prove costly so it can be helpful to recover from bad situations ASAP. This happened to American forces in An-Nasiriyah and Karbala when they were marching towards Baghdad in 2003.

This is my take and the bottom line for now.

I said it before and will repeat it, Russian tank designs are inferior to any Western tank out there. Another issue that plagued the Russian tank industry is that when the material wasn't available, they substituted it with cheap fillers.

Coming to VT-4, I wasn't happy then and now, as this tank is not up to the mark in modern combat scenarios, and its' survivability is even less than what the Indians will field. Pakistan should have gone for heavier tanks with more frontal and side armor; that can take hits before ERA's are applied and focused on top-down protection.

Again, just like Russian tanks, VT-4 is a damn lemon that rips off the Russian tank legacy.
 
I said it before and will repeat it, Russian tank designs are inferior to any Western tank out there. Another issue that plagued the Russian tank industry is that when the material wasn't available, they substituted it with cheap fillers.

Coming to VT-4, I wasn't happy then and now, as this tank is not up to the mark in modern combat scenarios, and its' survivability is even less than what the Indians will field. Pakistan should have gone for heavier tanks with more frontal and side armor; that can take hits before ERA's are applied and focused on top-down protection.

Again, just like Russian tanks, VT-4 is a damn lemon that rips off the Russian tank legacy.
Personally I think tanks are sitting ducks and more and more drones should be deployed. Light fast moving cavalry with a powerful air support is much better than large slow moving tanks
 
Sir,

Your capacity to put things into perspective is impressive and helpful. You are the "Ustaad" here, after all.

I completely agree with this observation: "Deployment pattern, terrain limitations, defender capabilities...all have their distinct effects." Brief but on the mark. I also tend to look at these factors in my evaluation of any conflict.

But I have reservations about this observation: "Russian armor has not failed in Ukraine."

In view of defeat in the Battle of Kyiv in 2022, Russian forces shifted to siege warfare involving heavy and indiscriminate bombardment to secure a Ukrainian city in other locations by using artillery pieces to this effect but this is a brutal and time-consuming approach to Urban Warfare. The Battle of Mariupol in 2022 is a notable Case Study in this respect.

I have yet to see a Case Study of Russian Armor (and also Ukranian Armor) providing breakthrough in a conventional battle of the ongoing Russia - Ukraine War. Both sides are OVER-RELYING on artillery pieces to duke it out in any sector and expending too much ammo in the process, to pave way for gains on the ground which are slow to materialize due to this approach.

Is the Main Battle Tank (MBT) not supposed to punch through enemy lines and pave way for the troops to secure the location of interest in sector by sector fashion? How can troops secure the location of interest in sector by sector fashion when the Armored Vehicles [in use] are NOT up to the challenge and can be easily knocked out?

For perspective:


The Persian Gulf War that was fought in 1991 was the FIRST to EXPOSE vulnerabilities of the Russian MBT design standard in comparison to the M1 Abrams design standard in terms of SURVIVABILITY in conventional battlespace.

1. Lack of baseline armor package:

Since Russia aims to limit the gross weight of the MBT around 50 tons mark, not much baseline armor can be applied to it.

2. Risky ammo storage due to requirement of the Russian auto-loader design:



Russian workaround is to apply ERA tiles and Cope Cage(s) on the MBT. These measures create the impression of a well-protected MBT on paper but have FAILED to ensure SURVIVABILITY of Russian MBTs in Ukraine.

Now, I shall clarify that I do NOT have unrealistic expectations from Armored Vehicles in warfare but I insist that the MBT should be SURVIVABLE in the face of enemy responses to it from the ground in order for it to move through heavily guarded spaces and HELP secure the location of interest in sector by sector fashion. In line with this expectation, I have noticed that American Armor can deliver in Urban Warfare situations and even in relatively open environments.

Below is a glimpse:


This is the M1A1M variant (exported to Iraq) - it has Chobbam Armor [without DU mesh found in American M1 variants]. Even this variant could endure deadly hits and allowed its crew to take out as many targets as possible in a battle with ISIS.

American Armor could produce desired results in Iraqi cities such as An-Nasiriyah in 2003, Najaf in 2003, Baghdad in 2003, Fallujah in 2004, and Sadr City in 2008. These experiences motivated improvements in American M1 variants.

Difference in SURVIVABILITY of Russian Armor and American Armor is apparent when the Battle of Grozny in 1995 and the Battle of Fallujah in 2004 are compared for perspective.

Russian Armor in the Battle of Grozny in 1995:

Although lighter than Western designs, most analysts gave high marks to the assortment of infantry fighting vehicles possessed by the Russians. The T-80 and T-72 tanks were assessed to be on par with their Western counterparts; with their advanced armor, they were expected to take a great deal of punishment. But, the battle for Grozny exposed some of the flaws of Russian armor. The tanks could not depress or elevate their main guns adequately to engage targets in basements or high in the buildings or rooftops. The armor protection on the top and rear was relatively thin, and the RPG-7s and antitank mines stood a good chance of penetrating these areas. The long tubes of the 125mm cannon had a very narrow traverse radius in the narrow streets that limited firing generally to the frontal arc. Clearly, the Russian tanks were designed to fight in the open country and not in the confines of a large city. To their credit, many tanks took multiple hits by RPG fire before their destruction. However, when the lead and trail vehicles in the column were disabled, even the best tank and crew found they were stationary targets with little ability to return fire. Much the same can be said for the infantry fighting vehicles, but their armor could not take the same amount of punishment.

With the failure to take Grozny quickly, the Russians returned to their traditional means of taking an urban area. Unconcerned with collateral damage or civilian casualties, they used massed artillery and aerial strikes systematically and literally to pulverize the city into rubble. This application of firepower eventually overcame the difficulties in communications, intelligence, unit coordination, and a host of other problems the Russian units faced.

The lessons of Grozny are sobering for anyone who contemplates using armor in an urban environment. Yet it was not a fair test of the tanks’ ability to fight in the city streets. Had the Russians followed the basic tenets of using combined arms with adequate communications and control, the results could have been far different. This fight emphasized the need to train completely the crews and troops in their weapons, tactics, and doctrine to employ them effectively. The battle for Grozny was actually a historical aberration in the use of armor in the urban fight. Far different results were possible had the Russians employed and supported their armor correctly.



Emphasis mine: I am not sure HOW most analysts assessed T-72 and T-80 to be on par with American M1 variants when the Russian MBT design standard has vulnerabilities that I pointed out above. I would say that Russian tactics to secure Grozny were initially detached from survivability expectations of the the Russian MBT design standard.

T-80 is definitely superior to T-72 but:

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Turret blown off like in the case of T-72.

Complete list of Russian Armor losses in the First Chechen War is provided in following link:


American Armor in the Battle of Fallujah in 2004:

If the insurgents were hoping for a replay of the Russian debacle in Grozny in 1994, they were disappointed. The strategy of “defenseless defense” used so effectively there did not work in Fallujah. The American and Iraqi forces were successful in countering this tactic by not rushing to the center of the city to be surrounded and eliminated piecemeal. Instead, they cleared and secured each building and the routes of ingress before moving on to the next. Additionally, some American and Iraqi forces remained behind the advance to keep the insurgents from reoccupying previously cleared areas. Establishing clear zones of operation and excellent communications facilitated this.

A key element in the success of the coalition in Fallujah was the application of American armor, namely the M1A2 Abrams tank. The Abrams was able to take enormous punishment and continue operating. In many instances, these tanks received multiple hits from RPG-7s, which failed to penetrate the heavy armor; even large improvised explosives failed to knock tanks out. Although the actual number is not currently released to the public, contemporary media reports show only two Abrams tanks were destroyed during this bitter battle. The tactics used by the Americans offset the inherent design weaknesses of tanks in the cities. Operating in pairs, tanks covered each other while others remained a short distance behind lending support. The same can be said about the Bradley vehicles, although their armor was far less capable. The Marines had dispersed their tanks to provide direct support to the riflemen, and this time-honored tactic worked to destroy systematically tough enemy positions. Conversely, the Army battalions assigned to this operation used a different approach. Instead, they led their assault with the heavy armor, which blasted through the city and unhinged the enemy defenses. This allowed for the rapid advance of the infantry and the clearing of their zone and ensured a swift victory.

The battle for Fallujah was a stunning victory with a historically low casualty rate for an urban fight of this size. It reaffirmed the capabilities of heavy armor in cities.



Emphasis mine: American Armor could produce desired results in the Battle of Fallujah irrespective of the tactics applied - a testament to its SURVIVABILITY in Urban Warfare situations in comparison to Russian Armor. I pointed out this fact in following post:


Americans are not taking their chances either. The baseline armor protection levels of the American M1 variants continue to increase in time:


Meaningful estimates of the American M1 variants up to the M1A2 SEP are available, but evolution of the M1 continues in view of new developments, and the current M1A2 SEPv3 might be the most protected MBT in existence due to a REVISIT to its baseline armor package when coupled with additional measures to make it survivable such as with TUSK kit and Trophy APS.

Like this:

message-editor%2F1641839412910-m1a2sep3.jpg


I wholeheartedly accept that the MBT should be utilized sensibly in combat situations irrespective of how good it is. The crew should NOT become complacent and try to play rambo in combat situations.

But I insist that the M1A2 SEPv2 and further updates are FAR more SURVIVABLE than any type of Russian Armor in existence on purely technical grounds. These M1 variants provide the capacity to punch through enemy lines and recover from a potential mistake in the thick of combat which is an important consideration in itself. Things can go wrong in the battlefield due to a lapse in judgement or due to a move that might prove costly so it can be helpful to recover from bad situations ASAP. This happened to American forces in An-Nasiriyah and Karbala when they were marching towards Baghdad in 2003.

This is my take and the bottom line for now.
Analysis is correct, but you miss the point that Abrams weighs 20 tons more than the tanks you are comparing it to. That will create severe complications in muddy terrain/crossing bridges the likes of which the russians have to face, and which is prevalent on the Indo pak border as well. Thats why Arjun, despite being better armoured than T90, was deployed in Thar where these complications dont exist. If you put 1500 hp engine and 20 tons of extra armour on russian tanks, you will get similar results as abrams.
 
Analysis is correct, but you miss the point that Abrams weighs 20 tons more than the tanks you are comparing it to. That will create severe complications in muddy terrain/crossing bridges the likes of which the russians have to face, and which is prevalent on the Indo pak border as well. Thats why Arjun, despite being better armoured than T90, was deployed in Thar where these complications dont exist. If you put 1500 hp engine and 20 tons of extra armour on russian tanks, you will get similar results as abrams.

Topography of many countries present these challenges to mechanized forces in rainy weather conditions which are relatively common in Europe, and every main battle tank can get stuck in muddy pits.


American military logistics is well-developed on the other hand.

Below is a clip of the M1 Abrams training regime for traversing muddy terrain:


M1A2 Abrams passing through a river in Greece:



If water depth is too much then there are solutions to this problem:



M1A2 Abrams drifting through icy terrain of Poland:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F1Pm7x3Ws8Q

M1A2 Abrams passing through pools of thin sand in Egyptian desert:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S5zh3GV6w5w

American military is a formidable war-machine and will apply combined arms approach in conventional warfare situations to produce desired battlefield effects in them:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTSAn8-HNUI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hLWgt6m_C2w

- - -

Pakistan Army creating a bridge to pass through a river:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2EfhjAuTZU

;)
 
Without APS tanks are a useless waste of money and lives in the modern battlefield.
yes and no....

The Chieftain made a great interview about his view of russian tanks and tanks on modern battlefield...

What we see is, many destroyed russian tanks without thermal nigth vision... outperfromed by western ATGM and Ukraine tanks with thermal view... a tank with thermal view a well trained crew and good connection to combinied arms like infantry Arty and Air support and protection from drones is a much harder target for ATGM crews ... thermal views on modern tanks can detect infantry and ATGM crews deep inside a forrest miles away ... portable thermal view for the infantry makes the screen that can detec atgm crews even bigger.

The tank is called dead since ww1.... now we are at the doors to 2023 and the tank is the primary weapon in Ukraine

According to Chieftain any "old" tank has a place on battlefield the moment he get thermal view ...

A ATGM Team hiding at the treeline of a forrest is invisible for normal view if you are on the other side of a field 1.5miles away from the treeline... the moment you have thermal view they shine like candels in the dark...and are easy pray for a Arty strike or direct fire.

Hard Kill systems like Trophy increase the protection, but are not as needed as many belive.

The key is see first, react fast, shoot first = survive

Not to forget that like the old Leo2 used by turkey, most of the russian tank units are terrible lead, have untrained unmotivated crew, badly supplyed
 

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