Can all 5 PN subs carry Babur SLCM?

[AUSTERLITZ]

You have S-400? answer me yes or no.....


Aey Kash k hum khoosh mien anay na payen....

Deal is done.We are getting it within 2 years.
Thought you didn't like bollywood 'corruption'.
Akash is a good option for us as an affordable mass produced short to medium range weapon and IAF in particular is happy with the missile for base defense.

 

[waz]

Hi @waz
That is what makes sense considering engineering realities. But then emotional folks here take it as bashing. On a side note, I wonder, folks who have never worked on UAVs, guidance, navigation and control, mission planners etc make gigantic claims based on newspaper, websites etc. Worse there are folks who stoop down to personal insults.

As far as I'm aware we haven't seen any such launch from a submarine, it has been an underwater platform and I remember your post explaining how you were impressed with the technical ability shown, so you have no axe to grind on this topic.
Leaving aside the engineering realities people have to understand 'end use' agreements and 'intellectual property', two issues which come up when you seek to alter a design given to you by another country, especially a Western one.
As I mentioned before the German refusal to integrate Pakistani standoff weapons was a key reason why the 214 deal was dropped. As you wrote yourself it the Germans actually did the work on the Israeli Dolphins before they were handed over.

The missiles can be launched using a previously secret hydraulic ejection system

http://www.spiegel.de/international...ar-weapons-on-german-submarines-a-836671.html

 

[ziaulislam]

someone, please tell this retarded TTA Indias newly founded daddy Israel is also using subsonic cruise missiles as sea-based deterrent

why waste time? nothing is going to get through him
even an amateur knows what benefits ballistic missiles and cruise missiles have..there was a big debate in 1950s on this

in my opinion short range(500km) its cruise missiles(unless the oppositions have vast network of very advance AWECS, india would need around 100 for covering pak boarders and from sea probably more) and long ranges its blastic missiles(with MIRV) that trumps

I don't believe they can i.e. the 90b models, hence partly the reason for the purchase of the large number of Chinese submarines. I also remember some talk between Pakistani and German defence officials regarding the usage of the 214 for cruise missile launch and the Germans refusing to allow such a mechanism. This was one of the reasons why the 214 deal was dropped.

you are probably right
but french are not Germans they might have quietly allowed it
my guess would be it will be possible after the new upgrades

regardless in the end babur might not even come to agosta and be only deployed on some of the Chinese subs
they are only 3 years away now

 

[waz]

you are probably right
but french are not Germans they might have quietly allowed it
my guess would be it will be possible after the new upgrades

regardless in the end babur might not even come to agosta and be only deployed on some of the Chinese subs
they are only 3 years away now

There's always a maybe, but at the time there wasn't a need for it, as the nuclear tests hadn't even been conducted.
Agreed regarding the Chinese subs, and do remember Pakistan's pursuit for its own nuclear submarine where we could see deployment of SLBM's.

 

[amardeep mishra]

regardless in the end babur might not even come to agosta and be only deployed on some of the Chinese subs
they are only 3 years away now

Hi @ziaulislam
In all liklihood, these sub-launched baburs will get deployed with the Chinese subs. Now it remains to be seen if Pakistan will use all of the 8 Chinese subs for strategic role or only a few will be deployed? This creates ambiguity in the sense that the adversary will have to consider entire Chinese sub fleet as being used for strategic role even if a few were actually deployed with nuclear baburs. Using a conventional sub with nuclear cruise missile is the best PN could have done with the limited financial and industrial resources at home. To be fairly honest, it is the underwater arm of PN that can challenge the IN to some extent and PN knows this fact too well-- it also shows in their procurement programs-- for instance procuring more subs instead of heavy aegis-type surface combatant ships or air assets. Their approach is entirely different from IN's approach. In my opinion, having more number of Chinese subs(8) ensures that at least a few are always on the deterrent patrol. But if lets say all the Chinese subs are deployed for strategic role, then Pakistan will be left with only 3 agosta-90 for conventional fighting. So, I believe, PN will have to take the call on number of Chinese subs that will go to strategic role and number of subs that will go to conventional role. A healthy balance has to be made, because PN will need higher number of conventional subs to fight off IN's conventional sub arm that is also growing- for instance 6 scorpenes plus 6 more planned. Besides PN will have to worry about the nuclear attack submarines that IN is planning to construct at vishakhapattnam yard.

unless the oppositions have vast network of very advance AWECS, india would need around 100 for covering pak boarders and from sea probably more) and long ranges its blastic missiles(with MIRV) that trumps

Actually you dont necessarily need AEWCS for detecting cruise missiles. Aerostat mounted look down radars can do that job fairly well. In fact India does have Aerostat mounted radars. In fact some of these Aerostat mounted radars have already been deployed on the border. The need of the hour is to network them together to form a grid that can sense any cruise missile flying into the Indian territory.

 

[volatile]

Augusta platforms have capability to launch cruise missile thru torpedo tubes .90s are all capable and there is a reason MLU is being done on these this capacity is termed as near or immediate terms . Chinese 8 subs if not all but at least 4 which are going to built locally will have , this is medium term solution ,long term solution is PN is working on some projects in house which will have surprize

 

[ziaulislam]

Hi @ziaulislam
Aerostat mounted look down radars can do that job fairly well. In fact India does have Aerostat mounted radars. In fact some of these Aerostat mounted radars have already been deployed on the border. The need of the hour is to network them together to form a grid that can sense any cruise missile flying into the Indian territory.

sir the neither have the mobility nor the power
but i like the optimisum

 

[khanmubashir]

AAA can shoot them down provided others detect them.How were the russians un le to stop tomahawks?What losses did russians take?Zero.Russian forces in syria were never attacked.They were prewarned and din't engage any american missiles.Only syrian army engaged them and even in that case at least 1/3rd of attacking missiles either malfunctioned or were shot down.As for Iraqis and serbs,you really comparing their AD network to ours?



Yes, we can.Nirbhay,Brahmos,Klub are all nuke capable.And brahmos also has land based strike variants.

Only syrian army engaged them and even in that case at least 1/3rd of attacking missiles either malfunctioned or were shot down. Source and not Syrian of Russian state media propaganda FYI the IAR defense of Syria is under Russian command so its there job to defend the allied Syrian

FYI Serbia was the most powerful member of Warsaw pact other then Soviet

I remember that an indian once made a similar claim and @gambit calmly explained how he was wrong and went in precise details with diagrams, publications, tactics discussion, and scientific literature as to why it is extremely hard, almost impossible, to 'just intercept' upcoming barrage of stealth cruise missiles. Being an ex-USAF instructor, Gambit even told as to why USAF itself considered the mantra of "Oh cruise missiles? They are slow and can be easily intercepted by advance radars/defence systems" to be utterly horsesh!t based on actual tests on the ground challenges and results. That's why U.S still relies on cruise missiles for precise strikes...even in extremely contested environments (Syrian airspace for example)

Regardless, that indian came back again and said the same exact thing and just said that Gambit was wrong and that he was a Pakistani hiding behind US flags

That's what happens when you are a resident of literally the largest open-air toilet/sh!thole of the world with extreme poverty and delusions of some unfounded grandeur. You become an internet joke for the rest of the world. Your post reminded me of this incident....bc no matter what happens, you'd still like to mentally masturbate that oh sea-launched nuclear stealth cruise missile? Oh its just for show!! Its easy to intercept!! No worries...

Near all upcoming USA and EU cruise and anti ship missiles r subsonic terrain hugging means they confident that its a reliable weapon

 

[amardeep mishra]

sir the neither have the mobility nor the power
but i like the optimisum

Hi @ziaulislam
Aerostat radars might lacks the power, but perhaps you dont take into account the fact that 4-5 aerostat radars can be had at the cost of one AEWCS system. Which means if effectively networked, these aerostat mounted radars do the job almost as efficiently as an AWECS(in the context of detecting low flying aerial vehicles). Also a point to note, is that modern aerostat radars for instance ELTA 2083--
http://www.iai.co.il/Sip_Storage//FILES/6/41636.pdf
can spot a fighter size target at over 250kms! So a cruise missile can be effectively detected in excess of more than 120kms! A detection of 120+kms against cruise missiles is a very healthy window to initiate counter fire via SAMs. Remember, the major challenge against low flying CMs is not interception but detection-- once detected, they can be taken care of by modern agile SAMs.

 

[RadioactiveFriends]

Hi Shaheen Missile!
Theoretically it is possible however practically not so much. I will try to explain my reason. Kindly note, my observations are based on engineering realities and should not be taken as bashing.
Firstly, we must understand that a CM is basically a kind of UAV. It needs GPS defined way points over sea as both TERCOM and DASMC cant be effectively used over sea. It is because of this reason that CM needs a dedicated flight planner of it's own-- something similar to APM mission planner that UAV hobbyists and researchers are familiar with.
View attachment 478035
This lets us define a set of way points that the GNC system of CM is supposed to track. The mission planner is usually the part of larger combat management system of submarines. So, in a practical scenario a human operator feeds in the target and way point information into the mission planner of CM which is then copied to the onboard computer. Once it is done, the CM is ejected out of torpedo tube and it rushes up to the surface, once on the surface, it's turbofan gets deployed and GNC system takes over and steers the CM over way points defined earlier using suitable guidance scheme.
Now, lets pause here for a moment and try to consider theoretical aspect-- i.e how can CM be launched without interfacing the mission planner of the missile with larger combat management system of submarine? For that we would have to program the way points into the CM OBC outside of the torpedo tube thus slowing down the launch rate considerably. But here is a problem, and that is, in order to define way points, the operator must precisely know the "starting way point" and the "end point". The end point is known because that happens to be the target, however the starting way point is difficult to obtain especially when you're programming your CM outside of combat management system.
Even if lets say we could individually program the CMs, slide it into the tube, the firing mechanism of submarine should be able to flush it out of the tube without damaging the submarine or the missile.
It is precisely because of these two mentioned reasons that I believe firing a CM without properly interfacing the mission planner of CM with combat management system of submarine is nearly impossible. Look at the case of India, even after having bought the ToT of scorpene, and having built 6 at home and 6 more planned, French have not shared the source code of their combat management system, so in all likelihood, French wouldnt have shared the source code of their agosta-90 with Pakistan especially when Pakistani order was way smaller than India's financially.

Your point is valid...! but...

 

[LeGenD]

AAA can shoot them down provided others detect them.How were the russians unable to stop tomahawks?What losses did russians take?Zero.Russian forces in syria were never attacked.They were prewarned and din't engage any american missiles.Only syrian army engaged them and even in that case at least 1/3rd of attacking missiles either malfunctioned or were shot down.As for Iraqis and serbs,you really comparing their AD network to ours?

Russians were only informed of impending strikes; they were not informed which targets will be struck.

Syrian and Russian defenses were on RED ALERT status that night, and both failed to stop a single cruise missile. Most of the videos you find in the web are of Syrian defenses shooting blindly in the air.

NATO forces armed their cruise missiles with least destructive warheads but over-shot each target. The strategy which NATO adopted to strike targets in Syria, is worth a discussion in itself.

Good explanation in this article about the event in question: https://www.news.com.au/technology/...a/news-story/d6a23877eb34b71bf8e3168b8f06e1d8

END GAME

Like the British submarine, neither the USS Donald Cook or USS Winston Churchill actually fired any Tomahawk cruise missiles.

It may never have been the point of their presence.

They were a distraction. A diversion.

Russia appears to have focused all its attention on these easily seen ‘threats’.

Instead, six Tomahawk cruise missiles suddenly appeared out of the Eastern Mediterranean from the hidden Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine USS John Warner.

All the 105 US, British and French missiles came from unexpected directions.

Bombers had refuelled at and above Cyprus before dashing in to unleash their guided weapons. Tomahawks were fired from warships in the Red Sea to the south and the Persian Gulf to the east.

It was all intended to overwhelm Syria’s defences.

It worked

Russia wasn't bluffing when it said that it would oppose NATO-led strikes in Syria but Russian technologies/defenses in Syria weren't up to the task.

Very easy for you to boast that a barrage of subsonic cruise missiles can be intercepted but you need an 'extensive sensor network' to track their movements first. Does India have such? Show me.

Iraq certainly have better A.D during first gulf war.

Fools assume that Iraqi AD capabilities were ancient in 1991 but reality was much different. Baghdad, in particular, was more heavily defended than any European city back then.

The Iraqi IADS was a composite system which integrated European and Soviet search and acquisition radars, and a range of Soviet and European SAM and AAA systems, all tied together with a French built Kari C3 (Command/Control/Communications) network. While smaller than the now defunct Soviet system in central Europe (Western TVD), the system had a respectable capability and comparable if not higher density of SAM and AAA systems, with considerable redundancy in communications links and hardened C3 facilities.

Organisationally the IADS was split into three principal elements, a national fixed site strategic system using fighters and SA-2 and SA-3 systems covering key airfields and strategic air defence sites, operated by the Iraqi air force. This system was supplemented by Republican Guard operated SAM and AAA systems covering key nuclear, biological and chemical warfare facilities. Finally, the Iraqi army had its own mobile radar, SAM and AAA systems tasked with protecting both fixed sites and units in the field.

Geographically the national IADS was split into several large zones, in each of which were located central local C3 facilities, one or more large hardened airbases and a network of communications links to fixed radar and SAM sites. Control of the whole network was centred in hardened facilities in the vicinity of Baghdad. While microwave links were used extensively, these were backed up by landlines.

The structure of the system reflected the Soviet Air Defence Force (PVO) and Army Air Defence (PVO-SV) models respectively. The strategic air defences employed large GCI/EW (Ground Controlled Intercept/Early Warning) radars such as the Soviet P-35M and P-37 Bar Lock, which were used for wide area surveillance and early warning, these large MTI (Moving Target Indicator - ie low PRF) E/F (2.6-3 GHz) band systems being situated at key geographical locations to cover principal air bases and population centres.

Bar Lock systems employ a pair of trailer mounted truncated paraboloid reflectors, and have a range of the order of 120 NM, the whole antenna/trailer assembly rotating at 12 rpm for 360 degree scan with six stacked beams for approximate height finding. Where low level coverage is required, they are typically supplemented by a Side Net E-band nodding height finding radar.

The air force operated GCI/EW system formed the top tier of the IADS, supporting fighters with GCI vectors, but also datalinking early warning information down to individual SAM and AAA batteries.

These were in turn directly supported by a range of early warning and acquisition radars, mobile and relocatable, such as the Flat Face, Squat Eye and Spoon Rest. These acquisition radars played a key role in the IADS, as they provided precise tracking information to SAM systems. They would also, under proper operating conditions, remain off the air until a target was to be engaged, at which time they would light up, acquire and track the target and feed the target's parameters to the fire control radars associated with the SAM and AAA systems in use.

The P-15 Flat Face is a low PRF MTI radar which uses a pair of elliptical paraboloid antennas on a short mast above a trailer, operating in the B/C (UHF) band the radar is generally credited with respectable look down performance into clutter and good ECCM performance. As several late model units were captured by the Allies during the eighties, the Flat Face was wholly compromised. Reports of testing by the French suggested the radar had remarkably good performance for its class of system, and good ECCM.

The P-15 Flat Face was originally used by the Soviets to support the SA-3 Goa, but since they were reluctant to export their mobile Long Track acquisition radars to non-Warpac nations, the P-15 was largely substituted. The Flat Face was the principal Soviet mobile battlefield surveillance/acquisition radar in use in Iraq and is associated with grouped area defence batteries of SA-3, SA-6 and point defence batteries of SA-8, Roland, ZSU-23-4P, SA-9 and SA-13. Where low altitude coverage was required, the P-15M Squat Eye was used. The Squat Eye is a direct derivative of the P-15, using essentially the same hardware but with only a single antenna mounted at the top of a 100 ft mast.

A typical arrangement was to colocate a Flat Face and Squat Eye at a single site, both vans buried in revetments and covered with nets. The radar site would then provide high altitude coverage to the maximum range of the systems, and low level coverage limited by the height of the P-15M mast. Most acquisition radars were situated close to the targets covered by the area defence and point defence SAM systems which they were designated to support, and were often supplemented by height finding radars such as the Thin Skin, a truck or trailer mounted H-band nodding elliptical paraboloid system.

The older SA-2 systems were supported by the geriatric VHF/A band P-12 and P-12M Spoon Rest low PRF MTI acquisition radars. These systems use an array of twelve Yagi antennas in two banks, mounted on horizontal booms on a common mast. Early models were mounted on a van trailer, newer build equipment on ZiL-151, 157 or Ural 375 trucks. While the P-12 is considered an unsophisticated analogue system by Western standards, it has a respectable range of 150 NM at altitude and its large wavelength improves its detection range performance against low RCS targets such as the F-117A. The Spoon Rest was wholly compromised when an Israeli commando team captured and removed a whole system in 1969.

Full read: http://www.ausairpower.net/Analysis-ODS-EW.html

Iraqi AD capabilities were state-of-the-art in design and function back in 1991.

 

[Rashid Mahmood]

Amazed to see keyboard warriors are now experts in PN Sub capabilities.
Good to see the confused state of minds. It helps.

 

[Maarkhoor]

Amazed to see keyboard warriors are now experts in PN Sub capabilities.
Good to see the confused state of minds. It helps.

Sir can we arm our current submarine fleet (Agusta 90b) with Babur cruise missile?

 

[Taimoor Khan]

Last tested successfully on Nov 2017.And yes,we can put nukes on brahmos if we wanted to.The main reason we don't is because - in SSBNs it doesn't make any sense when you have ballistic missiles instead.In other platforms if we put tactical level nukes on cruise missiles it will play into pakistan's hand and weaken our conventional superiority.Right now we don't have tac nukes,so our answer to a tactical nuclear strike will always be a strategic mass nuclear retaliation which makes use of tac nukes difficult.If both sides field tac nukes,pakistan can believe they can get away with tac nuke strikes on indian armed forces with only a tac nuke strike in return maybe.,a concept of 'limited' nuclear war which we don't desire.

A lot of non sense and self contradictory bravado.

Go through the highlighted parts and reflect what you wrote.

 

[Gryphon]

@amardeep mishra

Appreciate your contribution to this thread.

FYI, it was confirmed by Havelsan officials to @Bratva at DIMDEX 2018 that the French CMS of Agosta 90B submarines will be replaced with a Turkish CMS. New weapon integration requests will have to be forwarded to Turkish Ministry of Defence, and upon its approval, will be executed by Havelsan.

Existing weapons (SM-39 Exocet, DM2A4 and F-17P mod 2) will be retained.