Behind the CeaseFireLine (CFL) ......

[Pakistani Fighter]

Kargil and Jammu are not apples on a tree which will fall into your hands

Yes Sir Indeed. Thats what I think. But once in our hands, Valley will come automatically

 

[PanzerKiel]

@Joe Shearer

Ok, let me take the secret out....

What i have just narrated was Indian Operation Trident, 1987-88.....which was supposed to be launched alongside Brass Tacks.

@Joe Shearer
This is what happened in 87-88.....but this time, we can always assume that the IAF transport aircraft do have the potential to be shot down by PAF on their way once they are inside Kashmir.....either that or they will need very heavy AD systems on ground and heavy IAF air escorts as well.....rest, if they arrive and get concentrated, well then SOWs / PGMs can pick them up.

 

[313ghazi]

theoretically speaking...

Can an effective insurgency within IOK weaken the Indian military grip on Kashmir, making an attempt to take over easier, or is it too difficult to support an insurgency which is more than a security irritaint? Is the Indian response to support for insurgencies not worth the effort supporting one?

 

[PanzerKiel]

Yes Sir Indeed. Thats what I think. But once in our hands, Valley will come automatically

Dear you maybe right....but it didnt happen in 99.

As Churchill said.....let me mold it...Srinagar will not fall automatically....it will belong to whoever has boots on ground, inside that city.

@jbgt90

This particular member has Gen Sudarji as his DP....the main architect of what we've been discussing...interesting....

theoretically speaking...

Can an effective insurgency within IOK weaken the Indian military grip on Kashmir, making an attempt to take over easier, or is it too difficult to support an insurgency which is more than a security irritaint? Is the Indian response to support for insurgencies not worth the effort supporting one?

Gibralter as a case study is in front of us....

If there is insurgency, Indians can pump in more troops to control it, moreover, they will also try to eliminate the bases on our side as well, if they are there. If an insurgency cannot be supported (financially, equipment, safe havens and manpower) it will fizzle out....

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Joe Shearer

Ok, let me take the secret out....

What i have just narrated was Indian Operation Trident, 1987-88.....which was supposed to be launched alongside Brass Tacks.

@Joe Shearer
This is what happened in 87-88.....but this time, we can always assume that the IAF transport aircraft do have the potential to be shot down by PAF on their way once they are inside Kashmir.....either that or they will need very heavy AD systems on ground and heavy IAF air escorts as well.....rest, if they arrive and get concentrated, well then SOWs / PGMs can pick them up.

@jbgt90

Dear you maybe right....but it didnt happen in 99.

As Churchill said.....let me mold it...Srinagar will not fall automatically....it will belong to whoever has boots on ground, inside that city.

This particular member has Gen Sudarji as his DP....the main architect of what we've been discussing...interesting....

He is very.....interesting. I have to introduce you two. His father was on Sundarji's staff. Any further personal details must come from him.

 

[PanzerKiel]

That reaction time, that mobilisation speed...that is scary.

YEs, but then, we all know that Pakistan has always been better off as far as speed of our mobilization is concerned.....Brasstacks, Trident, Parakaram.....

 

[Cuirassier]

theoretically speaking...

Can an effective insurgency within IOK weaken the Indian military grip on Kashmir, making an attempt to take over easier, or is it too difficult to support an insurgency which is more than a security irritaint? Is the Indian response to support for insurgencies not worth the effort supporting one?

Insurgency was way more rampant in 90s and early 2000s. Still Pakistan didn't attempt much except for Koh-e-Paima (which was unrelated to insurgency-hit Valley and Pir Panjal areas). Don't expect much now.

 

[PanzerKiel]

I somehow feel a great urge to return to my cooking. Far more comforting.

Dear....
whenever you feel that you are about to be dragged away from cooking, do please let me know....i'll narrate you more incidents about the Indian Army......happy cooking.....

LIGHTER PART.....

 

[Joe Shearer]

YEs, but then, we all know that Pakistan has always been better off as far as speed of our mobilization is concerned.....Brasstacks, Trident, Parakaram.....

<sigh>

All I can say is that we are working hard - very hard - on the physical infrastructure side. The cantonment based housing has yet to be transplanted, but roads are close to getting done, bridges have a 40 MT capacity (they need to be 70 MT, but there is a problem with some of them exceeding 40) and air fields and forward bases are almost all there.

The command and control element has to be done internally, as you know, and this forum will obviously hear little or nothing about this.

One unexpected problem with the overall planning is that there is now an element of uncertainty regarding formation sizes; there are exercises at 'right-sizing' formations to meet their mission objectives.

 

[PanzerKiel]

<sigh>

All I can say is that we are working hard - very hard - on the physical infrastructure side. The cantonment based housing has yet to be transplanted, but roads are close to getting done, bridges have a 40 MT capacity (they need to be 70 MT, but there is a problem with some of them exceeding 40) and air fields and forward bases are almost all there.

The command and control element has to be done internally, as you know, and this forum will obviously hear little or nothing about this.

One unexpected problem with the overall planning is that there is now an element of uncertainty regarding formation sizes; there are exercises at 'right-sizing' formations to meet their mission objectives.

Exactly, personally i believe it will take some YEARS for Indian Army to re-emerge from these changes, ready to fight again....because results can be disastrous if it is made to fight while this massive re-organization is taking place.

<sigh>

All I can say is that we are working hard - very hard - on the physical infrastructure side. The cantonment based housing has yet to be transplanted, but roads are close to getting done, bridges have a 40 MT capacity (they need to be 70 MT, but there is a problem with some of them exceeding 40) and air fields and forward bases are almost all there.

The command and control element has to be done internally, as you know, and this forum will obviously hear little or nothing about this.

One unexpected problem with the overall planning is that there is now an element of uncertainty regarding formation sizes; there are exercises at 'right-sizing' formations to meet their mission objectives.

and of course, dont forget the changing doctrines as well....making doctrines, and then validating them, again takes years.

 

[313ghazi]

Insurgency was way more rampant in 90s and early 2000s. Still Pakistan didn't attempt much except for Koh-e-Paima (which was unrelated to insurgency-hit Valley and Pir Panjal areas). Don't expect much now.

The insurgency in the 90's wasn't as deadly as they can be in this day and age. Remotely detonated IED's for example, internet for communication and coordination, use of drones for intel, or even modified as weapons, home made rockets etc.

Don't get me wrong, i don't think we should be invading anywhere, but if we can support a sustained insurgency, we can get the bakhts on the backfoot.

 

[Cuirassier]

The insurgency in the 90's wasn't as deadly as they can be in this day and age. Remotely detonated IED's for example, internet for communication and coordination, use of drones for intel, or even modified as weapons, home made rockets etc.

Don't get me wrong, i don't think we should be invading anywhere, but if we can support a sustained insurgency, we can get the bakhts on the backfoot.

https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm

It is much weaker today - lesser crossings over the LC has disrupted supply of weapons and well-trained manpower. The handful of militants there today are mostly local hence have poor training and scavenge for weapons from ISF by snatching. Heck, in the last few weeks, they recovered an LMG from a militant hideout - the first found since the early 2000s! That can give you an idea on how brittle things are as of today.

But keeping this aside, Pakistan's aim was never to use these insurgents as tools for liberating J&K (as believed by gullible delusional Jihad enthusiasts). They were and are relevant at tactical level to :

a) cause attrition to them at low-cost
b) tie-up maximum forces in J&K to make a favourable force ratio opposite IB (Punjab, Sindh, where the main battles could be fought in case of conventional war)

Koh-e-Paima was launched as a reprisal for Siachen and interdiction of Neelum Valley Road.

 

[313ghazi]

https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm

It is much weaker today - lesser crossings over the LC has disrupted supply of weapons and well-trained manpower. The handful of militants there today are mostly local hence have poor training and scavenge for weapons from ISF by snatching. Heck, in the last few weeks, they recovered an LMG from a militant hideout - the first found since the early 2000s! That can give you an idea on how brittle things are as of today.

But keeping this aside, Pakistan's aim was never to use these insurgents as tools for liberating J&K (as believed by gullible delusional Jihad enthusiasts). They were and are relevant at tactical level to :

a) cause attrition to them at low-cost
b) tie-up maximum forces in J&K to make a favourable force ratio opposite IB (Punjab, Sindh, where the main battles could be fought in case of conventional war)

Koh-e-Paima was launched as a reprisal for Siachen and interdiction of Neelum Valley Road.

Interesting point about the pakistani aims to support insurgency.

Btw, i wasn't claiming that today the insurgency is more effective - it's not, they're barely armed. My point was I think if we repeated the actions of the 90's today, we'd probably get "better results" (feels terrible to describe the loss of human life as a result).

To build on aim B - do you think a re-built and well equipped insurgency could also provide a useful asset in IoK during wartime? Attacking supply lines/depots/stores resulting in enemy forces having to protect their backs too.

 

[Baghial]

Dear Paks,

Now that GanguDaesh has burried all the UN resolutions and the deadhorse of ShimlaMirch with its savage annexation of IoJK we are back to the pre 1947 stage of struggle for Pakistan.

Let us show our GreenColours and start using the term CeaseFireLine (CFL) instead of LoC... because by using LoC term we are indirectly legitimsing GanguDaesh's annexation.

Those who have SocialMedia accounts, kindly, use the term CeaseFireLine so that GoP wakes up and starts using this correct term in Offical Discourse.

Every small thing we can do is a contribution to The Struggle for Independence ... for the Idea of Pakistan.

Allow me to thankyou all for your kind help in The Struggle.

Mangus

Pakistan poses no real threat to India beyond limited proxy war - which, again, is a two way street. It should not be Indian national security priority. And yet it is the ultimate Indian obsession. At least that of Indian Right Wing.

, it is this kind of fantasies that I don't appreciate from either side - whether it is some Pakistanis talking about capturing New Delhi or whether it is Indians talking about breaking Pakistan into can't-decide-into-how-many pieces. Please let the reality hit you hard.

 

[Armchair]

Ahan, you are trying to do what @Armchair does... Going in too quick..... Kargil and Jammu are not apples on a tree which will fall into your hands



The end result was, at both of its intended points of launch.... Instead of one brigade , it now faced with two defending brigades each.

It was game over.

Surprise, attacking unexpectedly in a place and time that the enemy is not prepared to handle has been a key for military success from the dawn of human history.

Attacking anywhere in Kashmir would not have that element of surprise as this is exactly where both India and Pakistan are expecting an attack. They have legions guarding every pass and ever mountain top.

Furthermore, the lack of open terrain and the large number of troops particularly on the Indian side, makes an assault in mountainous terrain a suicidal blunder.

There is one place where an attack can be successful, but I'll keep that to myself.

If we look at Rommel's campaign in Italy, the key going forward was surprise, and lightening advances without holding and clearing operations (left to follow on units). That's the main element missing for either party.

Look at Kargil. irstly there would not have been a war as the political consideration would have been enough. Secondly, one would not have gone in without taking the PAF into confidence. Thirdly, going in the classic mistake made was what Rommel first made in France in WWI and later corrected, the penetration did not have meaningful follow on forces to backup the initial force.

One should have had strong backup forces to supplement the initial assault and gone on to cut the proverbial umbilical cord of Siachen.

About going too fast - remember that blitzkreig is lightening fast war. It is paced in a way that the initial, unexpected attack keeps the enemy off balance by further, rapid inroads. Slow, deliberate forces can never sustain that "unbalancing of the enemy".

This is a lesson that has not been learned by either Pakistan, India or Turkey, basically many militaries of the world have a hard time understanding the theory of blitzkreig.