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Attack on PAF Base Minhas

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Yes "we" can and not sure what specific technology you're referring to but they need to be in place at all major military bases. Also this kind of operation could have been prevented by manpower alone it didn't need sophisticated technology to thwart such an attack.

The attack was thwarted. The only damage was an RPG fired which did not find its target. Lets be clear on this point. The technology could be motion monitors around the perimeter to active monitoring of the perimeter with means beyond CCTV to ensure that blindspots are catered to. The reality is that you CANNOT implement these at ALL the bases just because it would be extremely cost prohibitive. I am not able to give a dollar amount, but this is something that will not be very easily achievable.

I would imagine security standards are or should be set by the service, "individual bases" they maybe "individual bases" by separation by land but they are all apart of a cohesive military network, these aren't like rebel outposts where there are fragmented and separate strong holds, each with their own uniqueness and standards.

I think you missed my point. The base commander cannot be held liable for security standards that, if set by the AHQ, are found to be less than sufficient at certain locations. The base security and its standards are set up by an authority beyond the base commander. Yes the base commander would have his input and that of his security team, but going back to the original point, the base commander is responsible, but not entirely for such failures.

If these standards aren't "affordable" then what are we doing? Why have standards in the first place? This is not the question whether these standards are affordable this is pity reasoning the question should be are these standards being reformed to the new threat and are they being executed.

The standards are revised. Just don't be oblivious to the costs of upgrading security standards and bringing in capabilities that we do not have in place. At a very basic level, Pakistan is fighting a war with a budget, as unaffordable as it is at the current level, which is not sufficient.
 
Hi,

The bases are going to stay where they are---it is easier to raise the level of conscience regarding security by regular training and speech sessions by security experts---.


Blain2----looking at your recent and post of he past---you always have a 'SOB STORY' why things can't be done---you are always full of lame excuses.

Man---you have always been a failure in your assessments for over the years---why don't you give us a break and stop posting such defeatist mindset posts.

Fascinating isn't it---a base that has around 2--4 billion dollars worth of weapons systems is concerned about two hundred thousand dollars to half million dollars worth of security expense----I am not talking about electronic security---but regular foot soldiers with automatic weapons---night vision goggles and dog patrols at the least.
 
and we all know that 100 million dollar bespoke fence by raytheon failed to detect a man who entered the JFK and walked across runways into the building..
So there is no such thing as foolproof security.
 
The security of Military bases is extremely important but it misses the wider dilemma. SSGs can be placed at every check point of every base and it would not curtail the attacks. The damage can be limited by superior security and reaction time ofcourse, but if we want to prevent attacks outright then the solution is altogether different.

Pakistan has a massive population; only radicalization of a small percentage provides extremist organizations with an endless pool of young and fit men to throw into battle. If we are to prevent attacks that risk our soldiers and our million/billion dollar assets, then we must strike at the heart of the enemy (to paraphrase MastanKhan). But even that statement requires clarification, because you can kill all potential extremists and those who make up the supply network, but it will only clear up the path for the next generation of extremists to rise sooner into the upper echelons of extremist groups.

In the end, facing an unconventional enemy requires an unconventional response: schools, books, freedom of expression...the ability of these people to exercise critical thinking is what is going to save them from the pull of the extremely shaky logic of extremist philosophy and it'll save us from trying to fight an enemy that wants nothing more than to die. The western edge of Pakistan has been neglected for decades and the lack of infrastructure has created breeding grounds for the worst kind of person: one who wants to kill and then die himself. You cannot reason with such a man; similarly, you cannot fight such a man and win since your death or his death, both signify victory to him. If we don't provide the upcoming generation of Pakistanis with the education that provides them the mental capacity to make the right decision, we will continue to fail.

While probably unpopular and too slow paced to appeal to most members, this is the only way to systematically and completely eliminate the terrorist threat we face.
 
Hi,

The bases are going to stay where they are---it is easier to raise the level of conscience regarding security by regular training and speech sessions by security experts---.


Blain2----looking at your recent and post of he past---you always have a 'SOB STORY' why things can't be done---you are always full of lame excuses.

Man---you have always been a failure in your assessments for over the years---why don't you give us a break and stop posting such defeatist mindset posts.

Fascinating isn't it---a base that has around 2--4 billion dollars worth of weapons systems is concerned about two hundred thousand dollars to half million dollars worth of security expense----I am not talking about electronic security---but regular foot soldiers with automatic weapons---night vision goggles and dog patrols at the least.


Mastan Bhai
, I still can't wrap my mind across the logic that we (alright you and others who've adopted this line of reasoning !) know more about protecting these multi-billion dollar assets then the people who've studied and trained for these exact things for the better part of their professional life ! Come on yaar some fairly venerable names have served in the PAF in general and these named bases in particular....you're telling me they couldn't think up these things and somehow you could ?
 
Pfpilot, could not agree with you more. We are mired in this tactical response issue forgetting the need to proactively go at the fountainhead of this problem.

Also let me clarify one point. It is not the job of the SSG/SSW to protect and guard sites. Theirs is an offensive tasking. In a defensive role, the SSG operator is no different than the infantryman or a DSG guard. That hapless lad is essentially waiting for someone to lob a grenade or fire a burst at him.
 
^^^there is no proof..factual or logical that the attackers were extremist religious nazis....
 
^^^there is no proof..factual or logical that the attackers were extremist religious nazis....
You are right. But going by the past, in every single attack, the trigger pullers have been locals.
 
You are right. But going by the past, in every single attack, the trigger pullers have been locals.

Under curent economic conditions paying 1 caror to the youngest brother ina family of 6 can lead to one fit young man their trainee for the attack..
When one awacs costs 250 million dollars..
Paying 10 to 15 caror PKR for destroying them is cheap as chips..
I am not saying that there is no extremist factor but we may well be barking up the wrong tree all along,and somebody out there may be buying these people purely on financial grounds and trainingnthem as cheap and secretive alternative to firing misssiles on pakistan or sending their airforce,and you know who i mean.
 
On the scale and accuracy of the attack..There should be arrests and investigation in all the villages on the rear of the Airbase as somebody there is on the side of the attackers and has been facilitating continuous monitoring of the airbase...

Some questions... By Ausaf
24 August, 2012

The security personnel at the PAF Base Minhas, Kamra, need to be applauded for effectively engaging the militants and killing nine of them.

The attack on the air force base at Kamra has raised a few questions as to how the militants were able to infiltrate into the highly guarded air base and were able to engage security personnel inside the base for nearly four hours. Why was the entire perimeter of the base not covered and monitored round the clock by stationary and patrolling guards, thus enabling the intruders to scale a 2.7 metre high wall strung with barbed wire to break into the base from behind the base at around 2:00 am? Why was the likely approach of the enemy from outside the base area around the base perimeter not guarded?

No attack on well protected military installations can be carried out unless the attackers and their sponsors have full information about their targets. Attackers cannot infiltrate into the protected target as easily as they did at the Kamra airbase without having prior knowledge about the target and the route to be taken to reach the target.

The PAF must look into all possibilities when investigating this attack. It is suggested that the services of PAF retired officers expert in the security of air bases who have participated in both the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 may be obtained to benefit the PAF with their rich valuable experience.

SQN LDR (RETD) S AUSAF HUSAIN Karachi

Some questions... By Ausaf - PakTribune
 
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^^^ baseless brain farts from our useless media
 
Why do you discount the report? Just wondering.
 
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