Attack on PAF Base Minhas

[SQ8]

Dogs, touching dogs is not considered a very good thing by muslims right?

You really dont have Muslims in India or something? or are they only confined to the lower classes so there is no interaction??
Nothing wrong with guard dogs.. ask any Muslim.

-no spare magazines---.

In their own words.. they cant even afford that in the budget anymore.
Its THAT bad..

 

[Armstrong]

Hi,

My good man---proof is in the pudding as they say---. And most of the time---in pakistan---what you see is what you get---.

In pakistan---there is no magic ball or a magic lamp or a genie in the bottle---. It is all very obvious---when you need to tie a rope around the barrel of a machine gun to attach it to a brace.

Principals of security have not changed---this not the security of a vault---or a computer system---. There is a secured area---people on foot want to invade and make a strike on assets placed in that arena---the area management need to create a security barrier so that the perforators cannot enter the premises---.

Now----what I want you and others to listen with open ears with your brains attentive---the reports are saying that the warrior gave them 10 minute time to pull security together----does this time have any significance at all on you people---.

I would also like to clear one thing---when it comes to my judgement call---please let me hang by the rope---you people may show yourself to be less capable and have praises for the professionals---but please leave me out of it---. My neck is stretched out too long----so please don't insult me---thank you.

You need machine gun nest---you need bike patrols---you need dog patrols---plus you need snipers---you need around 100---150 troops working in 4 to 6 hour shifts

Mastan Bhai, first off - I wasn't insulting you or anything of the sort; if it came across as such then I do apologize of course !

Good sir, my contention remains the same ! Do you really think that the men who are career soldiers and whose sole training for the better part of their lives involves these very issues, are oblivious to these things and yet you and I have the military acumen to come up with things that are most suited to 'base security' ? Why would they of all people who are most qualified and experienced to understanding the nuances of 'security' are going to forgo things as basic as what you and most of the others are suggesting ! I think it would be wrong of us to draw conclusions that imply that we have a better understanding of what the security needs of the base were and what was done about them ! I don't know why the base wasn't a nest infested by machines guns and manned by dogs, bikes and 150 soldiers but what I do understand is that the Commander of the base and his predecessors were exponentially more qualified, more experienced and in possession of extremely relevant information then I or almost everyone on this forum is or ever could be. And so I'd give them the benefit of the doubt instead of commenting so unreservedly without this being my forte and most of all without having been there !

 

[Irfan Baloch]

Move all the way to end at 30 mins to the end and listen to his very important question...

then you may go to the start and watch the analysis

what I do understand is that the Commander of the base and his predecessors were exponentially more qualified, more experienced and in possession of extremely relevant information then I or almost everyone on this forum is or ever could be. And so I'd give them the benefit of the doubt instead of commenting so unreservedly without this being my forte and most of all without having been there !

that's wrong comparison. most of us are civilians and dont have the responsibility to run an air force base. a valid comparison might be their performance vs Mehran base. indeed there is some improvement (as long as minimal dmage to Saab AWACs remains to be true).

giving benefit of doubt? thats fundamentally wrong statement when it comes to defending millions dollar worth of assets
I wont expect PAF to chart out the exact defence plan for the benefit of its enemies but what we see from pictures and footage is not much to impress.

 

[jha]

Thats the thing that doesnt make any sense to me. So many people saying it was a well planned attack and all credit to the bravery of Sepoy Muhammad Asif, it was 10 men against one. A well trained squad armed with RPGs grenades and explosives doesnt take 15 minutes to overrun one man with a rifle extra clip or not, especially when they know that reinforcments are close by and time is critical. Heck if you have



one post 10 men each with five blocks of c4 strapped to his chest and no one made the obvious connection?

I have been wondering the same...

 

[Armstrong]

that's wrong comparison. most of us are civilians and dont have the responsibility to run an air force base. a valid comparison might be their performance vs Mehran base. indeed there is some improvement (as long as minimal dmage to Saab AWACs remains to be true).

giving benefit of doubt? thats fundamentally wrong statement when it comes to defending millions dollar worth of assets
I wont expect PAF to chart out the exact defence plan for the benefit of its enemies but what we see from pictures and footage is not much to impress.

Indeed most of us are civilians which means that we are neither qualified to judge them nor issue directives advocating 'improvements here' or admonishing 'shortcomings' there ! Yes...we reserve the right to have an opinion, to think, to ponder, to ask and to express ourselves but are we really kidding ourselves here in expressing these opinions in such a definitive way as if the Armed Forces themselves are infested by bufffoons who themselves didn't know 'Base Security 101' that we need to give them a short-course in them over here ?

To the best of my knowledge, this Base Commander and his predecessors have all maintained, seemingly, more or less the same security arrangements that were present on the day of the attack. Now I can doubt the professional competence of one person...heck two to stretch it for the purpose of stretching it, but a whole cadre of the Airforce Elite couldn't think up these things when we - people who aren't in anyway remotely comparable to them in terms of knowledge or experience, in this context - could ? Irfan Bhai, it beggars belief that people like AVM Shahid Lateef (who by his own admission commandeered this base !) and other before and after him who've been responsible for these exact same things with respect to these exact same bases weren't competent enough to think up these same 'strategies' or to see these 'loopholes' that we've been talking about for the past 171 pages ! On the other-hand if there really was a fundamental lapse in the planning of the security controls, SOPs and what not, pertaining to this base, then like PNS Mehran the internal control mechanism of the Armed Forces will sort it out with a reprimand handed out to the Base Commander but right now let us 'give the benefit of the doubt' in assuming that the Commander of this base is a qualified individual who knew about the risks posed to the Base and the available options and so he took the best possible course of action accordingly !

 

[BATMAN]

You can't have that near inhabited areas. The govt. should buy out all land in a one mile radius around each base and make it a no-go zone.

Base commander should have requested it to its superiors.
This is one out of many short comings of the base commander/s
Further more, if you look at GHQ!!!!!!
Even the bigger problem is we failed to convict Zardari on memo gate!
Wakeup.. Zardari is enemy of state along with his team.
Army cannot win this war, as long Rehman Malik and his appointed team in NADRA, Police, FIA & IB is facilitating the master minds.

 

[Viper0011.]

Is this how it is supposed to be, a base commander running out to find out whats happening? What happend to the modern communication. This was only a terrorist attack, what will he do in a real war if the base comes under attack, run to the AAA battery?

Good point. Base commander does NOT need to be out. A general doesn't need to run to the front line if his brigade comes under attack. He is the only DECISION MAKER & STRATEGIC planner in the unit. Him going out means he doesn't trust his men or is a micro-manager. Either one's bad for the unit. Not trying to insult his bravery but again, he is THE decision maker. Him being out, what if he got killed? For a while, there will be some degree of confusion to say the least. Not to mention the moral depression!!!


Next, this was a WELL planned attack. In many places it says 'Coincidentally, there was the other AWACS flying and RETURNING to the base. It was ordered to remain airborne'. Something tells me that these terrorists KNEW about both of the Eireye and their schedule. One of them was in the hanger and was still hit (even minimal but objective was achieved to some degree).

THEN the second returning aircraft was ALSO a target. An aircraft 'taxying' is the EASIEST target from even an SMG if you are close by or RPG, etc. Seems like these guys were VERY comfortable and accurate in using rocket propelled grenades and RPG types of arms as they did manage to hit the other AWACS from distance.

So I think this was planned to capture ONE Eireye in the hanger and the second one on the ground either stopping or slowly taxying.

This scenario actually seems more like it but it didn't workout due to schedule delay resulting from the resistance and the escalation to the towers, etc. The point is, there was INSIDE support. There are just too many 'coincidents' to not notice here.

Pakistan needs to build HIGH walls around the hangers. This is your third level of access to the assets. Then, there should be another perimeter with another high walls around it. Like 10 feet with electric barbed wires around it. Once the visibility is stopped, that itself causes loss of target acquisition. Now imagine two tall walls....you'll be reducing future threats by 80% in case someone makes it this far. These walls usually use VERY heavy gates. At the fire first bullet, the security should close down these gates, along with hanger gates. Now tall gates and walls in two tiers will eliminate visibility.
The first tier should include checkpoints and the manned soldiers. Behind the walls, ONLY authorized personnel should go.

This is Do-Able. If you guys have billions of assets, a few million can be allocated to safeguard these planes. There are a few air force basis in Pakistan so building these walls and other security protection shouldn't be that expensive.

 

[Thorough Pro]

I remember in Zia's times Pa used to practice attacks on Kahuta to identify the weaknesses and keep the security on toes.

 

[MastanKhan]

MK, Boss, that LONE man was wearing a suicide vest! you know what it means.. he was there to die.. he have been brain washed and it was a win win situation for him.. He can fight with his gun for 10 minutes or blew himself up to cause damage, all the same for him!!
For such attackers, fighting in desperation for 10 minutes in no big deal!!
Haven't you heard bout the valiant soldier on battle front, fighting a group of enemies all by them self.. just because life and death was not of any matter to them at that time!!

i hope you understand what i am trying to say!

regards!

The warrior I am talking about is our soldier---who by himself kept the terrorists at bay for awhile---not the other guys.

 

[Rafi]

You really dont have Muslims in India or something? or are they only confined to the lower classes so there is no interaction??
Nothing wrong with guard dogs.. ask any Muslim.



In their own words.. they cant even afford that in the budget anymore.
Its THAT bad..

 

[Rafi]

SSW boys.

 

[MastanKhan]

Mastan Bhai, first off - I wasn't insulting you or anything of the sort; if it came across as such then I do apologize of course !

Good sir, my contention remains the same ! Do you really think that the men who are career soldiers and whose sole training for the better part of their lives involves these very issues, are oblivious to these things and yet you and I have the military acumen to come up with things that are most suited to 'base security' ? Why would they of all people who are most qualified and experienced to understanding the nuances of 'security' are going to forgo things as basic as what you and most of the others are suggesting ! I think it would be wrong of us to draw conclusions that imply that we have a better understanding of what the security needs of the base were and what was done about them ! I don't know why the base wasn't a nest infested by machines guns and manned by dogs, bikes and 150 soldiers but what I do understand is that the Commander of the base and his predecessors were exponentially more qualified, more experienced and in possession of extremely relevant information then I or almost everyone on this forum is or ever could be. And so I'd give them the benefit of the doubt instead of commenting so unreservedly without this being my forte and most of all without having been there !

Hi,

I only talk for myself---and not for we---. There is no reason to infest the base with anything---except to place a few in strategic locations---in case there was a strike by a larger force---. You only take down a larger force on foot by rapid machine gun fire---and off course snipers.

You have made a choice to say that they know their job---that is your prerogative---don't drag me in that---and I am saying that they do not have the mindset---pakistan is not a security conscious nation---regardless of their being professionals----the outcome is pathetic---the one in karachi was horrendous----.

I say that it is a failure because of the reaction time and who was involved---the base commander---his presence in itself means total failure---. I don't doubt his bravery---I doubt the ability of his brains---.

What would have happened if he was killed in the initial strike---.

Proof is in the pudding---you people are all blind---you can't even see your hand in front of your eyes on a bright sunny day---it registers as an object but you don't know what to do with it---.

And the example I am going to talk about----the death of Benazir Bhutto---. Benazir died in the second round of the strike on her---and you people see what kind of chaos the nation is going thru right now after her demise---because there was no one capable and able to lead from the front.

Hi,

Awarding of Nishan A Haider is not GOD"S scipture that it cannot be changed---.

If Rashid Minhas can get it for committing the biggest blunder of allowing the instructor to get into the aircraft after he had already gotten into taxi position----this warrior deserves it a thousand times more.

 

[MastanKhan]

Good point. Base commander does NOT need to be out. A general doesn't need to run to the front line if his brigade comes under attack. He is the only DECISION MAKER & STRATEGIC planner in the unit. Him going out means he doesn't trust his men or is a macro-manager. Either one's bad for the unit. Not trying to insult his bravery but again, he is THE decision maker. Him being out, what if he got killed? For a while, there will be some degree of confusion to say the least. Not to mention the moral depression!!!


Next, this was a WELL planned attack. In many places it says 'Coincidentally, there was the other AWACS flying and RETURNING to the base. It was ordered to remain airborne'. Something tells me that these terrorists KNEW about both of the Eireye and their schedule. One of them was in the hanger and was still hit (even minimal but objective was achieved to some degree).

THEN the second returning aircraft was ALSO a target. An aircraft 'taxying' is the EASIEST target from even an SMG if you are close by or RPG, etc. Seems like these guys were VERY comfortable and accurate in using rocket propelled grenades and RPG types of arms as they did manage to hit the other AWACS from distance.

So I think this was planned to capture ONE Eireye in the hanger and the second one on the ground either stopping or slowly taxying.

This scenario actually seems more like it but may have resulted in schedule delay due to the resistance and the escalation to the towers, etc. The point is, there was INSIDE support. There are just too many 'coincidents' to not notice here.

Pakistan needs to build HIGH walls around the hangers. This is your third level of access to the assets. Then, there should be another perimeter with another high walls around it. Like 10 feet with electric barbed wires around it. Once the visibility is stopped, that itself causes loss of target acquisition. Now imagine two tall walls....you'll be reducing future threats by 80% in case someone makes it this far. These walls usually use VERY heavy gates. At the fire first bullet, the security should close down these gates, along with hanger gates. Now tall gates and walls in two tiers will eliminate visibility.
The first tier should include checkpoints and the manned soldiers. Behind the walls, ONLY authorized personnel should go.

This is Do-Able. If you guys have billions of assets, a few million can be allocated to safeguard these planes. There are a few air force basis in Pakistan so building these walls and other security protection shouldn't be that expensive.

Hi,

Remember the F117 that was shot down by the serbians----remember what they did---they had lookers outside of the base in italy from where it flew---hewould observe the time of take off---the others would calculate the time it took to reach the target---they plotted a route---and one day---they saw this anamoly on the radar and launched their missiles and thus took it down---so in similiar manner an observer can sit outside the base and calculate the take off and return time of the aircraft.

They need a wall and then large empty space---basically a kill zone----all flat---no brush---no trees---.

Rafi,

Thank you very much for the post----.

 

[Viper0011.]

Remember the F117 that was shot down by the serbians----remember what they did---they had lookers outside of the base in italy from where it flew---hewould observe the time of take off---the others would calculate the time it took to reach the target---they plotted a route---and one day---they saw this anamoly on the radar and launched their missiles and thus took it down

Are you positive that the reason behind 117 shot down was what's given above?

They need a wall and then large empty space---basically a kill zone--all flat---no brush---no trees---.

So you need three layers of security. One, just men and may be an APC at the checkpoint, different layers. Second some SSW folks on patrol in gear. It can be just two people but well trained, these guys can hold on their own for a few minutes till the backup comes.
Then, you have an outer perimeter walls with heavy iron gates, steep, concrete, tall like 10 feet with barbed wire on top. Upon the slightest hint of gun fire, people manning this will close the doors. Now, this is on the outer end, when planes go towards the runway. This is where planes on schedule to fly may be parked instead of being parked in the open. Between this wall and the one around the hangers, it's JUST tarmac. No trees, no nothing.
Then, another wall, just around hangers, again, taller than the first one with barbed electric wires. Inside the gate, you'll have hangers and each hanger needs a strong gate and walls too. This will secure plenty of area and assets. You can't just fire a couple of rpg's on these kinds of walls and penetrate. Plus the time wasted in breaking these rings, there is plenty of time for the SSW people to show up

 

[farhan_9909]

I remember in Zia's times Pa used to practice attacks on Kahuta to identify the weaknesses and keep the security on toes.

Good tactics