Arjun News & Discussions

[Titanium]

But you also have to take into account Buidling of Mig-21, Mig-27 and Jaguar was liceance production and on the top of it they were roughly from the catagory of 2nd and 3rd generation fighter planes, whereas what India is developing is 4th generation fighter plane which it never even liceance produced and hence delays are out to crop up. As well as the technolgical gadets that have been fitted with Mig-21, Mig-27 and Jaguar are no where nearer to what Indin is developing with Tejas. On the face of it India has already successfully manage to produce 2nd generation fighter plane in the form of Marut.

The idea of licence building is to learn and establish a aeronautical industry, so that we can develop the next gen aircraft. But did the idea translated into any meaning ful contribution in the development of the next fighter???

this is where the developers of LCA failed in raising to the occasion of 3 to 4th gen.
Suppose India wants to go alone with 5th gen aircraft......your above example fall flat that DRDO is only developed 4 th and govt asking for 5th gen??

History of developing tanks but you also have to elabroate what kind of Tanks Indian were manufacturing. Theory that I have elobrated above about differnce between 2nd & 3rd generation fighter plane and 4th generation fighter and their buidling is also applicable in case of Tank Development especially when country have the history of liceance production of Tanks.

That is the reason I gave the example of Poland, they able to assimilate the T-72 technology, being same like india a licence producer. where as India could not graduate from assembling, now looks to poland for help in upgrading...... this is Sameful, don't you think???

 

[JEFF]

The idea of licence building is to learn and establish a aeronautical industry, so that we can develop the next gen aircraft.

See to certain extent it might be true, but licenace production is all about assembling differnt compenant in knock down or semi knock down kit and hence you have don't have battle with design of liceance produced aircraft since all its design parameters are validate, in contrast in indigeous production of aircraft you have to design each and every compenant of aircraft on by own as well as airframe as well and hence it ought to take time in their validation as compared to liceance production. Another part is that engine development, LCA major worry is its engine, definetly India also have liceanse produced engines as well but design and thurst of those engine were validate and predetermined and hence you don't have to brainstrom while manufacuring but in case of India, it has brainstrom regarding thrust of the engine of its own which it never try to do in liceance production.

But did the idea translated into any meaning ful contribution in the development of the next fighter???

Definetly the idea is contributed a lot as you can see in the form of upgradation of Mig-27, Mig-21, Jaguars, Mig-29 as well as Su-30MKI, all these upgradation also involve various components of Indian origin as were developed during design and development of Tejas.

this is where the developers of LCA failed in raising to the occasion of 3 to 4th gen.

Since they never learn during the liceance production of other jet with regards to raising engine thrust, Radar etc. since during liceance production of the jets it is highly unlikely that you have to deal with competence regarding increasing thurst of engine and developing pulse doppler radar.

Suppose India wants to go alone with 5th gen aircraft......your above example fall flat that DRDO is only developed 4 th and govt asking for 5th gen??

And this is exactly the reason why India has first going for Joint production of 5th genenration of PAK-FA with russians, because Indian designers will incorporate the learning that they have gained in PAK-FA in MCA and also this is the reason why it has taking time in raising the thrust of the Kaveri.

That is the reason I gave the example of Poland, they able to assimilate the T-72 technology, being same like india a licence producer. where as India could not graduate from assembling, now looks to poland for help in upgrading...... this is Sameful, don't you think???

Once again I want to ask you, wheather India was involved in FCS development during license production of T-72? It is not then how do you supposed to raise finger over India’s competence in FCS development, infact BEL is currently designing FCS but only thing is that they have fell short of polish on account of extensive experience of Poland since world war-II.

Why does it matter of shameful, even you don't have to taken into account their Polish experience in buidling tanks, they have involved in design and development of tanks since 1930, and hence there is no match for Indian and Polish tank development. If even it was matter of shame then why does Poland is still licensed manufacturing T-72 when they have legacy of extensive armoured vehicle development dates back to prior of world war II.

 

[Iceman]

heyyy . i resent that RANT remark ... i am off for some official work .. but i sure am gonna come back with a gang ... wait up dudes .....i am gonna desecrate the Arjun ...now that the dude has asked for it

 

[indiapakistanfriendship]

The Pakistani contributions weer mentioned in Icecolds post.

AS in the case of the JF-17 - Pakistani scientists and engineers worked in China (presumably because we lacked the extensive infrastructure to undertake such a project in Pakistan) with the Chinese during development of the JF-17. Possibly the same in this case

I completely agree with you agno, this is one of the first step in the learning curve which will eventually lead to indegenous design capability and development. My replies were based on Icemans post where posted certain issues without substantiating them.

Cheers

 

[indiapakistanfriendship]

heyyy . i resent that RANT remark ... i am off for some official work .. but i sure am gonna come back with a gang ... wait up dudes .....i am gonna desecrate the Arjun ...now that the dude has asked for it

Sure you are welcome.

 

[Titanium]

OHH...... Lets wait for one more winter........summer....


Arjun tank fails winter trials, Army Chief writes to Antony

Manu Pubby

Posted online: Thursday, April 17, 2008 at 2317 hrs IST

New Delhi, April 16
In a major setback to indigenous development project, the Arjun tank has failed to clear a crucial round of winter trials that were to decide whether the tank will be cleared for bulk production by the Army.

While the tank has been consistently suffering transmission problems and trouble in its suspension unit, the latest round of user trials that concluded in March brought out major problems with German engines fitted on the indigenous tank.

Now, a disappointed Army Chief has written to Defence Minister A K Antony saying a “lot of improvements” are needed before the tank can be cleared for bulk intake into its armoured regiments.

During the five months of Accelerated Usage-cum-Reliability Trials (AUCRT) in Rajasthan, two Arjun tanks that were tested by the Army suffered engine failures on four separate occasions. This, when the Main Battle Tanks had been put through only 1,000 km of trials. The tank is fitted with German MTU 838 Ka 501 engines.

While this has come as a major embarrassment for DRDO that has been claiming that all defects on the tank have been rectified, the Army has made it clear that given the present problems on the tank, bulk intake is not an option. The Army has already ordered 124 tanks but had kept its options open for further purchases.

“The tanks have performed very poorly. There have been four engine failures so far. The tanks have done about 1,000 km each. There is a problem,” a senior Army officer informed the Parliament Standing Committee on Defence last month.

The tanks are now set for an even more gruelling round of summer trials in Rajasthan next month where they will be tested in temperatures of over 40 degrees Celsius.

 

[Always Neutral]

OHH...... Lets wait for one more winter........summer....


Arjun tank fails winter trials, Army Chief writes to Antony

Manu Pubby

Posted online: Thursday, April 17, 2008 at 2317 hrs IST

New Delhi, April 16
In a major setback to indigenous development project, the Arjun tank has failed to clear a crucial round of winter trials that were to decide whether the tank will be cleared for bulk production by the Army.

While the tank has been consistently suffering transmission problems and trouble in its suspension unit, the latest round of user trials that concluded in March brought out major problems with German engines fitted on the indigenous tank.

Now, a disappointed Army Chief has written to Defence Minister A K Antony saying a “lot of improvements” are needed before the tank can be cleared for bulk intake into its armoured regiments.

During the five months of Accelerated Usage-cum-Reliability Trials (AUCRT) in Rajasthan, two Arjun tanks that were tested by the Army suffered engine failures on four separate occasions. This, when the Main Battle Tanks had been put through only 1,000 km of trials. The tank is fitted with German MTU 838 Ka 501 engines.

While this has come as a major embarrassment for DRDO that has been claiming that all defects on the tank have been rectified, the Army has made it clear that given the present problems on the tank, bulk intake is not an option. The Army has already ordered 124 tanks but had kept its options open for further purchases.

“The tanks have performed very poorly. There have been four engine failures so far. The tanks have done about 1,000 km each. There is a problem,” a senior Army officer informed the Parliament Standing Committee on Defence last month.

The tanks are now set for an even more gruelling round of summer trials in Rajasthan next month where they will be tested in temperatures of over 40 degrees Celsius.

The tank is a failure no doubt but the learning curve to come to that conclusion will hopefully be usefull in future.

Regards

 

[ejaz007]

Arjun Main Battle Tanks Fail Winter Trials 2007: Indian Army
Dated 17/4/2008

An indigenous main battle tank (MBT) that has been in the development for nearly 36 years has failed to deliver at the just-concluded winter trials, the Indian Army has told a key parliamentary panel.

'We have just carried out the trial in winter. The tank performed very poorly. There have been four engine failures so far,' parliament's Standing Committee on Defence quotes an Indian Army officer as saying. Defence Minister A.K. Antony tabled the committee's 29th report in both houses of parliament Wednesday. 'The defence ministry has been apprised. A lot of improvements have to be done before the army is satisfied with the tank,' the report quotes the army officer as telling the committee at its meeting here last month.

The report could prove to be the last nail in the MBT project, analysts said. Ahead of the winter trials, conducted in the deserts of Rajasthan, an army officer had told IANS: 'We are currently re-evaluating the Arjun (as the MBT is named) to find out if the defects we had pointed out have truly been rectified.' 'In any case, even if the defects are removed, the army is unlikely to go beyond the figure of 124 that it has initially contracted to purchase,' the officer said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Fourteen Arjun tanks had been handed over to the Indian Army for user trials last year but were returned to the manufacturer - the Combat Vehicles Development Establishment - with a list of defects. These included a deficient fire control system, inaccuracy of its guns, low speeds in tactical areas - principally the deserts - and the tank's inability to operate in temperatures over 50 degrees Celsius. Indian Army chief General Deepak Kapoor and his predecessor, General J.J. Singh, had on separate occasions expressed their unhappiness with the tank.

'What we have today is a mid-level technology. What we need is a tank of international quality,' Kapoor said last November. Singh had spoken in much in the same vein during a major Indian Army exercise in the desert of Rajasthan in April-May, 2007. 'We have to make sure the troops are not exposed to any disadvantage,' Singh replied cryptically when asked about Arjun's performance during the five-day Exercise 'Ashwamedh' for which a squadron of 14 Arjun tanks was deployed.

The Indian Army laid down its qualitative requirement (QR) for the Arjun in 1972. In 1982, it was announced that the prototype was ready for field trials. However, the tank was publicly unveiled for the first time only in 1995. Arjun was originally meant to be a 40-tonne tank with a 105 mm gun. It has now grown to a 50-tonne tank with a 120 mm gun. The tank was meant to supplement and eventually replace the Soviet-era T-72 MBT that was first inducted in the early 1980s.

However, delays in the Arjun project, and Pakistan's decision to purchase the T-80 from Ukraine, prompted India to order 310 T-90s, an upgraded version of the T-72, in 2001. Of these, 186 were assembled from kits at the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi in Tamil Nadu. An agreement was also signed for the licensed production of another 1,000 T-90s. With the Arjun development delayed further, India last year signed a fresh contract with Russia to buy another 330 T-90s.

Arjun Main Battle Tanks Fail Winter Trials 2007: Indian Army | India Defence

 

[Logic note]

Broadsword: ONLY FOR HARDCORE TANK BUFFS: The Arjun controversy

This post is a prelude to an article that I'm writing on the recent controversy over the Army’s statement to Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence, which was tabled in parliament as a part of the Committee’s 29th Report. The part relating to the Arjun, in Para 8.18 of the report, is quoted below:

8.18. During evidence before the Committee, a representative of the Army clarifying the position regarding performance of the Arjun tank submitted as under:-

“Sir, we have just carried out the trial in winter. The tanks have performed very poorly. There have been four engine failures so far. The tanks have done about 1000 km each. There has been a problem. The Defence Minister has been apprised by the Chief. I think two or three days back, he has written a DO letter giving the exact position. So a lot of improvements have to be done before the Army will be satisfied with the Arjun tank.”

The factual position

During the AUCRT in Pokhran, there was NO problem with either of the two engines. The problems were actually with four transmission systems: supplied by Renk AG, from Germany.

The problem: When the oil temperature went up, the oil viscosity was reduced… and the oil pressure was therefore insufficient. As a result, the bearing gave way, and the main shaft in the transmission also got damaged. Pieces were flying around and, when the transmission gearbox was opened, it looked pretty ugly.

The investigations are focusing on three aspects:

1. The possibility that the use of indigenous oil, rather than German oil, may have led to a failure of lubrication. The CQA (PP)… that is Controller of Quality Assurance (Petroleum Products)… has examined the oil and said that it is of the same grade as the foreign oil. However, the experts from Renk AG are still not convinced. They have taken samples of the oil to Germany to analyse, are will reach a conclusion by Monday, 21st April.

2. The possibility that recent changes made to the Arjun’s system of dual gear levers might have led to the problem. The driver has a Mode Selector Switch (with options: Forward-Neutral-Reverse)… and also a gear lever (with options: 1, 2, 3, Automatic). So totally, the tank has four forward and two reverse gears. Recently, when the production series tanks began being manufactured, the Gear Lever options were changed to (1, 2, Automatic). In the new system, gears 3 and 4 engage and disengage automatically. In fact, one school of thought amongst the designers is to have just the first gear manual… and then 2-4 automatic, i.e. (1, Automatic).

The CVRDE’s Transmission Group Team has recommended that another Manual Gear lever be introduced. That would be used while tow starting the tank. There are also problems with the logic of gear change in the Pokharan area where the tests are taking place. Unlike the Suratgarh desert, which had heavy sand, the Pokhran desert has hard, flat ground. Since the driving conditions are different, the logic for gear changing has to be different, and the micro-switches that signal the gear changes have to be calibrated differently.

3. There is also a possibility that a recent change in the supplier of the bearing that failed might have led to the problem. [Renk AG, which manufactures the gearbox, recently changed its bearing supplier.]

Experts from Renk AG are reaching the trial area and also CVRDE, Avadi, on 22nd April. Renk AG is one of the world’s most respected suppliers of transmission systems and it’s prestige is at stake here. A top Arjun designer says, “Renk’s prestige is at stake. I have no doubt they will fix the problem fast.”

Problems with four HSUs

The second problem that the Arjun faced was in some Hydro-pneumatic Suspension Units (HSUs). The Arjun has 7 road wheel stations on each side, which means that each tank has 14 HSUs. With two tanks participating in the trials, there were 28 HSUs that were effectively taking part. Of these, four HSUs failed.

One of them was a genuine failure, in which the HSU’s breather pipe got damaged and sand went in through that. The other three HSUs failed after 2000 km of running. HVF lays down a service life of 2000 km for each HSU, so that was predictable. This was not a problem at all.

It might also be noted that it takes just two hours to replace an HSU in the Arjun. This tank does not have a torsion bar suspension, in which replacing a road wheel station was a major undertaking.

Incidentally, the HSU has been an area where the Arjun’s designers have put in some really serious thinking. The terrain in Pokhran, which is flat and hard, generates in the HSU pistons a low amplitude, high frequency vibration. That is in contrast to heavy sand dune country like Suratgarh, where the HSU pistons undergo a high amplitude, low frequency vibration. In Suratgarh there were no problems, but the resurfacing of problems (albeit after the specified service life) in Pokhran brings to mind the earlier problems in which HSUs were leaking while the tank was being transported by train. The low-amplitude, high frequency vibrations generated by the vibrations of a train were enough to cause the HSUs to leak. That problem was resolved by changing the rings of the floating piston in the HSU. Also, the CVRDE tried out different types of piston rings, including imported ones from Hunger, Germany. Eventually, a life of 2000 km was achieved.

Problems with top rollers

Three or four top rollers also failed. That is being investigated.

Problems with tank Muzzle Reference Sight (MRS)

Of the two tanks undergoing AUCRT, one had a problem with the MRS, which was found to shift when the tank fired. This could have been easily overcome by firing through other means, disregarding the MRS. But suffice to say, the MRS had a problem.

These are very interesting dimensions to the trials in Pokhran, but far more interesting is the way the Army has reacted to them… taking the opportunity to slam the CVRDE for a “substandard” tank. An article on that will be appearing in the Business Standard on Saturday morning.

 

[Logic note]

Broadsword: Battle-lines drawn on the Arjun tank: Armed Forces prefer Russian armour

by Ajai Shukla
(Business Standard: 19th April 2008)

The battle-lines have been drawn. At stake is the future of one of India’s most prestigious defence products: the Arjun main battle tank (MBT). In its 29th report, which was tabled in parliament yesterday, Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence writes that it was “startled” to be told that the Arjun tank had performed poorly in winter trials conducted by the army, and that it was miles away from meeting the army’s requirements.

Business Standard has learned from three different members of the Standing Committee on Defence that it is more than “startled”; it is frankly disbelieving of the army’s deposition. In its last annual report for 2007-08, the committee was told by the MoD that the Arjun tank was:

• “A product unique in its class”, and “an improved system over the T-72.”

• “Rs 6-8 crores cheaper than its contemporary system in the West”.

• “Far superior (in firing accuracy) to the other two tanks (T-72 and T-90)”.

• “Driven for over 60,000 kms and fired more than 8,000 rounds. There was no problem.”

After the army representative slammed the Arjun, the Standing Committee chairman, Balasaheb Vikhe Patil, as well as the Defence Secretary, and several other members agreed that the committee would formulate a clear policy on India’s tank of the future. Underlying this decision is the belief amongst most members of the Standing Committee that the army is biased against the Arjun tank, and in favour of continuing to use Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.

There were clear factual inaccuracies in the army’s deposition before the Standing Committee. The most glaring of them is the army’s suggestion that it is carrying out trials on the Arjun’s performance. In fact, the army has already accepted the Arjun for introduction into service, based upon its driving and firing performance over years. After firing trials in summer 2006, the trial report (written by the army) said, “The accuracy and consistency of the Arjun has been proved beyond doubt.”

The ongoing trials in Pokhran that the army is citing are Accelerated Usage cum Reliability Trials (AUCRT). In these, two Arjun tanks were run almost non-stop for 3000 kilometers, not to judge performance, but to evaluate the tank’s requirement of spare parts, fuel and lubricants during its entire service life. In fact, it is the Arjun’s developer, the Central Vehicle R&D Laboratory (CVRDE), Avadi, that has long demanded comparative trials, where the performance of five Arjuns would be gauged against five Russian T-90s and T-72s. The army has consistently sidestepped that invitation.

The army has also testified incorrectly to the Standing Committee about four engine failures during the recent AUCRT. In fact, sources closely associated with the trials say, the problems were with four gearboxes, manufactured by German company, Renk AG. A world leader in transmission systems, Renk representatives are already in Pokhran and Avadi, analysing and resolving the problem.

The army does not mention, but problems were also experienced with four hydro-pneumatic suspension units (HSUs), which leaked after the Arjuns had run 2000 kilometers. But the Arjun’s makers say 2000 kilometers is the service life of the suspension; normally they would have been replaced before the point at which they leaked.

Officers closely associated with the Arjun, as well as several members of the Standing Committee on Defence contrast the army’s approach to the Arjun with the navy’s acceptance of indigenous projects. They say the navy has achieved striking success in building its own warships, by associating itself with the project right from the design stage; warships are accepted into service and many hiccups overcome during their service lives. In contrast, the army is resisting accepting the Arjun until every last hiccup is resolved by the DRDO.

An application to interview the army’s Director General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF) was approved by the MoD eight months ago. However, the DGMF has not granted an interview so far because of “scheduling problems.”

 

[ejaz007]

Govt looking into `sabotage possibility` of Arjun tank

New Delhi, April 24: Government on Thursday spoke of the "possibility of sabotage" in winter trials of country`s indigenous Arjun tank prompting army chief, Gen Deepak Kapoor, and other top officials to rush to the Avadi tank factory to carry out fresh inspections.

Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh told reporters that the possibility of sabotage of the recent winter trials of the Arjun tanks should be examined.

He said though the German engines in the tanks had been used for over 15 years, "it should be examined how they broke down during the winter trials.

"How can this happen all of a sudden?" he wondered as he responded to questions whether the tanks had failed in winter trials conducted by the army.

Eight years after the force placed an order for 124 tanks with the ordinance factory board, the army, in a scathing indictment of the tank`s performance, has told the parliamentary standing committee on defence that the tanks had "faired very badly".

Army officers have informed the committee that the tanks were miles away from meeting the army`s requirement and several improvements needed to be carried out before they could be declared battle worthy.

Soon after the minister`s comments, a high-level defence ministry team, comprising the army chief and secretary, defence production Pradeep Kumar left for Avadi tank factory near Chennai to carry out on-the-spot inspection of the tank.

:: Bharat-Rakshak.com - Indian Military News Headlines ::

Funny theory. Any guess who possibly could have carried out the sabotage. Normally the blame would go to ISI.
Regards,

 

[indiapakistanfriendship]

Funny theory. Any guess who possibly could have carried out the sabotage. Normally the blame would go to ISI.

Naaah cmon we are not that bad.. I think the blame will go towards ruskie agents, army personell in their payroll etc etc

 

[BATMAN]

Sabotage allegations ‘baseless’
Publish Date: Tuesday,29 April, 2008, at 09:02 AM Doha Time

NEW DELHI: The army yesterday refuted allegations of “sabotage” in the trials of the indigenously developed main battle tank (MBT) Arjun saying any speculation on this score was “misconceived’’.
“During the winter trials of the Arjun tank, the DRDO’s (Defence Research and Development Organisation) involvement was complete and of the same extent as the user’s (the army). Hence, any speculation of sabotage in the conduct of the trials is totally uncalled for, misconceived and baseless,” an army official said.
Fourteen Arjun tanks were handed over to the army for user trials last May but were returned to the manufacturer - the Combat Vehicles Development Establishment - with a list of defects. These were handed back to the army in December for the winter trials that were conducted in the deserts of Rajasthan.
The army had told a key parliamentary panel earlier this month that the Arjun tank, which has been in development for nearly 36 years, failed to deliver at the winter trials. The army said a number of improvements still needed to be carried out before it was satisfied.
Last Thursday, Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh had hinted at the possibility of the “sabotage” during the winter trials. Army chief Gen Deepak Kapoor then visited the production unit to inspect the tanks.
“The possibility of sabotage needs to be examined,” Singh had said.
“The engines fitted in the tanks were German and were performing well for the past 15 years. I wonder what has happened to them overnight,” Singh said, referring to the reported failures of the tank.
Clarifying the issue, the army official said: “Despite the removal of a large number of defects at the joint receipt inspection (JRI) stage, duly assisted by the Indian Army, major assemblies of the two tanks failed in the winter trials.”
The major assemblies included four power packs of German origin and one indigenous gun.
The army has also pointed to the tank’s deficient fire control system, inaccuracy of its guns, low speeds in tactical areas - principally the desert - and its inability to operate in temperatures over 50 degrees Celsius.
The army had laid down its qualitative requirement (QR) for the Arjun in 1972. In 1982, it was announced that the prototype was ready for field trials. However, the tank was publicly unveiled for the first time only in 1995.
Arjun was originally meant to be a 40-tonne tank with a 105mm gun. It has now grown to a 50-tonne tank with a 120mm gun.
The tank was meant to supplement and eventually replace the Soviet-era T-72 MBT that was first inducted in the early 1980s.
However, delays in the Arjun project, and Pakistan’s decision to purchase the T-80 from Ukraine, prompted India to order 310 T-90s, an upgraded version of the T-72, in 2001.
Of these, 186 were assembled from kits at the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi in Chennai. An agreement was also signed for the licensed production of another 1,000 T-90s.
With the development of the Arjun delayed further, India last year signed a fresh contract with Russia to buy another 330 T-90s. – IANS

Army denies sabotage of Arjun trial - National News – News – MSN India - News

half a century for making a tank is simply too bad to be true.
I strongly believe it is Indian army which has sabotaged Arjun tank project.
It needs no investigation and responsible officers should be trialed in public for toying with billion plus nation's pride.

Can some tank specialist tell us what is the significance of winter trials of a machine which sieze to work at temperatures above 45°C?
Perhaps it was an attempt to induct Arjun as a seasonal tank!

 

[BATMAN]

Army tank fares poorly in latest trials

The Arjun tank is nowhere close to becoming India’s trump card on the battlefield. The Arjun tank project, beset by huge delays and cost overruns, has once again failed to meet the army’s requirements. Eight years after the force placed an indent for 124 tanks with the Ordnance Factory Board, the Arjun has performed “very poorly” in winter trials conducted by the army.

In a blistering indictment of the tank’s performance, the army has told a parliamentary panel that the Arjun requires several improvements before it can be declared battle worthy. The Standing Committee on Defence was “startled” to learn that the tank is miles away from meeting the army’s requirements and several parameters need to be fine-tuned.

The Arjun has been plagued with a mix of problems concerning its fire control system, suspension and poor mobility. The 29th report of the Committee, tabled in Parliament on Wednesday, quotes an army officer as saying, “We have carried out winter trials. The tanks have performed very poorly and there have been four engine failures. The tanks have done about 1,000 km each.”

 

[BATMAN]

Now, a tank of worms crawl out of DRDO’s Arjun

Natteri Adigal

30 April 2008, Wednesday

CLOSE ON the heels of the Indian Air Force (IAF) being slammed by ultra-patriotic scientists and technologists, it is now the turn of the Directorate General of Mechanised Warfare (DGMF) to get the beating from bureaucrats and politicians, batting for the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The R&D behemoth, which routinely hogs media limelight for the feel-good factor involved in its ‘breakthroughs’, considers IAF as insensitive to national pride. The airmen have chosen to be ‘disloyal’ to the country and send out a Request for Proposal (RFP) to six global manufacturers for the acquisition of 126 multi-role combat aircrafts. If IAF is unpatriotic for losing faith in the ever-elusive ‘Tejas’ light combat aircraft (LCA), the Army is accused of being extremely reluctant to induct ’Arjun’ battle tanks, “successfully developed indigenously” by it. Citing that the indigenous tank has undergone extensive trials – driven over 75,000 km, fired over10,000 ammunition rounds – they claim the Arjuns have proven themselves.


The Army seems more keen on inducting foreign tanks at great cost rather than indigenous ones,” says a high profile lobbyist engaged by DRDO. The Indian Army has been obliquely accused of ’internal sabotage’ of the nationally important strategic project. Rao Inderjit Singh, the honourable minister of state in charge of defence production in the Manmohan Singh government has implied disloyalty of the combat officers from the mechanised forces of the Army, by stating, “The possibility of sabotage in the recent winter trials of the (Arjun) tanks should be examined.” The dignitary is not – as one might imagine from his authoritative note – a knowledgeable one-time military officer, well versed in tank warfare. Inderjit Singh is supposed to be a ’humble’ farmer cum lawyer and owes his position to former chief minister of Haryana and his illustrious father, Rao Birender Singh, noted as past master in the game of political disloyalty and defection. Far from being a decorated officer, he is unlikely to have attended any National Cadet Corps (NCC) drill as a student!


DRDO was assigned the work of building India’s own Main Battle Tank (MBT) in 1974. The then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was set on projecting herself as a formidable leader of the Indian Ocean region after her ‘triumph’ in creating Bangladesh and becoming ‘Durga’ in the eyes of gullible Indians. Just like the indigenous development of nuclear reactors and weapons undertaken by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the only achievement of DRDO in the MBT project was to give it a formidable name – Arjun! It missed deadline after deadline on targets set by itself. While the unfulfilled promises of BARC about a breakthrough in nuclear power sector being just around the corner, could be made up by setting up numerous inefficient thermal power plants, similar hollow promises by DRDO about the MBT (as well as about the LCA) did not present any such alternative to the defence services. Eventually, the organisation that has become noted for sky-high levels of nepotism, corruption and non-performance, lost any semblance of trust it had enjoyed with the Army and the IAF.


The army had to buy the T-72 tanks in late 1970s and T-90 tanks in the 1990s from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The ‘trusted friend’ of India was the monopoly supplier, enjoying good clout with top politicians and bureaucrats of New Delhi. So, the Army had to live with numerous technical glitches in these second grade tanks. Moscow sucked up billions of dollars from Indians in the guise of ‘rupee trade’, while worthies from Congress and communist parties were content with the crumbs thrown at them. In 2000, the Army was forced, despite serious deficiencies in the half baked imitations touted by DRDO, to place an order for 124 Arjun tanks. These were supposed to be manufactured by the Heavy Vehicle Factory (HVF) at Avadi, near Chennai and handed over by 2008-09. Even as five machines submitted after long delays to the Army for Accelerated Usage-cum-Reliability Trials (AURT) are yet to be cleared, HVF claims to have ‘almost completed’ assembly of several tanks under this order at great expense.


Reporting on the third round of AURT last winter, when the tanks miserably failed to stand up to the stringent requirements, the Army told honourable MPs, comprising of the standing committee on defence, “We (Army) have just carried out the trial in winter. The tanks have performed very poorly. There have been four engine failures so far... There has been a problem. The defence minister has been apprised by the (Army) chief... So, a lot of improvements have to be done before the Army will be satisfied with the Arjun tank.


The public relation folk of DRDO and India’s breed of armchair strategic analysts started finding fault with the Army, claiming that the DGMF systematically undermined the project. The super-brilliant scientists of DRDO went to the extent of questioning the intelligence of the Army officers. It was said that whenever they approached a technology solution, the Army would get new ideas from the latest issue of Jane’s Defence Weekly and upgrade the design goalposts! The logic of the soldiers that they could not accept a tank-equivalent of PC-XT in the age of Pentium 4 has been portrayed as their keenness to please foreign arms dealers!


Interestingly, the ‘indigenous’ Arjun is powered by a German engine and the transmission components are designed according to German technology, just like the ‘indigenous’ Tejas LCA has a General Electric power plant.In both cases, suboptimal design of the other components, awry integration of systems and too high a weight have led to the failure of proven engines.

The MPs, in their superior wisdom, have observed, “The committee, however, is startled to hear now from a representative of the Army that the Arjun tanks have performed very poorly and a lot of improvements have to be made before the Army is satisfied with the Arjun tank. It is not clear why things went wrong with the Arjun tank. In any case, the causes for the failure of the Arjun tank should be identified without loss of time...”It requires only a little bit of common sense to make the causes clear!


The netas and babus want the Army and IAF to emulate the Indian Navy and fully participate in indigenous design and development of their needs. The worthies have found fault with the soldiers for seeing “the Arjun not as a national defence project, but as a tank that they must drive into battle!” In effect, the netas are against adopting a ‘judgmental’ approach in approving indigenous items. Army Chief, Gen Deepak Kapoor has rushed to HVF as part of the stocktaking by the government, in the wake of failure of the trials. High pressure lobbying has been mounted to force the Army to somehow give grace marks and pass the Arjuns in the fourth round of AUCRT in May.

No rational person will find fault with combat officers from the mechanised forces for seeing the Arjun as a ’tank’. After all, the Army is supposed to maintain the tanks over extended periods in ‘combat-ready’ condition and can compromise on reliability only at the country’s peril. If the netas need to peddle feel-good euphoria to their illiterate vote banks, there are other areas for that. They can boast of any number of make-believe breakthroughs on other fronts – like Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles’ (ICBM), moon missions, submarine-fired nukes and such other fictitious strengths, which are never intended to be used. Any number of desk-bound, bogus scientists and technologists could be employed for that purpose. Similarly, our Navy is minuscule and has only a ceremonial presence. Even if all the allocated money is siphoned off in junks like Kitty Hawk or Admiral Gorshkov, it is not going to make much difference. But, when it comes to real military might, there can be no compromise on quality. It is heartening that the Army and IAF top brass are standing firm and not betraying their fighters. They simply cannot accept mediocre products that are even worse than Russian ones, just because they are ‘indigenous’ and can generate euphoria. Hopefully, the Army and IAF will succeed in drilling sanity into the heads of the babus and netas that manufacture of mission-critical equipment – and subsequently R&D at a later stage – are better left to be done by entities with core skills and requisite investments. They cannot be achieved just by hollow self-pride. Also, cutting edge R&D can have meaning only after high-tech manufacture is mastered.